Control Plane of Inter-Domain Source Address Validation Architecture
draft-xu-savax-control-05
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Ke Xu , Jianping Wu , Xiaoliang Wang , Yangfei Guo | ||
| Last updated | 2023-05-22 (Latest revision 2023-05-21) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-xu-savax-control-05
Network Working Group K. Xu
Internet-Draft J. Wu
Intended status: Standards Track X. Wang
Expires: 23 November 2023 Tsinghua University
Y. Guo
ZGC Lab
22 May 2023
Control Plane of Inter-Domain Source Address Validation Architecture
draft-xu-savax-control-05
Abstract
Because the Internet forwards packets according to the IP destination
address, packet forwarding typically takes place without inspection
of the source address and malicious attacks have been launched using
spoofed source addresses. The inter-domain source address validation
architecture is an effort to enhance the Internet by using state
machine to generate consistent tags. When communicating between two
end hosts at different ADs of IPv6 network, tags will be added to the
packets to identify the authenticity of the IPv6 source address.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/BasilGuo/savax-control.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 November 2023.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology and Abbreviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The design of the Consortium Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Trust Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Consortium Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Joining and Exiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.1. Node Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.2. Node Exiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Alliance Information and State Machine Maintenance based on the
Consortium Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Address Domain Identity Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. AD Registration Information Record . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. AD Prefix Information Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Time Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The Inter-Domain Source Address Validation (SAVA-X) mechanism
establishes a trust alliance among Address Domains (AD), maintains a
one-to-one state machine among ADs with AD Control Server (ACS),
generates a consistent tag, and deploys the tag to the ADs' border
router (AER). The AER of the source AD adds a tag to identify the
identity of the AD to the packet originating from one AD and sinking
in another AD. The AER of the destination AD verifies the source
address by validating the correctness of the tag to determine whether
it is a packet with a forged source address.
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In the process of packet forwarding, if the source address and the
destination address of this packet both are addresses in the trust
alliance, however the tag is not added or incorrectly added, AER of
the destination AD determines that the source address is forged and
directly discards this packet. The destination AD forwards the
packet directly for packets whose source address is an address
outside the trust alliance.
This document mainly studies the relevant specifications of the
control plane of the inter-domain source address validation
architecture mechanism between ADs, which will protect IPv6 networks
from being forged source address. You could see [RFC8200] for more
details about IPv6. It stipulates the design of the consortium
blockchain, the nodes' joining and exiting, the maintenance of trust
alliance information based on the consortium blockchain, and the
maintenance of the state machine. Its promotion and application can
realize the standardization of the control plane in the SAVA-X to
facilitate the related equipment developed by different manufacturers
and organizations to cooperate to accomplish the inter-domain source
address validation jointly.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2.1. Terminology and Abbreviation
+==============+====================================================+
| Abbreviation | Description |
+==============+====================================================+
| AD | Address Domain, the unit of a trust |
| | alliance, which is an address set |
| | consisting of all IPv6 addresses |
| | corresponding to an IPv6 address prefix. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| TA | Trust Alliance, the IPv6 network that |
| | uses the SAVA-X mechanism. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| STA | sub-Trust Alliance, parts of TA. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| STA-admin | STA Administrator, the administrator of |
| | STA. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| ACS | AD Control Server, the server that |
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| | matains state machine with other ACS and |
| | distribute information to AER. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| AER | AD border router, which is placed at the |
| | boundary of an AD of STA. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| ADID | The identity of an AD. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| ADID_Rec | The record of a number of an AD. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| ARI_Rec | The record with relavent information of |
| | an AD or STA. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| API_Rec | The record of prefix of an AD or STA. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| CSR | Certificate Signing Request, which is |
| | used for an AD or STA to join or exit |
| | the consortium blockchain. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| SM | State Machine, which is maintained by a |
| | pair of ACS to generate tags. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Tag | The authentic identification of source |
| | address of a packet. |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
Table 1
3. The design of the Consortium Blockchain
As discussed in the introduction, consortium blockchain will be used
in SAVA-X mechanism.
3.1. Trust Alliance
Trust Alliance (TA) is a hierarchical structure. Address domains
(AD) are assigned into different sub-trust alliances (STA) according
to geographic location, economic relationship, political
relationship, social relationship, and military relationship. AD is
the minimum unit for trust. The one-to-one maintenance state machine
between ADs located in the same layer of sub-trust alliance generates
consistent tags and deploys the tags to their AERs. The ADs in each
sub-trust alliance elect a master AD node. The master AD node
represents the sub-trust alliance and maintains the alliance-level
state machine with other master AD nodes to generate alliance-level
tags. When communicating across sub-trust alliances, it is necessary
to achieve the feature of tag replacement.
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The AD in the SAVA-X must be located in a specific sub-trust
alliance. According to its position in the SAVA-X, AD can be divided
into three roles: primary address domain, boundary address domain,
and ordinary address domain which is neither primary nor boundary
address domain.
* The primary address domain is the representative node of the
aforementioned sub-trust alliance and is used to establish
connection with the primary address domain of other sub-trust
alliances. In this way, the relationship between trust alliances
finally forms a tree-like relationship, and there will be no
direct relationship between address domains under the same branch.
* The boundary address domain is the address domain located at the
boundary of the sub-trust alliance. It sends the packet to other
sub-trust alliances or outside the trust alliance.
* The ordinary address domain is neither the primary address domain
nor the address domain of the boundary address domain.
Due to the uncontrollable packet forwarding path, in SAVA-X, a
virtual address domain needs to be set up as a non-boundary AD to
communicate with the sub-trust alliance outside or receive packets
sent from outside the sub-trust alliance to maintain the state
machine. The virtual AD is recorded as AD_V (Virtual Address
Domain). When a packet from an AD in a sub-trust alliance needs to
be sent outside the sub-trust alliance, but there are multiple paths
to the destination AD in the sub-trust alliance, the sub-trust
alliance may have multiple boundary ADs to reach the destination AD.
The sub-trust alliance doesnot know which boundary AD will be
selected during the packet forwarding. Therefore, the primary
function of AD_V is to prevent this by specifying the specific tag
that should be added to the packet sent to the external address
domain of the sub-trust alliance.
What's more, the tag needs to be verified by the boundary address
domain of the sub-trust alliance. Therefore, the boundary AD also
needs to receive the tags maintained by the AD and AD_V in the trust
alliance. As a tag for communicating data between the non-primary
address domain and the external address domain of the sub-trust
alliance.
3.2. Consortium Blockchain
To simplify the control plane's design and avoid the single point
failure to subvert the SAVA-X, we design the SAVA-X with a
decentralized infrastructure which will store the information of the
trust alliance.
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The consortium blockchain is composed of the trust alliance
management committee chain and several sub-chains. Among them, the
management committee chain is composed of several nodes to manage the
administrator nodes of each sub-chain. The consortium blockchain
records information of the sub-trust alliance administrator node,
named as STA-admin (Sub Trust Alliance administrator), and member
list of each sub-chain which are packaged and submitted by the STA-
admin. Each sub-trust alliance has one STA-admin that is assumed by
a specific elected AD in the sub-trust alliance. The AD in the same
sub-trust alliance forms a private chain to maintain the information
of the members of the sub-trust alliance jointly. The STA-admin in
each sub-trust alliance is responsible for managing the joining and
exiting of the sub-trust alliance node. The STA-admin of each sub-
trust alliance maintains the relationship of the members in each sub-
trust alliance through the trust alliance management committee chain.
3.3. Joining and Exiting
3.3.1. Node Joining
This is the admission of joining of the sub-trustalliance member AD.
The prerequisite for the AD to join the sub-trust alliance is to have
a certificate issued by the STA-admin firstly. AD's Address Control
Server (ACS), which will maintain state machine with other ACS and
distribute alliance information and other information to AER, submits
a Certificate Signing Request file to the STA-admin of the sub-trust
alliance that it wants to join to request the certificate. The CSR
file includes ADID, ACS address information, IPv6 address prefix
information, and its public key information. If the file is valid,
STA-admin verifies the file, generates a node certificate, packages
the AD's information into a block, and updates the list of members of
the sub-consortium. STA-admin submits the latest block to the
consortium blockchain, and the consortium blockchain updates the list
of alliance members of the entire trust alliance.
When a sub-trust alliance want to join the trust alliance, STA-admin
submits a CSR file to the consortium blockchain, including the member
information list in the sub-chain and the information of the STA-
admin. It requires offline negotiation and cooperation to apply for
joining the consortium blockchain. The consortium blockchain
management committee verifies the validity of the request, issues
administrator certificates, and updates block information. The STA-
admins in the current trust alliance jointly maintain a management
committee chain, manage the administrator certificates of each sub-
trust alliance, and use the certificates for encrypted communication.
STA-admin submits the list of members of the sub-trust alliance to
the consortium blockchain and joins the entire trust alliance.
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After a node joins the consortium blockchain, there is an Effecting
Time and an Expiration Time in the CSR file. STA-admin will assign
the sub-trust alliance member with an ADID number if it does not
contain the ADID information in the submitted information. The
consortium blockchain will give the permitted sub-trust alliance a
sub-trust alliance number if the information submitted by the sub-
trust alliance does not have the sub-trust alliance number. If there
is a conflict between the submitted information and the returned
information, the returned ADID or sub-trust alliance number will be
selected.
3.3.2. Node Exiting
The member node needs to submit the CSR file again to delete its
relevant information. Its STA-admin decides whether to allow it exit
or not. After passing the validation, nodes of the sub-blockchain
delete the relevant member information. It also needs to submit a
CSR file for the exit of the sub-trust alliance node, which the
alliance management committee decides whether to allow it. After
validating the receiving exit request, other sub-trust alliance
administrator nodes need to delete their maintenance-related sub
alliance node information.
4. Alliance Information and State Machine Maintenance based on the
Consortium Blockchain
On the AER of the destination AD, to validate the tag, it is first
necessary to find out the sub-trust alliance number from the source
address of the arriving packet and find out its corresponding source
Address Domain Identity (ADID) number. Then find the currently valid
tag according to the ADID number. The generation of the tag requires
the maintenance of the state machine between the ACSes. In SAVA-X,
member ADs need to inform each other of their sub-trust alliance
number, ADID number, AD role, ACS address, and IPv6 address prefix.
The members interact with each other with the state machine
information according to the hierarchical division structure after
obtaining the basic information of the other members. And use the
tags generated by the state machine during the packet forwarding
after the specified time to add and validate the tags.
The relevant information needs to be stored in the sub-chains, where
the node is located after joining the consortium blockchain. The
information stored on the consortium blockchain needs the content
specified in the following three message formats, namely ADID_Rec,
ARI_Rec, and API_Rec. We give the packet format required by SAVA-X
in the control plane as follows.
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4.1. Address Domain Identity Record
Address Domain Identity Record (ADID_Rec) is used to identify an
address domain uniquely in the trust alliacne.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ADID Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Address Domain Identity (ADID) ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
ADID Type: 8-bit Type of ADID, 1 for 16-bits AS number, 2 for
32-bits AS number and other unassigned.
ADID: The 16-bit or 32-bit ADID number. Its value can be the AS
number or the number assigned by the consortium blockchain, and
the specific length is determined by the ADID Type field. When
each bit of ADID is 1, it represents that the AER requests the
information of all members from ACS.
4.2. AD Registration Information Record
AD Registration Information Record (ARI_Rec) is the registration
information record of AD, which is used to record the necessary
information required to register a specific member AD. The ACS and
AD establish connections.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Action | AD Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ ADID_Rec ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ACS Address |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Effecting Time |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Action: 8-bit instruction to add (ADD=1) or delete (DEL=2) this
record. Others are unassigned.
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AD Type: 8-bit unsigned number indicating the role of AD. 0 for
ordinary AD, 1 for primary AD and 2 for boundary AD. Others are
unassigned.
ADID_Rec: Reference the ADID_Rec packet.
ACS Address: 128-bit the IPv6 address of ACS.
Effecting Time: 64-bit time specifies when this record is applied.
It is recommended to use the 64 bits struct timeval format for the
effecting time of the execution of this record. If all bits of
this field are 0 or earlier than the current time, it means that
it takes effect immediately.
The role of address domain is essential, and each address domain
needs to be assigned a corresponding role according to its position
in the sub-trust alliance. A sub-trust alliance needs to set one
(and only one) primary address domain. It serves as the
representative of the sub-trust alliance. The tag generated by its
ACS and the ACSes of other sub-trust alliances' primary address
domain maintains the state machine to generate the tag of the sub-
trust alliance, and it issues the tag to the boundary address domain
of the sub-trust alliance. A specific recommendation of a consensus
algorithm could generate the primary address domain or be directly
specified by the operator of the address domain with offline
negotiation. The boundary address domain means that packet forwards
outside the address domain is no longer in the current sub-trust
alliance. The primary address domain can be a boundary address
domain or not. The tag replacement may occur in the boundary address
domain. The ordinary address domain is neither a primary address
domain nor a boundary address domain.
4.3. AD Prefix Information Record
AD Prefix Information Record (API_Rec) is the prefix information
corresponds to the prefix of a specific AD. An AD may have more than
one prefix, so registration information and prefix information
records must be separated.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Action | Alliance |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ ADID_Rec ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Prefix Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IPv6 Address |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Effecting Time |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Format of AD Prefix Information Record
Action: 8-bit instruction to add (ADD=1) or delete (DEL=2) this
record. Others are unassigned.
Alliance: 8-bit the sub-trust alliance number.
ADID_Rec: Reference the ADID_Rec packet.
Prefix Length: 8-bit the length of the IPv6 prefix.
IPv6 Address: 128-bit indicates a certain address prefix operated by
the corresponding member AD using together with Prefix Length.
Effecting Time: 64-bit time specifies when this record is applied.
It is recommended to use the 64 bits struct timeval format for the
effecting time of the execution of this record. If all bits of
this field are 0 or earlier than the current time, it means that
it takes effect immediately.
ARI_Rec and API_Rec are required to store the AD information in the
consortium blockchain and send it to all AERs of their AD with the
communication protocol between ACS and AER.
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5. Time Synchronization
Due to the time error between the border routers of the member ADs,
to ensure the correct operation of the tag validation, it is
necessary to make each device including ACS and AER in the trust
alliance calibrate to the same clock reference. The NTP protocol
could achieve this goal. You could see [RFC5905] for more details.
Although the NTP protocol can guarantee the time synchronization
between AERs, there may inevitably still have a slight time
difference between AERs and ACSes. Therefore, each AER sets a shared
time slice. With this time slice, both the expired tag and the new
tag are considered valid. That is, more than one tag is valid for a
while. The destination AD needs to validate all valid tags belonging
to a specific source AD. The tag is correct if one of the tags is
validated.
Assuming that the maximum time difference between AER and ACS is te,
we set a shared time slice with a length of 2te between two adjacent
tags. In this shared time slice, the two tags before and after are
valid. The validity period of the tag with the shared time slice is
shown below, see Figure 2.
+----------------------+
| Tag_(n-1) |
+----------------------+
+----------------------+
| Tag_n |
+----------------------+
| |
| |
| |
--------------------|--|------------------------------> Time Line
2te
Figure 2: Validity period of tag with the shared time slice
In addition to the time difference, we should also take into account
the packet transmission delay in the network. Set the minimum delay
to td_min and the maximum delay to td_max. The expiration of Tag_n
should be extended td_max later, and the beginning of Tag_(n+1)
validity period should be delayed td_min later. The shared time
slice and tag validity period corrected according to transmission
delay are shown as follows, see Figure 3.
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+----------------------+
| Tag_(n-1) |
+----------------------+
+----------------------+
| Tag_n |
+----------------------+
| |
| |
---------------------|-|------------------------------> Time Line
2te-td_min+td_max
Figure 3: Validity period of tag with the shared time slice after
modified
The expiration of the Tag_n is extended to te+td_max, and the
beginning of the Tag_(n+1) is extended to te-td_min. The parameters
such as te, td_min, td_max, the period of the shared time slice, and
tag validity period are determined by the destination based on the
actual network environment. Therefore, the lifecyle of a tag is as:
lifecycle = Transition Interval + 2te --td_min + td_max.
6. Security Consideration
TBD.
7. IANA Consideration
TBD.
8. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5210] Wu, J., Bi, J., Li, X., Ren, G., Xu, K., and M. Williams,
"A Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA) Testbed
and Deployment Experience", RFC 5210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5210, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5210>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5905>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8200>.
Acknowledgments
TODO acknowledge.
Authors' Addresses
Ke Xu
Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn
Jianping Wu
Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn
Xiaoliang Wang
Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing
China
Email: wangxiaoliang0623@foxmail.com
Yangfei Guo
Zhongguancun Laboratory
Beijing
China
Email: guoyangfei@zgclab.edu.cn
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