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Problem Statement for Secure End to End Privacy Enabled Mapping System
draft-xyz-atick-ps-00

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Authors Dirk Von Hugo , Behcet Sarikaya , Luigi Iannone , Tom Herbert
Last updated 2018-05-30
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draft-xyz-atick-ps-00
Network Working Group                                        D. von Hugo
Internet-Draft                           Telekom Innovation Laboratories
Intended status: Standards Track                             B. Sarikaya
Expires: December 1, 2018                            Denpel Informatique
                                                              L. Iannone
                                                       Telecom ParisTech
                                                              T. Herbert
                                                              Quantonium
                                                            May 30, 2018

 Problem Statement for Secure End to End Privacy Enabled Mapping System
                       draft-xyz-atick-ps-00.txt

Abstract

   Problem Statement for Secure End to End Privacy Enabled Mapping
   System for Identifier Locator separation systems is presented.  Since
   identifiers are often carried in packet headers in clear, and mapping
   systems are often designed to be accessible by any entity, to
   preserve identifier's privacy, lookups to the mapping system should
   be allowed only by authorized entities.  In mapping systems, in
   addition to privacy, security also requires special attention because
   of the caches introduced into the data path.  Any denial of service
   attacks on the cache should not allow the communication to come to an
   end.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 1, 2018.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Security In the Data Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Current 4G and the upcoming converged communication network of 5G
   core network (5GC) make use of tunneling with anchor points to handle
   mobility, policy and quality of service.  The use of IP addresses
   induces the topology and enables easy location tracking.  Elimination
   or reduction of anchor points, as well as disassociating topology
   from IP addresses to facilitate efficient mobility and user privacy
   using Identifier Locator separation systems like Identifier Locator
   Addressing, Identifier-Locator Network Protocol, and The Locator/ID
   Separation Protocol is needed.  Many drawbacks of tunneling are
   discussed in [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels] and we do not repeat them
   here.

   This document attempts to make the case for the use of the identifier
   locator separation (Id-Loc) protocols in the data plane and
   identifies the problems for such a large scale use.  The problems
   identified mainly are privacy of the identifiers and associated
   locators and security issues.

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2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   Identifier: An identifier is information to unambiguously identify an
   entity or an entity group within a given scope.  An identifier is the
   equivalent of an End point identifier (EID) in The Locator/ID
   Separation Protocol (LISP).  It may be visible in communications.

   Locator: A locator is a routable network address.  It may be
   associated with an identifier and used for communication on the
   network layer according to identifier locator split principle.  A
   locator is the equivalent of a Routing Locator (RLOC) in LISP or an
   IP address in other cases.

3.  Problem Statement

   Identifier represents a communication end-point of an entity and may
   not be routable.  Locator also represents a communication end point,
   i.e. its routable network address and thus can change if the entity
   moves.  A database called a mapping system needs to be used for
   identifier to locator mapping.  Identifiers are mapped to locators
   for forwarding purposes.  Mapping system has to handle mobility by
   modifying identifier to locator mappings in the database.

   To start the communication, a device needs to know the identifier of
   the destination and then relies on a process to lookup on a network
   identifier and return the locator(s).  Note that both identifier and
   locator can be carried in clear in packet headers.

   Usage of identifiers readily available for public access raises
   privacy issues.  For public entities, it may be desirable to have
   their fully qualified domain names or host names available for public
   lookups by the clients however such is not the case in general for
   the identifiers, e.g. for individuals roaming in a mobile network.

   This document describes the problem statement for a new kind of
   mapping system to be used by identifier locator separation systems
   (Id-Loc) that are end to end privacy enabled.

   Heavy use of tunneling with fixed anchors:

   Current 4G and the upcoming converged communication network of 5G
   core network (5GC) make use of tunneling with anchor points to handle
   mobility, policy and quality of service.  The use of IP addresses
   induces the topology and enables easy location tracking.  Elimination

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   or reduction of anchor points, as well as disassociating topology
   from IP addresses to facilitate efficient mobility and user privacy
   using Identifier Locator separation systems is needed.  Increasing
   packet overhead due to encapsulation that may cause fragmentation and
   all related issues typical disadvantages of (especially static end-
   to-end) tunneling comprise inflexibility to properly react to dynamic
   changes of end points and potential on-path anchors which is required
   to support mobility.  Added complexity of increased signaling for
   tunnel management are further drawbacks [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels].

   Proposed 5G operation:

   The use of GTP is proposed to tunnel UE packets from the base
   station, gNB to the User Plane Function (UPF) in N3 interface
   establishes a fixed anchor for UE traffic and UPF further GTP tunnels
   to another UPF in N9 interface which is connected to an external data
   network (DN).  Access and Session Management control plane functions
   (AMF, SMF) push such configuration setup to the data plane functions.
   With such a rigid setup user mobility as well as UE receiving traffic
   on multiple interfaces can not be handled efficiently.  UE to another
   UE traffic has to go to the fixed anchor since gNBs are not mobility
   anchors.  Also due to the induced delays, delay sensitive
   applications such as Ultra Reliable Low Latency (URLL) applications
   can not be supported.

   IP Addressing Reveals geographic location:

   Addressing scheme in use currently reveal the topology of the
   internet and thus location privacy of the end nodes can not be
   established.  Move away from this heavy use of locators is needed in
   favor of identifier locator separation systems.

   Gap Analysis:

   Gaps in mapping solutions developed so far in Id-Loc systems reveal
   the fact that secure end to end privacy enabled mapping system
   approach is needed across the board [I-D.xyzy-atick-gaps].

   Access to a mapping system should not reveal the location about an
   entity to the unauthorized requestor of a look up on an identifier.
   Tracking of the identifiers of an entity and mounting attacks based
   on that should be avoided.  On the other hand discovery by the
   entities that are allowed to should not be made difficult.  This may
   be possible by using encryption effectively in the control plane
   mechanisms to avoid eavesdroppers to access such information
   [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec].

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   If locators/ addresses (or device prefixes) are common between flows
   for a given entity then a third party can make inferences (i.e.
   whether they are sourced from the same host).  This points to the
   problem of persistent identifiers which should be avoided.

   Compromise of a mapping system is very bad since it would allow
   attackers to take control of traffic and to misdirect it.

   If locators/ addresses contain fine grained topology then device
   location (and hence user location) can be inferred.  This gets to the
   problem that locators may contain detailed geographic location
   information and hence are very sensitive data.  This points to the
   need for using identifier locator separation.

   Scaling is an issue for mapping systems built using very high
   performance massively distributed noSQL databases.  Slow moving or
   fixed hosts can probably induce light loads on mapping systems.  In
   5G case, very high number of devices moving at high speeds this
   changes drastically, i.e. very heavy load is induced on the mapping
   system.  Mapping systems that scale to 100s of millions of entries
   with 100s of milliseconds response times are needed.  State of the
   art shows that such systems can be built and operated with the use of
   thousands of servers worldwide.

3.1.  Security In the Data Path

   If a cache is introduced into the data path (as might be the case in
   some mapping systems) then that in turn will introduce potential DoS
   attacks in order to slow down or even completely stop the
   communication.  So proper protocol actions and security policies
   should be taken against DoS attacks.

   Compromise of a mapping system is very bad since it would allow
   attackers to take control of traffic and to misdirect it.

4.  IANA Considerations

   TBD.

5.  Security Considerations

6.  Acknowledgements

7.  References

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7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis]
              Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., Lewis, D., and A.
              Cabellos-Aparicio, "The Locator/ID Separation Protocol
              (LISP)", draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-12 (work in progress),
              March 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis]
              Fuller, V., Farinacci, D., and A. Cabellos-Aparicio,
              "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Control-Plane",
              draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis-10 (work in progress), March
              2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6740]  Atkinson, RJ. and SN. Bhatti, "Identifier-Locator Network
              Protocol (ILNP) Architectural Description", RFC 6740,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6740, November 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6740>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.herbert-intarea-ila]
              Herbert, T. and P. Lapukhov, "Identifier-locator
              addressing for IPv6", draft-herbert-intarea-ila-01 (work
              in progress), March 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels]
              Touch, J. and M. Townsley, "IP Tunnels in the Internet
              Architecture", draft-ietf-intarea-tunnels-08 (work in
              progress), January 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec]
              Maino, F., Ermagan, V., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., and D.
              Saucez, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)", draft-ietf-lisp-sec-15
              (work in progress), April 2018.

   [I-D.xyzy-atick-gaps]
              Hugo, D., Sarikaya, B., Herbert, T., Iannone, L., and S.
              Bhatti, "Gap and Solution Space Analysis for End to End
              Privacy Enabled Mapping System", draft-xyzy-atick-gaps-00
              (work in progress), May 2018.

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Authors' Addresses

   Dirk von Hugo
   Telekom Innovation Laboratories
   Deutsche-Telekom-Allee 7
   D-64295 Darmstadt
   Germany

   Email: Dirk.von-Hugo@telekom.de

   Behcet Sarikaya
   Denpel Informatique

   Email: sarikaya@ieee.org

   Luigi Iannone
   Telecom ParisTech

   Email: ggx@gigix.net

   Tom Herbert
   Quantonium

   Email: tom@herbertland.com

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