Gap and Solution Space Analysis for End to End Privacy Enabled Mapping System
draft-xyzy-atick-gaps-00

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Network Working Group                                        D. von Hugo
Internet-Draft                                          Deutsche Telekom
Intended status: Standards Track                             B. Sarikaya
Expires: November 26, 2018                           Denpel Informatique
                                                              T. Herbert
                                                              Quantonium
                                                              L. Iannone
                                                       Telecom ParisTech
                                                               S. Bhatti
                                               University of St. Andrews
                                                            May 25, 2018

 Gap and Solution Space Analysis for End to End Privacy Enabled Mapping
                                 System
                      draft-xyzy-atick-gaps-00.txt

Abstract

   This document presents a gap and solution analysis for end-to-end
   privacy enabled mapping systems.  Each of the identifier locator
   separation system has its own approach to mapping identifiers to the
   locators.  We analyse all these approaches and identify the gaps in
   each of them and do a solution space analysis in an attempt to
   identify a mapping system that can be end to end privacy enabled.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

von Hugo, et al.        Expires November 26, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             Atick Gap Analysis                   May 2018

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Gap and Solution Space Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  ILNP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  ILA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  LISP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  General Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Security In the Data Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   Identifier Locator Systems like ILA [I-D.herbert-intarea-ila], ILNP
   RFC 6740 [RFC6740], and LISP [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis]
   [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis] are proposed as alternative approaches to
   enabling direct routing in the upcoming converged communication
   networks such as 5G core network (5GC) rather than using tunneling
   with GTP-U, GRE, (P)MIPv6 or similar ones.  In addition to increasing
   packet overhead due to encapsulation that may cause fragmentation and
   all related issues typical disadvantages of (especially static end-
   to-end) tunneling comprise inflexibility to properly react to dynamic
   changes of end points and potential on-path anchors.  Added
   complexity in case of multicast traffic and increased signaling for
   tunnel management are further drawbacks.  Tunnels may introduce
   vulnerabilities or add to the potential for receiver overload and
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