simple VPN solution using Multi-point Security Association
draft-yamaya-ipsecme-mpsa-01
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| Authors | Arifumi Yamaya , Ken Ueki, Tomoki Murai , Takafumi Ohya | ||
| Last updated | 2013-06-26 | ||
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draft-yamaya-ipsecme-mpsa-01
IP Security Maintenance and Extensions A. Yamaya, Ed.
(ipsecme) K. Ueki
Internet-Draft T. Murai
Intended status: Informational Furukawa Network Solution Corp.
Created: June 26, 2013 T. Ohya
Expires: December 26, 2013 NTT
June 26, 2013
simple VPN solution using Multi-point Security Association
draft-yamaya-ipsecme-mpsa-01.txt
Abstract
This document describes the over-lay network solution by utilizing
dynamically established IPsec multi-point Security Association (SA)
without individual connection.
Multi-point SA technology provides the simplified mechanism of the
Auto Discovery and Configuration function.
This is applicable for any IPsec tunnels such as IPv4 over IPv4,
IPv4 over IPv6, IPv6 over IPv4 and IPv6 over IPv6.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2013.
Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Extended Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1 Vendor ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2 MPSA_PUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3 Multi-point SA Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
3.3.1 Gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
3.3.2 CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.3 Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
3.4. Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
6. REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
6.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
6.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
8. AUTHOR'S ADDRESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
1. Introduction
As described in the problem statement document[ad-vpn-problem],
dynamic, secure and scalable system for establishing SAs is needed.
With multi-point SA, an endpoint automatically discovers other
endpoint. In this draft, an endpoint means an inexpensive CPE, which
can hardly establish large number of IPsec sessions simultaneously.
The CPEs also share a multi-point SA within the same
group, and there is no individual connection between them.
Scalability issue becomes serious in the service, such as triple play
which requires large number of sessions at the same time.
MPSA enables large scale simultaneous sessions even with inexpensive CPEs,
and can avoid scalability issue.
The latency between CPEs can be minimized because of stateless
shared multipoint SA, MPSA is suitable for video and voice
services which is very sensitive to latency.
It can avoid the exhaustive configuration for CPEs/ gateways.
No reconfiguration is needed when a new CPE is added, removed,
or changed. It can avoid high load on the gateways.
1.1. Terminology
Multi-point SA - This is similar
to Dynamic Full Mesh topology described in [ad-vpn-problem];
direct connections exist in a hub and spoke manner, but only one SA
for data transfer is shared with all CPEs.
2. Motivation
There are two major topologies - Star topology and full-mesh topology -
to communicate securely on over-lay network by using IPsec.
Figure.1 shows star topology. The number of IPsec connection is the
same as the number of CPEs (CPE). Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting (AAA) of each CPE can be achieved on the gateway.
The problem of the star topology is all the traffic go through the
gateway, then it causes high load and latency.
+---------------------------------------------+
| IPsec Gateway |
| |
| +--------------(A<->C)--------------+ |
| | +---(A<->B)---+ +---(B<->C)---+ | |
+---:|-|:-----------:|---|:-----------:|-|:---+
:| |: :| |: :| |:
:| |: :| |: :| |:
:| |: :| |: :| |:
+---:v-v:---+ :| |: +---:v-v:---+
| | :| |: | |
| CPE_A | :| |: | CPE_C |
| | :| |: | |
+-----------+ :| |: +-----------+
+--:v---v:--+
| |
| CPE_B |
| |
+-----------+
Figure 1
Figure.2 shows Full-mesh topology. There is no gateways. Each CPE
establishes IPsec connection independently. The latency on this
topology is relatively low compared to star topology.
In large system, there are huge number ((N^2-N)/2) of IPsec connections.
AAA of each CPE is hard to manage in this topology.
Moreover, when a CPE is added, removed or changed, reconfiguration
is needed for all rest of the CPEs.
+-----------+ +-----------+
| |.....................| |
| CPE_A <-------(A<->C)-------> CPE_C |
| |.....................| |
+---: ^ :---+ +---: ^ :---+
: | : : | :
: | : +-----------+ : | :
: | :........| |........: | :
: +-(A<->B)--> CPE_B <--(B<->C)-+ :
:............| |............:
+-----------+
Figure 2
The solution in this document eliminates the problems listed above.
Figure 3 shows topology of multi-point SA.
Traffic between CPEs does not go through the gateway, low latency,
AAA of each CPE can be achieved, the number of
IPsec connection is almost same as star topology, and no reconfiguration
is needed for all the rest of CPEs even when a CPE is added,
removed or changed.
+---------------------------------------------+
| IPsec Gateway |
| |
+---: | :------------: | :------------: | :---+
: | : : | : : | :
: | : : | : : | :
----------------------------------------- SA to distribute
: | : : | : : | : Multi-point SA
: | : : | : : | :
+---: v :---+ +---: v :---+ +---: v :---+
| | | | | |
| CPE_A | | CPE_B | | CPE_C |
| | | | | |
+--- ^ ^ ---+ +--- ^ ^ ---+ +--- ^ ^ ---+
.....| |..............| |..............| |.....
| | | | | | \
| +----(A<->B)---+ +---(B<->C)----+ | Multi-point SA
+--------------(A<->C)--------------+ for data transfer
.............................................../
Figure 3
3. Procedure
3.1 Sequence
The multi-point SA capability of the remote host is determined by an
exchange of Vendor ID payloads. In the IKE_SA_INIT exchange,
the Vendor ID payload for this specification is sent if
the multi-point SA is used.
CPE Gateway
----------- -----------
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni, V(MPSA) -->
<-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, V(MPSA), [CERTREQ]
MPSA : multi-point SA
The initial exchange (including IKE_AUTH) is same as [IKEV2],
other than Vendor ID payload included in IKE_SA_INIT.
After the initial exchange has finished successfully, a new
INFORMATIONAL exchange is used to distribute multi-point SA to the
CPE, with the Notify payload of MPSA_PUT that includes
cryptographic algorithm, nonce, keying material, SPI and so on.
Keys for multi-point SA is generated according to the contents of
the Notify payload by the CPE. The response of the Notify payload
has empty Encrypted payload.
CPE Gateway
----------- -----------
<-- HDR, SK {N(MPSA_PUT)}
HDR, SK {} -->
3.2 Extended format
3.2.1 Vendor ID
This document defines a new Vendor ID. The content of the payload is
described below.
"multi-point SA"
3.2.2 MPSA_PUT
This document defines a new Notify Message Type MPSA_PUT.
The Notify Message Type of MPSA_PUT is 40960.
Notification Data of MPSA_PUT has a Proposal-substructure-like
format. It consists of Transform-substructure-like structures
that have following data.
Description Trans. Reference
Type
------------------------------------------------------------------
Encryption Algorithm (ENCR) 1 RFC5996
Pseudorandom Function (PRF) 2 RFC5996
Integrity Algorithm (INTEG) 3 RFC5996
Nonce (NONCE) 241
SK_d (SKD) 242
Lifetime (LIFE) 243
Rollover time 1 (ROLL1) 244
Rollover time 2 (ROLL2) 245
- Nonce
For Nonce, the Transform ID is 1.
The attribute contains actual nonce value with attribute type 16384.
The size of the Nonce Data is between 16 and 256 octets.
Name Number
---------------------------------------------------
NONCE_NONCE 1
Attribute Type Value Attribute Format
------------------------------------------------------------
Nonce Value 16384 TLV
- SK_d
For SK_d, the Transform ID is 1.
The attribute contains actual SK_d value with attribute type 16385.
The length of SK_d Data is the preferred key length of the PRF.
Name Number
---------------------------------------------------
SKD_SK_D 1
Attribute Type Value Attribute Format
------------------------------------------------------------
SK_d Value 16385 TLV
- Lifetime
For Lifetime, the Transform ID is 1.
The attribute contains actual lifetime value with attribute type 16386.
The length of Lifetime Value is 4 octets.
Lifetime is stored in seconds as effective time of the multi-point SA.
Name Number
---------------------------------------------------
LIFE_LIFETIME 1
Attribute Type Value Attribute Format
------------------------------------------------------------
Lifetime Value 16386 TLV
- Rollover time 1
For Rollover time 1, the Transform ID is 1.
The attribute contains actual rollover time 1 value with attribute
type 16387. The length of Rollover time 1 Value is 4 octets.
Rollover time 1 defines activation time delay for new outbound
multi-point SA.
Name Number
---------------------------------------------------
ROLL1_ROLLOVER1 1
Attribute Type Value Attribute Format
------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover1 Value 16387 TLV
- Rollover time 2
For Rollover time 2, the Transform ID is 1.
The attribute contains actual rollover time 2 value with attribute
type 16388. The length of Rollover time 2 Value is 4 octets.
Rollover time 2 defines deactivation time delay for old inbound
multi-point SA.
Name Number
---------------------------------------------------
ROLL2_ROLLOVER2 1
Attribute Type Value Attribute Format
------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover2 Value 16388 TLV
Therefore, the format of the MPSA_PUT of the Notify Message is
described below.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol ID | SPI Size | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security Parameter Index (SPI) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0 (last) or 2 | RESERVED | Proposal Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Proposal Num | Protocol ID | SPI Size |Num Transforms|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security Parameter Index (SPI) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0 (last) or 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Transform Type | RESERVED | Transform ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Transform Attributes ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0 (last) or 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Transform Type | RESERVED | Transform ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Transform Attributes ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0 | RESERVED | Transform Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Transform Type | RESERVED | Transform ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Transform Attributes ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The following example shows a N(MPSA_PUT) notification message.
The SPIs in the Proposal-like and Tranform-like substructure are the
same value. Following values are defined by the example.
Protocol: ESP
ENCR: AES-CBC (256bits)
PRF: SHA-1
INTEG: HAMC-SHA-1-96
NONCE: 241
SKD: 242
LIFE: 243
ROLL1: 244
ROLL2: 245
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| 0 (last) |C| RESERVED | Payload Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \
| 3 (ESP) | SPI Size = 4 | MPSA_PUT | Notify
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
| Security Parameter Index (SPI) | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| 0 (last) | RESERVED | Proposal Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Proposal-
| Prop Num = 1 | 3 (ESP) | SPI Size = 4 |Num Transforms| like
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
| Security Parameter Index (SPI) | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \
| 1 (ENCR) | RESERVED | 12 (ENCR_AES_CBC) | ENCR
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
|1| 14 (Key Length) | 256 | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ PRF
| 2 (PRF) | RESERVED | 2 (PRF_HMAC_SHA1) | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ INTEG
| 3 (INTEG) | RESERVED | 2 (AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96) | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \
| 241 (NONCE) | RESERVED | 1 | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \
|0| 16384 (Nonce) | Attribute Length | NONCE
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
| | /
~ [Nonce] ~ /
| | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \
| 242 (SKD) | RESERVED | 1 | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \
|0| 16385 (SK_d) | Attribute Length | SKD
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
| | /
~ [SK_d] ~ /
| | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \
| 243 (LIFE) | RESERVED | 1 | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ LIFE
|0| 16386 (Lifetime) | Attribute Length = 4 | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
| [Lifetime] | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \
| 244 (ROLL1) | RESERVED | 1 | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ROLL1
|0| 16386 (Lifetime) | Attribute Length = 4 | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
| [RolloverTime1] | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ \
| 245 (ROLL2) | RESERVED | 1 | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ROLL2
|0| 16386 (Lifetime) | Attribute Length = 4 | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
| [RolloverTime2] | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
3.3 Multi-point SA Management
3.3.1 Gateway
Gateway generates a multi-point SA for a group before connecting to any
CPEs.
After the initial exchanges have finished, Gateway distributes the same
multi-point SA information to CPEs within the group by sending
N(MPSA_PUT).
SPI and Nonce is generated similar way of [IKEv2].
SK_d is generated from random numbers similar to Nonce.
The same SPI value is stored to Notify payload and Proposal-like
substructure.
The multi-point SA will not be negotiated between gateway and CPE,
but will be notified from gateway to CPE one way.
Gateway initiates rekey before Lifetime expiration.
As the Lifetime, gateway notifies the effective time left of the
multi-point SA.
3.3.2 CPE
After the initial exchange has finished, CPE obtains multi-point SA
information by receiving N(MPSA_PUT) from gateway. The keys for the
multi-point SA are generated in the same procedure described in [IKEv2],
except Ni | Nr is replaced by Nonce.
Therefore, KEYMAT is derived by PRF listed below.
KEYMAT = prf+(SK_d, Nonce)
The multi-point SA is protected in a cryptographic manner by ENCR and
INTEG which uses the generated keys.
The SPI value for the multi-point SA is the same of its in Notify message.
CPE uses the same multi-point SA as both inbound and outbound SAs.
CPE deletes both of inbound and outbound SA when Lifetime is expired.
Rollover time 1, 2 have no meaning when no old multi-point SA exists.
3.3.3 Rekeying
Rekeying should be finished before Lifetime expiration of current
multi-point SA. Rekeying of multi-point SA will be performed as follows.
- Gateway generates a new multi-point SA
- Gateway distributes a new multi-point SA to all CPEs within the
group
- CPE replaces the current multi-point SA to new one
CPE replaces multi-point SA using rollover method like [GDOI].
3.4 Forwarding
Each CPE sends and receives encapsulated packets using the
multi-point SA.
The destination address of encapsulated packet will be determined
with routing information, which can achieved
by static configuration or route exchange mechanism such as
BGP on encapsulated environment described in [MESH].
It is applicable for any IPsec tunnels such as IPv4 over IPv4,
IPv4 over IPv6, IPv6 over IPv4 and IPv6 over IPv6.
4. Security Considerations
5. IANA Considerations
There is no new IANA considerations in this document.
6. References
6.1 Normative References
[IKEv2]
Charlie Kaufman, Paul Hoffman, Yoav Nir, Pasi Eronen
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC5596, September 2010
6.2 Informative References
[GDOI] B. Weis, S. Rowles, T. Hardjono
"The Group Domain of Interpretation"
RFC6407, October 2011
[MESH] J. Wu, Y. Cui, C. Metz, E. Rosen
"Softwire Mesh Framework" RFC5565, June 2009
[ad-vpn-problem]
S. Hanna, V. Manral "Auto Discovery VPN Problem Statement
and Requirements" draft-ietf-ipsecme-ad-vpn-problem-03,
"work in progress." December 17, 2012
7. Acknowledgments
Author's Addresses
Arifumi Yamaya
Furukawa Network Solution Corp.
5-1-9, Higashi-Yawata, Hiratsuka
Kanagawa 254-0016, JAPAN
Email: yamaya@fnsc.co.jp
Ken Ueki
Furukawa Network Solution Corp.
5-1-9, Higashi-Yawata, Hiratsuka
Kanagawa 254-0016, JAPAN
Email: ueki@fnsc.co.jp
Tomoki Murai
Furukawa Network Solution Corp.
5-1-9, Higashi-Yawata, Hiratsuka
Kanagawa 254-0016, JAPAN
Email: murai@fnsc.co.jp
Takafumi Ohya
NTT West Corp.
1-2-31, Sonezaki Kita-Ku
Osaka 530-0057, JAPAN
Email: t.ohya@rdc.west.ntt.co.jp