RADIUS over QUIC
draft-yl-radext-quic-transport-04
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Shengnan Yue , Changwang Lin , Feng Yang | ||
| Last updated | 2026-05-12 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
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draft-yl-radext-quic-transport-04
RADEXT S. Yue
Internet-Draft China Mobile
Intended status: Standards Track C. Lin
Expires: 13 November 2026 New H3C Technologies
F. Yang
China Mobile
12 May 2026
RADIUS over QUIC
draft-yl-radext-quic-transport-04
Abstract
The Remote Authentication Dial-In User Server (RADIUS) Protocol can
use the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the Transport Control
Protocol (TCP) as its underlying transport layer. But it permits TCP
to be used as a transport protocol for RADIUS only when a transport
layer such as TLS or IPsec provides confidentiality and security.
QUIC inherently supports encryption (using TLS 1.3), which could
provide a higher level of security. And QUIC supports multiple
streams over a single connection, enhancing throughput and
efficiency. This document defines RADIUS over the QUIC transport
protocol, named RADIUSoQUIC.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 13 November 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Connection Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Connection Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Connection Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.1. QUIC Connection Termination Process . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. RADIUSoQUIC Considerations for Connection
Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Stream Mapping and Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Bidirectional Stream between Client and Server . . . . . 6
4.1.1. Multi-Stream Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Endpoint Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Configuration Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. QUIC Port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.4. Management Information Base (MIB) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.5. Detecting Live Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.6. Malformed Packets and Unknown Clients . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.7. Limitations of the ID Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.8. EAP Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) is a networking
protocol that provides centralized authentication, authorization, and
accounting for users who connect and use a network service. It is
typically used in environments such as Internet service providers
(ISPs), corporate networks, and other places where secure access
management is required.
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The RADIUS protocol was originally defined in [RFC2865] as using the
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for the underlying transport layer.
Since UDP has some limitations (such as unreliable transport, packet
fragmentation, connectionless transport, and lack of congestion
control), the TCP transport is recommended to be used [RFC6613] when
another method such as IPsec [RFC4301] or RADIUS/TLS [RFC6614] is
used to provide additional confidentiality and security of RADIUS in
inter-server communications scenarios, such as inter-domain
communication between proxies.
QUIC is developed based on the UDP protocol and aims to address
certain limitations of TCP. Compared with the traditional TCP/UDP
protocol used by RADIUS, QUIC provides the following enhancements:
* Improved Security. QUIC inherently supports encryption (using TLS
1.3), which could provide a higher level of security for RADIUS
communications compared to the standard RADIUS protocol that
relies heavily on IPsec or TLS over TCP for encryption. This can
also greatly simplify security-related configurations.
* Enhanced Performance. QUIC reduces connection establishment time
with its zero-round-trip setup for repeat connections, potentially
speeding up the authentication process significantly.
* Reliability and Robustness. QUIC's congestion control, loss
recovery, and reduced latency features could make RADIUS
communications more reliable, especially over less-stable network
connections.
* Connection Migration. The ability of QUIC to handle connection
migrations seamlessly could enhance RADIUS network mobility
between client (running on Network Access Server) and server,
allowing client to change networks without disrupting
authentication sessions.
* Multiplexing. QUIC's support for multiple streams over a single
connection could enable multiple RADIUS transactions to be
processed simultaneously, enhancing throughput and efficiency.
This can alleviate the congestion problem of large-scale
authentication messages and provide users with faster
authentication services and higher authentication success rate via
fewer connections. Independent streams can also prevent Head-of-
Line (HoL) blocking between different RADIUS transaction messages.
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Therefore, for inter-server communication scenarios that require
secure connections and reliable data transmission, QUIC is a
competitive transport protocol for the message transmission mechanism
of RADIUS Protocol. This document specifies how to use QUIC as the
transport protocol for RADIUS Protocol, named RADIUSoQUIC.
2. Terminology and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
In this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to refer
to the two ends of the QUIC connection. The client actively
initiates the QUIC connection. The terms "RADIUS client" and "RADIUS
server" are used to refer to the two ends of the RADIUS Protocol
session. Generally, an "RADIUS client" provides an access service
for a user to a network, meanwhile a "RADIUS server" provides one or
more of authentication, authorization, and/or accounting (AAA)
services to a Network Access Server (NAS). In addition, A RADIUS
Proxy acts as a RADIUS server to the NAS, and a RADIUS client to the
RADIUS server.
* Client: The endpoint that initiates a QUIC connection, the RADIUS
client or RADIUS proxy.
* Server: The endpoint that accepts a QUIC connection, the RADIUS
server or RADIUS proxy.
3. Connection Management
3.1. Connection Establishment
QUIC connection establishment is described in [RFC9000]. During
establishing connection, RADIUSoQUIC support is indicated by
selecting the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) [RFC7301]
token as listed in the IANA Section 7 in the TLS handshake.
The RADIUS Client or Proxy as client should be the initiator of the
QUIC connection to the RADIUS Server meanwhile the RADIUS Server or
Proxy as server acts as a connection acceptor.
3.2. Connection Termination
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3.2.1. QUIC Connection Termination Process
The typical QUIC connection termination process is described in
[RFC9000].
3.2.2. RADIUSoQUIC Considerations for Connection Termination
When an RADIUS session is implemented based on a QUIC connection, the
idle timeout should be disabled or the QUIC max_idle_timeout should
be set appropriately in order to keep the QUIC connection persistent
even if the RADIUS session is idle.
If the QUIC connection is broken or closed, retransmissions over new
connections are permissible. RADIUS request packets that have not
yet received a response MAY be transmitted by a RADIUS client over a
new QUIC connection. Since this procedure involves using a new
source port, the ID of the packet MAY change. If the ID changes, any
security attributes such as Message-Authenticator MUST be
recalculated.
If a QUIC connection is broken or closed, any cached RADIUS response
packets ([RFC5080], Section 2.2.2) associated with that connection
MUST be discarded. A RADIUS server SHOULD stop the processing of any
requests associated with that QUIC connection. No response to these
requests can be sent over the QUIC connection, so any further
processing is pointless. This requirement applies not only to RADIUS
servers, but also to proxies. When a client's connection to a proxy
server is closed, there may be responses from a home server that were
supposed to be sent by the proxy back over that connection to the
client. Since the client connection is closed, those responses from
the home server to the proxy server SHOULD be silently discarded by
the proxy.
RADIUS clients using QUIC MUST mark a connection DOWN if the network
stack indicates that the connection is no longer active. If the
network stack indicates that the connection is still active, clients
MUST NOT decide that it is down until the application-layer watchdog
algorithm has marked it DOWN ([RFC3539], Appendix A). RADIUS clients
using QUIC MUST NOT decide that a RADIUS server is unresponsive until
all QUIC connections to it have been marked DOWN.
A client should proactively close connections or mark a server as
DOWN due to an administrative decision.
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4. Stream Mapping and Usage
QUIC [RFC9000] uses multiple simultaneous streams to carry data in
one direction. QUIC Streams provide a lightweight, ordered byte-
stream abstraction to an application. Streams can be unidirectional
or bidirectional meanwhile streams can be initiated by either the
client or the server. Unidirectional streams carry data in one
direction: from the initiator of the stream to its peer.
Bidirectional streams allow for data to be sent in both directions.
QUIC uses Stream ID to identify the stream. The least significant
bit (0x1) of the stream ID identifies the initiator of the stream
(client with the bit set to 0). The second least significant bit
(0x2) of the stream ID distinguishes between bidirectional streams
(with the bit set to 0) and unidirectional streams [RFC9000].
RADIUS packets include request packets and response packets. RADIUS
request packet is a packet originated by a RADIUS client to a RADIUS
server. For example, Access-Request, Accounting-Request, CoA-
Request, or Disconnect-Request. RADIUS response packet is a packet
sent by a RADIUS server to a RADIUS client, in response to a RADIUS
request packet. For example, Access-Accept, Access-Reject, Access-
Challenge, Accounting-Response, or CoA-ACK [RFC6613].
4.1. Bidirectional Stream between Client and Server
If RADIUS request packets are carried via transport protocol from
RADIUS client to RADIUS server, RADIUS response packet are needed to
be sent from RADIUS server to RADIUS client in response to the RADIUS
request packets. Therefore, the RADIUS connection should be
bidirectional between Client and Server.
Based on the above description, The RADIUS request messages are
initiated by the Client and the replies are needed from the Server.
So the RADIUS messages MAY be mapped into one bidirectional stream
whose stream type is 0x0 according to section 2.1 of [RFC9000].
To enhance transmission performance during large-scale processing of
authentication, accounting, and authorization requests, RADIUS
messages can be transmitted over multiple configurable bidirectional
streams.
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When using multiple streams, all messages belonging to the same
RADIUS transaction must remain within a single stream to maintain
protocol integrity. A RADIUS transaction refers to a complete
protocol interaction process, including all message exchanges between
the client (such as NAS) and the server (such as RADIUS server) from
the request to the final response. RADIUS transactions can be
divided into authentication transactions, accounting transactions,
and dynamic authorization transactions.
4.1.1. Multi-Stream Use Case
As described above, there are three types of RADIUS transactions;
therefore, the client can create three QUIC bidirectional streams to
carry these three RADIUS transactions, as shown in Figure 1. Stream
0 is used for authentication, stream 1 for accounting, and stream 2
for authorization transactions.
Client Server
+------------------------+ Stream 0 +-------------------------+
| Authentication Request |<------------->| Authentication Response |
+------------------------+ +-------------------------+
+------------------------+ Stream 1 +-------------------------+
| Accounting Request |<------------->| Accounting Response |
+------------------------+ +-------------------------+
+------------------------+ Stream 2 +-------------------------+
| Authorization Request |<------------->| Authorization Response |
+------------------------+ +-------------------------+
Figure 1: Multiple Stream Use Case
5. Endpoint Authentication
RADIUSoQUIC uses QUIC which uses TLS version 1.3 or greater.
Therefore, the TLS handshake process can be used for RADIUSoQUIC
endpoint authentication. A third-party authentication mechanism can
also be applied for RADIUSoQUIC endpoint authentication, such as a
TLS client certificate.
6. Operational Considerations
6.1. Configuration Parameters
The decision to use RADIUSoQUIC instead of the TCP-based/UDP-based
mechanism is an operational decision, and an implementation MUST
provide a configuration mechanism to enable RADIUSoQUIC on the RADIUS
session.
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A configuration option SHOULD be provided to enable the use of
multiple streams, and the number of streams also SHOULD be
configurable.
As QUIC is a reliable transport, if there is no response to a RADIUS
packet over one QUIC connection, implementations MUST NOT retransmit
that packet over a different QUIC connection to the same destination
IP address and port, while the first connection is in the OKAY state
([RFC3539], Appendix A).
6.2. Packet Format
RADIUSoQUIC MUST strictly preserve all specifications of [RFC2865],
[RFC2866], and [RFC5176], including packet format, attribute
encoding, and security computations (authenticators, dynamic or
encrypted attributes).
The use of QUIC transport does not change the calculation of
security-related fields (such as the Response-Authenticator) in
RADIUS [RFC2865] or RADIUS Dynamic Authorization [RFC5176].
Calculation of attributes such as User-Password [RFC2865] or Message-
Authenticator [RFC3579] also does not change. In addition, Clients
and servers MUST be able to store and manage secrets based on the key
described at the section 5 of [RFC9001].
The changes required to implement this specification primarily affect
the RADIUS components responsible for sending and receiving network
packets.
6.3. QUIC Port
The default destination port for RADIUSoQUIC is UDP/TBD (assigned by
IANA), which handles authentication, accounting, and dynamic
authorization without port differentiation. Source ports may be
arbitrarily chosen.
RADIUS over UDP or TCP [RFC2865] [RFC6613] uses distinct ports for
authentication, accounting, and dynamic authorization. In contrast,
RADIUSoQUIC utilizes a single port for all packet types. However,
RADIUSoQUIC maintains the fundamental client-server model where:
* Clients send authentication requests and process replies for user
sessions.
* Servers receive requests, process them, and return responses.
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The normative rules defining acceptable packet types for clients and
servers maintain identical packet flow behavior to RADIUS over UDP or
TCP.
6.4. Management Information Base (MIB)
The MIB modules defined in [RFC4668], [RFC4669], [RFC4670],
[RFC4671], [RFC4672], and [RFC4673] were specifically designed for
RADIUS over UDP transport and therefore do not support either RADIUS
over TCP [RFC6613] or RADIUSoQUIC implementations. These existing
MIB modules should not be reused for RADIUSoQUIC connection
statistics monitoring, as they lack the necessary constructs to
properly track QUIC-specific features such as connection migration,
cryptographic handshakes, and stream multiplexing. Future updates to
the MIB specifications will be required to adequately support these
newer transport protocols.
6.5. Detecting Live Servers
In RADIUS' hop-by-hop architecture, proxies inherently isolate
clients from downstream server information, preventing direct
awareness of backend server states. While clients can assess their
immediate proxy's operational status, they lack visibility into
subsequent hops since proxies primarily function as transparent
forwarders between NAS and RADIUS servers without generating
independent responses (per [RFC2865]). This opacity creates
ambiguity when requests go unanswered, as failures could stem from
multiple points: packet loss in either the NAS-proxy or proxy-server
segments, proxy malfunctions, or actual server outages, with no
built-in mechanism to distinguish between these scenarios.
RADIUS clients using RADIUSoQUIC must consider a connection DOWN when
either: (1)All active QUIC Connection IDs enter DRAINING state, or
(2)The connection receives a valid CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. However,
if any Connection ID remains ACTIVE, clients should continue treating
the connection as operational until: (1)Path validation fails for all
available Connection IDs, and (2)The application-layer watchdog timer
expires (as specified in [RFC3539] Appendix A). A RADIUS server
should only be declared unresponsive when: (1)All existing QUIC
connections have terminated, and (2)No new connections can be
established using remaining Connection IDs.
The RADIUSoQUIC do not forbid the practice of a client proactively
closing connections or marking a server as DOWN due to an
administrative decision.
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6.6. Malformed Packets and Unknown Clients
For RADIUSoQUIC implementations, due to QUIC's stream-based reliable
delivery, when encountering any condition that would require closing
a TCP connection under Section 2.6.4 of [RFC6613], implementations
MUST terminate the affected QUIC stream immediately. Additionally,
implementations MAY choose to terminate the entire QUIC connection
based on local policy.
For two exceptional cases permitting silent discarding for TCP under
Section 2.6.4 of [RFC6613], RADIUSoQUIC performs the same operation.
Implementations MAY either close only the offending stream while
maintaining the QUIC connection, or terminate the entire QUIC
connection. In all cases, the invalid packet MUST be discarded
without processing. This approach maintains security while
leveraging QUIC's ability to isolate stream failures - a compromised
stream won't necessarily disrupt other concurrent RADIUS
transactions.
6.7. Limitations of the ID Field
For RADIUSoQUIC, the one-octet RADIUS ID field similarly limits each
QUIC connection to 256 simultaneous in-flight RADIUS transactions.
However, QUIC's stream multiplexing allows multiple independent
transactions to coexist efficiently on a single connection without
head-of-line blocking.
To scale beyond 256 concurrent RADIUS transactions, implementations
should establish additional QUIC connections as needed. This
approach benefits from QUIC's efficient connection establishment,
particularly its 0-RTT resumption capability, which minimizes latency
overhead when creating new connections. While the ID space
limitation remains per connection (as described in Section 2.4 of
[RFC3539]), QUIC's reduced connection overhead makes the multi-
connection strategy more practical compared to TCP.
6.8. EAP Sessions
For RADIUSoQUIC implementations handling Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) sessions [RFC3579], clients SHOULD use the same QUIC
stream for all packets within a single EAP session to ensure in-order
delivery through QUIC's stream sequencing while maintaining fault
isolation and efficient multiplexing. Regarding retransmissions:
EAP-level retransmissions MUST NOT cause RADIUS packet
retransmissions on the same QUIC stream, though alternative streams
or connections may be used if the original becomes unavailable;
importantly, QUIC's native loss recovery handles all necessary
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transport-layer retransmissions automatically.
7. IANA Considerations
This document creates a new registration for the identification of
RADIUSoQUIC in the "Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
Protocol IDs" registry established in [RFC7301].
The "RADIUSoQ" string identifies RADIUSoQUIC:
* Protocol: RADIUSoQUIC
* Identification Sequence: 0x52 0x41 0x44 0x49 0x55 0x53 0x6f 0x51
("RADIUSoQ")
* Specification: This document
In addition, it is requested for IANA to reserve a UDP port TBD for
'RADIUS over QUIC'.
8. Security Considerations
This document replaces the transport protocol layer of RADIUS from
other transport protocols to QUIC. The basic protocol specification
of RADIUS is not modified, and therefore the new security risks are
not introduced to the basic RADIUS protocol. RADIUSoQUIC enhances
transport-layer security for RADIUS session according to [RFC9000].
This document does not require to support third-party authentication
(e.g., backend Authentication) due to the fact that TLS does not
specify this way of authentication. If third-party authentication is
needed, TLS client certificates are recommended to be used here.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865>.
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[RFC3539] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and
Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3539, June 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3539>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[RFC9001] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2866, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2866>.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3579, September 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3579>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[RFC4668] Nelson, D., "RADIUS Authentication Client MIB for IPv6",
RFC 4668, DOI 10.17487/RFC4668, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4668>.
[RFC4669] Nelson, D., "RADIUS Authentication Server MIB for IPv6",
RFC 4669, DOI 10.17487/RFC4669, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4669>.
[RFC4670] Nelson, D., "RADIUS Accounting Client MIB for IPv6",
RFC 4670, DOI 10.17487/RFC4670, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4670>.
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[RFC4671] Nelson, D., "RADIUS Accounting Server MIB for IPv6",
RFC 4671, DOI 10.17487/RFC4671, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4671>.
[RFC4672] De Cnodder, S., Jonnala, N., and M. Chiba, "RADIUS Dynamic
Authorization Client MIB", RFC 4672, DOI 10.17487/RFC4672,
September 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4672>.
[RFC4673] De Cnodder, S., Jonnala, N., and M. Chiba, "RADIUS Dynamic
Authorization Server MIB", RFC 4673, DOI 10.17487/RFC4673,
September 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4673>.
[RFC5080] Nelson, D. and A. DeKok, "Common Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Implementation Issues and
Suggested Fixes", RFC 5080, DOI 10.17487/RFC5080, December
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5080>.
[RFC5176] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 5176,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5176, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5176>.
[RFC6613] DeKok, A., "RADIUS over TCP", RFC 6613,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6613, May 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6613>.
[RFC6614] Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS",
RFC 6614, DOI 10.17487/RFC6614, May 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6614>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
Authors' Addresses
Shengnan Yue
China Mobile
Beijing
China
Email: yueshengnan@chinamobile.com
Yue, et al. Expires 13 November 2026 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft RADIUS over QUIC May 2026
Changwang Lin
New H3C Technologies
Beijing
China
Email: linchangwang.04414@h3c.com
Feng Yang
China Mobile
Beijing
China
Email: yangfeng@chinamobile.com
Yue, et al. Expires 13 November 2026 [Page 14]