BLACKHOLEIXP BGP Community for Blackholing at IXPs
draft-ymbk-grow-blackholing-00

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2015-05-28
Replaced by rfc7999, draft-ietf-grow-blackholing
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Network Working Group                                            T. King
Internet-Draft                                                C. Dietzel
Intended status: Standards Track                  DE-CIX Management GmbH
Expires: November 29, 2015                                    G. Doering
                                                             SpaceNet AG
                                                              G. Hankins
                                                          Alcatel-Lucent
                                                                C. Seitz
                                                               STRATO AG
                                                                P. Jiran
                                                                  NIX.CZ
                                                              Y. Kritski
                                                              NetIX Ltd.
                                                            May 28, 2015

           BLACKHOLEIXP BGP Community for Blackholing at IXPs
                     draft-ymbk-grow-blackholing-00

Abstract

   This document describes the use of a well-known Border Gateway
   Protocol (BGP) community for blackholing at Internet Exchange Points
   (IXP).  This well-known advisory transitive BGP community, namely
   BLACKHOLEIXP, allows an origin AS to specify through the route server
   that IXPs should blackhole a specific route.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
   upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
   words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any

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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 29, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

   This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
   be created, and it may not be published except as an Internet-Draft.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  BLACKHOLEIXP Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Peering at Route Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Accepting Blackholed IP Prefixes  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.2.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   Massive DDoS attacks targeting Internet Exchange Point (IXP) members
   may cause a congestion of their peering port(s).  In order to limit
   the impact of such a scenario on legitimate traffic, IXPs adopted a
   feature called blackholing.  A member may trigger blackholing via BGP
   through the route server [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server].  All
   traffic destined to the such announced prefixes is discarded on the
   switching fabric of the IXP.  This resolves the port congestion
   caused by the DDoS attack.

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