Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-open-policy-03
Document | Type | Replaced Internet-Draft (idr WG) | |
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Authors | Alexander Azimov , Eugene Bogomazov , Randy Bush , Keyur Patel , Kotikalapudi Sriram | ||
Last updated | 2017-06-14 (Latest revision 2017-03-13) | ||
Replaced by | RFC 9234 | ||
Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats |
Expired & archived
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Yang Validation | ☯ 0 errors, 0 warnings | ||
Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-open-policy-03.txt
Abstract
Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes according to operator configuration options without any check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement of the (peer, customer, provider, internal) relationship of two neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with an iOTC attribute according to agreed relationship allowing prevention of route leaks.
Authors
Alexander Azimov
Eugene Bogomazov
Randy Bush
Keyur Patel
Kotikalapudi Sriram
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)