Origin Validation Clarifications
draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-clarify-01
| Document | Type | Replaced Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Randy Bush | ||
| Last updated | 2018-04-19 (Latest revision 2017-07-29) | ||
| Replaced by | RFC 8481 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
plain text
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bibtex
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of
the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-clarify-01.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-clarify-01.txt
Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)