BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress-01

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Randy Bush  , RĂ¼diger Volk  , Jakob Heitz 
Last updated 2019-12-01 (latest revision 2019-05-30)
Replaced by RFC 8893
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress-01.txt

Abstract

A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route, which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS.

Authors

Randy Bush (randy@psg.com)
RĂ¼diger Volk (unknown-email-Ruediger-Volk)
Jakob Heitz (jheitz@cisco.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)