Origin Validation Signaling

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Last updated 2018-06-26
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Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track                                K. Patel
Expires: December 28, 2018                                        Arrcus
                                                           June 26, 2018

                      Origin Validation Signaling


   Within a trust boundary, e.g. an operator's PoP, it may be useful to
   have only a few central devices do full Origin Validation using the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure, and be able to signal to an
   internal sender that a received route fails Origin Validation.  E.g.
   route reflectors could perform Origin Validation for a cluster and
   signal back to a sending client that it sent an invalid route.
   Routers capable of sending and receiving this signal can use the
   extended community described in [RFC8097]

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
   upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
   words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2018.

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Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   Within a routing trust boundary, e.g. an operator's Point of Presence
   (PoP), it may not be desirable or necessary for all routers to
   perform Origin Validation using the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) per [RFC6811].  A good example is route
   reflectors (see [RFC4456]).

   An RPKI-enabled device, an Evaluator, SHOULD signal receipt of an
   Invalid route back to the sender by announcing that route back to the
   sender marked with the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
   Community as defined in [RFC8097] with a last octet having the value
   2, meaning "Invalid."

   We use the term "Sender" to refer to the router announcing routes to
   the device evaluating the Origin Validation of the announcements.
   Beware that the Sender receives signaling back from the Evaluator,
   which can be somewhat confusing.

   We use the term "Evaluator" to describe the device receiving routing
   announcements from senders, applying RPKI-based Origin Validation,
   and possibly signaling route Invalidity back to the sender(s).

2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
   [RFC6480], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and the BGP
   Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community as described in

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3.  Trust Boundary

   As a general rule, we discourage 'outsourcing trust,' i.e.  letting
   others make security decisions for us.  But there are operational
   environments with a somewhat wide trust boundary, a single operator's
   PoP for example.

   As described in [RFC7115], a PoP might have a single RPKI Cache,
   hence all trust is outsourced to it.  So it is reasonable that
   routers in that PoP could share Origin Validation results instead of
   each doing full validation.

   An [RFC4456] Route Reflector Cluster is an obvious candidate for this
   approach.  The route reflector(s) would perform Origin Validation and
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