Origin Validation Signaling
draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-signal-03
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Randy Bush , Keyur Patel | ||
Last updated | 2020-01-03 (Latest revision 2019-07-02) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Within a trust boundary, e.g. an operator's PoP, it may be useful to have only a few central devices do full Origin Validation using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure, and be able to signal to an internal sender that a received route fails Origin Validation. E.g. route reflectors could perform Origin Validation for a cluster and signal back to a sending client that it sent an invalid route. Routers capable of sending and receiving this signal can use the extended community described in [RFC8097].
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)