The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI
draft-yossigi-rpkimaxlen-01

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Network Working Group                                           Y. Gilad
Internet-Draft                                               S. Goldberg
Intended status: Best Current Practice                 Boston University
Expires: March 11, 2018                                        K. Sriram
                                                                    NIST
                                                             J. Snijders
                                                                     NTT
                                                       September 7, 2017

                    The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI
                      draft-yossigi-rpkimaxlen-01

Abstract

   This document recommends that operators avoid using the maxLength
   attribute when issuing Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) in the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  These recommendations
   complement those in [RFC7115].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 11, 2018.

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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Forged Origin Subprefix Hijack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Measurements of Today's RPKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Use Minimal ROAs without Maxlength  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  When a Minimal ROA Cannot Be Used?  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   The RPKI [RFC6480] uses Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to create
   a trusted mapping from an IP prefix to a set of autonomous systems
   (ASes) that are authorized to originate this prefix.  Each ROA
   contains a set of IP prefixes, and an AS number of an AS authorized
   originate all the IP prefixes in the set [RFC6482].  Each ROA is
   cryptographically signed by the party that is authorized to allocate
   the set of IP prefixes.

   The RPKI also supports a maxLength attribute.  According to
   [RFC6482], "When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length
   of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise."
   Thus, rather than requiring the ROA to explictly list each prefix the
   AS is authorized to originate, the maxLength attribute provides a
   shorthand that authorizes an AS to originate a set of IP prefixes.

   However, measurements of current RPKI deployments have found that use
   of the maxLength in ROAs tends to lead to security problems.
   Specifically, as of June 2017, 84% of the prefixes specified in ROAs
   that use the maxLength attribute, are vulnerable to a forged-origin
   subprefix hijack.  The forged-origin subprefix hijack can be launched
   against any IP prefix that is authorized in ROA but is not originated
   in BGP.  The impact of such an attack is the same as standard
   subprefix hijack on an IP prefix that is unprotected by a ROA in the
   RPKI.

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