Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Authentication Using M2M Certificate
draft-ypoeluev-tls-m2mcertificate-00

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2015-09-24 (latest revision 2015-03-23)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ypoeluev-tls-m2mcertificate-00.txt

Abstract

This memo defines Transport Layer Security (TLS) extensions and associated semantics that allow clients and servers to negotiate the use of M2M certificates for a TLS/DTLS session, and specifies how to transport M2M certificates via TLS/DTLS. It also defines the registry for non-X.509 certificate types. The X.509 public key certificate format is overly verbose for Internet- of-Things (IoT) constrained environments, where nodes with limited memory and networks with limited bandwidth are not uncommon. The Machine-to-Machine (M2M) certificate format is a pruned down and encoding-optimized replacement for X.509, which reuses much of the X.509 semantics but reduces certificate sizes by typically 40%.

Authors

Yuri Poeluev (ypoeluev@trustpointinnovation.com)
Warwick Ford (wford@wyltan.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)