Security Analysis of Multi-agents Secured Communication and Limitations of Existing Protocols
draft-zhang-dmsc-mas-communication-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Haodi | ||
| Last updated | 2026-07-20 (Latest revision 2026-01-16) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Multi-agents systems (MAS) increasingly cooperate through workflow, orchestrated, and mesh communication patterns. While existing Internet protocols provide confidentiality and endpoint authentication, they were not designed for agent-native semantics such as dynamic identity, computation-bounded requests, context integrity, and intermediary trust. This document analyzes security risks in agent communication and identifies limitations in widely deployed protocols (TLS, HTTP, MQTT,A2A and etc.) and developer framework (AutoGen and etc.). This document intend to establish a common problem statement and gap analysis to inform future IETF standardization.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)