Secure Extension of BGP by Decoupling Path Propagation and Adoption

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2013-06-27 (latest revision 2012-12-24)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


This draft proposes a novel mitigation scheme to protect the inter- domain data delivery during false routing announcements. A new path attribute is defined to Decouple propagation of a path and adoption of a path for data forwarding in BGP (DBGP). DBGP does not use suspicious paths for data forwarding, but still propagates them in the routing system to facilitate attack detection. It can extensively protect data delivery from routing announcements of false sub- prefixes, false origins, false nodes and false links, and works well with ongoing attack detection and prevention systems.


Mingui Zhang (
Bin Liu (
Dacheng Zhang (
Beichuan Zhang (
Beichuan Zhang (

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)