CT for Binary Codes
draft-zhang-trans-ct-binary-codes-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2017-03-06
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
TRANS                                                        L. Xia, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                  D. Zhang
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Huawei
Expires: September 7, 2017                                    D. Gillmor
                                                                    CMRG
                                                             B. Sarikaya
                                                              Huawei USA
                                                           March 6, 2017

                          CT for Binary Codes
                  draft-zhang-trans-ct-binary-codes-04

Abstract

   This document proposes a solution extending the Certificate
   Transparency protocol [I-D.ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis] for transparently
   logging the software binary codes (BC)or its digest with their
   signature, to enable anyone to monitor and audit the software
   provider activity and notice the distribution of suspect software as
   well as to audit the BC logs themselves.  The solution is called
   "Binary Transparency" in this document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Xia, et al.             Expires September 7, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             CT for Binary Codes                March 2017

   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Cryptographic Components of Binary Transparency . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Motivation Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Log Format and Operation Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Log Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  TransItem Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  Merkle Tree Leaves  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Structure of the Signed Binary Timestamp  . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Log Client Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Add Binary Code and Certificate Chain to Log  . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Retrieve Entries and STH from Log . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Digital signatures have been widely used in software distributions to
   prove the authenticity of software.  Through verifying signature, an
   end user can ensure that the gotten software is developed by a legal
   provider (e.g., Microsoft) and is not tampered during the
   distribution.  If an end user does not have a direct trust
   relationship with the software provider, an certificate chain to a
   trust anchor that the user trusts should be provided.  That is why
   many signature mechanisms for software distribution are based on
   public key infrastructure (PKI).  However, signature mechanisms
Show full document text