Certificate Transparency for Domain Name System Security Extensions
draft-zhang-trans-ct-dnssec-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Dacheng Zhang , Daniel Kahn Gillmor , ana.hedanping@huawei.com , Behcet Sarikaya , Ning Kong | ||
| Last updated | 2016-01-06 (Latest revision 2015-07-05) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
In draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis, a solution (Certificate Transparency) is proposed for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates using Merkle Hash Trees. This document proposes a mechanism to extend Certificate Transparency for DNSSEC which publicly logs the DS RRs to notice the issuance of suspect key signing keys.
Authors
Dacheng Zhang
Daniel Kahn Gillmor
ana.hedanping@huawei.com
Behcet Sarikaya
Ning Kong
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)