Certificate Transparency for Domain Name System Security Extensions

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Dacheng Zhang  , Daniel Gillmor  , ana.hedanping@huawei.com  , Behcet Sarikaya  , Ning Kong 
Last updated 2016-01-06 (latest revision 2015-07-05)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


In draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis, a solution (Certificate Transparency) is proposed for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates using Merkle Hash Trees. This document proposes a mechanism to extend Certificate Transparency for DNSSEC which publicly logs the DS RRs to notice the issuance of suspect key signing keys.


Dacheng Zhang (dacheng.zhang@gmail.com)
Daniel Gillmor (dkg@fifthhorseman.net)
ana.hedanping@huawei.com (ana.hedanping@huawei.com)
Behcet Sarikaya (sarikaya@ieee.org)
Ning Kong (nkong@cnnic.cn)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)