Network Working Group                                         A. Langley
Internet-Draft                                                Google Inc
Intended status: Informational                           August 21, 2015
Expires: February 22, 2016


      CMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (CKDF)
                           draft-agl-ckdf-00

Abstract

   This memo describes a KDF based on AES-CMAC.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 22, 2016.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  CKDF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  CKDF-Extract  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  CKDF-Expand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   The HKDF key derivation function, described in [RFC5869], is
   currently the de-facto KDF for use in a variety of protocols.
   However, in hardware orientated designs, significant space savings
   can be achieved if the underlying primitive is AES rather than a
   cryptographic hash function.

   The memo specifies CKDF, the CMAC-based Key Derivation Function.  It
   is, succinctly, HKDF but with HMAC [RFC2104] replaced by CMAC
   [RFC4493].

2.  CKDF

   CKDF follows exactly the same structure as [RFC5869] but "HMAC-Hash"
   is replaced by the function "AES-CMAC" throughout.  The "AES-CMAC"
   function also takes two arguments: the first is a 16 byte key and the
   second is an input.  It returns the AES-CMAC MAC of the input using
   the given key as an AES key.

   Thus, following HKDF, the "CKDF-Extract(salt, IKM)" function takes an
   optional, 16-byte salt and an arbitrary-length "input keying
   material" (IKM) message.  If no salt is given, the 16-byte, all-zero
   value is used.  It returns the result of "AES-CMAC(key = salt, input
   = IKM)", called the "pseudorandom key" (PRK), which will be 16 bytes
   long.

   Likewise, the "CKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L)" function takes the PRK
   result from "CKDF-Extract", an arbitrary "info" argument and a
   requested number of bytes to produce.  It calculates the L-byte
   result, called the "output keying material" (OKM), as:






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   N = ceil(L/16)
   T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
   OKM = first L octets of T

   where:
   T(0) = empty string (zero length)
   T(1) = AES-CMAC(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
   T(2) = AES-CMAC(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
   T(3) = AES-CMAC(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)
   ...

   (where the constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a single
   octet.)

   Note that AES-CMAC in [RFC4493] is only defined for AES-128 and
   likewise, so is CKDF.  However, the dependency on AES-128 is stronger
   here because the length of the PRK from "CKDF-Extract" is the AES
   blocksize of 128 bits.  Thus, if one wished to use AES-256 in the
   future, the PRK would, somehow, need to be 256 bits.  Given the
   complexities of this, those wishing a higher security level should
   instead use HKDF with a suitable hash function.

3.  Test Vectors

3.1.  CKDF-Extract

   This section contains test vectors for the "CKDF-Extract" function.

   # These two test vectors are from RFC4493, section 4
   Salt: 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
   IKM:  (empty)
   PRK:  bb1d6929 e9593728 7fa37d12 9b756746

   Salt: 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
   IKM:  6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
   PRK:  070a16b4 6b4d4144 f79bdd9d d04a287c

   Salt: (none)
   IKM:  73656372 6574206b 6579
   PRK:  6f79b401 ea761a01 00b7ca60 c178b69d

3.2.  CKDF-Expand

   This section contains test vectors for the "CKDF-Expand" function.







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PRK:  6f79b401 ea761a01 00b7ca60 c178b69d
Info: (empty)
L:    32
OKM:  922da31d 7e1955f0 6a56464b 5feb7032 f3e99629 5165f6c6 0e08ba43 2dd9058b


PRK:  6f79b401 ea761a01 00b7ca60 c178b69d
Info: 696e666f 20737472 696e67
L:    256
OKM:
  6174e672 12e1234b 6e05bfd3 1043422c 7ab6dc31 5db7d98d 013ab332 924b7fe9
  0ae9a89d 09c93be4 0ce525e0 b6f0d37d f3818191 3aa3d588 f75a3594 ef7a93ac
  d791331e 7929de8b c8c8a6ee 2dd9960e c57fe159 610676a7 c118c4aa c2d34a89
  6edd3691 f0e922a3 0eecc7b3 ec3eaa91 13d4ee51 8b0a4c7e d0b475df bd07ee02
  a3470832 da247ef3 b07f9acd 8ddbb765 7369e1c5 2942fab2 11d47c44 0d6818f8
  29cdd8da d84b825e 1166cbdc dbb13904 d6753de7 6070a145 a8572496 c2808567
  9459d801 f14449fb f3430a83 685a4b8d 091dc2fc 85b8209d 7cfd5dbd 39d79a8d
  d7c6f981 af064ce6 9e58a99f bd9ffd58 a2d93d60 972ec873 f27feaed eed73f0a

4.  Security Considerations

   Since CKDF is so closely based on HKDF, the security considerations
   are the same and sections 3, 4 and 5 of [RFC5869] are included here
   by reference.

5.  IANA Considerations

   None.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC4493]  Song, JH., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The
              AES-CMAC Algorithm", RFC 4493, DOI 10.17487/RFC4493, June
              2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4493>.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.



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Author's Address

   Adam Langley
   Google Inc

   Email: agl@google.com













































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