Network Working Group J. Arkko
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Informational S. Farrell
Expires: 13 January 2022 Trinity College Dublin
July 2021
Internet Threat Model Guidance
draft-arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance-00.txt
Abstract
Communications security has been at the center of many security
improvements in the Internet. The goal has been to ensure that
communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.
This memo suggests that the existing RFC 3552 threat model, while
important and still valid, is no longer alone sufficient to cater for
the pressing security and privacy issues seen on the Internet today.
For instance, it is often also necessary to protect against endpoints
that are compromised, malicious, or whose interests simply do not
align with the interests of users. While such protection is
difficult, there are some measures that can be taken and we argue
that investigation of these issues is warranted.
It is particularly important to ensure that as we continue to develop
Internet technology, non-communications security related threats, and
privacy issues, are properly understood.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 January 2022.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Attack Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Communications Security Improvements . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Beyond Communications Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Accidental Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Misbehaving Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. Untrustworthy Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6. Untrustworthy "Closed" Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.7. Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Trusting Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Protecting Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Role of End-to-End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
Communications security has been at the center of many security
improvements in the Internet. The goal has been to ensure that
communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.
At the IETF, this approach has been formalized in BCP 72 [RFC3552],
which defined the Internet threat model in 2003.
The purpose of a threat model is to outline what threats exist in
order to assist the protocol designer. But RFC 3552 also ruled some
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threats to be in scope and of primary interest, and some threats out
of scope [RFC3552]:
The Internet environment has a fairly well understood threat
model. In general, we assume that the end-systems engaging in a
protocol exchange have not themselves been compromised.
Protecting against an attack when one of the end-systems has been
compromised is extraordinarily difficult. It is, however,
possible to design protocols which minimize the extent of the
damage done under these circumstances.
By contrast, we assume that the attacker has nearly complete
control of the communications channel over which the end-systems
communicate. This means that the attacker can read any PDU
(Protocol Data Unit) on the network and undetectably remove,
change, or inject forged packets onto the wire.
However, the communications-security -only threat model is becoming
outdated. Some of the causes for this are:
* Success! Advances in protecting most of our communications with
strong cryptographic means. This has resulted in much improved
communications security, but also highlights the need for
addressing other, remaining issues. This is not to say that
communications security is not important, it still is.
Fortunately, there are ongoing projects working on improvements.
* Adversaries have increased their pressure against other avenues of
attack, from supply-channel attacks, to compromising devices to
legal coercion of centralized endpoints in conversations.
* New adversaries and risks have arisen, e.g., due to creation of
large centralized information sources.
* While communications-security does seem to be required to protect
privacy, more is needed, especially if endpoints choose to act
against the interests of their peers or users.
In short, attacks are migrating towards the currently easier targets,
which no longer necessarily include direct attacks on traffic flows.
It is important that when it comes to basic Internet infrastructure,
our chosen technologies lead to minimal exposure with respect to the
non-communications threats. It is particularly important to ensure
that non-communications security related threats are properly
understood for any new Internet technology. The sole consideration
of communications security aspects in designing Internet protocols
may lead to accidental or increased impact of security issues
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elsewhere. For instance, allowing a participant to unnecessarily
collect or receive information may lead to a similar effect as
described in [RFC8546] for protocols: over time, unnecessary
information will get used with all the associated downsides,
regardless of what deployment expectations there were during protocol
design.
The rest of this memo is organized as follows. Section 2 makes some
observations about the threa situation. Section 3 discusses some
high-level principles that could be used to address some of the
emerging issues.
2. Attack Landscape
This section discusses the evolving landscape of security
vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks.
2.1. Communications Security Improvements
Being able to ask about threat model improvements is due to progress
already made: The fraction of Internet traffic that is
cryptographically protected has grown tremendously in the last few
years. Several factors have contributed to this change, from Snowden
revelations to business reasons and to better available technology
such as HTTP/2 [RFC7540], TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], QUIC
[I-D.ietf-quic-transport].
In many networks, the majority of traffic has flipped from being
cleartext to being encrypted. Reaching the level of (almost) all
traffic being encrypted is no longer something unthinkable but rather
a likely outcome in a few years.
At the same time, technology developments and policy choices have
driven the scope of cryptographic protection from protecting only the
pure payload to protecting much of the rest as well, including far
more header and meta-data information than was protected before. For
instance, efforts are ongoing in the IETF to assist encrypting
transport headers [I-D.ietf-quic-transport], server domain name
information in TLS [I-D.ietf-tls-esni], and domain name queries
[RFC8484].
There have also been improvements to ensure that the security
protocols that are in use actually have suitable credentials and that
those credentials have not been compromised, see, for instance, Let's
Encrypt [RFC8555], HSTS [RFC6797], HPKP [RFC7469], and Expect-CT
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-expect-ct].
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This is not to say that all problems in communications security have
been resolved -- far from it. But the situation is definitely
different from what it was a few years ago. Remaining issues will be
and are worked on; the fight between defense and attack will also
continue. Communications security will stay at the top of the agenda
in any Internet technology development.
2.2. Beyond Communications Security
There are issues beyond communications security in the Internet. It
is not necessarily clear that one can trust all the endpoints in any
protocol interaction, including the user's own devices. Managed or
closed ecosystems with multiple layers of hardware and software have
made it harder to understand or influence what your devices do.
The situation is different, but not necessarily better on the side of
servers. Even for applications that are for user-to-user
communication, a typical pattern of communications is almost always
via an intermediary that has at least as much information as the
other parties have. For instance, these intermediaries are typically
endpoints for any transport layer security connections, and able to
see much communications or other messaging in cleartext. There are
some exceptions, of course, e.g., messaging applications with end-to-
end confidentiality protection.
For instance, while e-mail transport security [RFC7817] has become
much more widely deployed in recent years, progress in securing
e-mail messages between users has been much slower. This has lead to
a situation where e-mail content is considered a critical resource by
some mail service providers who use the content for machine learning,
advertisement targeting, and other purposes unrelated to message
delivery. Equally however, it is unclear how some useful anti-spam
techniques could be deployed in an end-to-end encrypted mail universe
(with today's end-to-end mail security protocols) and there are many
significant challenges should one desire to deploy end-to-end email
security at scale.
Even services that are not about user-to-user to communication often
collect information about the user.
Services that are part of the infrastructure may have security
issues. For instance, despite progress in protecting DNS query
protocols with encryption (see, e.g., [RFC7858] and [RFC8484]), DNS
resolver services themselves may be targets for attack or sources for
leaks. For instance, the services may collect information or be
vulnerable targets of denial-of-service attacks, attacks to steal
user browsing history information, or be the target of surveillance
activities and government information requests. Infrastructure
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services with information about a large number of users is collected
in small number of services are particularly attractive targets for
these attacks.
In general, many recent attacks relate more to information than
communications. For instance, personal information leaks typically
happen via information stored on a compromised server rather than
capturing communications. There is little hope that such attacks can
be prevented entirely. Again, the best course of action seems to be
avoid the disclosure of information in the first place, or at least
to not perform that in a manner that makes it possible that others
can readily use the information.
2.3. Accidental Vulnerabilities
Some vulnerabilities came to being through various levels of
carelessness and/or due to erroneous assumptions about the
environments in which those applications currently run at. A
vulnerability can be exploited to misuse the data for someone's own
purposes.
Some attacks in this category include hardware-related issues, for
example, Meltdown and Spectre [MeltdownAndSpectre], compromised or
badly-maintained web sites or services, e.g., [Passwords], supply-
chain attacks, for example, the [TargetAttack], and breaches of major
service providers, that many of us might have assumed would be
sufficiently capable to be the best large-scale "Identity providers",
for example, Yahoo (https://www.wired.com/story/yahoo-breach-three-
billion-accounts/), Facebook (https://www.pcmag.com/news/367319/
facebook-stored-up-to-600m-user-passwords-in-plain-text and many
others.
2.4. Misbehaving Applications
There are many examples of application developers doing their best to
protect the security and privacy of their users or customers. But
there are also some that do not act int he best interests of their
users. As a result, it becomes necessary to consider applications as
potentially untrusted, much in the same way that we consider in-
network actors as potential adversaries despite the many examples of
network operators who both act in the best interests of their users
and succeed in defending against attacks from others.
This can also happen indirectly. Despite the best efforts of
curators, so-called App-Stores frequently distribute malware of many
kinds.
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Applications may also mislead users. Many web sites today provide
some form of privacy policy and terms of service, that are known to
be mostly unread [Unread]. This implies that, legal fiction aside,
users of those sites have not in reality agreed to the specific terms
published and so users are therefore highly exposed to being
exploited by web sites, for example [Cambridge] is a recent well-
publicised case where a service provider abused the data of 87
million users via a partnership.
2.5. Untrustworthy Devices
Traditionally, there's been an implied trust in various parts of the
system -- such as the user's own device, nodes inside a particular
network perimeter, or nodes under a single administrative control.
Client endpoint implementations were never fully trusted, but the
environments in which those endpoints exist are changing. Users may
not have as much control over their own devices as they used to, due
to manufacturer-controlled operating system installations and locked
device ecosystems. And within those ecosystems, even the
applications that are available tend to have privileges that users by
themselves might not desire those applications be granted, such as
excessive rights to media, location, and peripherals. There are also
designated efforts by various authorities to hack end-user devices as
a means of intercepting data about the user.
Examples of these issues are too many to list, for instance, so-
called "smart" televisions spying on their owners and one survey of
user attitudes [SmartTV]. Untrustworthy devices can also cause
damage to other parties, such as badly constructed IoT devices
[DynDDoS] attacking large Internet services.
2.6. Untrustworthy "Closed" Networks
Even in a closed network with carefully managed components there may
be compromised components, as evidenced in the most extreme way by
the Stuxnet worm that operated in an airgapped network. Every system
runs large amount of software, and it is often not practical or even
possible to prevent compromised code even in a high-security setting,
let alone in commercial or private networks. Installation media,
physical ports, both open source and proprietary programs, firmware,
or even innocent-looking components on a circuit board can be suspect
[TinyChip]. In addition, complex underlying computing platforms,
such as modern CPUs with underlying security and management tools are
prone to problems.
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2.7. Tracking
One of the biggest threats to user privacy on the Web is ubiquitous
tracking. This is often done to support advertising based business
models, or more specifically advertising based business models that
attempt to find out information about the user.
While some people may be sanguine about this kind of tracking, others
consider this behaviour unwelcome, when or if they are informed that
it happens. Historically, browsers have not made this kind of
tracking visible and have enabled it by default, though some recent
browser versions are starting to enable visibility and blocking of
some kinds of tracking.
One form of tracking is by third parties. HTTP header fields (such
as cookies, [RFC6265]) are commonly used for such tracking, as are
structures within the content of HTTP responses such as links to 1x1
pixel images and (ab)use of Javascript APIs offered by browsers
[Tracking]. Whenever a resource is loaded from a server, that server
can include a cookie which will be sent back to the server on future
loads. The combination of these features makes it possible to track
a user across the Web.
This capability itself constitutes a major threat to user privacy.
Additional techniques such as cookie syncing, identifier correlation,
and fingerprinting make the problem even worse
[I-D.wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting]. For instance, features such
as User-Agent string, plugin and font support, screen resolution, and
timezone can yield a fingerprint that is sometimes unique to a single
user [AmIUnique] and which persists beyond cookie scope and lifetime.
Third party web tracking is not the only concern. An obvious
tracking danger exists also in popular ecosystems -- such as social
media networks -- that house a large part of many users' online
existence. There is no need for a third party to track the user's
browsing as all actions are performed within a single site, where
most messaging, viewing, and sharing activities happen.
Browsers themselves or services used by the browser can also become a
potential source of tracking users. For instance, the URL/search bar
service may leak information about the user's actions to a search
provider via an "autocomplete" feature. [Leith2020]
Tracking through users' IP addresses or DNS queries is also a danger.
This may happen by directly observing the cleartext IP or DNS
traffic, though DNS tracking may be preventable via DNS protocols
that are secured end-to-end. But the DNS queries are also (by
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definition) seen by the used DNS recursive resolver service, which
may accidentally or otherwise track the users' activities.
Tracking happens through other systems besides the web, of course.
For instance, some mail user agents (MUAs) render HTML content by
default (with a subset not allowing that to be turned off, perhaps
particularly on mobile devices) and thus enable the same kind of
adversarial tracking seen on the web.
One of the concerns with universal user tracking is that it provides
yet another avenue for pervasive surveillance [RFC7258], e.g.,
intelligence agencies can tap into the databases constructed by user
tracking.
3. Principles
Based on the above issues, it is necessary to pay attention to the
following aspects:
* Security of devices, including the user's own devices.
* Security of data at rest or in use, in various parts of the
system.
* Tracking and identification of users and their devices.
* Role of servers, and in particular information passing through
them.
These topics are discussed below. There are obviously many detailed
technical questions and approaches to tackling them. However, in
this memo we wish to focus on higher level architectural principles
that might guide us in thinking about about the topics.
3.1. Trusting Devices
In general, this means that one cannot entirely trust even a closed
system where you picked all the components yourself, let alone
typical commercial, networked and Internet-connected systems.
PRINCIPLE: Consider all system components as potentially
untrustworthy, and consider the implications of their compromise.
There may also be ways to mitigate damages, should a compromise
occur.
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3.2. Protecting Information
Data leaks have become the primary concern. Even trusted, well-
managed parties can be problematic, such as when large data stores
attract attempts to use that data in a manner that is not consistent
with the users' interests.
Mere encryption of communications is not sufficient to protect
information.
PRINCIPLE: Consider information passed to another party as a
publication. Avoid passing information that should not be published.
This principle applies even if the communications that carry that
information are encrypted.
PRINCIPLE: Build defences to protect information, even when some
component in a system is compromised.
For instance, encryption of data at rest or in use may assist in
protecting information when an attacker gainst access to a server
system.
PRINCIPLE: Trust that information is handled appropriately, but
verify that this is actually the case.
It is not wise to merely trust that someone acts correctly, without
mistakes, and does not misuse your information. When we send packets
over the Internet, we encrypt them and know that they can only
received by a specific party. Similarly, if we send information to a
server, we can, for instance:
* encrypt a message only to the actual final recipient, even if the
server holds our message before it is delivered
* verify (e.g., through confidential computing attestations) that
the server runs a software that we know does not leak our
information
3.3. Tracking
Information leakage is particularly harmful in situations where the
information can be traced to an individual, such as is the case with
any information that users would consider private, be it about
messages to another users, browsing history, or even user's medical
information.
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PRINCIPLE: Assume that every interaction with another party can
result in fingerprinting or identification of the user in question.
In many cases there are readily available user identifiers in data
that is leaked. But even when such identifiers are not present,
there is often an opportunity to narrow down which entity is
connecting, through, for instance, geolocation or fingerprinting.
3.4. Role of End-to-End
[RFC1958] noted that "end-to-end functions can best be realised by
end-to-end protocols". This functional argument aligns with other,
practical arguments about the evolution of the Internet under the
end-to-end model. The endpoints evolve quickly, often with simply
having one party change the necessary software on both ends. The
end-to-end model supports permissionless innovation where new
innovation can flourish in the Internet without excessive wait for
other parties to act.
However, there is a significant difference between actual endpoints
from a user's interaction perspective (e.g., another user) and from a
system perspective (e.g., a party relaying a message). In general,
there needs to be distinction between the intended interaction
participants and the services used to carry this interaction out.
These services are typically implemented as servers that provide,
e.g., the messaging relay function.
Thomson [I-D.thomson-tmi] discusses the role of intermediaries. We
prefer to use the term services to underline how all types of
services can have issues -- including the simple case of an end-user
contacting a server for some information.
In any case, as Thomson points out, intermediaries (or services) can
provide a useful function. Networks themselves would not exist
without intermediaries that can forward communications to others.
Similarly, networks would not exist without services responding to
communications sent by end users.
PRINCIPLE: Set clear limits what all services can do, and minimise
the use of those services to cases where they are necessary.
This is a general rule, but perhaps a few examples can illustrate it:
* A router's role is to efficiently forward packets to their
destination, not to differentiate the treatment based on what
content is being carried.
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* The role of an information service web server is to provide that
information, not to gather the identity or personal information
about the user accessing information.
* The role of a messaging service is to deliver messages to other
users, not to process the contents of the messages.
Note that this principle applies at multiple layers in the stack. It
is not just about intermediaries in the network and transport layers,
but also intermediaries and services on the application layer.
PRINCIPLE: Pass information only between the "real ends" of a
conversation, unless the information is necessary for a useful
function in a service.
For instance, a transport connection between two components of a
system is not an end-to-end connection even if it encompasses all the
protocol layers up to the application layer. It is not end-to-end,
if the information or control function it carries actually extends
beyond those components. For instance, just because an e-mail server
can read the contents of an e-mail message does not make it a
legitimate recipient of the e-mail.
PRINCIPLE: Information should not be disclosed, stored, or routed in
cleartext through services that do not absolutely need to have that
information for the function they perform.
This the "need to know" principle. It also relates to the discussion
in [I-D.thomson-tmi], in that the valuable functions provided by
intermediaries need to be balanced against the information that they
need to perform their function.
4. Security Considerations
The entire memo covers the security considerations.
5. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations in this work.
6. Informative References
[AmIUnique]
INRIA, ., "Am I Unique?", https://amiunique.org , 2020.
[Cambridge]
Isaak, J. and M. Hanna, "User Data Privacy: Facebook,
Cambridge Analytica, and Privacy Protection", Computer
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51.8 (2018): 56-59, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/
stamp.jsp?arnumber=8436400 , 2018.
[DynDDoS] York, K., "Dyn's Statement on the 10/21/2016 DNS DDoS
Attack", Company statement: https://dyn.com/blog/dyn-
statement-on-10212016-ddos-attack/ , 2016.
[I-D.arkko-arch-dedr-report]
Arkko, J. and T. Hardie, "Report from the IAB workshop on
Design Expectations vs. Deployment Reality in Protocol
Development", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
arkko-arch-dedr-report-00, 4 November 2019,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-arkko-arch-dedr-
report-00.txt>.
[I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model]
Arkko, J., "Changes in the Internet Threat Model", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-arkko-arch-internet-
threat-model-01, 8 July 2019,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-arkko-arch-
internet-threat-model-01.txt>.
[I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]
Arkko, J. and S. Farrell, "Challenges and Changes in the
Internet Threat Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-04, 13 July 2020,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-arkko-farrell-arch-
model-t-04.txt>.
[I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-redux]
Arkko, J. and S. Farrell, "Internet Threat Model
Evolution: Background and Principles", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-redux-01,
22 February 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-redux-01.txt>.
[I-D.farrell-etm]
Farrell, S., "We're gonna need a bigger threat model",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-farrell-etm-03, 6
July 2019, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-farrell-
etm-03.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-expect-ct]
Stark, E., "Expect-CT Extension for HTTP", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct-08,
9 December 2018, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
ietf-httpbis-expect-ct-08.txt>.
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[I-D.ietf-quic-transport]
Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
and Secure Transport", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-quic-transport-34, 14 January 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-quic-
transport-34.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-esni]
Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A. Wood, "TLS
Encrypted Client Hello", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-esni-12, 7 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-esni-
12.txt>.
[I-D.lazanski-smart-users-internet]
Lazanski, D., "An Internet for Users Again", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-lazanski-smart-users-
internet-00, 8 July 2019,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-lazanski-smart-
users-internet-00.txt>.
[I-D.thomson-tmi]
Thomson, M., "Principles for the Involvement of
Intermediaries in Internet Protocols", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-thomson-tmi-02, 6 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-thomson-tmi-
02.txt>.
[I-D.wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting]
Goldberg, I., Wang, T., and C. A. Wood, "Network-Based
Website Fingerprinting", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00, 4 November
2019, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wood-pearg-
website-fingerprinting-00.txt>.
[Leith2020]
Leith, D., "Web Browser Privacy: What Do Browsers Say When
They Phone Home?", In submission,
https://www.scss.tcd.ie/Doug.Leith/pubs/
browser_privacy.pdf , March 2020.
[MeltdownAndSpectre]
CISA, ., "Meltdown and Spectre Side-Channel Vulnerability
Guidance", Alert (TA18-004A),
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-004A , 2018.
[Passwords]
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com, haveibeenpwned., "Pwned Passwords", Website
https://haveibeenpwned.com/Passwords , 2019.
[RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1958>.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
[RFC6797] Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6797, November 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6797>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
[RFC7469] Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>.
[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[RFC7817] Melnikov, A., "Updated Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Server Identity Check Procedure for Email-Related
Protocols", RFC 7817, DOI 10.17487/RFC7817, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7817>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
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[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
[RFC8546] Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The Wire Image of a
Network Protocol", RFC 8546, DOI 10.17487/RFC8546, April
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8546>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.
[SmartTV] Malkin, N., Bernd, J., Johnson, M., and S. Egelman, "What
Can't Data Be Used For? Privacy Expectations about Smart
TVs in the U.S.", European Workshop on Usable Security
(Euro USEC), https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/
eurousec2018_16_Malkin_paper.pdf" , 2018.
[TargetAttack]
Osborne, C., "How hackers stole millions of credit card
records from Target", ZDNET,
https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-hackers-stole-millions-
of-credit-card-records-from-target/ , 2014.
[TinyChip] Robertson, J. and M. Riley, "The Big Hack: How China Used
a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies",
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-
big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-
s-top-companies , October 2018.
[Tracking] Ermakova, T., Fabian, B., Bender, B., and K. Klimek, "Web
Tracking-A Literature Review on the State of Research",
Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences, https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/
bitstream/10125/50485/paper0598.pdf , 2018.
[Unread] Obar, J. and A. Oeldorf, "The biggest lie on the
internet{:} Ignoring the privacy policies and terms of
service policies of social networking services",
Information, Communication and Society (2018): 1-20 ,
2018.
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Appendix A. Contributors
Eric Rescorla and Chris Wood provided much of the text in
Section 2.7. Martin Thomson's excellent document [I-D.thomson-tmi]
also inspired some of the work in Section 3.
Earlier variations of this draft were produced in [I-D.farrell-etm]
[I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model]
[I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t]
[I-D.arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-redux].
There are also other documents discussing this overall space, e.g.
[I-D.lazanski-smart-users-internet] [I-D.arkko-arch-dedr-report].
Appendix B. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the members of the IAB, the
participants of the IETF SAAG meeting where this topic was discussed,
the participants of the IAB 2019 DEDR workshop, and the participants
of the Model-T meetings at the IETFs.
Authors' Addresses
Jari Arkko
Ericsson
Valitie 1B
FI- Kauniainen
Finland
Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net
Stephen Farrell
Trinity College Dublin
College Green
Dublin
Ireland
Email: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
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