Network Working Group J. Arkko
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Expires: October 4, 2004 H. Haverinen
Nokia
April 5, 2004
Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for UMTS Authentication and
Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)
draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-12.txt
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using the
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) Authentication and
Key Agreement (AKA) mechanism. UMTS AKA is based on symmetric keys,
and runs typically in a UMTS Subscriber Identity Module, a smart card
like device.
EAP-AKA includes optional identity privacy support, optional result
indications, and an optional fast re-authentication procedure.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terms and Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . 5
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1 Identity Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.1 Format, Generation and Usage of Peer Identities . . . . . . 13
4.1.2 Communicating the Peer Identity to the Server . . . . . . . 19
4.1.3 Message Sequence Examples (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2 Fast Re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2.2 Comparison to UMTS AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2.3 Fast Re-authentication Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2.4 Fast Re-authentication Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2.5 Fast Re-authentication Procedure when Counter is Too
Small . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3 EAP-AKA Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.3.2 Result Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4 Error Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4.1 Peer Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4.2 Server Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4.3 EAP-Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4.4 EAP-Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.5 Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5. Message Format and Protocol Extensibility . . . . . . . . . 44
5.1 Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.2 Protocol Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.1 EAP-Request/AKA-Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.2 EAP-Response/AKA-Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.3 EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.4 EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.5 EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.6 EAP-Response/AKA-Synchronization-Failure . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.7 EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.8 EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.9 EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.10 EAP-Request/AKA-Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.11 EAP-Response/AKA-Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.1 Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.2 AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.3 AT_ANY_ID_REQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.4 AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.5 AT_IDENTITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.6 AT_RAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
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7.7 AT_AUTN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.8 AT_RES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.9 AT_AUTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.10 AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.11 AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.12 AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_PADDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.13 AT_CHECKCODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.14 AT_RESULT_IND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7.15 AT_MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.16 AT_COUNTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7.17 AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7.18 AT_NONCE_S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7.19 AT_NOTIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.20 AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8. IANA and Protocol Numbering Considerations . . . . . . . . . 64
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9.1 Identity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9.2 Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9.3 Flooding the Authentication Centre . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9.4 Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
9.5 Brute-Force and Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
9.6 Protection, Replay Protection and Confidentiality . . . . . 67
9.7 Negotiation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
9.8 Protected Result Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
9.9 Man-in-the-middle Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
9.10 Generating Random Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
10. Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11. Acknowledgements and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
A. Pseudo-Random Number Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 74
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1. Introduction and Motivation
This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using the
UMTS AKA authentication mechanism [TS 33.102]. UMTS is a global third
generation mobile network standard.
AKA is based on challenge-response mechanisms and symmetric
cryptography. AKA typically runs in a UMTS Subscriber Identity Module
(USIM). Compared to the GSM mechanism, UMTS AKA provides
substantially longer key lengths and mutual authentication.
The introduction of AKA inside EAP allows several new applications.
These include the following:
o The use of the AKA also as a secure PPP authentication method in
devices that already contain an USIM.
o The use of the third generation mobile network authentication
infrastructure in the context of wireless LANs
o Relying on AKA and the existing infrastructure in a seamless way
with any other technology that can use EAP.
AKA works in the following manner:
o The USIM and the home environment have agreed on a secret key
beforehand.
o The actual authentication process starts by having the home
environment produce an authentication vector, based on the secret
key and a sequence number. The authentication vector contains a
random part RAND, an authenticator part AUTN used for
authenticating the network to the USIM, an expected result part
XRES, a session key for integrity check IK, and a session key for
encryption CK.
o The RAND and the AUTN are delivered to the USIM.
o The USIM verifies the AUTN, again based on the secret key and the
sequence number. If this process is successful (the AUTN is valid
and the sequence number used to generate AUTN is within the
correct range), the USIM produces an authentication result, RES
and sends this to the home environment.
o The home environment verifies the correct result from the USIM. If
the result is correct, IK and CK can be used to protect further
communications between the USIM and the home environment.
When verifying AUTN, the USIM may detect that the sequence number the
network uses is not within the correct range. In this case, the USIM
calculates a sequence number synchronization parameter AUTS and sends
it to the network. AKA authentication may then be retried with a new
authentication vector generated using the synchronized sequence
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number.
For a specification of the AKA mechanisms and how the cryptographic
values AUTN, RES, IK, CK and AUTS are calculated, see [TS 33.102].
In EAP-AKA, the EAP server node obtains the authentication vectors,
compares RES and XRES, and uses CK and IK in key derivation.
In the third generation mobile networks, AKA is used both for radio
network authentication and IP multimedia service authentication
purposes. Different user identities and formats are used for these;
the radio network uses the International Mobile Subscriber Identifier
(IMSI), whereas the IP multimedia service uses the Network Access
Identifier (NAI) [RFC2486].
2. Terms and Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The terms and abbreviations "authenticator", "backend authentication
server", "EAP server", "peer", "Silently Discard", "Master Session
Key (MSK)", and "Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [EAP].
This document frequently uses the following terms and abbreviations:
AAA protocol
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting protocol
AKA
Authentication and Key Agreement
AuC
Authentication Centre. The mobile network element that can
authenticate subscribers either in GSM or in UMTS networks.
EAP
Extensible Authentication Protocol
[EAP]
GSM
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Global System for Mobile communications.
NAI
Network Access Identifier
[RFC2486]
AUTN
Authentication value generated by the AuC which together with the
RAND authenticates the server to the peer, 128 bits
[TS 33.102]
AUTS
A value generated by the peer upon experiencing a synchronization
failure, 112 bits.
Fast Re-authentication Identity
A fast re-authentication identity of the peer, including an NAI realm
portion in environments where a realm is used. Used on re-
authentication only.
Fast Re-authentication Username
The username portion of fast re-authentication identity, ie. not
including any realm portions.
Nonce
A value that is used at most once or that is never repeated
within the same cryptographic context. In general, a nonce can be
predictable (e.g. a counter) or unpredictable (e.g. a random value).
Since some cryptographic properties may depend on the randomness of
the nonce, attention should be paid to whether a nonce is required
to be random or not. In this document, the term nonce is only
used to denote random nonces, and it is not used to denote counters.
Permanent Identity
The permanent identity of the peer, including an NAI realm
portion in environments where a realm is used. The permanent
identity is usually based on the IMSI. Used on full
authentication only.
Permanent Username
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The username portion of permanent identity, ie. not including any
realm portions.
Pseudonym Identity
A pseudonym identity of the peer, including an NAI realm portion
in environments where a realm is used. Used on full authentication
only.
Pseudonym Username
The username portion of pseudonym identity, ie. not including any
realm portions.
RAND
Random number generated by the AuC, 128 bits
[TS 33.102]
.
RES
Authentication result from the peer, which together with the RAND
authenticates the peer to the server, 128 bits
[TS 33.102]
SQN
Sequence number used in the authentication process, 48 bits
[TS 33.102]
SIM
Subscriber Identity Module. The SIM is traditionally a smart
card distributed by a GSM operator.
SRES
The authentication result parameter in GSM, corresponds to the
RES parameter in UMTS aka, 32 bits.
USIM
UMTS Subscriber Identity Module. USIM is an application that is
resident e.g. on smart cards distributed by UMTS operators.
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3. Protocol Overview
Figure 1 shows the basic successful full authentication exchange in
EAP-AKA, when optional result indications are not used. The
authenticator typically communicates with an EAP server that is
located on a backend authentication server using an AAA protocol. The
authenticator shown in the figure is often simply relaying EAP
messages to and from the EAP server, but these back end AAA
communications are not shown. At the minimum, EAP-AKA uses two
roundtrips to authorize the user and generate session keys. As in
other EAP schemes, an identity request/response message pair is
usually exchanged first. On full authentication, the peer's identity
response includes either the user's International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI), or a temporary identity (pseudonym) if identity
privacy is in effect, as specified in Section 4.1. (As specified in
[EAP], the initial identity request is not required, and MAY be
bypassed in cases where the network can presume the identity, such as
when using leased lines, dedicated dial-ups, etc. Please see also
Section 4.1.2 for specification how to obtain the identity via EAP
AKA messages.)
After obtaining the subscriber identity, the EAP server obtains an
authentication vector (RAND, AUTN, RES, CK, IK) for use in
authenticating the subscriber. From the vector, the EAP server
derives the keying material, as specified in Section 4.5. The vector
may be obtained by contacting an Authentication Centre (AuC) on the
UMTS network; per UMTS specifications, several vectors may be
obtained at a time. Vectors may be stored in the EAP server for use
at a later time, but they may not be reused.
Next, the EAP server starts the actual AKA protocol by sending an
EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge message. EAP-AKA packets encapsulate
parameters in attributes, encoded in a Type, Length, Value format.
The packet format and the use of attributes are specified in Section
5. The EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge message contains a RAND random
number (AT_RAND) and a network authentication token (AT_AUTN), and a
message authentication code AT_MAC. The EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge
message MAY optionally contain encrypted data, which is used for
identity privacy and fast re-authentication support, as described in
Section 4.1. The AT_MAC attribute contains a message authentication
code covering the EAP packet. The encrypted data is not shown in the
figures of this section.
The peer runs the AKA algorithm (typically using a USIM) and verifies
the AUTN. If this is successful, the peer is talking to a legitimate
EAP server and proceeds to send the EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge. This
message contains a result parameter that allows the EAP server in
turn to authenticate the peer, and the AT_MAC attribute to integrity
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protect the EAP message.
The EAP server verifies that the RES and the MAC in the EAP-Response/
AKA-Challenge packet are correct. Because protected success
indications are not used in this example, the EAP server sends the
EAP-Success packet, indicating that the authentication was
successful. (Protected success indications are discussed in Section
4.3.2.) The EAP server may also include derived keying material in
the message it sends to the authenticator. The peer has derived the
same keying material, so the authenticator does not forward the
keying material to the peer along with EAP-Success.
Peer Authenticator
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes user's NAI) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------+
| | Server runs UMTS algorithms, |
| | generates RAND and AUTN. |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge |
| (AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
+-------------------------------------+ |
| Peer runs UMTS algorithms on USIM, | |
| verifies AUTN and MAC, derives RES | |
| and session key | |
+-------------------------------------+ |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge |
| (AT_RES, AT_MAC) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +--------------------------------+
| | Server checks the given RES, |
| | and MAC and finds them correct.|
| +--------------------------------+
| EAP-Success |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
Figure 1: EAP-AKA full authentication procedure
Figure 2 shows how the EAP server rejects the Peer due to a failed
authentication.
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Peer Authenticator
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes user's NAI) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------+
| | Server runs UMTS algorithms, |
| | generates RAND and AUTN. |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge |
| (AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
+-------------------------------------+ |
| Peer runs UMTS algorithms on USIM, | |
| possibly verifies AUTN, and sends an| |
| invalid response | |
+-------------------------------------+ |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge |
| (AT_RES, AT_MAC) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------------------+
| | Server checks the given RES and the MAC, |
| | and finds one of them incorrct. |
| +------------------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Notification |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/AKA-Notification |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| EAP-Failure |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
Figure 2: Peer authentication fails
Figure 3 shows the peer rejecting the AUTN of the EAP server.
The peer sends an explicit error message (EAP-Response/
AKA-Authentication-Reject) to the EAP server, as usual in AKA when
AUTN is incorrect. This allows the EAP server to produce the same
error statistics as AKA in general produces in UMTS.
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Peer Authenticator
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes user's NAI) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------+
| | Server runs UMTS algorithms, |
| | generates RAND and a bad AUTN|
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge |
| (AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
+-------------------------------------+ |
| Peer runs UMTS algorithms on USIM | |
| and discovers AUTN that can not be | |
| verified | |
+-------------------------------------+ |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| EAP-Failure |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
Figure 3: Network authentication fails
The AKA uses shared secrets between the Peer and the Peer's home
operator together with a sequence number to actually perform an
authentication. In certain circumstances it is possible for the
sequence numbers to get out of sequence. Figure 4 shows what happens
then.
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Peer Authenticator
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes user's NAI) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------+
| | Server runs UMTS algorithms, |
| | generates RAND and AUTN. |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge |
| (AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
+-------------------------------------+ |
| Peer runs UMTS algorithms on USIM | |
| and discovers AUTN that contains an | |
| inappropriate sequence number | |
+-------------------------------------+ |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Synchronization-Failure |
| (AT_AUTS) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +---------------------------+
| | Perform resynchronization |
| | Using AUTS and |
| | the sent RAND |
| +---------------------------+
| |
Figure 4: Sequence number synchronization
After the resynchronization process has taken place in the server and
AAA side, the process continues by the server side sending a new
EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge message.
In addition to the full authentication scenarios described above,
EAP-AKA includes a fast re-authentication procedure, which is
specified in Section 4.2. Fast re-authentication is based on keys
derived on full authentication. If the peer has maintained state
information for re- authentication and wants to use fast
re-authentication, then the peer indicates this by using a specific
fast re-authentication identity instead of the permanent identity or
a pseudonym identity. The fast re-authentication procedure is
described in Section 4.2.
4. Operation
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4.1 Identity Management
4.1.1 Format, Generation and Usage of Peer Identities
4.1.1.1 General
In the beginning of EAP authentication, the Authenticator or the EAP
server usually issues the EAP-Request/Identity packet to the peer.
The peer responds with EAP-Response/Identity, which contains the
user's identity. The formats of these packets are specified in [EAP].
UMTS subscribers are identified with the International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [TS 23.003]. The IMSI is composed of a
three digit Mobile Country Code (MCC), a two or three digit Mobile
Network Code (MNC) and a not more than 10 digit Mobile Subscriber
Identification Number (MSIN). In other words, the IMSI is a string of
not more than 15 digits. MCC and MNC uniquely identify the GSM
operator and help identify the AuC from which the authentication
vectors need to be retrieved for this subscriber.
Internet AAA protocols identify users with the Network Access
Identifier (NAI) [RFC2486]. When used in a roaming environment, the
NAI is composed of a username and a realm, separated with "@"
(username@realm). The username portion identifies the subscriber
within the realm.
This section specifies the peer identity format used in EAP-AKA. In
this document, the term identity or peer identity refers to the whole
identity string that is used to identify the peer. The peer identity
may include a realm portion. "Username" refers to the portion of the
peer identity that identifies the user, i.e. the username does not
include the realm portion.
4.1.1.2 Identity Privacy Support
EAP-AKA includes optional identity privacy (anonymity) support that
can be used to hide the cleartext permanent identity and thereby to
make the subscriber's EAP exchanges untraceable to eavesdroppers.
Because the permanent identity never changes, revealing it would help
observers to track the user. The permanent identity is usually based
on the IMSI, which may further help the tracking, because the same
identifier may be used in other contexts as well. Identity privacy is
based on temporary identities, or pseudonyms, which are equivalent to
but separate from the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identities (TMSI)
that are used on cellular networks. Please see Section 9.1 for
security considerations regarding identity privacy.
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4.1.1.3 Username Types in EAP-AKA Identities
There are three types of usernames in EAP-AKA peer identities:
(1) Permanent usernames. For example, 0123456789098765@myoperator.com
might be a valid permanent identity. In this example,
0123456789098765 is the permanent username.
(2) Pseudonym usernames. For example, 2s7ah6n9q@myoperator.com might
be a valid pseudonym identity. In this example, 2s7ah6n9q is the
pseudonym username.
(3) Fast re-authentication usernames. For example,
43953754@myoperator.com might be a valid fast re-authentication
identity. In this case, 43953754 is the fast re-authentication
username.
The first two types of identities are only used on full
authentication and the last one only on fast re-authentication. When
the optional identity privacy support is not used, the non-pseudonym
permanent identity is used on full authentication. The fast
re-authentication exchange is specified in Section 4.2.
4.1.1.4 Username Decoration
In some environments, the peer may need to decorate the identity by
prepending or appending the username with a string, in order to
indicate supplementary AAA routing information in addition to the NAI
realm. (The usage of a NAI realm portion is not considered to be
decoration.) Username decoration is out of the scope of this
document. However, it should be noted that username decoration might
prevent the server from recognizing a valid username. Hence, although
the peer MAY use username decoration in the identities the peer
includes in EAP-Response/Identity, and the EAP server MAY accept a
decorated peer username in this message, the peer or the EAP server
MUST NOT decorate any other peer identities that are used in various
EAP-AKA attributes. Only the identity used in EAP-Response/Identity
may be decorated.
4.1.1.5 NAI Realm Portion
The peer MAY include a realm portion in the peer identity, as per the
NAI format. The use of a realm portion is not mandatory.
If a realm is used, the realm MAY be chosen by the subscriber's home
operator and it MAY a configurable parameter in the EAP-SIM peer
implementation. In this case, the peer is typically configured with
the NAI realm of the home operator. Operators MAY reserve a specific
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realm name for EAP-AKA users. This convention makes it easy to
recognize that the NAI identifies a UMTS subscriber. Such reserved
NAI realm may be useful as a hint as to the first authentication
method to use during method negotiation. When the peer is using a
pseudonym username instead of the permanent username, the peer
selects the realm name portion similarly as it select the realm
portion when using the permanent username.
If no configured realm name is available, the peer MAY derive the
realm name from the MCC and MNC portions of the IMSI. A RECOMMENDED
way to derive the realm from the IMSI using the realm 3gppnetwork.org
will be specified in [Draft 3GPP TS 23.003].
Some old implementations derive the realm name from the IMSI by
concatenating "mnc", the MNC digits of IMSI, ".mcc", the MCC digits
of IMSI and ".owlan.org". For example, if the IMSI is
123456789098765, and the MNC is three digits long, then the derived
realm name is "mnc456.mcc123.owlan.org". As there are no DNS servers
running at owlan.org, these realm names can only be used with
manually configured AAA routing. New implementations SHOULD use the
mechanism specified in [Draft 3GPP TS 23.003] instead of owlan.org as
soon as the 3GPP specification is finalized.
The IMSI is a string of digits without any explicit structure, so the
peer may not be able to determine the length of the MNC portion. If
the peer is not able to determine whether the MNC is two or three
digits long, the peer MAY use a 3-digit MNC. If the correct length of
the MNC is two, then the MNC used in the realm name includes the
first digit of MSIN. Hence, when configuring AAA networks for
operators that have 2-digit MNC's, the network SHOULD also be
prepared for realm names with incorrect 3-digit MNC's.
4.1.1.6 Format of the Permanent Username
The non-pseudonym permanent username SHOULD be derived from the IMSI.
In this case, the permanent username MUST be of the format "0" |
IMSI, where the character "|" denotes concatenation. In other words,
the first character of the username is the digit zero (ASCII value 30
hexadecimal), followed by the IMSI. The IMSI is an ASCII string that
consists of not more than 15 decimal digits (ASCII values between 30
and 39 hexadecimal), one character per IMSI digit, in the order as
specified in [TS 23.003]. For example, a permanent username derived
from the IMSI 295023820005424 would be encoded as the ASCII string
"0295023820005424" (byte values in hexadecimal notation: 30 32 39 35
30 32 33 38 32 30 30 30 35 34 32 34)
The EAP server MAY use the leading "0" as a hint to try EAP-AKA as
the first authentication method during method negotiation, rather
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than for example EAP-SIM. The EAP-AKA server MAY propose EAP-AKA even
if the leading character was not "0".
Alternatively, an implementation MAY choose a permanent username that
is not based on the IMSI. In this case the selection of the username,
its format, and its processing is out of the scope of this document.
In this case, the peer implementation MUST NOT prepend any leading
characters to the username.
4.1.1.7 Generating Pseudonyms and Fast Re-authentication Identities by
the Server
Pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication identities are
generated by the EAP server. The EAP server produces pseudonym
usernames and fast re-authentication identities in an
implementation-dependent manner. Only the EAP server needs to be able
to map the pseudonym username to the permanent identity, or to
recognize a fast re-authentication identity.
EAP-AKA includes no provisions to ensure that the same EAP server
that generated a pseudonym username will be used on the
authentication exchange when the pseudonym username is used. It is
recommended that the EAP servers implement some centralized mechanism
to allow all EAP servers of the home operator to map pseudonyms
generated by other severs to the permanent identity. If no such
mechanism is available, then the EAP server failing to understand a
pseudonym issued by another server can request the peer to send the
permanent identity.
When issuing a fast re-authentication identity, the EAP server may
include a realm name in the identity to make the fast
re-authentication request be forwarded to the same EAP server.
When generating fast re-authentication identities, the server SHOULD
choose a fresh new fast re-authentication identity that is different
from the previous ones used within a same reauthentication context.
The fast re-authentication identity SHOULD include a random
component. The random component works as a full authentication
context identifier. A context-specific fast re-authentication
identity can help the server to detect whether its fast
re-authentication state information matches the peer's fast
re-authentication state information (in other words whether the state
information is from the same full authentication exchange). The
random component also makes the fast re-authentication identities
unpredictable, so an attacker cannot initiate a fast
re-authentication exchange to get the server's EAP-Request/SIM/
Re-authentication packet.
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Regardless of construction method, the pseudonym username MUST
conform to the grammar specified for the username portion of an NAI.
The fast re-authentication identity also MUST conform to the NAI
grammar. The EAP servers that the subscribers of an operator can use
MUST ensure that the pseudonym usernames and the username portions
used in fast re-authentication identities they generate are unique.
In any case, it is necessary that permanent usernames, pseudonym
usernames and fast re-authentication usernames are separate and
recognizable from each other. It is also desirable that EAP-SIM and
EAP-AKA user names be recognizable from each other as an aid for the
server to which method to offer.
In general, it is the task of the EAP server and the policies of its
administrator to ensure sufficient separation in the usernames.
Pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication usernames are both
produced and used by the EAP server. The EAP server MUST compose
pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication usernames so that it
can recognize if a NAI username is an EAP-AKA pseudonym username or
an EAP-AKA fast re-authentication username. For instance, when the
usernames have been derived from the IMSI, the server could use
different leading characters in the pseudonym usernames and fast
re-authentication usernames (e.g. the pseudonym could begin with a
leading "2" character). When mapping a fast re-authentication
identity to a permanent identity, the server SHOULD only examine the
username portion of the fast re-authentication identity and ignore
the realm portion of the identity.
Because the peer may fail to save a pseudonym username sent to in an
EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge, for example due to malfunction, the EAP
server SHOULD maintain at least the most recently used pseudonym
username in addition to the most recently issued pseudonym username.
If the authentication exchange is not completed successfully, then
the server SHOULD NOT overwrite the pseudonym username that was
issued during the most recent successful authentication exchange.
4.1.1.8 Transmitting Pseudonyms and Fast Re-authentication Identities to
the Peer
The server transmits pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication
identities to the peer in cipher, using the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
The EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge message MAY include an encrypted
pseudonym username and/or an encrypted fast re-authentication
identity in the value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute. Because
identity privacy support and fast re-authentication are optional to
implement, the peer MAY ignore the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute and always
use the permanent identity. On fast re-authentication (discussed in
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Section 4.2), the server MAY include a new encrypted fast
re-authentication identity in the EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication
message.
On receipt of the EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge, the peer MAY decrypt the
encrypted data in AT_ENCR_DATA and if a pseudonym username is
included, the peer may use the obtained pseudonym username on the
next full authentication. If a fast re-authentication identity is
included, then the peer MAY save it together with other fast
re-authentication state information, as discussed in Section 4.2, for
the next re- authentication.
If the peer does not receive a new pseudonym username in the EAP-
Request/AKA-Challenge message, the peer MAY use an old pseudonym
username instead of the permanent username on next full
authentication. The username portions of fast re-authentication
identities are one-time usernames, which the peer MUST NOT re-use.
When the peer uses a fast re-authentication identity in an EAP
exchange, the peer MUST discard the fast re-authentication identity
and not re-use it in another EAP authentication exchange, even if the
authentication exchange was not completed.
4.1.1.9 Usage of the Pseudonym by the Peer
When the optional identity privacy support is used on full
authentication, the peer MAY use a pseudonym username received as
part of a previous full authentication sequence as the username
portion of the NAI. The peer MUST NOT modify the pseudonym username
received in AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM. However, as discussed above, the peer
MAY need to decorate the username in some environments by appending
or prepending the username with a string that indicates supplementary
AAA routing information.
When using a pseudonym username in an environment where a realm
portion is used, the peer concatenates the received pseudonym
username with the "@" character and a NAI realm portion. The
selection of the NAI realm is discussed above. The peer can select
the realm portion similarly regardless of whether it uses the
permanent username or a pseudonym username.
4.1.1.10 Usage of the Fast Re-authentication Identity by the Peer
On fast re-authentication, the peer uses the fast re-authentication
identity, received as part of the previous authentication sequence. A
new fast re-authentication identity may be delivered as part of both
full authentication and fast re-authentication. The peer MUST NOT
modify the username part of the fast re-authentication identity
received in AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID, except in cases when username
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decoration is required. Even in these cases, the "root" fast
re-authentication username must not be modified, but it may be
appended or prepended with another string.
4.1.2 Communicating the Peer Identity to the Server
4.1.2.1 General
The peer identity MAY be communicated to the server with the
EAP-Response/Identity message. This message MAY contain the permanent
identity, a pseudonym identity, or a fast re-authentication identity.
If the peer uses the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity,
which the server is able to map to the permanent identity, then the
authentication proceeds as discussed in the overview of Section 3. If
the peer uses a fast re-authentication identity, and if the fast
re-authentication identity matches with a valid fast
re-authentication identity maintained by the server , then a fast
re-authentication exchange is performed, as described in Section 4.2.
The peer identity can also be transmitted from the peer to the server
using EAP-AKA messages instead of EAP-Response/Identity. In this
case, the server includes an identity requesting attribute
(AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ or AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ) in the
EAP-Request/AKA-Identity message, and the peer includes the
AT_IDENTITY attribute, which contains the peer's identity, in the
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity message. The AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute is a
general identity requesting attribute, which the server uses if it
does not specify which kind of an identity the peer should return in
AT_IDENTITY. The server uses the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute to
request either the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity. The
server uses the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute to request the peer to
send its permanent identity. The EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge,
EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge, or the packets used on fast
re-authentication may optionally include the AT_CHECKCODE attribute,
which enables the protocol peers to ensure the integrity of the
AKA-Identity packets. AT_CHECKCODE is specified in Section 7.13.
The identity format in the AT_IDENTITY attribute is the same as in
the EAP-Response/Identity packet (except that identity decoration is
not allowed). The AT_IDENTITY attribute contains a permanent
identity, a pseudonym identity or a fast re-authentication identity.
Obtaining the subscriber identity via EAP-AKA messages is useful if
the server does not have any EAP-AKA peer identity at the beginning
of the EAP-AKA exchange or does not recognize the identity the peer
used in EAP-Response/Identity. This may happen if, for example, the
EAP-Response/Identity has been issued by some EAP method other than
EAP-AKA or if intermediate entities or software layers in the peer
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have modified the identity string in the EAP-Response/Identity
packet. Also, some EAP layer implementations may cache the identity
string from the first EAP authentication and do not obtain a new
identity string from the EAP method implementation on subsequent
authentication exchanges.
As the identity string is used in key derivation, any of these cases
will result in failed authentication unless the EAP server uses
EAP-AKA attributes to obtain an unmodified copy of the identity
string. Therefore, unless the EAP server can be certain that no
intermediate element or software layer has modified the EAP-
Response/Identity packet, the EAP server MUST use the EAP-AKA
attributes to obtain the identity, even if the identity received in
EAP-Response/Identity was valid.
Please note that the EAP-AKA peer and the EAP-AKA server only process
the AT_IDENTITY attribute and entities that only pass through EAP
packets do not process this attribute. Hence, if the EAP server is
not co-located in the authenticator, then the authenticator and other
intermediate AAA elements (such as possible AAA proxy servers) will
continue to refer to the peer with the original identity from the
EAP-Response/Identity packet regardless of whether the AT_IDENTITY
attribute is used in EAP-AKA to transmit another identity.
4.1.2.2 Choice of Identity for the EAP-Response/Identity
If EAP-AKA peer is started upon receiving an EAP-Request/Identity
message, then the peer performs the following steps.
If the peer has maintained fast re-authentication state information
and if the peer wants to use fast re-authentication, then the peer
transmits the fast re-authentication identity in EAP-Response/
Identity.
Else, if the peer has a pseudonym username available, then the peer
transmits the pseudonym identity in EAP-Response/Identity.
In other cases, the peer transmits the permanent identity in
EAP-Response/Identity.
4.1.2.3 Server Operation in the Beginning of EAP-AKA Exchange
If the EAP server has not received any EAP-AKA peer identity
(permanent identity, pseudonym identity or fast re-authentication
identity) from the peer when sending the first EAP-AKA request, or if
the EAP server has received an EAP-Response/Identity packet but the
contents do not appear to be a valid permanent identity, pseudonym
identity or a re- authentication identity, then the server MUST
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request an identity from the peer using one of the methods below.
The server sends the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity message with the
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ message to indicate that the server wants the
peer to include the permanent identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute
of the EAP-Response/AKA-Identity message. This is done in the
following cases:
o The server does not support fast re-authentication or identity
privacy.
o The server received an identity that it recognizes as a pseudonym
identity but the server is not able to map the pseudonym identity
to a permanent identity.
o The server issues the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity packet with the
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute to indicate that the server wants the
peer to include a full authentication identity (pseudonym identity
or permanent identity) in the AT_IDENTITY attribute of the
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity message. This is done in the following
cases:
o The server does not support fast re-authentication and the server
supports identity privacy
o The server received an identity that it recognizes as a re-
authentication identity but the server is not able to map the re-
authentication identity to a permanent identity
The server issues the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity packet with the
AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute to indicate that the server wants the peer to
include an identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/
SIM/Start message, and the server does not indicate any preferred
type for the identity. This is done in other cases, such as when the
server does not have any identity, or the server does not recognize
the format of a received identity.
4.1.2.4 Processing of EAP-Request/AKA-Identity by the Peer
Upon receipt of an EAP-Request/AKA-Identity message, the peer MUST
perform the following steps.
If the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity includes AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, and if
the peer does not have a pseudonym available, then the peer MUST
respond with EAP-Response/AKA-Identity and include the permanent
identity in AT_IDENTITY. If the peer has a pseudonym available, then
the peer MAY refuse to send the permanent identity; hence in this
case the peer MUST either respond with EAP-Response/AKA-Identity and
include the permanent identity in AT_IDENTITY or respond with
EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error packet with code "unable to process
packet".
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If the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity includes AT_FULL_AUTH_ID_REQ, and if
the peer has a pseudonym available, then the peer SHOULD respond with
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity and include the pseudonym identity in
AT_IDENTITY. If the peer does not have a pseudonym when it receives
this message, then the peer MUST respond with EAP-Response/
AKA-Identity and include the permanent identity in AT_IDENTITY. The
Peer MUST NOT use a fast re-authentication identity in the
AT_IDENTITY attribute.
If the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity includes AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if the
peer has maintained fast re-authentication state information and the
peer wants to use fast re-authentication, then the peer responds with
EAP- Response/AKA-Identity and includes the fast re-authentication
identity in AT_IDENTITY. Else, if the peer has a pseudonym identity
available, then the peer responds with EAP-Response/AKA-Identity and
includes the pseudonym identity in AT_IDENTITY. Else, the peer
responds with EAP-Response/AKA-Identity and includes the permanent
identity in AT_IDENTITY.
An EAP-AKA exchange may include several EAP/AKA-Identity rounds. The
server may issue a second EAP-Request/AKA-Identity, if it was not
able to recognize the identity the peer used in the previous
AT_IDENTITY attribute. At most three EAP/AKA-Identity rounds can be
used, so the peer MUST NOT respond to more than three EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity messages within an EAP exchange. The peer MUST verify
that the sequence of EAP-Request/AKA-Identity packets the peer
receives comply with the sequencing rules defined in this document.
That is, AT_ANY_ID_REQ can only be used in the first EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity, in other words AT_ANY_ID_REQ MUST NOT be used in the
second or third EAP-Request/AKA-Identity. AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ MUST NOT
be used if the previous EAP-Request/AKA-Identity included
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. The peer operation in cases when it receives an
unexpected attribute or an unexpected message is specified in Section
4.4.1.
4.1.2.5 Attacks against Identity Privacy
The section above specifies two possible ways the peer can operate
upon receipt of AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. This is because a received
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ does not necessarily originate from the valid
network, but an active attacker may transmit an EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity packet with an AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute to the
peer, in an effort to find out the true identity of the user. If the
peer does not want to reveal its permanent identity, then the peer
sends the EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error packet with the error code
"unable to process packet", and the authentication exchange
terminates.
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Basically, there are two different policies that the peer can employ
with regard to AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. A "conservative" peer assumes
that the network is able to maintain pseudonyms robustly. Therefore,
if a conservative peer has a pseudonym username, the peer responds
with EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error to the EAP packet with
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, because the peer believes that the valid network
is able to map the pseudonym identity to the peer's permanent
identity. (Alternatively, the conservative peer may accept
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ in certain circumstances, for example if the
pseudonym was received a long time ago.) The benefit of this policy
is that it protects the peer against active attacks on anonymity. On
the other hand, a "liberal" peer always accepts the
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ and responds with the permanent identity. The
benefit of this policy is that it works even if the valid network
sometimes loses pseudonyms and is not able to map them to the
permanent identity.
4.1.2.6 Processing of AT_IDENTITY by the Server
When the server receives an EAP-Response/AKA-Identity message with
the AT_IDENTITY (in response to the server's identity requesting
attribute), the server MUST operate as follows.
If the server used AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, and if the AT_IDENTITY does
not contain a valid permanent identity, then the server sends an
EAP-Request/AKA-Notification packet with AT_NOTIFICATION code 16384
to terminate the EAP exchange. If the server recognizes the permanent
identity and is able to continue, then the server proceeds with full
authentication by sending EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge.
If the server used AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, and if AT_IDENTITY contains a
valid permanent identity or a pseudonym identity that the server can
map to a valid permanent identity, then the server proceeds with full
authentication by sending EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge. If AT_IDENTITY
contains a pseudonym identity that the server is not able to map to a
valid permanent identity, or an identity that the server is not able
to recognize or classify, then the server sends EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity with AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ.
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if the AT_IDENTITY contains a
valid permanent identity or a pseudonym identity that the server can
map to a valid permanent identity, then the server proceeds with full
authentication by sending EAP-Request/ AKA-Challenge.
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if AT_IDENTITY contains a valid
fast re-authentication identity and the server agrees on using re-
authentication, then the server proceeds with fast re-authentication
by sending EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication (Section 4.2).
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If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if the peer sent an
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity with AT_IDENTITY that contains an identity
that the server recognizes as a fast re-authentication identity, but
the server is not able to map the identity to a permanent identity,
then the server sends EAP-Request/AKA-Identity with
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ.
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if AT_IDENTITY contains a valid
fast re-authentication identity, which the server is able to map to a
permanent identity, and if the server does not want to use fast
re-authentication, then the server proceeds with full authentication
by sending EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge.
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and AT_IDENTITY contains an
identity that the server recognizes as a pseudonym identity but the
server is not able to map the pseudonym identity to a permanent
identity, then the server sends EAP-Request/AKA-Identity with
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ.
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and AT_IDENTITY contains an
identity that the server is not able to recognize or classify, then
the server sends EAP-Request/AKA-Identity with AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ.
4.1.3 Message Sequence Examples (Informative)
This section contains non-normative message sequence examples to
illustrate how the peer identity can be communicated to the server.
4.1.3.1 Usage of AT_ANY_ID_REQ
Obtaining the peer identity with EAP-AKA attributes is illustrated in
Figure 5 below.
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Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have any |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP-AKA |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_ANY_ID_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_IDENTITY) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
Figure 5: Usage of AT_ANY_ID_REQ
4.1.3.2 Fall Back on Full Authentication
Figure 6 illustrates the case when the server does not recognize the
fast re-authentication identity the peer used in AT_IDENTITY.
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Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have any |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP-AKA |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_ANY_ID_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_IDENTITY containing a fast re-auth. identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not recognize |
| | The fast re-auth. |
| | Identity |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_IDENTITY with a full-auth. Identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
Figure 6: Fall back on full authentication
If the server recognizes the fast re-authentication identity, but
still wants to fall back on full authentication, the server may issue
the EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge packet. In this case, the full
authentication procedure proceeds as usual.
4.1.3.3 Requesting the Permanent Identity 1
Figure 7 illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to decode a
pseudonym identity included in the EAP-Response/Identity packet.
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Peer Authenticator
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes a pseudonym) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------+
| | Server fails to decode the |
| | Pseudonym. |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
Figure 7: Requesting the permanent identity 1
If the server recognizes the permanent identity, then the
authentication sequence proceeds as usual with the EAP Server issuing
the EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge message.
4.1.3.4 Requesting the Permanent Identity 2
Figure 8 illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to decode the
pseudonym included in the AT_IDENTITY attribute.
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Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have any |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP-AKA |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_ANY_ID_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
|EAP-Response/AKA-Identity |
|(AT_IDENTITY with a pseudonym identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------+
| | Server fails to decode the |
| | Pseudonym in AT_IDENTITY |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
Figure 8: Requesting the permanent identity 2
4.1.3.5 Three EAP/AKA-Identity Round Trips
Figure 9 illustrates the case with three EAP/AKA-Identity round
trips.
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Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have any |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP-AKA |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_ANY_ID_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_IDENTITY with fast re-auth. identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not accept |
| | The fast re-authentication |
| | Identity |
| +------------------------------+
| |
: :
: :
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: :
: :
| EAP-Request/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
|EAP-Response/AKA-Identity |
|(AT_IDENTITY with a pseudonym identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +------------------------------+
| | Server fails to decode the |
| | Pseudonym in AT_IDENTITY |
| +------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/AKA-Identity |
| (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
Figure 9: Three EAP-AKA Start rounds
After the last EAP-Response/AKA-Identity message, the full
authentication sequence proceeds as usual.
4.2 Fast Re-authentication
4.2.1 General
In some environments, EAP authentication may be performed frequently.
Because the EAP-AKA full authentication procedure makes use of the
UMTS AKA algorithms, and it therefore requires fresh authentication
vectors from the Authentication Centre, the full authentication
procedure may result in many network operations when used very
frequently. Therefore, EAP-AKA includes a more inexpensive fast
re-authentication procedure that does not make use of the UMTS AKA
algorithms and does not need new vectors from the Authentication
Centre.
Fast re-authentication is optional to implement for both the EAP-AKA
server and peer. On each EAP authentication, either one of the
entities may also fall back on full authentication if they do not
want to use fast re-authentication.
Fast re-authentication is based on the keys derived on the preceding
full authentication. The same K_aut and K_encr keys as in full
authentication are used to protect EAP-AKA packets and attributes,
and the original Master Key from full authentication is used to
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generate a fresh Master Session Key, as specified in Section 4.5.
The fast re-authentication exchange makes use of an unsigned 16-bit
counter, included in the AT_COUNTER attribute. The counter has three
goals: 1) it can be used to limit the number of successive
reauthentication exchanges without full-authentication 2) it
contributes to the keying material, and 3) it protects the peer and
the server from replays. On full authentication, both the server and
the peer initialize the counter to one. The counter value of at least
one is used on the first fast re-authentication. On subsequent fast
re-authentications, the counter MUST be greater than on any of the
previous fast re-authentications. For example, on the second fast
re-authentication, counter value is two or greater etc. The
AT_COUNTER attribute is encrypted.
Both the peer and the EAP server maintain a copy of the counter. The
EAP server sends its counter value to the peer in the fast
re-authentication request. The peer MUST verify that its counter
value is less than or equal to the value sent by the EAP server.
The server includes an encrypted server random nonce (AT_NONCE_S) in
the fast re-authentication request. The AT_MAC attribute in the
peer's response is calculated over NONCE_S to provide a challenge/
response authentication scheme. The NONCE_S also contributes to the
new Master Session Key.
Both the peer and the server SHOULD have an upper limit for the
number of subsequent fast re-authentications allowed before a full
authentication needs to be performed. Because a 16-bit counter is
used in fast re-authentication, the theoretical maximum number of re-
authentications is reached when the counter value reaches FFFF
hexadecimal. In order to use fast re-authentication, the peer and the
EAP server need to store the following values: Master Key, latest
counter value and the next fast re-authentication identity. K_aut,
K_encr may either be stored or derived again from MK. The server may
also need to store the permanent identity of the user.
4.2.2 Comparison to UMTS AKA
When analyzing the fast re-authentication exchange, it may be helpful
to compare it with the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
exchange, which it resembles closely. The counter corresponds to the
UMTS AKA sequence number, NONCE_S corresponds to RAND, and AT_MAC in
EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication corresponds to AUTN, the AT_MAC in
EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication corresponds to RES,
AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL corresponds to AUTS, and encrypting the counter
corresponds to the usage of the Anonymity Key. Also the key
generation on fast re-authentication with regard to random or fresh
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material is similar to UMTS AKA -- the server generates the NONCE_S
and counter values, and the peer only verifies that the counter value
is fresh.
It should also be noted that encrypting the AT_NONCE_S, AT_COUNTER or
AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL attributes is not important to the security of
the fast re-authentication exchange.
4.2.3 Fast Re-authentication Identity
The fast re-authentication procedure makes use of separate re-
authentication user identities. Pseudonyms and the permanent identity
are reserved for full authentication only. If a fast
re-authentication identity is lost and the network does not recognize
it, the EAP server can fall back on full authentication. If the EAP
server supports fast re-authentication, it MAY include the skippable
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute in the encrypted data of EAP- Request/
AKA-Challenge message. This attribute contains a new re-
authentication identity for the next fast re-authentication. The
attribute also works as a capability flag that indicates the fact
that the server supports fast re-authentication, and that the server
wants to continue using fast re-authentication within the current
context. The peer MAY ignore this attribute, in which case it will
use full authentication next time. If the peer wants to use fast
re-authentication, it uses this fast re-authentication identity on
next authentication. Even if the peer has a fast re-authentication
identity, the peer MAY discard the re- authentication identity and
use a pseudonym or the permanent identity instead, in which case full
authentication MUST be performed. If the EAP server does not include
the AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID in the encrypted data of EAP-Request/
AKA-Challenge or EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication, then the peer MUST
discard its current fast re-authentication state information and
perform a full authentication next time.
In environments where a realm portion is needed in the peer identity,
the fast re-authentication identity received in AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID
MUST contain both a username portion and a realm portion, as per the
NAI format. The EAP Server can choose an appropriate realm part in
order to have the AAA infrastructure route subsequent fast
re-authentication related requests to the same AAA server. For
example, the realm part MAY include a portion that is specific to the
AAA server. Hence, it is sufficient to store the context required for
fast re-authentication in the AAA server that performed the full
authentication.
The peer MAY use the fast re-authentication identity in the
EAP-Response/Identity packet or, in response to server's
AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute, the peer MAY use the fast re-authentication
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identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/
AKA-Identity packet. The peer MUST NOT modify the username portion of
the fast re-authentication identity, but the peer MAY modify the
realm portion or replace it with another realm portion.
Even if the peer uses a fast re-authentication identity, the server
may want to fall back on full authentication, for example because the
server does not recognize the fast re-authentication identity or does
not want to use fast re-authentication. If the server was able to
decode the fast re-authentication identity to the permanent identity,
the server issues the EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge packet to initiate
full authentication. If the server was not able to recover the peer's
identity from the fast re-authentication identity, the server starts
the full authentication procedure by issuing an EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity packet. This packet always starts a full authentication
sequence if it does not include the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute.
4.2.4 Fast Re-authentication Procedure
Figure 10 illustrates the fast re-authentication procedure. In this
example, the optional protected success indication is not used.
Encrypted attributes are denoted with '*'. The peer uses its fast
re-authentication identity in the EAP-Response/Identity packet. As
discussed above, an alternative way to communicate the fast
re-authentication identity to the server is for the peer to use the
AT_IDENTITY attribute in the EAP-Response/AKA-Identity message. This
latter case is not illustrated in the figure below, and it is only
possible when the server requests the peer to send its identity by
including the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute in the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
packet.
If the server recognizes the identity as a valid fast
re-authentication identity, and if the server agrees on using fast
re-authentication, then the server sends the EAP- Request/
AKA-Reauthentication packet to the peer. This packet MUST include the
encrypted AT_COUNTER attribute, with a fresh counter value, the
encrypted AT_NONCE_S attribute that contains a random number chosen
by the server, the AT_ENCR_DATA and the AT_IV attributes used for
encryption, and the AT_MAC attribute that contains a message
authentication code over the packet. The packet MAY also include an
encrypted AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute that contains the next fast
re-authentication identity.
Fast re-authentication identities are one-time identities. If the
peer does not receive a new fast re-authentication identity, it MUST
use either the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity on the next
authentication to initiate full authentication.
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The peer verifies that AT_MAC is correct and that the counter value
is fresh (greater than any previously used value). The peer MAY save
the next fast re-authentication identity from the encrypted
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID for next time. If all checks are successful, the
peer responds with the EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication packet,
including the AT_COUNTER attribute with the same counter value and
the AT_MAC attribute.
The server verifies the AT_MAC attribute and also verifies that the
counter value is the same that it used in the EAP-Request/AKA-
Reauthentication packet. If these checks are successful, the fast
re-authentication has succeeded and the server sends the EAP-Success
packet to the peer.
If protected success indications (Section 4.3.2) were used, the
EAP-Success packet would be preceded by an EAP-SIM notification
round.
Peer Authenticator
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes a fast re-authentication identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +--------------------------------+
| | Server recognizes the identity |
| | and agrees on using fast |
| | re-authentication |
| +--------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication |
| (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, *AT_COUNTER, |
| *AT_NONCE_S, *AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID, AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
: :
: :
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: :
: :
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| Peer verifies AT_MAC and the freshness of | |
| the counter. Peer MAY store the new re- | |
| authentication identity for next re-auth. | |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication |
| (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, *AT_COUNTER with same value, |
| AT_MAC) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +--------------------------------+
| | Server verifies AT_MAC and |
| | the counter |
| +--------------------------------+
| EAP-Success |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
Figure 10: Reauthentication
4.2.5 Fast Re-authentication Procedure when Counter is Too Small
If the peer does not accept the counter value of EAP-Request/
AKA-Reauthentication, it indicates the counter synchronization
problem by including the encrypted AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL in
EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication. The server responds with
EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge to initiate a normal full authentication
procedure. This is illustrated in Figure 11. Encrypted attributes are
denoted with '*'.
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Peer Authenticator
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes a fast re-authentication identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication |
| (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, *AT_COUNTER, |
| *AT_NONCE_S, *AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID, AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| AT_MAC is valid but the counter is not fresh. | |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication |
| (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, *AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL, |
| *AT_COUNTER, AT_MAC) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +----------------------------------------------+
| | Server verifies AT_MAC but detects |
| | That peer has included AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL|
| +----------------------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Normal full authentication follows. |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
Figure 11: Fast re-authentication counter too small
In the figure above, the first three messages are similar to the
basic fast re-authentication case. When the peer detects that the
counter value is not fresh, it includes the AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL
attribute in EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication. This attribute
doesn't contain any data but it is a request for the server to
initiate full authentication. In this case, the peer MUST ignore the
contents of the server's AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute.
On receipt of AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL, the server verifies AT_MAC and
verifies that AT_COUNTER contains the same counter value as in the
EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication packet. If not, the server
terminates the authentication exchange by sending the EAP-Request/
AKA-Notification packet with AT_NOTIFICATION code 16384. If all
checks on the packet are successful, the server transmits a
EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge packet and the full authentication
procedure is performed as usual. Since the server already knows the
subscriber identity, it MUST NOT use the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
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packet to request the identity.
4.3 EAP-AKA Notifications
4.3.1 General
The EAP server can use EAP-AKA notifications to convey localizable
notifications and result indications (Section 4.3.2) to the peer.
The server MUST use notifications in cases discussed in Section
4.4.2. When the EAP server issues an EAP-Request/AKA-Notification
packet to the peer, the peer MUST process the notification packet.The
peer MAY show a notification message to the user and the peer MUST
respond to the EAP server with an EAP-Response/AKA-Notification
packet, even if the peer did not recognize the notification code.
An EAP-AKA full authentication exchange or a fast re-authentication
exchange MUST NOT include more than one EAP-AKA notification round.
The notification code is a 16-bit number. The most significant bit is
called the Failure bit (F bit). The F bit specifies whether the
notification implies failure. The code values with the F bit set to
zero (code values 0...32767) are used on unsuccessful cases. The
receipt of a notification code from this range implies failed EAP
exchange, so the peer can use the notification as a failure
indication. After receiving the EAP-Response/AKA-Notification for
these notification codes, the server MUST send the EAP-Failure
packet.
The receipt of a notification code with the F bit set to one (values
32768...65536) does not imply failure. Notification code 32768 has
been reserved as a general notification code to indicate successful
authentication.
The second most significant bit of the notification code is called
the Phase bit (P bit). It specifies at which phase of the EAP-AKA
exchange the notification can be used. If the P bit is set to zero,
the notification can only be used after a successful EAP/
AKA-Challenge round in full authentication or a successful EAP/
AKA-Reauthentication round in reautentication. A re-authentication
round is considered successful only if the peer has successfully
verified AT_MAC and AT_COUNTER attributes, and does not include the
AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL attribute in EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication.
If the P bit is set to one, the notification can only by used before
the EAP/AKA-Challenge round in full authentication or before the EAP/
AKA-Reauthentication round in reauthentication.
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Section 6.10 and Section 6.11 specify what other attributes must be
included in the notification packets.
Some of the notification codes are authorization related and hence
not usually considered as part of the responsibility of an EAP
method. However, they are included as part of EAP-AKA because there
are currently no other ways to convey this information to the user in
a localizable way, and the information is potentially useful for the
user. An EAP-AKA server implementation may decide never to send these
EAP-AKA notifications.
4.3.2 Result Indications
As discussed in Section 4.4, the server and the peer use explicit
error messages in all error cases. If the server detects an error
after successful authentication, the server uses an EAP-AKA
notification to indicate failure to the peer. In this case, the
result indication is integrity and replay protected.
By sending an EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge packet or an EAP-Response/
AKA-Reauthentication packet (without AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL), the peer
indicates that it has successfully authenticated the server and that
the peer's local policy accepts the EAP exchange. In other words,
these packets are implicit success indications from the peer to the
server.
EAP-AKA also supports optional protected success indications from the
server to the peer. If the EAP server wants to use protected success
indications, it includes the AT_RESULT_IND attribute in the
EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge or the EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication
packet. This attribute indicates, that the EAP server would like to
use result indications in both successful and unsuccessful cases. If
the peer also wants this, the peer includes AT_RESULT_IND in
EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge or EAP-Response/AKA-Re-authentication. The
peer MUST NOT include AT_RESULT_IND if it did not receive
AT_RESULT_IND from the server. If both the peer and the server used
AT_RESULT_IND, then the EAP exchange is not complete yet, but an
EAP-AKA notification round will follow. The following EAP-SIM
notification may indicate either failure or success.
Success indications with the AT_NOTIFICATION code 32768 can only be
used if both the server and the peer indicate they want to use them
with AT_RESULT_IND. If the server did not include AT_RESULT_IND in
the EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge or EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication
packet, or if the peer did not include AT_RESULT_IND in the
corresponding response packet, then the server MUST NOT use protected
success indications.
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Because the AT_NOTIFICATION code 32768 is used to indicate success,
the server MUST ignore the contents of the EAP-AKA response it
receives to the EAP-Request/AKA-Notification with this code.
Regardless of the contents of the EAP-AKA response, the server MUST
send EAP-Success as the next packet.
4.4 Error Cases
This section specifies the operation of the peer and the server in
error cases. The subsections below require the EAP-AKA peer and
server to send an error packet (EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error or
EAP-Request/AKA-Notification) in error cases. However,
implementations SHOULD NOT rely upon the correct error reporting
behavior of the peer, authenticator, or the server. It is possible
for error and other messages to be lost in transit or for a malicious
participant to attempt to consume resources by not issuing error
messages. Both the peer and the EAP server SHOULD have a mechanism
to clean up state even if an error message or EAP-Success is not
received after a timeout period.
4.4.1 Peer Operation
Two special error messages have been specified for error cases that
are related to the processing of the UMTS AKA AUTN parameter, as
described in Section 3: (1) if the peer does not accept AUTN, the
peer responds with EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject (Section
6.5), and the server issues EAP-Failure, and (2) if the peer detects
that the sequence number in AUTN is not correct, the peer responds
with EAP-Response/AKA-Synchronization-Failure (Section 6.6), and the
server proceeds with a new EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge.
In other error cases, when an EAP-AKA peer detects an error in a
received EAP-AKA packet, the EAP-AKA peer responds with the
EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error packet. In response to the
EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error, the EAP server MUST issue the
EAP-Failure packet and the authentication exchange terminates.
By default, the peer uses the client error code 0, "unable to process
packet". This error code is used in the following cases:
o EAP exchange is not acceptable according to the peer's local
policy.
o the peer is not able to parse the EAP request, i.e. the EAP
request is malformed
o the peer encountered a malformed attribute
o wrong attribute types or duplicate attributes have been included
in the EAP request
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o a mandatory attribute is missing
o unrecognized non-skippable attribute
o unrecognized or unexpected EAP-AKA Subtype in the EAP request
o invalid AT_MAC
o invalid AT_CHECKCODE
o invalid pad bytes in AT_PADDING
o the peer does not want to process AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ
4.4.2 Server Operation
If an EAP-AKA server detects an error in a received EAP-AKA response,
the server MUST issue the EAP-Request/AKA-Notification packet with an
AT_NOTIFICATION code that implies failure. By default, the server
uses one of the general failure codes (0 or 16384). The choice
between these two codes depends on the phase of the EAP-AKA exchange,
see Section 4.3. The errors cases when the server issues an
EAP-Request/AKA-Notification that implies failure include the
following:
o the server is not able to parse the peer's EAP response
o the server encounters a malformed attribute, a non-recognized non-
skippable attribute, or a duplicate attribute
o a mandatory attribute is missing or an invalid attribute was
included
o unrecognized or unexpected EAP-AKA Subtype in the EAP Response
o invalid AT_MAC
o invalid AT_CHECKCODE
o invalid AT_COUNTER
4.4.3 EAP-Failure
The EAP-AKA server sends EAP-Failure in three cases:
1) In response to an EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error packet the server
has received from the peer, or
2) In response to an EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject packet
the server has received from the peer, or
3) Following an EAP-AKA notification round, when the AT_NOTIFICATION
code implies failure.
The EAP-AKA server MUST NOT send EAP-Failure in other cases than
these three. However, it should be noted that even though the EAP-AKA
server would not send an EAP-Failure, an authorization decision that
happens outside EAP-AKA, such as in the AAA server or in an
intermediate AAA proxy, may result in a failed exchange.
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The peer MUST accept the EAP-Failure packet in case 1), case 2) and
case 3) above. The peer SHOULD silently discard the EAP-Failure
packet in other cases.
4.4.4 EAP-Success
On full authentication, the server can only send EAP-Success after
the EAP/AKA-Challenge round. The peer MUST silently discard any
EAP-Success packets if they are received before the peer has
successfully authenticated the server and sent the EAP-Response/
AKA-Challenge packet.
If the peer did not indicate that it wants to use protected success
indications with AT_RESULT_IND (as discussed in Section 4.3.2) on
full authentication, then the peer MUST accept EAP-Success after a
successful EAP/AKA-Challenge round.
If the peer indicated that it wants to use protected success
indications with AT_RESULT_IND (as discussed in Section 4.3.2), then
the peer MUST NOT accept EAP-Success after a successful EAP/
AKA-Challenge round. In this case, the peer MUST only accept
EAP-Success after receiving an EAP-AKA Notification with the
AT_NOTIFICATION code 32768.
On fast re-authentication, EAP-Success can only be sent after the
EAP/AKA-Reauthentication round. The peer MUST silently discard any
EAP-Success packets if they are received before the peer has
successfully authenticated the server and sent the EAP-Response/
AKA-Reauthentication packet.
If the peer did not indicate that it wants to use protected success
indications with AT_RESULT_IND (as discussed in Section 4.3.2) on
fast re-authentication, then the peer MUST accept EAP-Success after a
successful EAP/AKA-Reauthentication round.
If the peer indicated that it wants to use protected success
indications with AT_RESULT_IND (as discussed in Section 4.3.2), then
the peer MUST NOT accept EAP-Success after a successful EAP/
AKA-Reauthentication round. In this case, the peer MUST only accept
EAP-Success after receiving an EAP-AKA Notification with the
AT_NOTIFICATION code 32768.
If the peer receives an EAP-AKA notification (Section 4.3) that
indicates failure, then the peer MUST no longer accept the EAP-
Success packet even if the server authentication was successfully
completed.
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4.5 Key Generation
This section specifies how keying material is generated.
On EAP-AKA full authentication, a Master Key (MK) is derived from the
underlying UMTS AKA values (CK and IK keys), and the identity as
follows.
MK = SHA1(Identity|IK|CK)
In the formula above, the "|" character denotes concatenation.
Identity denotes the peer identity string without any terminating
null characters. It is the identity from the AT_IDENTITY attribute
from the last EAP-Response/AKA-Identity packet, or, if AT_IDENTITY
was not used, the identity from the EAP-Response/Identity packet. The
identity string is included as-is, without any changes and including
the possible identity decoration. The hash function SHA-1 is
specified in [SHA-1].
The Master Key is fed into a Pseudo-Random number Function (PRF),
which generates separate Transient EAP Keys (TEKs) for protecting
EAP-AKA packets, as well as a Master Session Key (MSK) for link layer
security and an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) for other
purposes. On fast re-authentication, the same TEKs MUST be used for
protecting EAP packets, but a new MSK and a new EMSK MUST be derived
from the original MK and new values exchanged in the fast
re-authentication.
EAP-AKA requires two TEKs for its own purposes, the authentication
key K_aut to be used with the AT_MAC attribute, and the encryption
key K_encr, to be used with the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute. The same
K_aut and K_encr keys are used in full authentication and subsequent
fast re-authentications.
Key derivation is based on the random number generation specified in
NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication
186-2 [PRF]. The pseudo-random number generator is specified in the
change notice 1 (2001 October 5) of [PRF] (Algorithm 1). As specified
in the change notice (page 74), when Algorithm 1 is used as a
general-purpose pseudo-random number generator, the "mod q" term in
step 3.3 is omitted. The function G used in the algorithm is
constructed via Secure Hash Standard as specified in Appendix 3.3 of
the standard. It should be noted that the function G is very similar
to SHA-1, but the message padding is different. Please refer to [PRF]
for full details. For convenience, the random number algorithm with
the correct modification is cited in Annex A.
160-bit XKEY and XVAL values are used, so b = 160. On each full
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authentication, the Master Key is used as the initial secret seed-key
XKEY. The optional user input values (XSEED_j) in step 3.1 are set to
zero.
On full authentication, the resulting 320-bit random numbers x_0,
x_1, ..., x_m-1 are concatenated and partitioned into suitable-sized
chunks and used as keys in the following order: K_encr (128 bits),
K_aut (128 bits), Master Session Key (64 bytes), Extended Master
Session Key (64 bytes).
On fast re-authentication, the same pseudo-random number generator
can be used to generate a new Master Session Key and a new Extended
Master Session Key. The seed value XKEY' is calculated as follows:
XKEY' = SHA1(Identity|counter|NONCE_S| MK)
In the formula above, the Identity denotes the fast re-authentication
identity, without any terminating null characters, from the
AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/AKA-Identity packet, or, if
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity was not used on fast re-authentication, the
identity string from the EAP-Response/Identity packet. The counter
denotes the counter value from AT_COUNTER attribute used in the
EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication packet. The counter is used in
network byte order. NONCE_S denotes the 16-byte random NONCE_S value
from the AT_NONCE_S attribute used in the EAP-Request/
AKA-Reauthentication packet. The MK is the Master Key derived on the
preceding full authentication.
On fast re-authentication, the pseudo-random number generator is run
with the new seed value XKEY', and the resulting 320-bit random
numbers x_0, x_1, ..., x_m-1 are concatenated and partitioned into
64-byte chunks and used as the new 64-byte Master Session Key and the
new 64-byte Extended Master Session Key. Note that because K_encr and
K_aut are not derived on fast re-authentication, the Master Session
Key and the Extended Master Session key are obtained from the
beginning of the key stream x_0, x_1, ....
The first 32 bytes of the MSK can be used as the Pairwise Master Key
(PMK) for IEEE 802.11i.
When the RADIUS attributes specified in [RFC2548] are used to
transport keying material, then the first 32 bytes of the MSK
correspond to MS-MPPE-RECV-KEY and the second 32 bytes to
MS-MPPE-SEND-KEY. In this case, only 64 bytes of keying material (the
MSK) are used.
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5. Message Format and Protocol Extensibility
5.1 Message Format
As specified in [EAP], EAP packets begin with the Code, Identifiers,
Length, and Type fields, which are followed by EAP method specific
Type-Data. The Code field in the EAP header is set to 1 for EAP
requests, and to 2 for EAP Responses. The usage of the Length and
Identifier fields in the EAP header is also specified in [EAP]. In
EAP-AKA, the Type field is set to 23.
In EAP-AKA, the Type-Data begins with an EAP-AKA header that consists
of a 1-octet Subtype field, and a 2-octet reserved field. The Subtype
values used in EAP-AKA are defined in Section 8. The formats of the
EAP header and the EAP-AKA header are shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The rest of the Type-Data, immediately following the EAP-AKA header,
consists of attributes that are encoded in Type, Length, Value
format. The figure below shows the generic format of an attribute.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Attribute Type | Length | Value...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Attribute Type
Indicates the particular type of attribute. The attribute type
values are listed in
Section 8
.
Length
Indicates the length of this attribute in multiples of 4 bytes.
The maximum length of an attribute is 1024 bytes. The length
includes the Attribute Type and Length bytes.
Value
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The particular data associated with this attribute. This field is
always included and it is two or more bytes in length. The type
and length fields determine the format and length of the value
field.
Attributes numbered within the range 0 through 127 are called
non-skippable attributes. When an EAP-AKA peer encounters a
non-skippable attribute type that the peer does not recognize, the
peer MUST send the EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error packet, and the
authentication exchange terminates. If an EAP-AKA server encounters a
non-skippable attribute that the server does not recognize, then the
server sends EAP-Request/AKA-Notification packet with an
AT_NOTIFICATION code that implies general failure (0 or 16384
depending on the phase of the exchange), and the authentication
exchange terminates.
When an attribute numbered in the range 128 through 255 is
encountered but not recognized that particular attribute is ignored,
but the rest of the attributes and message data MUST still be
processed. The Length field of the attribute is used to skip the
attribute value when searching for the next attribute. These
attributes are called skippable attributes.
Unless otherwise specified, the order of the attributes in an EAP AKA
message is insignificant, and an EAP-AKA implementation should not
assume a certain order to be used.
Attributes can be encapsulated within other attributes. In other
words, the value field of an attribute type can be specified to
contain other attributes.
5.2 Protocol Extensibility
EAP-AKA can be extended by specifying new attribute types. If
skippable attributes are used, it is possible to extend the protocol
without breaking old implementations. As specified in Section 7.13,
if new attributes are specified for EAP-Request/AKA-Identity or
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity, then the AT_CHECKCODE MUST be used to
integrity protect the new attributes.
When specifying new attributes, it should be noted that EAP-AKA does
not support message fragmentation. Hence, the sizes of the new
extensions MUST be limited so that the maximum transfer unit (MTU) of
the underlying lower layer is not exceeded. According to [EAP], lower
layers must provide an EAP MTU of 1020 bytes or greater, so any
extensions to EAP-AKA SHOULD NOT exceed the EAP MTU of 1020 bytes.
EAP-AKA packets do not include a version field. However, should there
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be a reason to revise this protocol in the future, new non-skippable
or skippable attributes could be specified in order to implement
revised EAP-AKA versions in a backward-compatible manner. It is
possible to introduce version negotiation in the EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity and EAP-Response/AKA-Identity messages by specifying new
skippable attributes.
6. Messages
This section specifies the messages used in EAP-AKA. It specifies
when a message may be transmitted or accepted, which attributes are
allowed in a message, which attributes are required in a message, and
other message specific details. Message format is specified in
Section 5.1.
6.1 EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
The EAP/AKA-Identity roundtrip MAY used for obtaining the peer
identity to the server. As discussed in Section 4.1, several
AKA-Identity rounds may be required in order to obtain a valid peer
identity.
The server MUST include one of the following identity requesting
attributes: AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, AT_ANY_ID_REQ.
These three attributes are mutually exclusive, so the server MUST NOT
include more than one of the attributes.
If the server has previously issued an EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
message with the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute, and if the server has
received a response from the peer, then the server MUST NOT issue a
new EAP-Request/AKA-Identity packet.
If the server has previously issued an EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
message with the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute, and if the server has
received a response from the peer, then the server MUST NOT issue a
new EAP-Request/AKA-Identity packet with the AT_ANY_ID_REQ or
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attributes.
If the server has previously issued an EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
message with the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute, and if the server has
received a response from the peer, then the server MUST NOT issue a
new EAP-Request/AKA-Identity packet with the AT_ANY_ID_REQ.
This message MUST NOT include AT_MAC, AT_IV, or AT_ENCR_DATA.
6.2 EAP-Response/AKA-Identity
The peer sends EAP-Response/AKA-Identity in response to a valid EAP-
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Request/AKA-Identity from the server.
The peer MUST include the AT_IDENTITY attribute. The usage of
AT_IDENITY is defined in Section 4.1.
This message MUST NOT include AT_MAC, AT_IV, or AT_ENCR_DATA.
6.3 EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge
The server sends the EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge on full authentication
after successfully obtaining the subscriber identity.
The AT_RAND attribute MUST be included.
AT_MAC MUST be included. In EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge, there is no
message-specific data covered by the MAC, see Section 7.15.
The AT_RESULT_IND attribute MAY be included. The usage of this
attribute is discussed in Section 4.3.2.
The AT_CHECKCODE attribute MAY be included, and in certain cases
specified in Section 7.13, it MUST be included.
The EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge packet MAY include encrypted attributes
for identity privacy and for communicating the next re-
authentication identity. In this case, the AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA
attributes are included (Section 7.12).
The plaintext of the AT_ENCR_DATA value field consist of nested
attributes. The nested attributes MAY include AT_PADDING (as
specified in Section 7.12). If the server supports identity privacy
and wants to communicate a pseudonym to the peer for the next full
authentication, then the nested encrypted attributes include the
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM attribute. If the server supports re-
authentication and wants to communicate a fast re-authentication
identity to the peer, then the nested encrypted attributes include
the AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute. Later versions of this protocol MAY
specify additional attributes to be included within the encrypted
data.
When processing this message, the peer MUST process AT_RAND and
AT_AUTN before processing other attributes. Only if these attributes
are verified to be valid, the peer derives keys and verifies AT_MAC.
The operation in case an error occurs is specified in Section 4.4.1.
6.4 EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge
The peer sends EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge in response to a valid
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EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge.
Sending this packet indicates, that the peer has successfully
authenticated the server and that the EAP exchange will be accepted
by the peer's local policy. Hence, if these conditions are not met,
then the peer MUST NOT send EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge, but the peer
MUST send EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. In EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge,
there is no message-specific data covered by the MAC, see Section
7.15.
The AT_RES attribute MUST be included.
The AT_CHECKCODE attribute MAY be included, and in certain cases
specified in Section 7.13, it MUST be included.
The AT_RESULT_IND attribute MAY be included, if it was included in
EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge. The usage of this attribute is discussed
in Section 4.3.2.
Later versions of this protocol MAY make use of the AT_ENCR_DATA and
AT_IV attributes in this message to include encrypted (skippable)
attributes. The EAP server MUST process EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge
messages that include these attributes even if the server did not
implement these optional attributes.
6.5 EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject
The peer sends the EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject packet if
it does not accept the AUTN parameter. This version of the protocol
does not specify any attributes for this message. Future versions of
the protocol MAY specify attributes for this message.
The AT_MAC, AT_ENCR_DATA, or AT_IV attributes MUST NOT be used in
this message.
6.6 EAP-Response/AKA-Synchronization-Failure
The peer sends the EAP-Response/AKA-Synchronization-Failure, when the
sequence number in the AUTN parameter is incorrect.
The peer MUST include the AT_AUTS attribute. Future versions of the
protocol MAY specify other additional attributes for this message.
The AT_MAC, AT_ENCR_DATA, or AT_IV attributes MUST NOT be used in
this message.
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6.7 EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication
The server sends the EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication message if it
wants to use fast re-authentication, and if it has received a valid
fast re-authentication identity in EAP-Response/Identity or
EAP-Response/AKA-Identity.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. No message-specific data is
included in the MAC calculation, see Section 7.15.
The AT_RESULT_IND attribute MAY be included. The usage of this
attribute is discussed in Section 4.3.2.
The AT_CHECKCODE attribute MAY be included, and in certain cases
specified in Section 7.13, it MUST be included.
The AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes MUST be included. The plaintext
consists of the following nested encrypted attributes, which MUST be
included: AT_COUNTER and AT_NONCE_S. In addition, the nested
encrypted attributes MAY include the following attributes:
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID and AT_PADDING.
6.8 EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication
The client sends the EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication packet in
response to a valid EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-Response/AKA-
Reauthentication, the MAC code is calculated over the following data:
EAP packet| NONCE_S. The EAP packet is represented as specified in
Section 5.1. It is followed by the 16-byte NONCE_S value from the
server's AT_NONCE_S attribute.
The AT_CHECKCODE attribute MAY be included, and in certain cases
specified in Section 7.13, it MUST be included.
The AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes MUST be included. The nested
encrypted attributes MUST include the AT_COUNTER attribute. The
AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL attribute MAY be included in the nested
encrypted attributes, and it is included in cases specified in
Section 4.2. The AT_PADDING attribute MAY be included.
The AT_RESULT_IND attribute MAY be included, if it was included in
EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication. The usage of this attribute is
discussed in Section 4.3.2.
Sending this packet without AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL indicates, that the
peer has successfully authenticated the server and that the EAP
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exchange will be accepted by the peer's local policy. Hence, if these
conditions are not met, then the peer MUST NOT send EAP-Response/
AKA-Reauthentication, but the peer MUST send EAP-Response/
AKA-Client-Error.
6.9 EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error
The peer sends EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error in error cases, as
specified in Section 4.4.1.
The AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE attribute MUST be included. The AT_MAC,
AT_IV, or AT_ENCR_DATA attributes MUST NOT be used with this packet.
6.10 EAP-Request/AKA-Notification
The usage of this message is specified in Section 4.3.
The AT_NOTIFICATION attribute MUST be included.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included if the P bit of the
AT_NOTIFICATION code is set to zero, and MUST NOT be included if the
P bit is set to one. The P bit is discussed in in Section 4.3.
No message-specific data is included in the MAC calculation. See
Section 7.15.
If EAP-Request/AKA-Notification is used on a fast re-authentication
exchange, and if the P bit in AT_NOTIFICATION is set to zero, then
AT_COUNTER is used for replay protection. In this case, the
AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_IV attributes MUST be included, and the
encapsulated plaintext attributes MUST include the AT_COUNTER
attribute. The counter value included in AT_COUNTER MUST be the same
as in the EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication packet on the same fast
re-authentication exchange.
6.11 EAP-Response/AKA-Notification
The usage of this message is specified in Section 4.3. This packet is
an acknowledgement of EAP-Request/AKA-Notification.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST included in cases when the P bit of the
notification code in AT_NOTIFICATION of EAP-Request/AKA-Notification
is set to zero, and MUST NOT be included in cases when the P bit is
set to one. The P bit is discussed in Section 4.3.
If EAP-Request/AKA-Notification is used on fast a re-authentication
exchange, and if the P bit in AT_NOTIFICATION is set to zero, then
AT_COUNTER is used for replay protection. In this case, the
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AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_IV attributes MUST be included, and the
encapsulated plaintext attributes MUST include the AT_COUNTER
attribute. The counter value included in AT_COUNTER MUST be the same
as in the EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication packet on the same fast
re-authentication exchange.
7. Attributes
This section specifies the format of message attributes. The
attribute type numbers are specified in Section 8.
7.1 Table of Attributes
The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
in which kinds of messages, and in what quantity. Messages are
denoted with numbers in parentheses as follows: (1) EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity, (2) EAP-Response/AKA-Identity, (3) EAP-Request/
AKA-Challenge, (4) EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge, (5) EAP-Request/
AKA-Notification, (6) EAP-Response/AKA-Notification, (7) EAP-
Response/AKA-Client-Error (8) EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication, (9)
EAP-Response/AKA-Re-authentication, (10) EAP-Response/
AKA-Authentication-Reject, and (11) EAP-Response/
AKA-Synchronization-Failure. The column denoted with "E" indicates
whether the attribute is a nested attribute that MUST be included
within AT_ENCR_DATA.
"0" indicates that the attribute MUST NOT be included in the message,
"1" indicates that the attribute MUST be included in the message,
"0-1" indicates that the attribute is sometimes included in the
message, and "0*" indicates that the attribute is not included in the
message in cases specified in this document, but MAY be included in
the future versions of the protocol.
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Attribute (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)(11) E
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
AT_ANY_ID_REQ 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
AT_IDENTITY 0 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
AT_RAND 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
AT_AUTN 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
AT_RES 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
AT_AUTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 N
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM 0 0 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Y
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID 0 0 0-1 0 0 0 0 0-1 0 0 0 Y
AT_IV 0 0 0-1 0* 0-1 0-1 0 1 1 0 0 N
AT_ENCR_DATA 0 0 0-1 0* 0-1 0-1 0 1 1 0 0 N
AT_PADDING 0 0 0-1 0* 0-1 0-1 0 0-1 0-1 0 0 Y
AT_CHECKCODE 0 0 0-1 0-1 0 0 0 0-1 0-1 0 0 N
AT_RESULT_IND 0 0 0-1 0-1 0 0 0 0-1 0-1 0 0 N
AT_MAC 0 0 1 1 0-1 0-1 0 1 1 0 0 N
AT_COUNTER 0 0 0 0 0-1 0-1 0 1 1 0 0 Y
AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0-1 0 0 Y
AT_NONCE_S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Y
AT_NOTIFICATION 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N
AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 N
It should be noted that attributes AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_ANY_ID_REQ
and AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ are mutually exclusive, so that only one of
them can be included at the same time. If one of the attributes AT_IV
and AT_ENCR_DATA is included, then both of the attributes MUST be
included.
7.2 AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ
The format of the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_PERM..._REQ | Length = 1 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The use of the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ is defined in Section 4.1. The
value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero
on sending and ignored on reception.
7.3 AT_ANY_ID_REQ
The format of the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute is shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_ANY_ID_REQ | Length = 1 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The use of the AT_ANY_ID_REQ is defined in Section 4.1. The value
field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero on
sending and ignored on reception.
7.4 AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ
The format of the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_FULLAUTH_...| Length = 1 | Reserved |
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
The use of the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ is defined in Section 4.1. The
value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero
on sending and ignored on reception.
7.5 AT_IDENTITY
The format of the AT_IDENTITY attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_IDENTITY | Length | Actual Identity Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Identity .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The use of the AT_IDENTITY is defined in Section 4.1. The value field
of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual identity length, which
specifies the length of the identity in bytes. This field is followed
by the subscriber identity of the indicated actual length. The
identity is the permanent identity, a pseudonym identity or a fast
re-authentication identity. The identity format is specified in
Section 4.1.1. The same identity format is used in the AT_IDENTITY
attribute and the EAP-Response/Identity packet, with the exception
that the peer MUST NOT decorate the identity it includes in
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AT_IDENTITY. The identity does not include any terminating null
characters. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of
4 bytes, the sender pads the identity with zero bytes when necessary.
7.6 AT_RAND
The format of the AT_RAND attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_RAND | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| RAND |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains two reserved bytes
followed by the AKA RAND parameter, 16 bytes (128 bits). The reserved
bytes are set to zero when sending and ignored on reception.
7.7 AT_AUTN
The format of the AT_AUTN attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_AUTN | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| AUTN |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains two reserved bytes
followed by the AKA AUTN parameter, 16 bytes (128 bits). The reserved
bytes are set to zero when sending and ignored on reception.
7.8 AT_RES
The format of the AT_RES attribute is shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_RES | Length | RES Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
| |
| RES |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute begins with the 2-byte RES Length,
which is identifies the exact length of the RES in bits. The RES
length is followed by the UMTS AKA RES parameter. According to [TS
33.105] the length of the AKA RES can vary between 32 and 128 bits.
Because the length of the AT_RES attribute must be a multiple of 4
bytes, the sender pads the RES with zero bits where necessary.
7.9 AT_AUTS
The format of the AT_AUTS attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+|
| AT_AUTS | Length = 4 | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| |
| AUTS |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains the AKA AUTS parameter,
112 bits (14 bytes).
7.10 AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM
The format of the AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_NEXT_PSEU..| Length | Actual Pseudonym Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Next Pseudonym .
. .
| |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual pseudonym
length which specifies the length of the following pseudonym in
bytes. This field is followed by a pseudonym username that the peer
can use in the next authentication. The username MUST NOT include any
realm portion. The username does not include any terminating null
characters. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of
4 bytes, the sender pads the pseudonym with zero bytes when
necessary. The username encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation
format [RFC2279]. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by
encapsulating it within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
7.11 AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID
The format of the AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_NEXT_REAU..| Length | Actual Re-Auth Identity Length|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Next Fast Re-authentication Username .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual
re-authentication identity length which specifies the length of the
following fast re-authentication identity in bytes. This field is
followed by a fast re-authentication identity that the peer can use
in the next fast re-authentication, as described in Section 4.2. In
environments where a realm portion is required, the fast
re-authentication identity includes both a username portion and a
realm name portion. The fast re-authentication identity does not
include any terminating null characters. Because the length of the
attribute must be a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender pads the fast
re-authentication identity with zero bytes when necessary. The
identity encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation format
[RFC2279]. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating
it within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
7.12 AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_PADDING
AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes can be used to transmit encrypted
information between the EAP-SIM peer and server.
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The value field of AT_IV contains two reserved bytes followed by a
16-byte initialization vector required by the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
The reserved bytes are set to zero when sending and ignored on
reception. The AT_IV attribute MUST be included if and only if the
AT_ENCR_DATA is included. Section 4.4 specifies the operation if a
packet that does not meet this condition is encountered.
The sender of the AT_IV attribute chooses the initialization vector
by random. The sender MUST NOT reuse the initialization vector value
from previous EAP-AKA packets. The sender SHOULD use a good source of
randomness to generate the initialization vector. Please see
[RFC1750] for more information about generating random numbers for
security applications. The format of AT_IV is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_IV | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Initialization Vector |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute consists of two
reserved bytes followed by cipher text bytes encrypted using the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [AES] with a 128-bit key in the
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation using the
initialization vector from the AT_IV attribute. The reserved bytes
are set to zero when sending and ignored on reception. Please see
[CBC] for a description of the CBC mode. The format of the
AT_ENCR_DATA attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_ENCR_DATA | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Encrypted Data .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The derivation of the encryption key (K_encr) is specified in Section
4.5.
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The plaintext consists of nested EAP-AKA attributes.
The encryption algorithm requires the length of the plaintext to be a
multiple of 16 bytes. The sender may need to include the AT_PADDING
attribute as the last attribute within AT_ENCR_DATA. The AT_PADDING
attribute is not included if the total length of other nested
attributes within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute is a multiple of 16
bytes. As usual, the Length of the Padding attribute includes the
Attribute Type and Attribute Length fields. The length of the Padding
attribute is 4, 8 or 12 bytes. It is chosen so that the length of the
value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute becomes a multiple of 16
bytes. The actual pad bytes in the value field are set to zero (00
hexadecimal) on sending. The recipient of the message MUST verify
that the pad bytes are set to zero. If this verification fails on the
peer, then it MUST send the EAP-Response/AKA-Client- Error packet
with the error code "unable to process packet" to terminate the
authentication exchange. If this verification fails on the server,
then the server sends the EAP-Response/AKA-Notification packet with
an AT_NOTIFICATION code that implies failure to terminate the
authentication exchange. The format of the AT_PADDING attribute is
shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_PADDING | Length | Padding... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
7.13 AT_CHECKCODE
The AT_MAC attribute is not used in the very first EAP-AKA messages
during the AKA-Identity round, because keying material has not been
derived yet. The peer and the server may exchange one or more pairs
of EAP-AKA messages of the Subtype AKA-Identity before keys are
derived and before the AT_MAC attribute can be applied. The EAP/
AKA-Identity messages may also be used upon fast re-authentication.
The AT_CHECKCODE attribute MAY be used to protect the EAP/
AKA-Identity messages. AT_CHECKCODE is included in EAP-Request/
AKA-Challenge and/or EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge upon full
authentication. In fast re-authentication, AT_CHECKCODE MAY be
included in EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication and/or EAP-Response/
AKA-Reauthentication. Because the AT_MAC attribute is used in these
messages, AT_CHECKCODE will be integrity protected with AT_MAC. The
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format of the AT_CHECKCODE attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_CHECKCODE | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Checkcode (0 or 20 bytes) |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of AT_CHECKCODE begins with two reserved bytes, which
may be followed by a 20-byte checkcode. If the checkcode is not
included in AT_CHECKCODE, then the attribute indicates that no EAP/
AKA-Identity messages were exchanged. This may occur in both full
authentication and fast re-authentication. The reserved bytes are set
to zero when sending and ignored on reception.
The checkcode is a hash value, calculated with SHA1 [SHA-1], over all
EAP-Request/AKA-Identity and EAP-Response/ AKA-Identity packets
exchanged in this authentication exchange. The packets are included
in the order that they were transmitted, that is, starting with the
first EAP-Request/ AKA-Identity message, followed by the
corresponding EAP-Response/ AKA-Identity, followed by the second
EAP-Request/ AKA-Identity (if used) etc.
EAP packets are included in the hash calculation "as-is", as they
were transmitted or received. All reserved bytes, padding bytes etc.
that are specified for various attributes are included as such, and
the receiver must not reset them to zero. No delimiter bytes, padding
or any other framing are included between the EAP packets when
calculating the checkcode.
Messages are included in request/response pairs; in other words only
full "round trips" are included. Packets that are silently discarded
are not included. The EAP server must only include an EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity in the calculation once it has received a corresponding
response, with the same Identifier value. Retransmissions or requests
to which the server does not receive response are not included.
The peer must include the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity and the
corresponding response in the calculation only if the peer receives a
subsequent EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge, or a follow-up EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity with different attributes (attribute types) than in the
first EAP-Request/AKA-Identity. After sending EAP-Response/
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AKA-Identity, if the peer receives another EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
with the same attributes as in the previous request, then the peer's
response to the first request must have been lost. In this case the
peer must not include the first request and its response in the
calculation of the checkcode.
The AT_CHECKCODE attribute is optional to implement. It is specified
in order to allow protecting the EAP/AKA-Identity messages and any
future extensions to them. The implementation of AT_CHECKCODE is
RECOMMENDED.
If the receiver of AT_CHECKCODE implements this attribute, then the
receiver MUST check that the checkcode is correct. If the checkcode
is invalid, the receiver must operate as specified in Section 4.4.
If the EAP/AKA-Identity messages are extended with new attributes
then AT_CHECKCODE MUST be implemented and used. More specifically, if
the server includes any other attributes than AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ,
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ or AT_ANY_ID_REQ in the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity
packet, then the server MUST include AT_CHECKCODE in EAP-Request/
AKA-Challenge or EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication. If the peer
includes any other attributes than AT_IDENTITY in the EAP-Response/
AKA-Identity message, then the peer MUST include AT_CHECKCODE in
EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge or EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication.
If the server implements the processing of any other attribute than
AT_IDENTITY for the EAP-Response/AKA-Identity message, then the
server MUST implement AT_CHECKCODE. In this case, if the server
receives any other attribute than AT_IDENTITY in the EAP- Response/
AKA-Identity message, then the server MUST check that AT_CHECKCODE is
present in EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge or EAP- Response/
AKA-Reauthentication. The operation when a mandatory attribute is
missing is specified in Section 4.4.
Similarly, if the peer implements the processing of any other
attribute than AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ or
AT_ANY_ID_REQ for the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity packet, then the peer
MUST implement AT_CHECKCODE. In this case, if the peer receives any
other attribute than AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ or
AT_ANY_ID_REQ in the EAP-Request/AKA-Identity packet, then the peer
MUST check that AT_CHECKCODE is present in EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge
or EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication. The operation when a mandatory
attribute is missing is specified in Section 4.4.
7.14 AT_RESULT_IND
The format of the AT_RESULT_IND attribute is shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_RESULT_...| Length = 1 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute consists of two reserved bytes,
which are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception. This
attribute is always sent unencrypted, so it MUST NOT be encapsulated
within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
7.15 AT_MAC
The AT_MAC attribute is used for EAP-AKA message authentication.
Section 6 specifies which messages AT_MAC MUST be included.
The value field of the AT_MAC attribute contains two reserved bytes
followed by a keyed message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is
calculated over the whole EAP packet, concatenated with optional
message-specific data, with the exception that the value field of the
MAC attribute is set to zero when calculating the MAC. The EAP packet
includes the EAP header that begins with the Code field, the EAP-AKA
header that begins with the Subtype field, and all the attributes, as
specified in Section 5.1. The reserved bytes in AT_MAC are set to
zero when sending and ignored on reception. The contents of the
message-specific data that may be included in the MAC calculation are
specified separately for each EAP-AKA message in Section 6.
The format of the AT_MAC attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_MAC | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| MAC |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The MAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA1-128 [RFC2104] keyed hash value. (The
HMAC-SHA1-128 value is obtained from the 20-byte HMAC-SHA1 value by
truncating the output to 16 bytes. Hence, the length of the MAC is 16
bytes.) The derivation of the authentication key (K_aut) used in the
calculation of the MAC is specified in Section 4.5.
When the AT_MAC attribute is included in an EAP-AKA message, the
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recipient MUST process the AT_MAC attribute before looking at any
other attributes, except when processing EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge.
The processing of EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge is specified in Section
6.3. If the message authentication code is invalid, then the
recipient MUST ignore all other attributes in the message and operate
as specified in Section 4.4.
7.16 AT_COUNTER
The format of the AT_COUNTER attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_COUNTER | Length = 1 | Counter |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of the AT_COUNTER attribute consists of a 16-bit
unsigned integer counter value, represented in network byte order.
This attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating it within
the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
7.17 AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL
The format of the AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_COUNTER...| Length = 1 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute consists of two reserved bytes,
which are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception. This
attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating it within the
AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
7.18 AT_NONCE_S
The format of the AT_NONCE_S attribute is shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_NONCE_S | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| |
| NONCE_S |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of the AT_NONCE_S attribute contains two reserved
bytes followed by a random number generated by the server (16 bytes)
freshly for this EAP-AKA fast re-authentication. The random number is
used as challenge for the peer and also a seed value for the new
keying material. The reserved bytes are set to zero upon sending and
ignored upon reception. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by
encapsulating it within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
The server MUST NOT reuse the NONCE_S value from a previous EAP-AKA
fast re-authentication exchange. The server SHOULD use a good source
of randomness to generate NONCE_S. Please see [RFC1750] for more
information about generating random numbers for security
applications.
7.19 AT_NOTIFICATION
The format of the AT_NOTIFICATION attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_NOTIFICATION| Length = 1 |F|P| Notification Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains a two-byte notification
code. The first and second bit (F and P) of the notification code are
interpreted as described in Section 4.3.
The notification code values listed below have been reserved. The
descriptions below illustrate the semantics of the notifications. The
peer implementation MAY use different wordings when presenting the
notifications to the user. The "requested service" depends on the
environment where EAP-AKA is applied.
0 - General failure. (implies failure, used after successful
authentication)
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16384 - General failure. (implies failure, used before
authentication)
32768 - User has been successfully authenticated. (does not imply
failure, used after successful authentication). The usage of this
code is discussed in Section 4.3.2.
1026 - User has been temporarily denied access to the requested
service. (Implies failure, used after successful authentication)
1031 - User has not subscribed to the requested service (implies
failure, used after successful authentication)
7.20 AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE
The format of the AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_CLIENT_ERR..| Length = 1 | Client Error Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains a two-byte client error
code. The following error code values have been reserved.
0 "unable to process packet": a general error code
8. IANA and Protocol Numbering Considerations
IANA has assigned the EAP type number 23 for EAP-AKA authentication.
EAP-AKA messages include a Subtype field. The Subtype is a new
numbering space for which IANA administration is required. The
following Subtypes are specified in this document:
AKA-Challenge...................................1
AKA-Authentication-Reject.......................2
AKA-Synchronization-Failure.....................4
AKA-Identity....................................5
AKA-Notification...............................12
AKA-Reauthentication...........................13
AKA-Client-Error...............................14
The messages are composed of attributes, which have attribute type
numbers. The EAP-AKA attribute type number is a new numbering space
for which IANA administration is required. The following attribute
types are specified in this document:
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AT_RAND.........................................1
AT_AUTN.........................................2
AT_RES..........................................3
AT_AUTS.........................................4
AT_PADDING......................................6
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ............................10
AT_MAC.........................................11
AT_NOTIFICATION................................12
AT_ANY_ID_REQ..................................13
AT_IDENTITY....................................14
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ.............................17
AT_COUNTER.....................................19
AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL...........................20
AT_NONCE_S.....................................21
AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE...........................22
AT_IV.........................................129
AT_ENCR_DATA..................................130
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM.............................132
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID.............................133
AT_CHECKCODE..................................134
AT_RESULT_IND.................................135
The AT_NOTIFICATION attribute contains a notification code value. The
notification code is a new numbering space for which IANA
administration is required. Values 0, 1024, 1026, 1031, 16384 and
32768 have been specified in Section 7.19 of this document.
The AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE attribute contains a client error code. The
client error code is a new numbering space for which IANA
administration is required. Value 0 has been specified in Section
7.20 of this document.
All requests for value assignment from the various number spaces
described in this document require proper documentation, according to
the "Specification Required" policy described in [RFC2434]. Requests
must be specified in sufficient detail so that interoperability
between independent implementations is possible. Possible forms of
documentation include, but are not limited to, RFCs, the products of
another standards body (e.g. 3GPP), or permanently and readily
available vendor design notes.
EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM [EAP-SIM] are "sister" protocols with similar
message structure and protocol numbering spaces. Many attributes and
message Subtypes have the same protocol numbers in these two
protocols. Hence, it is recommended that the same protocol number
value SHOULD NOT be allocated for two different purposes in EAP-AKA
and EAP-SIM.
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9. Security Considerations
The EAP base protocol specification [EAP] highlights several attacks
that are possible against the EAP protocol. This section discusses
the claimed security properties of EAP-AKA as well as vulnerabilities
and security recommendations.
9.1 Identity Protection
EAP-AKA includes optional Identity privacy support that protects the
privacy of the subscriber identity against passive eavesdropping.
This document only specifies a mechanism to deliver pseudonyms from
the server to the peer as part of an EAP-SIM exchange. Hence, a peer
that has not yet performed any EAP-SIM exchanges does not typically
have a pseudonym available. If the peer does not have a pseudonym
available, then the privacy mechanism cannot be used, but the
permanent identity will have to be sent in the clear. The terminal
SHOULD store the pseudonym in a non-volatile memory so that it can be
maintained across reboots. An active attacker that impersonates the
network may use the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute (Section 4.1.2) to
learn the subscriber's IMSI. However, as discussed in Section 4.1.2,
the terminal can refuse to send the cleartext IMSI if it believes
that the network should be able to recognize the pseudonym.
If the peer and server cannot guarantee that the pseudonym will be
maintained reliably and Identity privacy is required then additional
protection from an external security mechanism such as Protected
Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) [PEAP] may be used. The
benefits and the security considerations of using an external
security mechanism with EAP-AKA are beyond the scope of this
document.
9.2 Mutual Authentication
EAP-AKA provides mutual authentication via the UMTS AKA mechanisms.
9.3 Flooding the Authentication Centre
The EAP-AKA server typically obtains authentication vectors from the
Authentication Centre (AuC). EAP-AKA introduces a new usage for the
AuC. The protocols between the EAP-AKA server and the AuC are out of
the scope of this document. However, it should be noted that a
malicious EAP-AKA peer may generate a lot of protocol requests to
mount a denial of service attack. The EAP-AKA server implementation
SHOULD take this into account and SHOULD take steps to limit the
traffic that it generates towards the AuC, preventing the attacker
from flooding the AuC and from extending the denial of service attack
from EAP-AKA to other users of the AuC.
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9.4 Key Derivation
EAP-AKA supports key derivation with 128-bit effective key strength.
The key hierarchy is specified in Section 4.5.
The Transient EAP Keys used to protect EAP-AKA packets (K_encr,
K_aut) and the Master Session Keys are cryptographically separate. An
attacker cannot derive any non-trivial information from K_encr or
K_aut based on the Master Session Key or vice versa. An attacker also
cannot calculate the pre-shared secret from the UMTS AKA IK, UMTS AKA
CK, EAP-AKA K_encr, EAP-AKA K_aut or from the Master Session Key.
9.5 Brute-Force and Dictionary Attacks
The effective strength of EAP-AKA values is 128 bits, and there are
no known computationally feasible brute-force attacks. Because UMTS
AKA is not a password protocol (the pre-shared secret must not be a
weak password), EAP-AKA is not vulnerable to dictionary attacks.
9.6 Protection, Replay Protection and Confidentiality
AT_MAC, AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_COUNTER attributes are used to
provide integrity, replay and confidentiality protection for EAP-AKA
Requests and Responses. Integrity protection with AT_MAC includes the
EAP header. Integrity protection (AT_MAC) is based on a keyed message
authentication code. Confidentiality (AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_IV) is
based on a block cipher.
Because keys are not available in the beginning of the EAP methods,
the AT_MAC attribute cannot be used for protecting EAP/AKA-Identity
messages. However, the AT_CHECKCODE attribute can optionally be used
to protect the integrity of the EAP/AKA-Identity roundtrip.
Confidentiality protection is applied only to a part of the protocol
fields. The table of attributes in Section 7.1 summarizes which
fields are confidentiality protected. It should be noted that the
error and notification code attributes AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE and
AT_NOTIFICATION are not confidential but they are transmitted in the
clear. Identity protection is discussed in Section 9.1.
On full authentication, replay protection of the EAP exchange is
provided by RAND and AUTN values from the underlying UMTS AKA scheme.
Protection against replays of EAP-AKA messages is also based on the
fact that messages that can include AT_MAC can only be sent once with
a certain EAP-AKA Subtype, and on the fact that a different K_aut key
will be used for calculating AT_MAC in each full authentication
exchange.
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On fast re-authentication, a counter included in AT_COUNTER and a
server random nonce is used to provide replay protection. The
AT_COUNTER attribute is also included in EAP-AKA notifications, if
they are used after successful authentication in order to provide
replay protection between re-authentication exchanges.
The contents of the user identity string are implicitly integrity
protected by including them in key derivation.
Because EAP-AKA is not a tunneling method, EAP-Request/Notification,
EAP-Response/Notification, EAP-Success or EAP-Failure packets are not
confidential, integrity protected or replay protected. On physically
insecure networks, this may enable an attacker to mount denial of
service attacks by spoofing these packets. As discussed in Section
4.4, the peer will only accept EAP-Success after successful
authentication. Hence, the attacker cannot force the peer to believe
successful authentication has occurred when mutual authentication
failed or has not happened yet.
The security considerations of EAP-AKA result indications are covered
in Section 9.8
An eavesdropper will see the EAP Notification, EAP_Success and
EAP-Failure packets sent in the clear. With EAP-AKA, confidential
information MUST NOT be transmitted in EAP Notification packets.
9.7 Negotiation Attacks
EAP-AKA does not protect the EAP-Response/Nak packet. Because EAP-AKA
does not protect the EAP method negotiation, EAP method downgrading
attacks may be possible, especially if the user uses the same
identity with EAP-AKA and other EAP methods.
As described in Section 5, EAP-AKA allows the protocol to be extended
by defining new attribute types. When defining such attributes, it
should be noted that any extra attributes included in EAP-Request/
AKA-Identity or EAP-Response/AKA-Identity packets are not included in
the MACs later on, and thus some other precautions must be taken to
avoid modifications to them.
EAP-AKA does not support ciphersuite negotiation or EAP-AKA protocol
version negotiation.
9.8 Protected Result Indications
EAP-AKA supports optional protected success indications, and
acknowledged failure indications. If a failure occurs after
successful authentication, then the EAP-AKA failure indication is
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integrity and replay protected.
Even if an EAP-Failure packet is lost when using EAP-SIM over an
unreliable medium, then the EAP-SIM failure indications will help
ensure that the peer and EAP server will know the other parties
authentication decision. If protected success indications are used,
then the loss of Success packet will also be addressed by the
acknowledged, integrity and replay protected EAP-SIM success
indication. If the optional success indications are not used, then
the peer may end up believing the server succeeded authentication
when it actually failed. Since access will not be granted in this
case protected result indications are not needed unless the client is
not able to realize it does not have access for an extended period of
time.
9.9 Man-in-the-middle Attacks
In order to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks and session hijacking,
user data SHOULD be integrity protected on physically insecure
networks. The EAP-AKA Master Session Key or keys derived from it MAY
be used as the integrity protection keys, or, if an external security
mechanism such as PEAP is used, then the link integrity protection
keys MAY be derived by the external security mechanism.
There are man-in-the-middle attacks associated with the use of any
EAP method within a tunneled protocol such as PEAP, or within a
sequence of EAP methods followed by each other. This specification
does not address these attacks. If EAP-AKA is used with a tunneling
protocol or as part of a sequence of methods, there should be
cryptographic binding provided between the protocols and EAP-AKA to
prevent man-in-the-middle attacks through rogue authenticators being
able to setup one-way authenticated tunnels. EAP-AKA Master Session
Key MAY be used to provide the cryptographic binding. However the
mechanism how the binding is provided depends on the tunneling or
sequencing protocol, and it is beyond the scope of this document.
9.10 Generating Random Numbers
An EAP-AKA implementation SHOULD use a good source of randomness to
generate the random numbers required in the protocol. Please see
[RFC1750] for more information on generating random numbers for
security applications.
10. Security Claims
This section provides the security claims required by [EAP].
Auth. Mechanism: EAP-AKA is based on the UMTS AKA mechanism, which is
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an authentication and key agreement mechanism based on a symmetric
128-bit pre-shared secret.
Ciphersuite negotiation: No
Mutual authentication: Yes
Integrity protection: Yes (Section 9.6)
Replay protection: Yes (Section 9.6)
Confidentiality: Yes, except method specific success and failure
indications (Section 9.1, Section 9.6)
Key derivation: Yes
Key strength: EAP-AKA supports key derivation with 128-bit effective
key strength.
Description of key hierarchy: Please see Section 4.5.
Dictinary attack protection: N/A (Section 9.5)
Fast reconnect: Yes
Cryptographic binding: N/A
Session independence: Yes (Section 9.4)
Fragmentation: No
Channel binding: No
Indication of vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are discussed in
Section 9.
11. Acknowledgements and Contributions
The authors wish to thank Rolf Blom of Ericsson, Bernard Aboba of
Microsoft, Arne Norefors of Ericsson, N.Asokan of Nokia, Valtteri
Niemi of Nokia, Kaisa Nyberg of Nokia, Jukka-Pekka Honkanen of Nokia,
Pasi Eronen of Nokia, Olivier Paridaens of Alcatel and Ilkka Uusitalo
of Ericsson for interesting discussions in this problem space.
This protocol has been partly developed in parallel with EAP-SIM
[EAP-SIM], and hence this specification incorporates many ideas from
EAP-SIM, and many contributions from the reviewer's of EAP-SIM.
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The attribute format is based on the extension format of Mobile IPv4
[RFC3344].
Normative References
[TS 33.102]
3rd Generation Partnership Project, "3GPP Technical
Specification 3GPP TS 33.102 V5.1.0: "Technical
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G
Security; Security Architecture (Release 5)"", December
2002.
[RFC2486] Aboba, B. and M. Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier",
RFC 2486, January 1999.
[EAP] Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Aboba, B., Carlson, J. and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
draft-ietf-eap-rfc2284bis-09 (work in progress), February
2004.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[TS 23.003]
3rd Generation Partnership Project, "3GPP Technical
Specification 3GPP TS 23.003 V5.5.1: "3rd Generation
Parnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core
Network; Numbering, addressing and identification (Release
5)"", January 2003.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 197,
"Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)"", November 2001.
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/
fips-197.pdf
[CBC] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST
Special Publication 800-38A, "Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods and Techniques"",
December 2001.
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/
sp800-38a.pdf
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[SHA-1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS) Publication 180-1, "Secure Hash
Standard"", April 1995.
[PRF] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 186-2
(with change notice); Digital Signature Standard (DSS)",
January 2000.
Available on-line at: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
fips/fips186-2/fips186-2-change1.pdf
[TS 33.105]
3rd Generation Partnership Project, "3GPP Technical
Specification 3GPP TS 33.105 4.1.0: "Technical
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G
Security; Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements (Release
4)"", June 2001.
[RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
Informative References
[RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
RFC 2548, March 1999.
[PEAP] Palekar, A., Simon, D., Zorn, G., Salowey, J., Zhou, H.
and S. Josefsson, "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)",
draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-07 (work in progress),
October 2003.
[RFC1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.
[RFC3344] Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4", RFC 3344,
August 2002.
[EAP-SIM] Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Method for GSM Subscriber Identity Modules
(EAP-SIM)", draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-13 (work in
progress), April 2004.
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[Draft 3GPP TS 23.003]
3rd Generation Partnership Project, "Draft 3GPP Technical
Specification 3GPP TS 23.003 V 6.1.0: "3rd Generation
Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core
Network; Numbering, addressing and identification (Release
6)", December 2003.
work in progress
Authors' Addresses
Jari Arkko
Ericsson
FIN-02420 Jorvas
Finland
Phone: +358 40 5079256
EMail: jari.Arkko@ericsson.com
Henry Haverinen
Nokia Enterprise Solutions
P.O. Box 12
FIN-40101 Jyvaskyla
Finland
EMail: henry.haverinen@nokia.com
Appendix A. Pseudo-Random Number Generator
The "|" character denotes concatenation, and "^" denotes
exponentiation.
Step 1: Choose a new, secret value for the seed-key, XKEY
Step 2: In hexadecimal notation let
t = 67452301 EFCDAB89 98BADCFE 10325476 C3D2E1F0
This is the initial value for H0|H1|H2|H3|H4
in the FIPS SHS <xref target="SHA-1"/>
Step 3: For j = 0 to m - 1 do
3.1 XSEED_j = 0 /* no optional user input */
3.2 For i = 0 to 1 do
a. XVAL = (XKEY + XSEED_j) mod 2^b
b. w_i = G(t, XVAL)
c. XKEY = (1 + XKEY + w_i) mod 2^b
3.3 x_j = w_0|w_1
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