dnsext                                                    D. Barton, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                             GridFury, LLC
Intended status: Standards Track                           March 7, 2011
Expires: September 8, 2011


       Cloning Domain Name System (DNS) Labels for Fun and Profit
            draft-barton-clone-dns-labels-fun-profit-00.txt

Abstract

   This document describes a method for making one or more Domain Name
   System (DNS) labels behave in the DNS "as if" they were actually an
   entirely different label.  E.g., the delegee for the example.org zone
   could define bar.example.org to be a CLONE of foo.example.org.  This
   method is designed to meet the needs of those managing
   Internationalized Domain Name (IDN) zones that have been determined
   to be semantically similar, and therefore should be treated "as if"
   they were identical.  This method can also be used more generally to
   handle situations where currently either CNAME or DNAME Resource
   Records are being used.

   A key design goal for the CLONE method is that except for DNSSEC
   support all of the semantic benefits are available by updating the
   authoritative servers for the zone.  Therefore unless DNSSEC support
   for the CLONEd zones is required there is no dependency on end users
   being behind a CLONE-Aware resolving name server.

Foreword

   [RFC Editor, please remove this Section at publication time.
   Thanks.]

   This is my first draft, please be gentle. :) I'm definitely open to
   the possibility that there are better ways to accomplish the concepts
   presented herein.  I'm sure that there are a non-zero number of
   errors in the formatting, references, etc.  Also Sections 2 and 3 may
   be under-specified, unclear, or unworkable.  So please don't be
   afraid to offer (constructive) criticism.

   TODO:

      Update/add/improve references?

      Add/improve examples?

   Revision History:




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   1.  -00 Initial version

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.












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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  CLONE Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  The Authoritative Name Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.1.  Parent Zone File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Child Authoritative Server Configuration . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.3.  Query Response For CLONE Labels  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.4.  Query Response For CLONE And CLONES Resource Records . . .  7
   3.  The CLONE-Aware Resolving Name Server  . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.1.  CARNS DNSSEC Behavior For "Typical" Queries  . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  CARNS Behavior for DNSSEC Resource Record Queries  . . . .  7
   4.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Non-CARNS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  CARNS - First Query For CLONE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.3.  CARNS - Second Query For CLONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.4.  CLONES Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11



























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1.  Introduction

   The DNS was initially designed and implemented during a period when
   the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) text
   was the lingua franca, and certain assumptions about the
   characteristic behavior of ASCII text, and how it is commonly
   understood in written form, were baked into the protocol.  For
   example, while the following may not be stylistically appealing on
   the printed page; not only would all of the following be handled the
   same by the DNS, there would not be any confusion that all of the
   following representations refer to the same hostname:

   o  example.org

   o  Example.Org

   o  eXaMpLe.oRg

   o  EXAMPLE.ORG

   Because of the way that Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)
   [RFC5890] work it is not possible for the DNS to provide the same
   level(s) or type(s) of equivalence for different Unicode Code Points
   that upper and lower case ASCII letters enjoy.  Furthermore, there
   are unique issues with Unicode representations of DNS labels that
   have no equivalents in ASCII text.  More information about the
   problems that this document attempts to provide a solution for can be
   found in DNS Resolution of Aliased Names
   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-aliasing-requirements].

   In addition to solving the DNS part of the problem of IDN
   equivalence, being able to use a more complete solution to the
   problem of "aliasing" DNS labels than CNAMEs [RFC1035] and DNAMEs
   [RFC2672] currently provide also has appeal.

1.1.  Terminology

   There is some feeling in the IDN community that a DNS solution for
   IDN equivalence must treat (and consider) all versions of a label as
   truly equal.  However this document describes a procedure that relies
   on one version of a label being configured in the familiar way, and
   the CLONE(s) configured in a way that refers to the traditionally
   configured label.  Therefore this document will adopt the term used
   in the Joint Engineering Team (JET) Guidelines [RFC3743] and refer to
   the label configured in the typical way as the "preferred" label.
   While on the one hand it is easy to see how a solution that treats
   all versions of the label as truly equal would be desirable, this
   document intentionally sacrifices the goal of true equality in the



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   interest of providing a solution that can get the maximum possible
   benefit available to the largest number of end users while requiring
   only that the authoritative name servers are upgraded.  It will
   ultimately be up to the community to decide whether this is a
   sacrifice worth making.

   The terms "authoritative name server" and "resolving name server" are
   used with their commonly understood meanings.  A CLONE-Aware
   Resolving Name Server will hereinafter be referred to as a CARNS.

1.2.  CLONE Overview

   There are two sides of the CLONE method, the authoritative and
   resolving name servers.  For clients that are not aware of the CLONE
   RR the authoritative server will simply respond "as if" the query for
   a CLONE label had actually been for the preferred name.  When a CARNS
   queries the authoritative server it will send an EDNS [RFC2671]
   option that indicates that it is CLONE-Aware.  The authoritative
   server will then add the CLONE Resource Record (RR) to the ANSWER
   section, which will include the preferred label.  From then on when
   queries come into the CARNS for the CLONE it can in turn query the
   authoritative server for the preferred label, and respond to its
   querier "as if" the query had been for the preferred label.  In this
   way if the preferred label is signed with DNSSEC [RFC4035] a CARNS
   can perform DNSSEC validation on the response.

   This method also makes it possible to have CLONEs for more than one
   label in a given hostname.

   The CLONES RR is intended to aid application developers by making it
   easier to know when a given label has one or more other labels that
   are configured as part of the same "bundle."


2.  The Authoritative Name Server

2.1.  Parent Zone File

   At any level of the DNS tree above the root itself a label MAY be
   specified as a CLONE.  For example:

   clone1 CLONE preferred

   In this example "preferred" would be the preferred label, "clone1"
   would be the CLONE.  Multiple CLONES MAY be defined for the same
   preferred label.  The RDATA for the CLONE RR MUST be either a valid
   DNS label, or a valid hostname that is also served by the same
   authoritative name server.  Compliant authoritative server



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   implementations MUST generate a user error when attempting to load a
   zone that contains a CLONE RR with RDATA that is not served by that
   authoritative name server.

   The CLONE label MUST NOT have any other data associated with it.
   Compliant authoritative server implementations MUST generate a user
   error when attempting to load a zone that contains both a CLONE and
   other RDATA for the same label.

   The CLONES RR is used to list the preferred label and all of its
   CLONES.  It MUST NOT be defined in the zone file.  Compliant
   implementations MUST generate a user error when attempting to load a
   zone that contains a CLONES RR.

2.2.  Child Authoritative Server Configuration

   If the preferred label is a delegation point, and the delegee wishes
   to answer for the CLONE label(s), the authoritative name server for
   the zone with the preferred label MUST be configured for the
   CLONE(s).  An example that uses a BIND-style syntax follows, but this
   document is not attempting to specify how implementors perform this
   configuration.

   zone "clone1.example.org" { clone preferred.example.org; };

   Behavior of child authoritative servers which configure real zones
   for labels that the parent created as CLONEs of a preferred label is
   undefined.

2.3.  Query Response For CLONE Labels

   When a compliant authoritative name server implementation receives a
   query for a label or zone that is a CLONE, the server MUST respond
   "as if" it had received the query for the preferred label.  In the
   example above if the name server receives any query for
   clone1.example.org other than the CLONE or CLONES RRs it MUST respond
   "as if" the query had been for preferred.example.org.

   If the authoritative name server receives the CLONE-Aware EDNS option
   it MUST add the CLONE RR to the ANSWER section of the query response
   with the preferred label as the RDATA.

   If a compliant server does not receive the CLONE-Aware EDNS option it
   MUST NOT return DNSSEC-related records (such as RRSIG) along with the
   response, regardless of whether the DO bit was set in the query.






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2.4.  Query Response For CLONE And CLONES Resource Records

   When a compliant authoritative name server receives a query for the
   CLONE RR with a label that is a CLONE as the QDATA it MUST return an
   ANSWER with the preferred label as the RDATA.  When a compliant
   server receives a CLONE query for a label that is not a CLONE it MUST
   return RCODE 0 (No error).

   When a compliant server receives a query for the CLONES RR with a
   label that is a CLONE or a preferred label as the QDATA it MUST
   return an ANSWER with the preferred label listed first in the RDATA,
   followed by all of labels that are configured as a CLONE of the
   preferred label.  If the label in the QDATA is neither a preferred
   label or a CLONE the server MUST return RCODE 0 (No error).


3.  The CLONE-Aware Resolving Name Server

   When sending queries a compliant CARNS MUST send the EDNS option for
   CLONE-Aware.  When a compliant CARNS receives a query response which
   contains a CLONE RR as described in Section 2.3 it MUST "transform"
   future queries for hostnames or labels which it knows contain CLONE
   labels to the preferred version(s).  However regardless of whether
   the CARNS knows that a hostname it is queried for contains a CLONE
   label or not, the response to its client MUST be for the same QDATA
   it was queried for.

3.1.  CARNS DNSSEC Behavior For "Typical" Queries

   When a CARNS receives a response to a query that originally contained
   one or more CLONE labels that is signed with DNSSEC it MAY indicate
   that the response is authentic by setting the AD bit if all other
   conditions for setting it are otherwise met (i.e., the DO bit was set
   in the query originally received by the CARNS, etc.).  Local policy
   SHALL be the determining factor for whether to set the AD bit in the
   query response for the hostname which contains one or more CLONE
   labels if it were otherwise appropriate to do so.

3.2.  CARNS Behavior for DNSSEC Resource Record Queries

   When a CARNS receives a direct query for a DNSSEC-related RR for a
   hostname that contains one or more CLONE labels (e.g., RRSIG, DNSKEY,
   etc.) it MUST return RCODE 0 (No answer) and include the CLONE RR
   with the preferred label as RDATA in the ADDITIONAL section of the
   response






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4.  Examples

   Assuming a zone example.org with the following records:

   preferred A 192.0.2.1

   clone1 CLONE preferred

   clone2 CLONE preferred

4.1.  Non-CARNS

   +---+                      +-----------+                      +---+
   | S | clone1.example.org A |           | clone1.example.org A | A |
   | t |--------------------->| Non-CARNS |--------------------->| u |
   | u |                      |           |                      | t |
   | b |     192.0.2.1        |           |      192.0.2.1       | h |
   |   |<---------------------|           |<---------------------|   |
   +---+                      +-----------+                      +---+

4.2.  CARNS - First Query For CLONE

   +---+                      +---+                             +---+
   |   |                      |   |     clone1.example.org A    |   |
   | S | clone1.example.org A | C |     CLONE-Aware ENDS Opt    | A |
   | t |--------------------->| A |---------------------------->| u |
   | u |                      | R |                             | t |
   | b |                      | N |        192.0.2.1            | h |
   |   |     192.0.2.1        | S | CLONE RR clone1 > preferred |   |
   |   |<---------------------|   |<----------------------------|   |
   +---+                      +---+                             +---+

4.3.  CARNS - Second Query For CLONE

   +---+                      +---+                             +---+
   |   |                      | C |   preferred.example.org A   |   |
   | S | clone1.example.org A | A |     CLONE-Aware ENDS Opt    | A |
   | t |--------------------->| R |---------------------------->| u |
   | u |                      | N |                             | t |
   | b |     192.0.2.1        | S |         192.0.2.1           | h |
   |   |<---------------------|   |<----------------------------|   |
   +---+                      +---+                             +---+

4.4.  CLONES Response







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 +---+                                                             +---+
 | C |                                                             |   |
 | A |                 clone1.example.org CLONES                   | A |
 | R |------------------------------------------------------------>| u |
 | N |                                                             | t |
 | S | preferred.example.org clone1.example.org clone2.example.org | h |
 |   |<------------------------------------------------------------|   |
 +---+                                                             +---+


5.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests that the IANA assign the Resource Record (RR)
   Type Codes [RFC1035], [I-D.ietf-dnsext-5395bis] 77 and 88 to the
   CLONE and CLONES RRs, respectively; and the EDNS0 Option [RFC2671] 11
   for CLONE-Aware.


6.  Security Considerations

   There are currently (at least) two widely used solutions to the
   equivalence problem at the zone level.  For both of these solutions
   the preferred label and all of the variations need to be delegated,
   usually to the same set of name servers.  The obvious, albeit
   potentially the most difficult method of keeping the zones "the same"
   is to create multiple zone files that contain records that are
   identical to the extent possible.  This solution allows for the
   possibility of having DNSKEY records for each zone, thereby allowing
   each zone to be signed.  The other solution that takes advantage of
   identical delegation is to use the exact same zone file for multiple
   zones.  This method provides the same capability for DNSSEC
   compatibility as the CLONE method.  The preferred label can be
   signed, but validation would fail for the other labels since the
   DNSKEY record would not be for that zone.

   For parents (such as TLD registries) that allow the delegee/
   registrant to choose what method of "bundling" semantically similar
   labels to use, the techniques described in this document do not
   reduce security in any way.  The delegee can either decide as a
   matter of local policy that the DNSSEC capability of the CLONE
   technique is sufficient, or they can choose to have the non-preferred
   versions of the label delegated and maintain separate zone files.  In
   a context where the delegee is forced to accept the CLONE option
   DNSSEC validation for the non-preferred versions of the label will be
   limited to resolving name servers that are CLONE-Aware.

   No negative security implications for the CLONE or CLONES RRs
   themselves are known.  It is envisioned that in certain contexts



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   being able to verify that the non-preferred versions of a label have
   been listed as CLONEs rather than using some other method of
   "aliasing" (such as delegation, CNAME, etc.) could be beneficial.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-5395bis]
              3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations",
              draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-03 (work in progress),
              January 2011.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2671]  Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
              RFC 2671, August 1999.

   [RFC2672]  Crawford, M., "Non-Terminal DNS Name Redirection",
              RFC 2672, August 1999.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC5890]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
              RFC 5890, August 2010.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-aliasing-requirements]
              Woolf, S. and X. Lee, "Problem Statement: DNS Resolution
              of Aliased Names",
              draft-ietf-dnsext-aliasing-requirements-00 (work in
              progress), February 2011.

   [RFC3743]  Konishi, K., Huang, K., Qian, H., and Y. Ko, "Joint
              Engineering Team (JET) Guidelines for Internationalized
              Domain Names (IDN) Registration and Administration for
              Chinese, Japanese, and Korean", RFC 3743, April 2004.





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Author's Address

   Douglas Barton (editor)
   GridFury, LLC
   11901 Santa Monica Boulevard, Unit 612
   Los Angeles, CA  90025
   USA

   Email: dougb@dougbarton.us










































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