Working Group:                                               G. Bianchi
Internet Draft                                            University of
                                                         Palermo, Italy
                                                     N. Blefari-Melazzi
Document:

                                                          University of
draft-bianchi-blefari-admcontr-over-af-phb-00.txt
                                                         Perugia, Italy

Category: Informational                                      March 2000

             Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB Classes

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft
   documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated,
   replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is
   inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to
   cite them other than as "work in progress."
   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

1. Abstract

   This memo shows that an AF PHB class, as defined in RFC 2597, is
   capable of supporting explicit per flow admission control. Admission
   control is obtained by a suitable use of two out of the three drop
   precedence levels. Level 1 is dedicated to conforming accepted
   traffic, i.e. traffic that has passed admission control test and
   conforms to edge-policing functions. Level 2 is used as an implicit
   signaling pipe and acts as the core network support for the
   admission control procedure.

Table of Contents
   2. Introduction ................................................. 2
   3. Related work ................................................. 2
   4. AF PHB class management and implicit signaling ............... 3
   5. End Point Admission Control operation ........................ 5
   6. Appendix A: Possible roles of the AFx3 level ................. 6
   7. Appendix B: Arguments for new PHB definitions? ............... 7
   8. Appendix C: Performance issues ............................... 7
   9. Appendix D: Security considerations .......................... 8
   10. References .................................................. 9
   11. Author's Address ........................................... 10
   12. Full Copyright Statement ................................... 10





Bianchi&Blefari Informational - Expires September 2001               1

Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB groups               March 2001

2. Introduction

   There is a growing feeling [RFC2990, RFC2998] that the basic
   DiffServ architectural model [RFC2474, RFC2475] lacks the capability
   of providing service accuracy. Quoting [RFC2990] Œboth the
   Integrated Services architecture and the Differentiated Services
   architecture have some critical elements in terms of their current
   definition which appear to be acting as deterrents to widespread
   deployment... There appears to be no single comprehensive service
   environment that possesses both service accuracy and scaling
   propertiesŽ. Also, in [RFC2998], it is pointed out that Œfurther
   refinement of the QoS architecture is required to integrate DiffServ
   network services into an end-to-end service delivery model with the
   associated task of resource reservationŽ.

   To this purpose, [RFC2990] recommends to define an Œadmission
   control function which can determine whether to admit a service
   differentiated flow along the nominated network pathŽ. In fact,
   without per flow admission control, prevention of overload in a
   given service class, e.g. by means of pure inter-domain service
   level agreements, does not appear to be an easy task. Upon overload
   in a given service class, all flows in that class suffer a
   potentially harsh degradation of service.

   The Assured Forwarding Per Hop Behavior (AF PHB, [RFC2597]) has been
   devised to provide different levels of forwarding assurances. The
   example services presented in the appendix of [RFC2597] show that
   the primary intent of AF is to promote packet loss differentiation,
   either among different traffic classes, e.g., marked with different
   drop levels, as well as within the same traffic class, e.g. marking
   traffic conforming to a policy specification with a lower drop level
   than non conforming traffic.

   While low loss and low latency traffic support, such as that
   achievable with a strict admission control function, appears to be
   out of the scopes of the AF model, the class-based structure of the
   AF PHB has intrinsic (unforeseen?) capabilities to support per flow
   admission control. Our key idea (originally proposed - although not
   specifically envisioned over an AF PHB class - in [BBM01], under the
   name GRIP - Gauge&Gate Reservation with Independent Probing) is to
   rely the decision to admit a new connection upon the successful
   delivery of probes, tagged with a higher AF drop level mark than
   accepted traffic, independently generated by end points during each
   flow setup phase. It is quite interesting to remark that the idea of
   pushing traffic control to the edge and basing the connection
   request acceptance/refusal on packet loss detection is close to what
   TCP congestion control technique does, but it is used in the novel
   context of admission control.

3. Related work

   Several literature proposals describe a promising novel framework
   for admission control, generally referred to as Endpoint Admission
   Control (EAC - see [BKS00] and references therein contained). In

Bianchi&Blefari    Informational - Expires Jul 2001                  2

Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB groups               March 2001

   EAC, the explicit decisions whether to accept or refuse a connection
   request are taken by edge devices, rather than by devices within the
   network (e.g. core routers or bandwidth brokers). The driving idea
   of EAC schemes is to convey the congestion status of network nodes
   to the end-points, either in an implicit manner (i.e. by means of
   endpoint traffic measurements [BOR99, ELE00]), or explicitly (e.g.
   by requiring that network devices mark packets in a way that is load
   dependent [KEL00]). Both approaches have their pitfalls. Endpoint
   measurements appear unreliable when performed over the very short
   time frame given by the flow setup time. Explicit congestion
   notification mechanisms, instead, require to actively involving core
   routers in the process of marking packets, an activity that appears
   contrary to the spirit of DiffServ. Moreover, to be effective, such
   solutions need to be supported by all DiffServ routers at once, and
   a uniform marking protocol needs to be specified, e.g. by
   identifying a set of bits (one or more) in the IP packet header.

   An apparently un-related issue is how to perform admission control
   in a core router. We argue that this problem does not stay in the
   fact that the network has to be oblivious of individual flows. In
   fact recent literature has shown that admission control schemes
   driven by load measurements are extremely robust and efficient
   [GRO99, BJS00]. These schemes do not base the accept/reject decision
   on per-flow state information and related traffic specifications.
   Instead, they operate on the basis of per-node aggregate traffic
   measurements carried out at the packet level. The robustness of
   these schemes stays in the fact that, in suitable conditions (e.g.
   flow peak rates small with respect to link capacities), they are
   barely sensitive to uncertainties on traffic profile parameters. As
   a consequence, it seems that scalable decisions can be independently
   taken by the routers.

   Our aim is to integrate the effectiveness of measurement-based
   approaches with the simplicity of EAC. In other words, we want to
   implicitly convey the status of core routers (evaluated by means of
   aggregate measurements) to the end points so that the latter devices
   can take learned admission control decisions. The main open issue is
   then how to define and handle the signaling information needed to
   exchange information between end-points and core routers, without
   relying on explicit signaling and thus violating the DiffServ
   paradigm.

4. AF PHB class management and implicit signaling

   Four AF PHB classes have been standardized, each composed of three
   drop levels. In what follows, we will use the notation AFxj to
   indicate packet marks belonging to the AF class x, with drop level
   j. Conforming to [RFC2597], within a class x, if i<j, the dropping
   probability of packets labeled AFxi is lower than that of packets
   labeled AFxj. Quoting [RFC2597], Œan AF implementation MUST detect
   and respond to long-term congestion within each class by dropping
   packets, while handling short term congestion (packet bursts) by
   queueing packets. This implies the presence of a smoothing or
   filtering function that monitors the instantaneous congestion level

Bianchi&Blefari    Informational - Expires Jul 2001                  3

Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB groups               March 2001

   and computes a smoothed congestion level. The dropping algorithm
   uses this smoothed congestion level to determine when packets should
   be discardedŽ.

   Let us now focus our attention to a specific module in charge of
   handling AF traffic belonging to a given class x. A particular
   implementation of the AF specification is depicted in Figure 1 (for
   simplicity, the drop level AFx3 is neglected until Appendix A).

          AFx1  |--------------|
         |----->| measurement  |----|
         |      |   module     |    |
   input |      |--------------|    |  |-----------| output
   ----->|            ||            |->|FIFO queue |------->
         |            \/            |  |-----------|
         |AFx2  |--------------|    |
         |----->| AFx2 dropper |----|
                |--------------|

          Figure 1: logical handling of an AF class x

   A measurement module is devised to run-time measure the aggregate
   AFx1 traffic. The measurement module depicted in the figure does not
   interact with the AFx1 packets forwarding, i.e., these packets are
   forwarded to the FIFO buffer placed at the output regardless of the
   measurements taken. On the basis of such measurements, this module
   triggers a suitable dropping algorithm on the AFX2 traffic. With
   respect to the general AF PHB operation, we are restricting the AFX2
   dropping algorithm to depend only on AFX1 traffic measurements.

   The simplest dropping algorithm is represented by a ŒgateŽ (smoother
   dropping algorithms for AFx2 packets - e.g. RED-like algorithms -
   may be considered to improve stability). When the measurement module
   does not detect congestion on the AFx1 traffic, being the notion of
   congestion implementation-dependent, it keeps the gate opened (we
   call this ŒACCEPTŽ state). When the gate is open no AFx2 packet is
   dropped. Conversely, the measurement module keeps the gate closed
   (ŒREJECTŽ state) when congestion is detected, i.e. it enforces a
   100% drop probability over AFx2 packets. Note that this operation
   does not violate the AF drop level relationship, as AFx1 dropping
   probability is lower than the AFx2 one.

   While the above description is simply a particular implementation of
   an AF class, we now show its interpretation in terms of implicit
   signaling, which has important consequences for the definition of an
   overlay admission control function. In fact, let us assume that: i)
   the considered AF class x, is devoted to the support of QoS aware
   flows, requiring an admission control procedure; ii) traffic labeled
   AFx1 is generated by flows which have already passed an admission
   control test, iii) AFx2 packets are ŒsignalingŽ packets injected in
   the network by flows during the setup phase (in principle, one AFx2
   packet per flow).



Bianchi&Blefari    Informational - Expires Jul 2001                  4

Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB groups               March 2001

   According to the described operation, an AFx2 packet is delivered to
   its destination ONLY IF it encounters all the routers along the path
   in the ACCEPT state. This operation provides an implicit binary
   signaling pipe, semantically equivalent to a one-bit explicit
   congestion notification scheme.

5. End Point Admission Control operation

   The above interpretation of the AF PHB allows deploying an admission
   control function, whose operation is concentrated in the flow end
   points, and which does not relies on state management and explicit
   signaling exchange in DiffServ network routers (both core routers
   within a DS domain and border routers among different DS domains).

   The admission control function is triggered by explicit signaling
   exchanges between the source terminal (SRC in figure 2) and the
   access router (ARin) to the local DS domain. Assume that a one way
   connection is offered from user terminal SRC to user terminal DST,
   in principle belonging to different DS domains (see figure 2). Upon
   setup request, the ARin node starts a connection setup attempt by
   sending, in principle, just one packet labeled AFx2 through the
   network. In the same time, a probing phase timeout is started.

                ---------     ---------     ---------
               /         \   /         \   /         \
   |---|  |----|         |---|         |---|         |-----|  |---|
   |SRC|--|ARin|---DS1---|BR1|---DS2---|BR2|---DS3---|ARout|--|DST|
   |---|  |----|         |---|         |---|         |-----|  |---|
               \         /   \         /   \         /
                ---------     ---------     ---------

                  Figure 2: Sample Network Configuration

   We recall that, when an AFx2 packet reaches the destination, it
   implicitly conveys the information that all routers encountered
   across the path have been locally declared themselves in the ACCEPT
   state, i.e. capable of admitting new flows without QoS degradation.
   It is up to each specific router/domain to quantitatively determine
   its QoS target, and link this QoS target to the runtime measurements
   carried on the AFx1 traffic (see Appendix C for further discussion).

   If the AFx2 packet eventually reaches the ARout destination node, an
   explicit signaling is executed between the Arout and the DST node to
   verify that the DST terminal is capable (and willing) of accepting
   the call. We remark that a by-product of this operation is to allow
   a receiver capability negotiation function procedure, which is
   deemed necessary in [RFC2990].

   Once this test is performed with successful response, the ARout
   router replies with a feedback packet, labeled AFx1. The choice of
   the AFx1 mark to transmit the feedback packet is motivated by the
   fact that, for one way flows, it is not necessary to test the
   reverse path (from DST to SRC), and thus the AFx1 tag provides
   better guarantees that the feedback packet is correctly received at

Bianchi&Blefari    Informational - Expires Jul 2001                  5

Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB groups               March 2001

   the SRC. Indeed, when full duplex flows are considered, the feedback
   packet shall be tagged as AFx2, since in this case reverse path
   testing is also necessary.

   The decision whether to admit or reject the incoming call is driven
   by the eventual reception of the feedback. When a feedback packet is
   received in response, the source node labels the flow as accepted,
   and starts transmitting packets marked as AFx1. Conversely, by not
   receiving a feedback packet within the probing phase timeout, the
   source node is made able to implicitly determine that at least one
   router along the path has declared itself not capable of
   accommodating additional flows, and thus the source node can abort
   the flow setup attempt (or reiterate the setup attempt according to
   some suitable backoff mechanism).

6. Appendix A: Possible roles of the AFx3 level

   In the above description, the AFx3 drop level appears in principle
   unnecessary. However, it may be convenient to use this level. A
   first possibility is that the AFx3 level be used to mark non-
   conforming packets, which can be eventually delivered if network
   resources are available. Second, AFx3 packet marking can be enforced
   over flows that have not successfully passed the described admission
   control test. This allows deploying a service model where high QoS
   is provided to flows that pass the admission control test, while
   best effort delivery is provided to initially-rejected flows. These
   latter flows may occasionally retry the setup procedure, by simply
   marking occasional packets as AFx2 (e.g. by adhering to a suitable
   backoff procedure), and may eventually receive the upgraded AFx1
   marking when network resources become available (as testified by the
   eventual reception of an AFx1 feedback).

   The usage of the AFx3 level as described above is targeted to
   increase the link utilization. However, [RFC2597] requires the drop
   probability for AFx3 to be greater (or at most equal) than AFx2.
   This implies that the link utilization is bounded by the possibly
   strict mechanism that triggers AFx2 packets dropping: when AFx2
   packets receive a 100% dropping probability, all AFx3 packets must
   also be dropped to conform to the [RFC2597] specification. A more
   effective mechanism would consist in implementing a dropping
   algorithm for the AFx3 traffic not directly related to the AFx2 drop
   algorithm. However, this usage of the AFx3 level does not conform
   with the AF specification, since the AFx3 dropping probability may
   be eventually lower than AFx2.

   A more interesting possible usage of the AFx3 level consists in
   providing a second control (probing) channel in addition to AFx2.
   According to this solution, AFx1 traffic measurements trigger a
   dropping algorithm on the AFx3 traffic, with stricter dropping
   conditions than the AFx2 dropping algorithm (i.e. AFx3 packets are
   assumed to detect congestion, and notify it via packet drop, before
   AFx2 packets). This AFx3 probing class could request admission for
   flows with e.g., higher peak rate and bandwidth requirements than
   flows supported via the AFx2 probing class (i.e., we are adding a

Bianchi&Blefari    Informational - Expires Jul 2001                  6

Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB groups               March 2001

   second implicit signaling pipe). Also, being the AFx3 channel more
   reactive to congestion conditions, its usage can be envisioned to
   provide lower access priority to network resources. This would
   improve fairness and avoid some kinds of sources to ŒstealŽ a large
   part of network resources.

7. Appendix B: Arguments for new PHB definitions?

   Although this memo leaves untouched the basic AF PHB semantic, we
   feel that our suggested usage of AF is different (and quite
   unexpected) from what intended in RFC 2597. The services that are
   expected to make use of admission control are RTP/UDP streams with
   delay and loss performance requirements, whose support is currently
   envisioned by means of the EF PHB. On the contrary, AF appears
   designed to provide better than best effort support for generic
   TCP/UDP traffic. Thus, our study raises the case for the
   transformation of the (single) EF PHB into a PHB class (i.e. by
   adding an associated, "paired", probing pipe with a different DSCP).
   An alternative is defining new "paired" PHBs.

   On a different prospective, paired PHBs can be envisioned to support
   more general control functions than admission control. For example,
   the TCP fast retransmission and recovery algorithm might take
   advantage of isolated data packets labeled as ŒcontrolŽ, and thus
   expected to encounter loss if (controlled) congestion is encountered
   in the network.

8. Appendix C: Performance issues

   The described admission control semantic provides a reference
   framework compatible with "current" AF implementations, although
   poor performance are most likely provided over RED-like queueing
   management mechanisms. An explicit traffic measurement module
   implementation appears thus necessary.

   Quantitative and tunable performance may be independently provided
   and specified by each administrative entity. Uniform implementation
   across a specific domain allows defining a quantitative view (e.g.,
   a PDB) of the performance achievable within the considered domain.
   In this way, the refinements deemed necessary in [RFC2990] to
   provide service accuracy in the DiffServ architectural model can be
   considered as accomplished.

   In fact, the performance achievable by the described end point
   admission control operation depends on the notion of congestion as
   the triggering mechanism for AFx2 packet discarding, which is left
   to each specific implementation. Each administrative entity may
   arbitrarily tune the optimal throughput-delay/loss operational point
   supported by its routers, by simply determining the aggregate AFx1
   traffic target supported in each router. The mapping of AFx1
   throughput onto loss/delay performance in turns depends on the link
   capacities and on the traffic flow characteristics offered on the
   AFx class.


Bianchi&Blefari    Informational - Expires Jul 2001                  7

Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB groups               March 2001

   With this approach, it is possible to construct PDBs offering
   quantitative guarantees. A building block of such PDBs is the
   definition of specific measurement modules and AFX2 dropping
   algorithms.

   A generic dropping algorithm is based on suitable rules (or decision
   criteria). An example of a trivial decision criterion is to accept
   all AFx2 packets when the measured throughput is lower than a given
   threshold and reject all AFx2 packets when the AFx1 measurements
   overflow this threshold. The resulting delay performance depends
   upon the link capacity and the traffic model. For instance, with 32
   Kbps peak rate Brady on-off voice calls offered to a 2 Mbps (20
   Mbps) link, a target link utilization of 75% (92%) leads to a 99th
   percentile per hop delay lower than 5ms - see figure 4 in [BCP00].

   Tighter forms of traffic control are possible. As a second example
   of a decision criterion, we demonstrated that hard (loss and/or
   delay) QoS guarantees can be provided, under suitable assumptions on
   the offered traffic (i.e., traffic sources regulated by standard
   Dual Leaky Buckets, as in the IntServ framework) and with ad hoc
   defined measurement modules in the routers [BBM01].

   Finally, we note that the AFX2 dropping algorithm must not be
   necessarily driven by traffic measurements. In fact, it can be
   driven by lower layers QoS capabilities, (e.g., ATM).

9. Appendix D: Security considerations

   As all admission control functions, our solution presents the risk
   of theft of resources through the unauthorized admission of traffic.
   Although, logically, user terminals are the natural nodes where the
   endpoint admission control should operate, this is clearly not
   realistic, for the obvious reason that the user may bypass the
   admission control test and directly send AFx1 packets. Identity
   authentication and integrity protection are therefore needed in
   order to mitigate this potential for theft of resources [RFC2990].
   Administrators are then expected to protect network resources by
   configuring secure policers at interfaces (e.g. access routers) with
   untrusted customers. Similar protections must be provided at the
   interface between different domains. In particular, it may be
   necessary to restrict the access to the AF class(es) used for
   admission controlled traffic. For example, a DS domain should re-
   mark AF packets when they come from an un-trusted adjacent DS
   domain. In more generality, we remark that policing and conditioning
   rules enforced at the border routers of each domain depend on the
   usage of the considered AF PHB class within the specific domain and
   thus have to be accounted of in the definition of each specific PDB
   supporting admission control.

   A quite obvious security hazard is flooding the network with AFx2
   packets. The objective is twofold. On one side, denial of service
   situations can be easily created, as a massive loading of the
   network with AFx2 packets prevent the setup of normal connection. On
   the other side, the goal might be to affect fairness: the continuous

Bianchi&Blefari    Informational - Expires Jul 2001                  8

Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB groups               March 2001

   transmission of AFx2 packets at a rate higher than normal connection
   requests is a mean to gain faster access to resources when these are
   made available by a router along the path. This implies that some
   form of traffic conditioning and policing is necessary over AFx2
   streams. While it is simple to recognize an hard attack, by
   monitoring the AFx2 packets crossing an edge router (the AFx2
   traffic ± at most a few packets per originating connection - is
   minimal in normal conditions, and thus sudden increments of the AFx2
   load are suspicious), it may be not straightforward for DS boundary
   routers to recognize smoother fairness attacks. However, note that
   the same fairness problem is present also in more complex
   reservation mechanisms, such as RSVP (malicious users can
   continuously require setup to increase their access possibility with
   respect to normal users).

   Finally, all the security considerations expressed in [RFC2990]
   apply also to our solution.

10. References

   [BBM01] G. Bianchi, N. Blefari-Melazzi: " A Migration Path for the
   Internet: from Best-Effort to a QoS Capable Infrastructure by means
   of Localized Admission Control", Lecture Notes on Computer Science,
   Springer-Verlag, volume 1989, January 2001. This paper and a more
   detailed technical report can be requested to the authors, by
   writing to blefari@diei.unipg.it.

   [BCP00] G. Bianchi, A. Capone, C. Petrioli, ŒPacket Management
   Techniques for Measurement Based End-to-end Admission ControlŽ,
   KICS/IEEE Journal on Communications and Networking, June 2000.

   [BJS00] L. Breslau, S. Jamin, S. Schenker: "Comments on the
   performance of measurement-based admission control algorithms", IEEE
   Infocom 2000, Tel-Aviv, March 2000.

   [BKS00] L. Breslau, E. W. Knightly, S. Schenker, I. Stoica, H.
   Zhang: "Endpoint Admission Control: Architectural Issues and
   Performance", ACM SIGCOMM 2000, Stockholm, Sweden, August 2000.

   [BOR99] F. Borgonovo, A. Capone, L. Fratta, M. Marchese, C.
   Petrioli, "PCP: A Bandwidth Guaranteed Transport Service for IP
   networks", IEEE ICC'99, June 1999.

   [ELE00] V. Elek, G. Karlsson, "Admission Control Based on End-to-End
   Measurements", Proc. of IEEE Infocom 2000, Tel Aviv, Israel, March
   2000.

   [GRO99] M. Grossglauser, D. N. C. Tse: "A Framework for Robust
   Measurement Based Admission ControlŽ, IEEE/ACM Transactions on
   Networking, Vol. 7, No. 3, June 1999.

   [KEL00] F. P. Kelly, P. B. Key, S. Zachary: " Distributed Admission
   Control", IEEE JSAC, Vol. 18, No. 12, December 2000.


Bianchi&Blefari    Informational - Expires Jul 2001                  9

Per Flow Admission Control over AF PHB groups               March 2001

   [RFC2474] K. Nichols, S. Blake, F. Baker, D. Black, "Definitions of
   the Differentiated Service Field (DS Field) in the Ipv4 and Ipv6
   Headers", RFC2474, December 1998.

   [RFC2475] S. Blade, D. Black, M. Carlson, E. Davies, Z. Wang, W.
   Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated Services", RFC2475,
   December 1998.

   [RFC2597] J. Heinanen, F. Baker, W. Weiss, J. Wroclawski, ŒAssured
   Forwarding PHB GroupŽ, RFC 2597, June 1999.

   [RFC2990] G. Huston, "Next Steps for the IP QoS Architecture",
   RFC2990, November 2000.

   [RFC2998] Bernet, Y., Yavatkar, R., Ford, P., Baker, F., Zhang, L.,
   Speer, M., Braden, R., Davie, B., Wroclawski, J. and E. Felstaine,
   "A Framework for Integrated Services Operation Over DiffServ
   Networks", RFC 2998, November 2000.

11. Author's Addresses

   Giuseppe Bianchi
   DIE, University of Palermo
   Viale delle Scienze, Parco d'Orleans
   90128 Palermo, ITALY
   Tel: +39 091 6566 276
   E-mail: bianchi@elet.polimi.it

   Nicola Blefari-Melazzi

   DIEI, University of Perugia

   Via G. Duranti 93, 06125 Perugia, ITALY

   Tel: +39 075 585 3630

   e-mail: blefari@diei.unipg.it


12. Full Copyright Statement

   "Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved.
   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
   are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into






Bianchi&Blefari    Informational - Expires Jul 2001                 10