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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08                                    
Network                                                        K. Burdis
Internet-Draft                                         Rhodes University
Expires: February 10, 2003                                     R. Naffah
                                                          Forge Research
                                                         August 12, 2002


                 Secure Remote Password SASL Mechanism
                      draft-burdis-cat-srp-sasl-07

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
   www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 10, 2003.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document describes a SASL mechanism based on the Secure Remote
   Password protocol.  This mechanism performs mutual authentication and
   can provide a security layer with replay detection, integrity
   protection and/or confidentiality protection.









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Table of Contents

   1.    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.    Conventions Used in this Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.    Data Element Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.1   Scalar numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.2   Multi-Precision Integers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.3   Octet Sequences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.4   Extended Octet Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.5   Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.6   Buffers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.7   Data Element Size Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.    Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.1   Client sends its identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.2   Server sends initial protocol elements . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.3   Client sends its ephemeral public key  . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.4   Server sends its ephemeral public key  . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   4.5   Client sends its evidence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   4.6   Server sends its evidence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5.    Security Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.1   Cryptographic primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   5.1.1 Pseudo random number generators  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   5.1.2 Key derivation function  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   5.2   Confidentiality Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   5.3   Replay Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   5.4   Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   5.5   Summary of Security Layer Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   6.    Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   7.    Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   7.1   Mandatory Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   7.2   Modulus and generator values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   7.3   Replay detection sequence number counters  . . . . . . . . . 26
   7.4   SASL Profile Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   8.    Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   9.    Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
         References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
         Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   A.    Modulus and Generator values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   B.    Changes since the previous draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
         Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38











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1. Introduction

   The Secure Remote Password (SRP) is a password-based, zero-knowledge,
   authentication and key-exchange protocol developed by Thomas Wu.  It
   has good performance, is not plaintext-equivalent and maintains
   perfect forward secrecy.  It provides authentication (optionally
   mutual authentication) and the negotiation of a session key [SRP].

   The mechanism described herein is based on the optimised SRP protocol
   described at the end of section 3 in [RFC-2945], since this reduces
   the total number of messages exchanged by grouping together pieces of
   information that do not depend on earlier messages.  Due to the
   design of the mechanism, mutual authentication is MANDATORY.

   The SASL mechanism name associated with this protocol is "SRP".




































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2. Conventions Used in this Document

   o  A hex digit is an element of the set:

         {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 , 9, A, B, C, D, E, F}

      A hex digit is the representation of a 4-bit string.  Examples:

         7 = 0111

         A = 1010

   o  An octet is an 8-bit string.  In this document an octet may be
      written as a pair of hex digits.  Examples:

         7A = 01111010

         02 = 00000010

   o  All data is encoded and sent in network byte order (big-endian).

   o  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
      NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL"
      in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119].



























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3. Data Element Formats

   This section describes the encoding of the data elements used by the
   SASL mechanism described in this document.

3.1 Scalar numbers

   Scalar numbers are unsigned quantities.  Using b[k] to refer to the
   k-th octet being processed, the value of a two-octet scalar is:

      ((b[0] << 8) + b[1]),

   where << is the bit left-shift operator.  The value of a four-octet
   scalar is:

      ((b[0] << 24) + (b[1] << 16) + (b[2] << 8) + b[3]).


3.2 Multi-Precision Integers

   Multi-Precision Integers, or MPIs, are positive integers used to hold
   large integers used in cryptographic computations.

   MPIs are encoded using a scheme inspired by that used by OpenPGP -
   [RFC-2440] (section 3.2) - for encoding such entities:

      The encoded form of an MPI SHALL consist of two pieces: a two-
      octet scalar that represents the length of the entity, in octets,
      followed by a sequence of octets that contain the actual integer.

      These octets form a big-endian number; A big-endian number can be
      encoded by prefixing it with the appropriate length.

      Examples: (all numbers are in hexadecimal)

         The sequence of octets [00 01 01] encodes an MPI with the value
         1, while the sequence [00 02 01 FF] encodes an MPI with the
         value of 511.

      Additional rule:

      *  The length field of an encoded MPI describes the octet count
         starting from the MPI's first non-zero octet, containing the
         most significant non-zero bit.  Thus, the encoding [00 02 01]
         is not formed correctly; It should be [00 01 01].

   We shall use the syntax mpi(A) to denote the encoded form of the
   multi-precision integer A.  Furthermore, we shall use the syntax



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   bytes(A) to denote the big-endian sequence of octets forming the
   multi-precision integer with the most significant octet being the
   first non-zero octet containing the most significant bit of A.

3.3 Octet Sequences

   This mechanism generates, uses and exchanges sequences of octets;
   e.g.  output values of message digest algorithm functions.  When such
   entities travel on the wire, they shall be preceded by a one-octet
   scalar quantity representing the count of following octets.

   We shall use the syntax os(s) to denote the encoded form of the octet
   sequence.  Furthermore, we shall use the syntax bytes(s) to denote
   the sequence of octets s, in big-endian order.

3.4 Extended Octet Sequences

   Extended sequences of octets are exchanged when using the security
   layer.  When these sequences travel on the wire, they shall be
   preceded by a four-octet scalar quantity representing the count of
   following octets.

   We shall use the syntax eos(s) to denote the encoded form of the
   extended octet sequence.  Furthermore, we shall use the syntax
   bytes(s) to denote the sequence of octets s, in big-endian order.

3.5 Text

   The only character set for text is the UTF-8 encoding [RFC-2279] of
   Unicode characters [ISO-10646].  All text MUST be in Unicode
   Normalization Form KC [UNICODE-KC] without NUL characters.

   We shall use the syntax utf8(L) to denote the string L in UTF-8
   encoding, preceded by a two-octet scalar quantity representing the
   count of following octets.  Furthermore, we shall use the syntax
   bytes(L) to denote the sequence of octets representing the UTF-8
   encoding of L, in big-endian order.

3.6 Buffers

   In this SASL mechanism data is exchanged between the client and
   server using buffers.  A buffer acts as an envelope for the sequence
   of data elements sent by one end-point of the exchange, and expected
   by the other.

   A buffer MAY NOT contain other buffers.  It may only contain zero,
   one or more data elements.




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   A buffer shall be encoded as two fields: a four-octet scalar quantity
   representing the count of following octets, and the concatenation of
   the octets of the data element(s) contained in the buffer.

   We shall use the syntax {A|B|C} to denote a buffer containing A, B
   and C in that order.  For example:

      { mpi(N) | mpi(g) | utf8(L) }

   is a buffer containing, in the designated order, the encoded forms of
   an MPI N, an MPI g and a Text L.

3.7 Data Element Size Limits

   The following table details the size limit, in number of octets, for
   each of the SASL data element encodings described earlier.

      Data element type          Header       Size limit in octets
                                (octets)       (excluding header)
      ------------------------------------------------------------
      Octet Sequence               1                  255
      MPI                          2                 65,535
      Text                         2                 65,535
      Extended Octet Sequence      4             2,147,483,383
      Buffer                       4             2,147,483,643

   An implementation MUST signal an exception if any size constraint is
   violated.























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4. Protocol Description

   The following sections describe the sequence of data transmitted
   between the client and server for the SRP SASL mechanism, as well as
   the extra control information exchanged to enable a client to request
   whether or not replay detection, integrity protection and/or
   confidentiality protection should be provided by a security layer.

   Mechanism data exchanges, during the authentication phase, are shown
   below:

       Client                                             Server

         ---  { utf8(U) | utf8(I) }  ------------------------>

         <--------  { mpi(N) | mpi(g) | os(s) | utf8(L) }  ---

         ---  { mpi(A) | utf8(o) }  ------------------------->

         <-----------------------------------  { mpi(B) }  ---

         ---  { os(M1) }  ----------------------------------->

                 ( no confidentiality protection )

         <-----------------------------------  { os(M2) }  ---

   where:

      U     is the authentication identity (username),

      I     is the authorisation identity,

      N     is the safe prime modulus,

      g     is the generator,

      s     is the user's password salt,

      L     is the options list indicating available security services,

      A     is the client's ephemeral public key,

      o     is the options list indicating chosen security services,

      B     is the server's ephemeral public key,

      M1    is the client's evidence that the shared key K is known,



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      M2    is the server's evidence that the shared key K is known.


4.1 Client sends its identity

   The client determines its authentication identity U and authorisation
   identity I, encodes them and sends them to the server.

   The client sends:

      { utf8(U) | utf8(I) }


4.2 Server sends initial protocol elements

   The server receives U, and looks up the safe prime modulus N, the
   generator g, and the salt s to be used for that identity.

   The server also creates an options list L, which consists of a comma-
   separated list of option strings that specify the options the server
   supports.  This options list MUST NOT contain any whitespace
   characters and all alphabetic characters MUST be in lowercase.  When
   used in digest calculations by the client the options list MUST be
   used as received.

   The following option strings are defined:

   o  "mda=<message digest algorithm name>" indicates that the server
      supports the designated hash function as the underlying Message
      Digest Algorithm for the designated user to be used for all SRP
      calculations - to compute both client-side and server-side
      digests.  The specified algorithm MUST meet the requirements
      specified in section 3.2 of [RFC-2945]:

         "Any hash function used with SRP should produce an output of at
         least 16 bytes and have the property that small changes in the
         input cause significant nonlinear changes in the output."

      Note that in the interests of interoperability between client and
      server implementations and with other SRP-based tools, both the
      client and the server MUST support SHA-160 as an underlying
      Message Digest Algorithm.  While the server is not required to
      list SHA-160 as an available underlying Message Digest Algorithm,
      it must be able to do so.

   o  "integrity=hmac-<MDA-name>" indicates that the server supports
      integrity protection using the HMAC algorithm [RFC-2104] with
      <MDA-name> as the underlying Message Digest Algorithm.  Acceptable



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      MDA names are chosen from [SCAN] under the MessageDigest section.
      A server SHOULD send such an option string for each HMAC algorithm
      it supports.  The server MUST advertise at least one integrity
      protection algorithm and in the interest of interoperability the
      server SHOULD advertise support for the HMAC-SHA-160 algorithm.

   o  "replay_detection" indicates that the server supports replay
      detection using sequence numbers.  Replay detection SHALL NOT be
      activated without also activating integrity protection.  If the
      replay detection option is offered (by the server) and/or chosen
      (by the client) without explicitly specifying an integrity
      protection option, then the default integrity protection option
      "integrity=hmac-sha-160" is implied and SHALL be activated.

   o  "confidentiality=<cipher name>" indicates that the server supports
      confidentiality protection using the symmetric key block cipher
      algorithm <cipher name>.  The server SHOULD send such an option
      string for each confidentiality protection algorithm it supports.
      Note that in the interest of interoperability, if the server
      offers confidentiality protection, it MUST send the option string
      "confidentiality=aes" since it is then MANDATORY for it to provide
      support for the [AES] algorithm.

   o  "mandatory=[integrity|replay_detection|confidentiality]" is an
      option only available to the server that indicates that the
      specified security layer option is MANDATORY and MUST be chosen by
      the client for use in the resulting security layer.  If a server
      specifies an option as mandatory in this way, it MUST abort the
      connection if the specified option is not chosen by the client.
      It doesn't make sense for the client to send this option since it
      is only able to choose options that the server advertises.  The
      client SHOULD abort the connection if the server does not offer an
      option that it requires.  If this option is not specified then
      this implies that no options are mandatory.  The server SHOULD
      always send the "mandatory=integrity" option indicating that
      integrity protection is required.

   o  "maxbuffersize=<number of bytes>" indicates to the peer the
      maximum number of raw bytes (excluding the SASL buffer 4-byte
      length header) to be processed by the security layer at a time, if
      one is negotiated.  The value of <number of bytes> MUST NOT exceed
      the Buffer size limit defined in section 3.7.  If this option is
      not detected by a client or server mechanism, then it shall
      operate its security layer on the assumption that the maximum
      number of bytes that may be sent, to the peer server or client
      mechanism respectively, is the Buffer data size limit indicated in
      section 3.7.  On the other hand, if a recipient detects this
      option, it shall break any octet-sequence longer than the



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      designated limit into two or more fragments, each wrapped in a
      SASL buffer, before sending them, in sequence, to the peer.

   For example, if the server supports integrity protection using the
   HMAC-SHA-160 and HMAC-MD5 algorithms, replay detection and no
   confidentiality protection, the options list would be:

      mda=sha-1,integrity=hmac-sha-160,integrity=hmac-
      md5,replay_detection

   The server sends:

      { mpi(N) | mpi(g) | os(s) | utf8(L) }


4.3 Client sends its ephemeral public key

   The client receives the options list L from the server that specifies
   the Message Digest Algorithm(s) available to be used for all SRP
   calculations, the security service options the server supports, and
   the maximum buffer size the server can handle.  The client selects
   options from this list and creates a new options list o that
   specifies the selected Message Digest Algorithm to be used for SRP
   calculations and the security services that will be used in the
   security layer.  At most one available Message Digest Algorithm name,
   one available integrity protection algorithm and one available
   confidentiality protection algorithm may be selected.  In addition
   the client may specify the maximum buffer size it can handle.  The
   client MUST include any option specified by the mandatory option.

   The client SHOULD always select an integrity protection algorithm
   even if the server does not make it mandatory to do so.  If the
   client selects a confidentiality protection algorithm it SHOULD then
   also select an integrity protection algorithm.

   This options list MUST NOT contain any whitespace characters and all
   alphabetic characters MUST be in lowercase.  When used in digest
   calculations by the server the options list MUST be used as received.

   The client generates its ephemeral public key A as follows:

      a = prng();

      A = g**a % N;

   where:

      prng() is a random number generation function,



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      a      is the MPI that will act as the client's private key,

      **     is the exponentiation operator,

      %      is the modulus operator,

   The client sends:

      { mpi(A) | utf8(o) }


4.4 Server sends its ephemeral public key

   The server reads the client's verifier v, calculates the shared
   context key K and generates its ephemeral public key B as follows:

      b = prng();

      B = (v + g**b) % N;

      K = H2((A * v**u) ** b % N);

   where:

      b    is the MPI that will act as the server's private key,

      v    is the stored password verifier value,

      u    is a 32-bit unsigned integer which takes its value from the
      first 32 bits of the hash of B, MSB first,

      H2() is the "Interleaved SHA" function, as described in [RFC-
      2945], but generalised to any message digest algorithm, and
      applied using the underlying Message Digest Algorithm (see Section
      4.2).

   The server sends:

      { mpi(B) }


4.5 Client sends its evidence

   The client calculates the shared context key K, and calculates the
   evidence M1 that proves to the server that it knows the shared
   context key K, including I and L as part of the calculation.

   K, on the client's side is computed as follows:



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      x = H(s | H(U | ":" | p));

      K = H2((B - g**x) ** (a + u * x) % N);

   where:

      H() is the result of digesting the designated input/data with the
      underlying Message Digest Algorithm function (see Section 4.2).

      p   is the password value.

   M1 is computed as:

            H(   bytes(H( bytes(N) )) ^ bytes( H( bytes(g) ))
               | bytes(H( bytes(U) ))
               | bytes(s)
               | bytes(A)
               | bytes(B)
               | bytes(K)
               | bytes(H( bytes(I) )
               | bytes(H( bytes(L) ))
            )

   where:

      ^ is the bitwise XOR operator.

   All parameters received from the server that are used as input to a
   digest operation MUST be used as received.

   The client sends:

      { os(M1) }


4.6 Server sends its evidence

   When the Confidentiality Protection service is advertised by the
   server and chosen by the client, the server MUST NOT send M2 but
   instead conclude the SASL exchange after receiving and verifying the
   client's M1.  Otherwise, M2 MUST be sent.

   When the server has to send its evidence M2, which proves to the
   client that it knows the shared context key K, as well as U, I and o,
   it shall compute it as follows:






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            H(   bytes(A)
               | bytes(M1)
               | bytes(K)
               | bytes(H( bytes(U) ))
               | bytes(H( bytes(I) ))
               | bytes(H( bytes(o) ))
            )

   All parameters received from the client that are used as input to a
   digest operation MUST be used as received.

   If Confidentiality Protection was not negotiated the server sends:

      { os(M2) }





































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5. Security Layer

   Section 3 of [RFC-2222] describes the operation of the security
   layer:

      "The security layer takes effect immediately following the last
      response of the authentication exchange for data sent by the
      client and the completion indication for data sent by the server.
      Once the security layer is in effect, the protocol stream is
      processed by the security layer into buffers of cipher-text.  Each
      buffer is transferred over the connection as a stream of octets
      prepended with a four octet field in network byte order that
      represents the length of the following buffer.  The length of the
      cipher-text buffer must be no larger than the maximum size that
      was defined or negotiated by the other side."

   Depending on the options offered by the server and chosen by the
   client, the security layer may provide integrity protection, replay
   detection, and/or confidentiality protection.

   The security layer can be thought of as a three-stage filter through
   which the data flows from the output of one stage to the input of the
   following one.  The first input is the original data, while the last
   output is the data after being subject to the transformations of this
   filter.

   The data always passes through this three-stage filter, though any of
   the stages may be inactive.  Only when a stage is active would the
   output be different from the input.  In other words, if a stage is
   inactive, the octet sequence at the output side is an exact duplicate
   of the same sequence at the input side.

   Schematically, the three-stage filter security layer appears as
   follows:

















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                 +----------------------------+
                 |                            |     I/ p1
         p1  --->| Confidentiality protection |---+
                 |                            |   | A/ c
                 +----------------------------+   |
                                                  |
             +------------------------------------+
             |
             |   +----------------------------+
             |   |                            |     I/ p2
         p2  +-->|      Replay detection      |---+
                 |                            |   | A/ p2 | q
                 +----------------------------+   |
                                                  |
             +------------------------------------+
             |
             |   +----------------------------+
             |   |                            |     I/ p3
         p3  +-->|    Integrity protection    |--->
                 |                            |     A/ p3 | C
                 +----------------------------+

   where:

      p1, p2 and p3 are the input octet sequences at each stage,

      I/ denotes the output at the end of one stage if/when the stage is
      inactive or disabled,

      A/ denotes the output at the end of one stage if/when the stage is
      active or enabled,

      c is the encrypted (sender-side) or decrypted (receiver-side)
      octet sequence.  c1 shall denote the value computed by the sender,
      while c2 shall denote the value computed by the receiver.

      q is a four-octet scalar quantity representing a sequence number,

      C is the Message Authentication Code.  C1 shall denote the value
      of the MAC as computed by the sender, while C2 shall denote the
      value computed by the receiver.

   It is worth noting here that both client and server have their own
   distinct security contexts, including distinct encryption and
   decryption sub-contexts.  In principal, nothing in this specification
   should prevent an implementation from supporting asynchronous
   connections.




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5.1 Cryptographic primitives

5.1.1 Pseudo random number generators

   This mechanism requires random data to be generated for use in:

   1.  The CALG key material and the cipher initial vectors (IVs) for
       both the client and server when the Confidentiality Protection
       service is enabled.

   2.  The IALG key material for both the client and server when the
       Integrity Protection service is enabled.

   The PRNG used in this specification is based on the "UMacGenerator"
   algorithm described in [UMAC].  It uses the [AES] algorithm, in its
   256-bit key size variant, as the underlying symmetric key block
   cipher for its operations.

   A formal description of this PRNG follows:

   o  Initialisation

      *  SK: a 32-octet sequence (seeding key to AES)

   o  Input

      *  n: a positive integer

   o  Output

      *  Y: an n-octet sequence

   o  Algorithm

      *  (initialisation)

         1.  Initialise an AES instance for encryption with the first 32
             octets of SK as its user-supplied key material.  Let "aes"
             be that instance; i.e.  aes = AES(SK, ENCRYPTION);

         2.  Initialise T to be an all-zero 16-octet long sequence;

      *  (for every input)

         1.  Initialise "remaining" to n;

         2.  Initialise Y to be a 0-length octet sequence;




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         3.  while (remaining > 0) do

             1.  T = aes(T);

             2.  Append m octets from T to Y, where m is the minimum of
                 16 and remaining;

             3.  Subtract 16 from remaining;

         4.  return Y;

   In the rest of this document, "PRNG" will refer to this algorithm
   with the initialisation parameter SK set to be the shared context key
   K computed by the SRP calculations (see Section 4.4 and Section 4.5).

   This algorithm MAY also be used as part of the SRP calculations to
   generate the required "a" and "b" parameters used in creating the
   client and server ephemeral private keys ("A" and "B").  In this case
   the initialisation parameter SK can be any 32-octet sequence (e.g.
   multiple representations of the time-of-day).

   If the same PRNG instance is used for both the SRP calculations and
   the calculations in this specification, it MUST be re-initialised
   with the shared context key K before any of the latter calculations
   are performed.

5.1.2 Key derivation function

   During the authentication phase, both parties compute the shared
   context key K (see Section 4.4 for the server, and Section 4.5 for
   the client sides respectively).  The length of K is 2*s bits, where
   "s" is the output length of the underlying Message Digest Algorithm
   used in the SRP calculations (see "mda" option in Section 4.2).

   When Confidentiality Protection is required, and the length of K is
   not equal to the length of the user-supplied key material needed to
   initialise the chosen Confidentiality Algorithm (CALG), the peers
   MUST apply the Key Derivation Function (KDF) in order to obtain
   enough data for this purpose.

   Similarly, when Integrity Protection is required, and the length of K
   is not equal to the required length of the key material needed to
   initialise the chosen Integrity Algorithm (IALG), the peers MUST
   apply the Key Derivation Function (KDF) in order to obtain enough
   data for this purpose too.

   We define this KDF as:




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      Km = KDF(K, n)

   where:

      Km: is the required key material,

      K: is the shared context key, and

      n: is the required length of Km.

   The following steps describe the KDF algorithm:

      If length of K is greater than or equal to n, then

         Let Km be the first n bytes of K;

      Else

         Let Km = PRNG(n);

      return Km


5.2 Confidentiality Protection

   The plaintext data octet sequence p1 is encrypted using the chosen
   confidentiality algorithm (CALG) initialised for encryption with the
   key material Km obtained by applying the KDF to K (the shared context
   key K), and m (the key size of the chosen CALG) - see Section 5.1.2.

      Km = KDF(K, m)

      c1 = CALG(Km, ENCRYPTION)( bytes(p1) )

   On the receiving side, the ciphertext data octet sequence p1 is
   decrypted using the chosen confidentiality algorithm (CALG)
   initialised for decryption, with the key Km obtained by a similar
   process.

      Km = KDF(K, m)

      c2 = CALG(Km, DECRYPTION)( bytes(p1) )

   The designated CALG block cipher MUST be used in OFB (Output Feedback
   Block) mode in the ISO variant, as described in [HAC], algorithm
   7.20.

   Let k be the block size of the chosen symmetric key block cipher



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   algorithm; e.g.  for AES this is 128 bits or 16 octets.  The OFB mode
   used shall have a block size of k.

   It is recommended that Block ciphers operating in OFB mode be used
   with an Initial Vector (the mode's IV).  In such a mode of operation
   - OFB with key re-use - the IV need not be secret.  For the SASL
   mechanism described in this document, the IVs shall be:

      IV = PRNG(n);

   where n is the block size of the negotiated CALG.

   The input data to the confidentiality protection algorithm shall be a
   multiple of the symmetric key block cipher block size k.  When the
   input length is not a multiple of k octets, the data shall be padded
   according to the following scheme (described in [PKCS7] which itself
   is based on [RFC-1423]):

      Assuming the length of the input is l octets, (k - (l mod k))
      octets, all having the value (k - (l mod k)), shall be appended to
      the original data.  In other words, the input is padded at the
      trailing end with one of the following sequences:

                   01 -- if l mod k = k-1
                  02 02 -- if l mod k = k-2
                            ...
                            ...
                            ...
                k k ... k k -- if l mod k = 0

      The padding can be removed unambiguously since all input is padded
      and no padding sequence is a suffix of another.  This padding
      method is well-defined if and only if k < 256 octets, which is the
      case with symmetric block ciphers today, and in the forseeable
      future.

   The output of this stage, when it is active, is:

      at the sending side: CALG(Km, ENCRYPT)( bytes(p1) )

      at the receiving side: CALG(Km, DECRYPT)( bytes(p1) )


5.3 Replay Detection

   A sequence number q is incremented every time a message is sent to
   the peer.




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   The output of this stage, when it is active, is:

      p2 | q

   At the other end, the receiver increments its instance of the
   sequence number.  This new value of the sequence number is then used
   in the integrity protection transformation, which must also be active
   as described in Section 4.2.  See Section 7.3 for more details.

5.4 Integrity Protection

   When the Integrity Protection stage is active, a message
   authentication code C is computed using the chosen integrity
   protection algorithm (IALG) as follows:

   o  the IALG is initialised (once) with the key material Kn obtained
      by applying the KDF to K (the shared context key K), and n (the
      required key size of the chosen IALG) - see Section 5.1.2; i.e.
      Kn = KDF(K, n),

   o  the IALG is updated with every exchange of the sequence p3,
      yielding the value C and a new IALG context for use in the
      following exchange.

   At the other end, the receiver computes its version of C, using the
   same transformation, and checks that its value is equal to that
   received.  If the two values do not agree, the receiver MUST signal
   an exception and abort.

   The output of this stage, when it is active, is then:

      IALG(Kn)( bytes(p3) )


5.5 Summary of Security Layer Output

   The following table shows the data exchanged by the security layer
   peers, depending on the possible legal combinations of the three
   security services in operation:

      CP   IP   RD   Peer sends/receives

      I    I    I    { eos(p) }
      I    A    I    { eos(p) | os( IALG(K)( bytes(p) ) ) }
      I    A    A    { eos(p) | os( IALG(K)( bytes(p) | bytes(q)) ) }
      A    I    I    { eos(c) }
      A    A    I    { eos(c) | os( IALG(K)( bytes(c) ) ) }
      A    A    A    { eos(c) | os( IALG(K)((bytes(c) | bytes(q)) ) }



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   where

      CP    Confidentiality protection,

      IP    Integrity protection,

      RD    Replay detection,

      I     Security service is Inactive/disabled,

      A     Security service is Active/enabled,

      p     The original plaintext,

      q     The sequence number.

      c     The enciphered input obtained by either:

         CALG(Km, ENCRYPT)( bytes(p) ) at the sender's side, or

         CALG(Km, DECRYPT)( bytes(p) ) at the receiver's side






























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6. Example

   The example below uses SMTP authentication [RFC-2554].  The base64
   encoding of challenges and responses, as well as the reply codes
   preceding the responses are part of the SMTP authentication
   specification, not part of this SASL mechanism itself.

   "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and server
   respectively.


    S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready

    C: EHLO zaau.example.com

    S: 250-smtp.example.com
    S: 250 AUTH SRP CRAM-MD5 DIGEST-MD5

    C: AUTH SRP AAAADAAEdGVzdAAEdGVzdA==

     with:

       U = "test"

       I = "test"

    S: 334 AAABygEArGvbQTJKmpvxZt5eE4lYL69ytmUZh+4H/DGSlD21YFCjcynLtKCZ
    7YGT4HV3Z6E91SMSq0sDMQ3Nf0ip2gT9UOgIOWntt2ewz2CVF5oWOrNmGgX71fqq6Ck
    YqZYvC5O4Vfl5k+yXXuqoDXQK2/T/dHNZ0EHVwz6nHSgeRGsUdzvKl7Q6I/uAFna9IH
    pDbGSB8dK5B4cXRhpbnTLmiPh3SFRFI7UksNV9Xqd6J3XS7PoDLPvb9S+zeGFgJ5AE5
    Xrmr4dOcwPOUymczAQce8MI2CpWmPOo0MOCca41+Onb+7aUtcgD2J965DXeI21SX1R1
    m2XjcvzWjvIPpxEfnkr/cwABAgqsi3AvmIqdEbREALhtZGE9U0hBLTEsbWFuZGF0b3J
    5PXJlcGxheSBkZXRlY3Rpb24scmVwbGF5IGRldGVjdGlvbixpbnRlZ3JpdHk9aG1hYy
    1zaGExLGludGVncml0eT1obWFjLW1kNSxjb25maWRlbnRpYWxpdHk9YWVzLGNvbmZpZ
    GVudGlhbGl0eT1jYXN0NSxjb25maWRlbnRpYWxpdHk9Ymxvd2Zpc2gsbWF4YnVmZmVy
    c2l6ZT0yMTQ3NDgzNjQz

     with:

       N = "21766174458617435773191008891802753781907668374255538511144
       6432246898862353838409572109090130860564015713997172358072665816
       4960647214841029141336415219736447718088739565548373811507267740
       2235101762521901569820740293149529620419333266262073471054548368
       7360395197024862265062488610602569718029849535611214426801576680
       0076142998822245709041387397397017192709399211475176516806361476
       1119615476233422096442783117971236371647333871414335895773474667
       3089670508070055093204247996784170368679283167612722742303140675
       4829113358247958306143957755934710196177140617368437852270348349



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       5337037655006751328447510550299250924469288819"

       g = "2"

       s = "814819216327401865851972"

       L = "mda=sha-1,mandatory=replay_detection,replay_detection,integ
       rity=hmac-sha1,integrity=hmac-md5,confidentiality=aes,confidenti
       ality=cast5,confidentiality=blowfish,maxbuffersize=2147483643"

    C: AAABYwEAAp5q/4zhXoTUzXBscozN97SWgfDcAImIk3lNHNvd0b+Dr7jEm6upXblZ
    T5sL9mPgFsejlIh+B/eCu/HvzWCrXj6ylPZv8dy3LCH3LIORqQ45S7Lsbmrrg/dukDh
    4tZCJMLD4r3evzaY8KVhtJeLMVbeXuh4JljKP42Ll59Lzwf8jfPh4+4Lae1rpWUCL9D
    ueKcY+nN+xNHTit/ynLATxwL93P6+GoGY4TkUbUBfjiI1+rAMvyMDMw5XozGy07FOEc
    ++U0iPeXCQP4MT5FipOUoz8CYX7J1LbaXp2WJuFHlkyVXF7oCoyHbhld/5CfR3o6q/B
    /x9+yZRqaHH+JfllOgBfbWRhPVNIQS0xLHJlcGxheSBkZXRlY3Rpb24saW50ZWdyaXR
    5PWhtYWMtbWQ1LGNvbmZpZGVudGlhbGl0eT1ibG93ZmlzaCxtYXhidWZmZXJzaXplPT
    IxNDc0ODM2NDM=

     with:

       A = "33059541846712102497463123211304342021934496372587869281515
       9695658237779884462777478850394977744553746930451895815615888405
       0562780707370878253753979367019077142882237029766166623275718227
       6555389834190840322081091599089081947324537907613924707058150037
       7802790776231793962143786411792516760030102436603621046541729396
       6890613394379900527412007068242559299422872893332111365840536495
       1858834742328835373387573188369956379881606380890675411966073665
       1106922002294035533470301541999274557200666703389531481794516625
       4757418442215980634933876533189969562613241499465295849832999091
       40398081321840949606581251320320995783959866"

       o = mda=sha-1,replay_detection,integrity=hmac-md5,confidentialit
       y=blowfish,maxbuffersize=2147483643"

    S: 334 AAABAgEAOUKbXpnzMhziivGgMwm+FS8sKGSvjh5M3D+80RF/5z9rm0oPoi4+
    pF83fueWn4Hz9M+muF/22PHHZkHtlutDrtapj4OtirdxC21fS9bMtEh3F0whTX+3mPv
    thw5sk11turandHiLvcUZOgcrAGIoDKcBPoGyBud+8bMgpkf/uGfyBM2nEX/hV+oGgg
    X+LiHjmkxAJ3kewfQPH0eV9ffEuuyu8BUcBXkJsS6l7eWkuERSCttVOi/jS031c+CD/
    nuecUXYiF8IYzW03rbcwYhZzifmTi3VK9C8zG2K1WmGU+cDKlZMkyCPMmtCsxlbgE8z
    SHCuCiOgQ35XhcA0Qa0C3Q==

     with:

       B: "722842847565031844205403087285424428589273458129750231766015
       4465607827529853239240118185263492617243523916106658696965596526
       8585300845435562962039149169549800169184521786717633959469278439
       8771344445002432579509292115598435685062882631760796416554562980



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       8475896198325835507901319556929511421472132184990365213059654962
       7218189966140113906545856088040473723048909402258929560823932725
       2022154114087913895411927676707073040281136096806681758265221209
       8822374723416364340410020172215773934302794679034424699999611678
       9730443114919539575466941344964841591072763617954717789621871251
       71089179399349194452686682517183909017223901"

    C: AAAAFRTkoju6xGP+zH89iaDWIFjfIKt5Kg==

    S: 235 Authentication successful.









































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7. Discussion

7.1 Mandatory Algorithms

   The algorithms specified as mandatory were chosen for utility and
   availablity.  We felt that a mandatory confidentiality and integrity
   protection algorithm for the security layer and a mandatory Message
   Digest Algorithm for SRP calculations should be specified to ensure
   interoperability between implementations of this mechanism:

   o  The SHA-160 Message Digest Algorithm was chosen as an underlying
      algorithm for SRP calculations because this allows for easy
      interoperability with other SRP-based tools that use the SRP-SHA1
      protocol described in section 3 of [RFC-2945] and create their
      password files using this algorithm.

   o  The HMAC algorithm was chosen as an integrity algorithm because it
      is faster than MAC algorithms based on secret key encryption
      algorithms [RFC-2847].

   o  AES was chosen as a cipher because it has undergone thorough
      scrutiny by the best cryptographers in the world.

   Since confidentiality protection is optional, this mechanism should
   be usable in countries that have strict controls on the use of
   cryptography.

7.2 Modulus and generator values

   It is RECOMMENDED that the server use values for the modulus (N) and
   generator (g) chosen from those listed in Appendix A so that the
   client can avoid expensive constraint checks, since these predefined
   values already meet the constraints described in [RFC-2945]:

      "For maximum security, N should be a safe prime (i.e.  a number of
      the form N = 2q + 1, where q is also prime).  Also, g should be a
      generator modulo N (see [SRP] for details), which means that for
      any X where 0 < X < N, there exists a value x for which g**x % N
      == X."


7.3 Replay detection sequence number counters

   The mechanism described in this document allows the use of a Replay
   Detection security service that works by including sequence number
   counters in the message authentication code (MAC) created by the
   Integrity Protection service.  As noted in Section 4.2 integrity
   protection is always activated when the Replay Detection service is



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   activated.

   Both the client and the server keep two sequence number counters.
   Each of these counters is a 32-bit unsigned integer initialised with
   a Starting Value and incremented by an Increment Value with every
   successful transmission of an SASL buffer through the security layer.
   The Sent counter is incremented for each buffer sent through the
   security layer.  The Received counter is incremented for each buffer
   received through the security layer.  If the value of a sequence
   number counter exceeds 2**32-1 it wraps around and starts from zero
   again.

   When a sender sends a buffer it includes the value of its Sent
   counter in the computation of the MAC accompanying each integrity
   protected message.  When a recipient receives a buffer it uses the
   value of it's Received counter in its computation of the integrity
   protection MAC for the received message.  The recipient's Received
   counter must be the same as the sender's Sent counter in order for
   the received and computed MACs to match.

   This specification assumes that for each sequence number counter the
   Starting Value is ZERO, and that the Increment Value is ONE.  These
   values do not affect the security or the intended objective of the
   replay detection service, since they never travel on the wire.

7.4 SASL Profile Considerations

   As mentioned briefly in [RFC-2222], and detailed in [SASL] a SASL
   specification has three layers: (a) a protocol definition using SASL
   known as the "Profile", (b) a SASL mechanism definition, and (c) the
   SASL framework.

   Point (3) in section 5 of [SASL] ("Protocol profile requirements")
   clearly states that it is the responsibility of the Profile to define
   "...how the challenges and responses are encoded, how the server
   indicates completion or failure of the exchange, how the client
   aborts an exchange, and how the exchange method interacts with any
   line length limits in the protocol."

   The username entity, referenced as "U" throughout this document, and
   used by the server to locate the password data, is assumed to travel
   "in the clear," meaning that no transformation is applied to its
   contents.  This assumption was made to allow the same SRP password
   files to be used in this mechanism, as those used with other SRP
   applications and tools.

   A Profile may decide, for privacy or other reason, to disallow such
   information to travel in the clear, and instead use a hashed version



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   of U, or more generally a transformation function applied to U; i.e.
   f(U).  Such a Profile would require additional tools to add the
   required entries to the SRP password files for the new value(s) of
   f(U).  It is worth noting too that if this is the case, and the same
   user shall access the server through this mechanism as well as
   through other SRP tools, then at least two entries, one with U and
   the other with f(U) need to be present in the SRP password files if
   those same files are to be used for both types of access.











































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8. Security Considerations

   This mechanism relies on the security of SRP, which bases its
   security on the difficulty of solving the Diffie-Hellman problem in
   the multiplicative field modulo a large safe prime.  See section 4
   "Security Considerations" of [RFC-2945] and section 4 "Security
   analysis" of [SRP].

   B, the server's ephemeral public key, is computed as g**b + v = g**b
   + g**x, which is symmetric and allows two guesses per *active
   attack*.  In practical terms, this makes no difference to the
   security of SRP, since the number of active attacks needed is still
   linearly proportional to the number of guesses needed; only the
   constant factor (2 vs.  1) has changed.

   This mechanism also relies on the security of the HMAC algorithm and
   the underlying hash function when integrity protection is used.
   Section 6 "Security" of [RFC-2104] discusses these security issues in
   detail.  Weaknesses found in MD5 do not impact HMAC-MD5 [DOBBERTIN].

   U, A, I and o, sent from the client to the server, and N, g, L, s and
   B, sent from the server to the client could be modified by an
   attacker before reaching the other party.  For this reason, these
   values are included in the respective calculations of evidence (M1
   and M2) to prove that each party knows the session key K.  This
   allows each party to verify that these values were received
   unmodified.

   The use of integrity protection is RECOMMENDED to detect message
   tampering and to avoid session hijacking after authentication has
   taken place.

   Replay attacks may be avoided through the use of sequence numbers,
   because sequence numbers make each integrity protected message
   exchanged during a session different, and each session uses a
   different key.

   Research [KRAWCZYK] shows that the order and way of combining message
   encryption (Confidentiality Protection) and message authentication
   (Integrity Protection) are important.  This mechanism follows the EtA
   (encrypt-then-authenticate) method and is "generically secure."

   This mechanism uses a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) for
   generating some of its parameters.  Section 5.1.1 describes a
   securely seeded, cryptographically strong PRNG implementation for
   this purpose.





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9. Acknowledgements

   The following people provided valuable feedback in the preparation of
   this document:

      Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie>

      Timothy Martin <tmartin@andrew.cmu.edu>

      Alexey Melnikov <mel@messagingdirect.com>

      Ken Murchison <ken@oceana.com>

      Magnus Nystrom <magnus@rsasecurity.com>

      Thomas Wu <tom@arcot.com>



































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References

   [AES]         National Institute of Standards and Technology,
                 "Rijndael: NIST's Selection for the AES", December
                 2000, <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/rijndael/
                 Rijndael.pdf>.

   [DOBBERTIN]   Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent
                 Attack", December 1996, <ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/
                 cryptobytes/crypto2n2.pdf>.

   [HAC]         Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P. and S. Vanstone,
                 "Handbook of Applied Cryptography", CRC Press, Inc.,
                 ISBN 0-8493-8523-7, 1997, <http://
                 www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/about/chap7.ps>.

   [ISO-10646]   "International Standard --Information technology--
                 Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) --
                 Part 1 Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane. UTF-8
                 is described in Annex R, adopted but not yet published.
                 UTF-16 is described in Annex Q, adopted but not yet
                 published.", ISO/IEC 10646-1, 1993.

   [KRAWCZYK]    Krawczyk, H., "The order of encryption and
                 authentication for protecting communications (Or: how
                 secure is SSL?)", June 2001, <http://eprint.iacr.org/
                 2001/045/>.

   [PKCS7]       RSA Data Security, Inc., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic
                 Message Syntax Standard", Version 1.5, November 1993,
                 <ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/ascii/pkcs-7.asc>.

   [RFC-1423]    Balenson, D., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet
                 Electronic Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and
                 Identifiers", RFC 1423, February 1993, <http://
                 www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1423.txt>.

   [RFC-2104]    Krawczyk, H., "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
                 Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997, <http://
                 www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt>.

   [RFC-2119]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                 Requirement Levels", BCP 0014, RFC 2119, March 1997,
                 <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>.

   [RFC-2222]    Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer
                 (SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997, <http://www.ietf.org/
                 rfc/rfc2222.txt>.



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   [RFC-2279]    Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of Unicode
                 and ISO 10646", RFC 2279, January 1998, <http://
                 www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2279.txt>.

   [RFC-2440]    Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H. and R. Thayer,
                 "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998,
                 <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2440.txt>.

   [RFC-2554]    Myers, J., "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication",
                 RFC 2554, March 1999.

   [RFC-2629]    Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
                 June 1999, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2629.txt>.

   [RFC-2847]    Eisler, M., "LIPKEY - A Low Infrastructure Public Key
                 Mechanism Using SPKM", RFC 2847, June 2000, <http://
                 www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2847.txt>.

   [RFC-2945]    Wu, T., "The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange
                 System", RFC 2945, September 2000, <http://
                 www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2945.txt>.

   [SASL]        Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer
                 (SASL)", April 2001, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-
                 drafts/draft-myers-saslrev-01.txt>.

   [SCAN]        Hopwood, D., "Standard Cryptographic Algorithm Naming",
                 June 2000, <http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/scan-mirror/
                 >.

   [SRP]         Wu, T., "The Secure Remote Password Protocol", March
                 1998, <http://srp.stanford.edu/ndss.html>.

   [SRP-impl]    Wu, T., "SRP: The Open Source Password Authentication
                 Standard", March 1998, <http://srp.stanford.edu/srp/>.

   [UMAC]        Krovetz, T., Black, J., Halevi, S., Hevia, A.,
                 Krawczyk, H. and P. Rogaway, "UMAC: Message
                 Authentication Code using Universal Hashing", October
                 2000, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
                 krovetz-umac-01.txt>.

   [UNICODE-KC]  Durst, D., "Unicode Standard Annex #15: Unicode
                 Normalization Forms.", March 2001, <http://
                 www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr15>.






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Authors' Addresses

   Keith Burdis
   Rhodes University
   Computer Science Department
   Grahamstown  6139
   ZA

   EMail: keith@rucus.ru.ac.za


   Raif S. Naffah
   Forge Research Pty. Limited
   Suite 116, Bay 9
   Locomotive Workshop,
   Australian Technology Park
   Cornwallis Street
   Eveleigh, NSW  1430
   AU

   EMail: raif@forge.com.au






























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Appendix A. Modulus and Generator values

   Modulus (N) and generator (g) values for various modulus lengths are
   given below.  In each case the modulus is a large safe prime and the
   generator is a primitve root of GF(n) [RFC-2945].  These values are
   taken from software developed by Tom Wu and Eugene Jhong for the
   Stanford SRP distribution [SRP-impl].


      [264 bits]
        Modulus (base 16) =
          115B8B692E0E045692CF280B436735C77A5A9E8A9E7ED56C965F87DB5B2A2
          ECE3
        Generator = 2

      [384 bits]
        Modulus (base 16) =
          8025363296FB943FCE54BE717E0E2958A02A9672EF561953B2BAA3BAACC3E
          D5754EB764C7AB7184578C57D5949CCB41B
        Generator = 2

      [512 bits]
        Modulus (base 16) =
          D4C7F8A2B32C11B8FBA9581EC4BA4F1B04215642EF7355E37C0FC0443EF75
          6EA2C6B8EEB755A1C723027663CAA265EF785B8FF6A9B35227A52D86633DB
          DFCA43
        Generator = 2

      [640 bits]
        Modulus (base 16) =
          C94D67EB5B1A2346E8AB422FC6A0EDAEDA8C7F894C9EEEC42F9ED250FD7F0
          046E5AF2CF73D6B2FA26BB08033DA4DE322E144E7A8E9B12A0E4637F6371F
          34A2071C4B3836CBEEAB15034460FAA7ADF483
        Generator = 2

      [768 bits]
        Modulus (base 16) =
          B344C7C4F8C495031BB4E04FF8F84EE95008163940B9558276744D91F7CC9
          F402653BE7147F00F576B93754BCDDF71B636F2099E6FFF90E79575F3D0DE
          694AFF737D9BE9713CEF8D837ADA6380B1093E94B6A529A8C6C2BE33E0867
          C60C3262B
        Generator = 2

      [1024 bits]
        Modulus (base 16) =
          EEAF0AB9ADB38DD69C33F80AFA8FC5E86072618775FF3C0B9EA2314C9C256
          576D674DF7496EA81D3383B4813D692C6E0E0D5D8E250B98BE48E495C1D60
          89DAD15DC7D7B46154D6B6CE8EF4AD69B15D4982559B297BCF1885C529F56



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          6660E57EC68EDBC3C05726CC02FD4CBF4976EAA9AFD5138FE8376435B9FC6
          1D2FC0EB06E3
        Generator = 2

      [1280 bits]
        Modulus (base 16) =
          D77946826E811914B39401D56A0A7843A8E7575D738C672A090AB1187D690
          DC43872FC06A7B6A43F3B95BEAEC7DF04B9D242EBDC481111283216CE816E
          004B786C5FCE856780D41837D95AD787A50BBE90BD3A9C98AC0F5FC0DE744
          B1CDE1891690894BC1F65E00DE15B4B2AA6D87100C9ECC2527E45EB849DEB
          14BB2049B163EA04187FD27C1BD9C7958CD40CE7067A9C024F9B7C5A0B4F5
          003686161F0605B
        Generator = 2

      [1536 bits]
        Modulus (base 16) =
          9DEF3CAFB939277AB1F12A8617A47BBBDBA51DF499AC4C80BEEEA9614B19C
          C4D5F4F5F556E27CBDE51C6A94BE4607A291558903BA0D0F84380B655BB9A
          22E8DCDF028A7CEC67F0D08134B1C8B97989149B609E0BE3BAB63D4754838
          1DBC5B1FC764E3F4B53DD9DA1158BFD3E2B9C8CF56EDF019539349627DB2F
          D53D24B7C48665772E437D6C7F8CE442734AF7CCB7AE837C264AE3A9BEB87
          F8A2FE9B8B5292E5A021FFF5E91479E8CE7A28C2442C6F315180F93499A23
          4DCF76E3FED135F9BB
        Generator = 2

      [2048 bits]
        Modulus (base 16) =
          AC6BDB41324A9A9BF166DE5E1389582FAF72B6651987EE07FC3192943DB56
          050A37329CBB4A099ED8193E0757767A13DD52312AB4B03310DCD7F48A9DA
          04FD50E8083969EDB767B0CF6095179A163AB3661A05FBD5FAAAE82918A99
          62F0B93B855F97993EC975EEAA80D740ADBF4FF747359D041D5C33EA71D28
          1E446B14773BCA97B43A23FB801676BD207A436C6481F1D2B9078717461A5
          B9D32E688F87748544523B524B0D57D5EA77A2775D2ECFA032CFBDBF52FB3
          786160279004E57AE6AF874E7303CE53299CCC041C7BC308D82A5698F3A8D
          0C38271AE35F8E9DBFBB694B5C803D89F7AE435DE236D525F54759B65E372
          FCD68EF20FA7111F9E4AFF73
        Generator = 2














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Appendix B. Changes since the previous draft

   Removed the references to Rijndael since, strictly speaking it is not
   the AES.  This should also eliminate any ambiguities as to the
   required block and key sizes this specification refers to when
   mentioning the AES.

   Removed the requirement for (a) an all-zero IV, and (b) a dummy first
   block in the operations of the Confidentiality Service filter.

   Included the description of a secure PRNG.

   Included the description of a Key Derivation Function (KDF) to ensure
   there will always be enough bytes to initialise both the CALG and
   IALG from the shared context key computed by the SRP calculations.

   Added a paragraph before the end of the "Security layer" section to
   clarify that this specification does not mandate nor imply a lockstep
   in operating the security services.

   Added a paragraph to the "Security considerations" section about the
   quality of the PRNG to use.

   Added the restriction that all text should be in Unicode
   Normalization form KC with NULs prohibited.

   Tightened up the restrictions on the options lists L and o by
   specifying that they must not contain any whitespace and must always
   be in lowercase.  Changed "replay detection" to "replay_detection".
   This should simplify parsing of these lists.

   Added explicit notes that parameters received from the other party
   must be used as received in all digest calculations.  Clearly any
   alteration of these input parameters (such as changing the case of
   text) will prevent the digest calculations on each side from
   producing the same result.

   Made it mandatory for the server to advertise at least one integrity
   protection algorithm and recommended that the HMAC-SHA-160 algorithm
   always be advertised.  Recommended that the server always make
   integrity protection mandatory.

   Recommended that the client always select integrity protection, even
   if the server does not make it mandatory to do so.  Also recommended
   that the client always select integrity protection when it selects
   confidentiality protection.

   Added Alexey Melnikov to Section 9.



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   Added a quote from section 3 of [RFC-2222] to the description of the
   security layer in Section 8 to describe the operation of the security
   layer in SASL.

   TODO: Amend the Cryptix SASL library and re-generate the example.














































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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
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   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
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   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















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