SIMPLE                                                         E. Burger
Internet-Draft                               Brooktrout Technology, Inc.
Expires: August 9, 2006                                 February 5, 2006


  Instant Message Delivery Notification (IMDN) for Common Presence and
                        Instant Messaging (CPIM)
                      draft-burger-simple-imdn-03

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism for instant message delivery
   notification (IMDN) in the CPIM (Common Presence and Instant
   Messaging) environment.  The mechanism follows the procedures of
   ESMTP message delivery notification (MDN).







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Table of Contents

   1.  Document Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  State Sharing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.1.  Data Elements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.2.  Disposition States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       6.2.1.  read . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       6.2.2.  processed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       6.2.3.  error  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       6.2.4.  denied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.3.  B2BUAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Namespace  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  Requesting UAC Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     8.1.  IMDN Request Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       8.1.1.  Disposition-Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       8.1.2.  List-Action  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       8.1.3.  Original-From  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       8.1.4.  Message-ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       8.1.5.  Original-Message-ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     8.2.  IMDN Reception Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   9.  Reporting UAS Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     9.1.  General Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     9.2.  Recipient is the End User UAS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     9.3.  Recipient is a B2BUA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       9.3.1.  first-recipient  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       9.3.2.  final-recipient  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       9.3.3.  No List-Action Specified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       9.3.4.  Unknown List-Action Specified  . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   10. IMDN Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     10.1. disposition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     10.2. original-message-id  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     10.3. original-recipient-uri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     10.4. reporting-uas-uri  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     10.5. original-recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     10.6. disposition-time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   11. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     11.1. Simple End-to-End IMDN Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     11.2. Gateway Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     11.3. List Exploder - Forward  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     11.4. List Exploder - Private Forward  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     11.5. List With Lists  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     11.6. End-to-End Encryption Forwarded  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   12. Formal Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     12.1. IMDN CPIM Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22



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     12.2. IMDN Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   13. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Appendix A.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 26










































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1.  Document Conventions

   This document refers generically to the sender of a message in the
   masculine (he/him/his) and the recipient of the message in the
   feminine (she/her/hers).  This convention is purely for convenience
   and makes no assumption about the gender of a message sender or
   recipient.

   In this document, the term "CPIM header" refers to the message
   metadata headers encapsulated in a Message/CPIM object [1].

   The term "IM" refers to Instant Message.

   The term "Requesting UAC" is the User Agent Client that sends the
   message the user would like a disposition notification for.

   The term "Reporting UAS" is the User Agent Server that sends the
   disposition notification back to the Requesting UAC.

   The term "B2BUA" refers to a Back-to-Back User Agent.  IM B2BUA's
   implement gateways and list exploders, amongst other functions.

   If you missed it in the title, the term "IMDN" is an Instant Message
   Delivery Notification.  The IMDN indicates the disposition of the
   message after the message is available to the recipient.

      NOTE: Text like this, offset from the margin and starting with the
      word "NOTE:", is not normative and present only for discussion or
      explanation purposes.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [2].

   This document uses the augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) as described
   in RFC4234 [3] for all syntax specification uses, other than XML.

   Examples and discussion of CPIM headers, for clarity, do not include
   the leading name space identifier.


2.  Introduction

   In many user-to-user message exchange systems, message senders often
   wish to know if the human recipient actually read a message.  Most
   messaging protocols, including CPIM sessions [4], ensure reliable
   delivery of a message to the recipient.  However, they cannot report
   when a human user actually reads the message.



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   Electronic Mail [12] deals with this situation with message delivery
   notifications [5].  After the recipient views the message, her mail
   user agent generates a message delivery notification, or MDN.  The
   MDN is an e-mail that follows the format prescribed by RFC2298 [5].
   The fixed format ensures that an automaton can process the message.
   Even though a MDN is a normal e-mail message, a MDN cannot request a
   receipt, in order to prevent notification loops.

   The mechanism described here uses a CPIM header to indicate an IMDN
   request.  By using a CPIM header, we abstract the request outside the
   transport protocol.  This enhances interoperability between different
   IM systems because the request is at the message level, not transport
   level.  Likewise, the mechanism does not rely on session-mode versus
   pager-mode or SIP transport or any particular SIP or other response
   codes.

   Since the security and privacy considerations have a tremendous
   influence on a number of design decisions that may at first seem
   counter-intuitive, the Privacy Considerations (Section 4) and
   Security Considerations (Section 3) sections appear in the front of
   this document.

   The basic protocol flow is as follows.  A message sender marks a
   message for disposition notification.  At a certain point in time,
   the recipient's instant message user agent determines the recipient
   has read the message or otherwise disposed the message.  The
   mechanism by which an instant message user agent determines its user
   has read a message is beyond the scope of this document.  At that
   point, the recipient's instant message user agent automatically
   generates a notification message to the sender.  This notification
   message is the Instant Message Disposition Notification (IMDN).

   Note there are numerous circumstances under which the instant message
   user agent may not send a notification.  The following sections
   describe some of these situations.


3.  Security Considerations

   All of the security issues raised in RFC2298 [5] apply here.  For
   review, they are forgery and denial of service attacks,
   confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  Note that signing CPIM
   messages helps in this respect.

   The threats in the IMDN system, over and beyond the threats inherent
   to CPIM [4] include the following:





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   o  A malicious endpoint attempts to send messages to a user that
      would normally not wish to receive messages from that endpoint by
      convincing the IMDN system to "bounce" an IMDN from an
      unsuspecting endpoint to the user.
   o  A malicious endpoint attempts to flood a user with IMDNs by
      convincing a B2BUA list exploder to send IMDN responses to an
      unsuspecting user.
   o  A malicious node in the network that attempts to modify an IMDN
      from a Reporting UAS.
   o  A malicious B2BUA attempts to forward an IMDN from a Reporting UAS
      to the Recipient UAC, where the Reporting UAS would not normally
      forward the IMDN to that Recipient UAC if the identity of the
      Reporting UAS knew the identity of the Recipient UAC.
   o  A malicious endpoint that attempts to fish for a Request-URI of a
      UAS beyond a B2BUA, where the UAS would normally wish to keep its
      identity private from the malicious endpoint.
   o  A malicious node in the network that attempts to eavesdrop on IMDN
      traffic to, for example, learn Request-URI or traffic pattern
      information.
   o  A malicious node in the network attempts to stage a denial of
      service attack on a B2BUA by requesting a large list expansion
      with a request for consolidated IMDN processing.

   Attacks the protocol cannot protect against include the following:
   o  A malicious B2BUA directly revealing the identity of a downstream
      UAS that would not normally wish its identity revealed to such a
      UAS.  Keeping such information private is a B2BUA implementation
      issue.
   o  A malicious Reporting UAS that alters the time of the report.
      There is no protocol mechanism for ensuring the UAS does not lie
      about the time or purposely holds an IMDN for transmission to make
      it appear the user disposed of a message later than they actually
      did.
   o  A deletion attack on an IMDN.  This is a trade-off between privacy
      and security.  The privacy considerations allow the Reporting UAS
      to silently ignore an IMDN request.  Any mechanism that would
      reliably indicate that a malicious node deleted a Reporting UAS'
      message would also serve the purpose of detecting a Reporting UAS
      that chose not to issue an IMDN.

   To combat eavesdropping, modification, and man-in-the-middle attacks,
   we require some level of authentication and integrity protections.
   That said, there are circumstances where strong integrity would be
   overkill.  The presumption is the sender of the IM has and sets the
   expectation for the level of protection.  The procedures for
   integrity protection are as follows.





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   o  If the Reporting UAS has a certificate, the Reporting UAS MUST
      sign the IMDN.
   o  If the IM is encrypted, the Reporting UAS MUST encrypt the IMDN
      body, as an attacker may attempt to discern the user's activity
      profile and identity from sniffing IMDNs on the network.
   o  The two above rules are cumulative.
   Reporting UAS' MUST be capable of loading a user certificate.

   Replay and message insertion attacks are unlikely in an IMDN
   environment, as the Message-ID cannot be identical within a given
   session, and the Requesting UAC has the ability to maintain the state
   of Message-ID's sent for later correlation.  Moreover, the instant
   message itself MUST have the Message-ID sent securely to remove the
   possibility of an eavesdropper learning the Message-ID.

   To combat surreptitious delivery of messages by embedding them in
   IMDN's, as is done today by spammers using MDN's, an IMDN MUST NOT
   include a copy of the original message.

   An attacker can mount a distributed denial of service attack on a
   node by sending lots of messages to the node with IMDN requests.
   Note that this is the same problem as there is without IMDN; IMDN
   simply linearly increases the load on the node under attack.  One can
   mitigate, but not eliminate this threat by the UAS immediately
   ignoring requests that are not authenticated.

   Likewise, an attacker can mount a denial of service attack on a B2BUA
   by asking the B2BUA to explode a large list and to direct the B2BUA
   to consolidate the IMDN's from the targets of the list.


4.  Privacy Considerations

   As suggested by RFC2298 [5], it is strongly RECOMMENDED that the user
   agent obtain the user's consent before sending an IMDN.
   Circumstances where the user agend does not ask for the user's
   consent include instant messaging systems that, for regulatory
   reasons, are required to issue an IMDN, such as in the healthcare
   field or financial community.

   A user agent can obtain such consent by a prompt or dialog box on a
   per-message basis, globally through the user's setting of a
   preference, or other, user-configurable mechanism.  The user might
   also indicate globally that IMDNs are never to be sent or that a
   "denied" IMDN is always sent in response to a request for an IMDN.

   The protocol MUST enable the recipient of the IM to keep the message
   disposition private.  That is, only the sender is able to read the



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   IMDN body text.  The transmission of the IMDN SHOULD be end-to-end
   encrypted, if physically possible.  If the Originating UAC encrypted
   the IM, the Reporting UAS MUST encrypt the IMDN and wrap the result
   with S/MIME [6].


5.  State Sharing

   One of the design questions for the IMDN design is where to store
   message state.  This becomes a question when we introduce B2BUA's.
   If there were no B2BUA's, then the Reporting UAS simply sends the
   IMDN directly to the sender, and the sender retains the state of
   messages sent that are awaiting IMDN's.  However, since we have
   B2BUA's, we have a choice.  One option is for the Requesting UAC to
   record the state of messages sent and have stateless B2BUA's.
   Another option is for intermediary B2BUAs to record the state of
   messages sent and always forward IMDN's back to the immediately
   preceding message requestor.

   The trade-offs are as follows:
   o  End-to-End State Sharing
      *  Pro: The actual recipient sends the IMDN directly to the actual
         sender.  It is quite likely the path may be different.  For
         example, while the request may traverse a list exploder
         (B2BUA), the IMDN's will go directly to the sender.
      *  Pro: With the Reporting UAS sending the report directly to the
         Requesting UAC, it is possible to keep the disposition private
         with respect to intermediaries.
      *  Pro: Only the endpoints share state.  Network failures do not
         impact IMDN delivery.  Users should know when their user agent
         fails and can act accordingly.
      *  Pro: No matter what, the Requesting UAC should store state for
         messages is sends and has an interest in correlating IMDN's.
         There is no additional burden to the network or user agent.
      *  Pro: The Reporting UAS knows the direct recipient of the IMDN,
         so it can use more sophisticated algorithms to decide if or
         what kind of IMDN to generate.  Of course, a B2BUA can always
         hide the true recipient of an IMDN by requesting the report on
         its own behalf, as it is a full UAC.  However, the Reporting
         UAS can chose not to release information to untrusted B2BUA's.
      *  Con: Slightly more complex protocol, and requires authenticated
         hop-by-hop transport to combat spam and man-in-the-middle
         attacks.
      *  Con: Devices with limited resources and a high likelihood of
         total failure, such as a mobile phone, will lose their IMDN
         request state on total failure.





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   o  Intermediary State Sharing
      *  Pro: Supports endpoints with limited resources or a high
         likelihood of total failure, so long as all messages go through
         a B2BUA that records state.
      *  Pro: Simpler protocol: IMDN's always go to the "last" user
         agent up the relay chain.
      *  Pro: The B2BUA hides a recipient's IMDN reply to address, yet
         still let the Reporting UAS issue an IMDN the B2BUA will
         forward to the Requesting UAC.
            NOTE: Is this important?  It is saying that I am sending an
            IM to someone who I do not want to let talk back to me.
            That does not really fit the model of IM, does it?
      *  Con: Asking the B2BUA to take the role of IMDN forwarder means
         the Requesting UAC loses any chance of getting end-to-end
         IMDN's.
      *  Con: B2BUA's will have a tremendous amount of state to store,
         especially given their location in the network.

   The consensus of the work group is to use intermediary state sharing
   as it results in a simpler protocol.  The protocol does leave the
   potential for future end-to-end state sharing by allowing a token to
   be the value of the Disposition-Notification header.  The most likely
   value for this token is the URI to send the IMDN directly to.


6.  Overview

6.1.  Data Elements

   The data elements required for IMDN include elements that help
   correlate notifications with messages, indicate whether or not to
   generate a notification message, and, of course, the disposition of
   the message itself.

   The following list enumerates the data elements of the IMDN in
   detail.
   o  A protocol data element that indicates an IMDN request
   o  The Original Message Identifier uniquely identifies the original
      message.  Currently there is no unique message identifier in CPIM.
      Thus we will define one in this document.
   o  The Reporting UAS identifies the UAS generating the IMDN.  The
      reporting UAS might not be the "sender" of the IMDN, as there may
      be relays [13] between the Reporting UAS and the requesting UAC.
   o  The Original Recipient URI identifies the original URI the
      requesting UAC sent the message to.  This may not be the same as
      the Reporting UAS, as message delivery to the original URI may
      have resulted in a list expansion.  Section 6.3 describes B2BUA
      procedures in detail.



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   o  An indicator to keep the Original Recipient URI private.
   o  The Message Disposition identifies the eventual disposition of the
      message, such as read, deleted, and so on.
   o  The Disposition Time indicates when the disposition time at the
      Reporting UAS.

   The Requesting UAC needs to indicate to the Reporting UAS to generate
   an IMDN.  The Requesting UAC can indicate whether list exploders or
   gateways should report on their receipt of the message or report on
   the actual end recipient's receipt of the message.

6.2.  Disposition States

   There are three broad categories of disposition states.  They are
   read, processed, error, and denied.

6.2.1.  read

   The "read" state is straightforward.  The read state indicates the
   Recipient's UAS displayed the message to the user.

   Since there is no positive acknowledgement from the user, one cannot
   determine a priori the user actually read the message.  Thus one MUST
   NOT use the protocol described here as a non-repudiation service.

6.2.2.  processed

   The target URI of the message is a B2BUA.  The B2BUA's UAS indicates
   it successfully received and expanded or relayed the message.
   However, there MUST NOT be further notifications for this message
   (see Section 6.3.  See Section 8.1.2 for how the Requesting UAS can
   drive the generation of the processed notification when List-Action
   is first-recipient.

6.2.3.  error

   The error state indicates there was some processing error that makes
   it impossible or unlikely for the user to get the message.

6.2.4.  denied

   The denied state indicates the target URI does not allow
   notifications.  This could be for any reason, including a general
   policy to not send notifications, denying notifications to the
   particular sender, or by user direction on a per-message basis.  For
   privacy reasons, the UAS MUST NOT give the reason for denial.





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6.3.  B2BUAs

   The IMDN framework presented here supports back-to-back user agents
   (B2BUAs) that forward message requests.  This models most approaches
   for list expansion, including SIP URI lists [16].  It also models
   most gateway mechanisms.

   When a user sends a message to a B2BUA URI, there are two options for
   interpreting "delivery".  One option is to consider the message
   delivered to the list exploder URI itself.  This is a strict
   interpretation of "delivery", as the list exploder URI resolves to
   the B2BUA UAS.  What happens on the other side of the list exploder,
   namely, the re-origination of a bunch of messages, nominally related
   to the first message, has no relation in a protocol sense to the
   original message.

   The other option is to consider the message delivered to the ultimate
   recipients of the list.  On the one hand, this is what users expect,
   especially if the list is emulating a chat room.  On the other hand,
   this could result in a storm of responses, which the user does not
   want.

   If the B2BUA will be forwarding an IMDN from a downstream endpoint,
   it will encapsulate the IMDN.  This enables signatures over the
   original message.  Moreover, since the end system has the Original
   From URI, it has the potential to encrypt the IMDN using, for
   example, S/MIME [6], for the original sender, resulting in end-to-end
   security.

   Gateway processing is identical to list exploder processing, in that
   this mechanism considers a gateway to be a list exploder with a
   single destination.

   To ease interpretation of the IMDN at the B2BUA and original
   Requesting UAC, the B2BUA MUST preserve the original URI the
   Requesting UAC sent the message to.  That is, it must carry the value
   of the To header in the Original-To CPIM header.


7.  Namespace

   Per CPIM [1], IMDN uses a namespace for the CPIM headers.  The
   namespace is
   urn:ietf:params:cpim-headers:imdn

   All of the header definitions in this document refer to this
   namespace.




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      NOTE: If one does not specify the name space in one's CPIM
      message, YOU WILL NOT GET THE BEHAVIOR DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT.


8.  Requesting UAC Behavior

8.1.  IMDN Request Generation

   To request the generation of an IMDN, the Requesting UAC MUST include
   the Disposition-Notification and Message-ID headers.  The Requesting
   UAC MAY also include a List-Action header to provide down-stream
   B2BUA's with the user's desire for IMDN reporting by the final target
   of B2BUA expansion or the B2BUA itself.  B2BUA's SHOULD include the
   Original-From header, with the value of the inbound From header,
   unless privacy considerations require the B2BUA to not transmit the
   Original-From header.  Likewise, B2BUA's SHOULD copy the value of the
   inbound Message-ID into the outbound Original-Message-Id header.

   If the Requesting UAC insists on the possibility of an IMDN being
   generated, the UAC MUST include the "Require: imdn.Message-
   Disposition-To" header, where "imdn" is a reference to the name space
   (the "NS" header).  While this ensures the Reporting UAS is capable
   of generating an IMDN, there is no guarantee that it actually will
   generate an IMDN.  See the Privacy Considerations (Section 4) section
   for more discussion on this point.

8.1.1.  Disposition-Notification

   To mark a message for disposition notification, the sender MUST
   include a Disposition-Notification CPIM header in the CPIM part of
   the request.

   If the sender requires a notification, the message MUST include a
   CPIM Require header requiring the processing of the Disposition-
   Notification CPIM header.  Note that if the Recipient UAS does not
   support IMDN, then the UAS will reject the message.  In addition, the
   Recipient UAS SHOULD NOT display the message.

   If the sender does not require Disposition-Notification, and the
   recipient's instant message user agent does not support IMDN, then
   even though the recipient may read the message, the sender will not
   receive a notification report.

   Note that the choice of including a Require header is entirely a
   local matter to the sender.  Some instant messaging user agents may
   make this a per-receipt request option.  Another opinion is the
   Requesting UAC should never use the Require header to improve
   interoperability with non-IMDN clients.  However, in that case the



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   sender will not know if his message had no report because the
   recipient did not read it or if the recipient's UAS was simply
   unaware of IMDN.  Thus the decision to use the Require header is
   entirely outside the scope of this document.

   The syntax of the Disposition-Notification CPIM header is
   mdn-request-header =  "Disposition-Notification" ":" NULL / token-list

   token-list         =  token-list token / token

   For CPIM conferences, a message with a Disposition-Notification
   header will result in all recipients performing IMDN processing.  If
   this is not desirable, the sending system MUST send multiple messages
   with the appropriate requests (IMDN or not).

   Systems sending an IMDN MUST NOT include a Disposition-Notification
   header.

   At this time, there are no Disposition-Notification parameters or
   tokens defined.  Adding Disposition-Notification parameters MUST be
   by a Standards Track RFC.

8.1.2.  List-Action

   If the user sends a message to a B2BUA, such as a list expander or
   gateway, the Requesting UAC MAY include a List-Action header.  The
   List-Action header indicates how the B2BUA should handle IMDN
   generation.

   Values for List-Action are:
   final-recipient  This is a request for the B2BUA to request IMDN's
                    from the subsequent requests and relay the IMDN to
                    the Requesting UAC.
   first-recipient  This is a request for the B2BUA to generate an IMDN
                    for the B2BUA's receipt of the message.  That is,
                    the disposition reflects the B2BUA's processing of
                    the message, not any down-stream messages.
   {other}          The Reporting UAS MUST treat unrecognized values for
                    List-Action as "first-recipient".  Definitions for
                    new values MUST include optional CPIM REQUIRE tags
                    to ensure interoperability.

   If the Requesting UAC does not specify List-Action, the default List-
   Action is first-recipient.

   The syntax of the List-Action header is as follows.





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   list-action-hdr = "List-Action" ":" SP list-actions
   list-actions    = "final-recipient"
                   / "first-recipient"
                   / token

8.1.3.  Original-From

   A Requesting UAC MAY include its From identifier as the value to the
   Original-From header.  If there is no Original-From header, the value
   of the From header is used.  If there is no Original-From header in
   the message, a B2BUA MUST populate the Original-From value with the
   From identifier from the inbound message.  If there is an Original-
   From header in the message, a B2BUA MUST pass the Original-From
   header to the recipient URI(s).  This ensures that notifications from
   lists of lists will work, and that end-to-end encryption of IMDN's
   will work.

   If a Requesting UAC wishes to keep her URI private through a B2BUA,
   then the Reporting UAC includes the Original-From header, but with a
   NULL value.

   The syntax of the Original-From is as follows.
   original-from-header  =  "Original-From" ":" SP from-whom

   from-whom             =  "" / from-address

   from-address          =  [ Formal-name ] "<" URI ">"

   RFC3862 [1] section 4.1 defines "Formal-name".

8.1.4.  Message-ID

   A UAC MUST include a globally unique Message-ID.  It is necessary for
   the Message-ID to be unique to the UAC in order for the UAC to be
   able to exactly correlate IMDN's with the messages they refer to.  It
   will be necessary for the Message-ID to be globally unique in order
   to support frameworks such as message tracking [15] in the future.
   Since it is easy enough to make the Message-ID globally unique now,
   we mandate it here so that message tracking will be easier in the
   future.

   A Reporting UAC MUST be prepared to handle a Message-ID token of at
   least 4095 octets.

   The syntax of the Message-ID is as follows.
   message-id-hdr = "Message-ID" ":" SP token

   A B2BUA generates new messages, and thus the Message-ID will be new.



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8.1.5.  Original-Message-ID

   Since a B2BUA generates new messages, and thus new Message-ID's, we
   need a mechanism for the Reporting UAS to insert the appropriate
   Message-ID in the IMDN.  To do this, a B2BUA inserts an Original-
   Message-ID header with the value of the Message-ID.  If there is
   already an Original-Message-ID header, then the B2BUA MUST preserve
   the value in the outbound request, unless the request forbids it.
   The request may forbid it if, for example, the List-Action is first-
   recipient.  If there is no Original-Message-ID present in a message
   delivered to a B2BUA for subsequent forwarding, the B2BUA MUST copy
   the value of the Message-ID header of the inbound message to be the
   value of the Original-Message-ID header of the outbound message(s).

   The syntax of the Original-Message-ID is as follows.
   original-message-id-hdr = "Original-Message-ID" ":" SP token

8.2.  IMDN Reception Processing

   Once a Requesting UAC sends a message with an IMDN request, it SHOULD
   preserve the message context, principally the Message-ID, and other
   user-identifiable information such as the message subject or content.
   Without preservation of the message context, the Requesting UAC will
   not be able to correlate the IMDN with the outbound request.  The
   Requesting UAC may find it impossible to preserve message state if it
   has limited resources or does not have non-volatile memory and then
   loses power.

   How long to preserve the state is an implementation choice.  However,
   the Requesting UAC SHOULD keep the state for at least 5 minutes,
   unless that is physically impossible due to the characteristics of
   the Requesting UAC.

   It is RECOMMENDED that a Requesting UAC not notify the user if the
   Requesting UAC receives an IMDN that does not correlate to a message
   the Requesting UAC sent.  This is to prevent IMDN spoofing.  Clearly,
   if a requesting UAC loses its sent message state, the client may use
   a different display strategy in response to apparently unsolicited
   IMDN's.

   A Requesting UAC MUST NOT issue an IMDN in response to an IMDN, even
   if that IMDN incorrectly includes a Disposition-Notification header.


9.  Reporting UAS Operation






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9.1.  General Operation

   When the Reporting UAS receives a CPIM message with a Disposition-
   Notification CPIM header, the Reporting UAS SHOULD generate an IMDN.
   Security Considerations, Privacy Considerations, and local policy all
   may prevent the generation of an IMDN.

   The Reporting UAS MUST NOT send more than one IMDN in response to an
   IMDN request.  That is, once an IMDN has been issued on behalf of a
   recipient, no further IMDNs may be issued on behalf of that
   recipient, even if another disposition is performed on the message.
   For example, if the user reads and then deletes the message, the UAS
   will send a single read notification.  The delete operation in this
   case will not generate an additional IMDN.  Likewise, a B2BUA
   receiving a List-Action of first-recipient MUST NOT relay IMDN's from
   down-stream UAS's to the original Requesting UAC, as the original
   Requesting UAC has asked only for an IMDN from the B2BUA.

   A system receiving an instant message disposition notification MUST
   NOT generate a message disposition notification in response to that
   notification, even if the request includes a Disposition-Notification
   header.

   A system sending an IMDN MUST NOT include the Disposition-
   Notification-To header.

   A CPIM message that requests an IMDN but does not include the
   required Message-ID header is malformed and the UAS MUST reject the
   request using the appropriate protocol mechanism for rejecting a
   malformed request.
      NOTE: We could be helpful here and create a new SIP result code
      for this situation.  We can do that if needed.

   The Reporting UAS MUST copy the incoming CPIM Subject: header as the
   IMDN CPIM Subject: header.

9.2.  Recipient is the End User UAS

   If the recipient of a CPIM message with a well-formed IMDN request is
   the end-user user agent server, then
   o  If the user read the message, then the UAS SHOULD generate a read
      IMDN, mindful of the privacy considerations enumerated in
      Section 4.
   o  If the UAS automatically deleted the message, or the user deleted
      the message without reading it, then the UAS SHOULD generate a
      processed IMDN, mindful of the privacy considerations enumerated
      in Section 4.




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   o  If the UAS' policy is to deny IMDN to the requestor, or if the
      user requests a denial report to the UAC, the UAS SHOULD generate
      a denied IMDN, mindful of the privacy considerations enumerated in
      Section 4.
   o  If the UAS' policy is to ignore IMDN requests, or the user
      requests the supression of a given IMDN report, the UAS MUST
      silently ignore the IMDN request.

   If the Reporting UAS has a certificate, it MUST sign the IMDN it
   generates using S/MIME [6].  The Reporting UAS MUST be capable of
   loading a certificate for signing IMDN's.

   If the Requesting UAC encrypts the IM, the Reporting UAS MUST encrypt
   the IMDN.  For assistance in this task, the URI of the endpoint
   requesting the IMDN is in the Original-From header.

   The Reporting UAS MUST use the format and fill in the content of the
   IMDN as described in Section 10.

9.3.  Recipient is a B2BUA

   If the Recipient UAS is a back-to-back user agent (B2BUA), such as a
   list exploder or messaging gateway, then the action taken depends on
   the value of List-Action.  If there is no List-Action header, or the
   UAS does not understand the value of the List-Action header, the UAS
   takes the "first-recipient" action.

9.3.1.  first-recipient

   If the List-Action is "first-recipient" or there is no List-Action
   specified, then the Recipient UAS issues an IMDN using the following
   procedures.
   o  If the B2BUA forwards the message, it SHOULD return an "processed"
      IMDN, mindful of the privacy considerations enumerated in
      Section 4.
   o  If there was an error processing the message, the B2BUA SHOULD
      return an "error" IMDN, mindful of the privacy considerations
      enumerated in Section 4.

   Including a Disposition-Notification header in the forwarded messages
   is a matter of local policy.  However, if the List-Action is first-
   recipient or unspecified, the B2BUA MUST NOT relay down-stream IMDN's
   to the original Requesting UAC.

   The Reporting UAS MUST use the format and fill in the content of the
   IMDN as described in Section 10.





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9.3.2.  final-recipient

   If the List-Action is "final-recipient", then the B2BUA SHOULD
   forward the Message-Disposition and List-Action headers to down-
   stream destinations.  One condition where the B2BUA might not forward
   these headers is where the B2BUA knows the down-stream destination
   will not honor or is not capable of honoring the IMDN request.  In
   the latter case, the B2BUA SHOULD return an "processed" IMDN.  In the
   former case, local policy will decide whether to return a denied
   IMDN, processed IMDN, or not return an IMDN at all.

   When the B2BUA receives an IMDN from the Reporting UAS, the B2BUA
   will encapsulate the IMDN from the downstream UAS and send the
   response to the UAC that generated the upstream request.  The B2BUA
   MUST verify the Original-Message-ID header matches a Message-ID of a
   previous incoming request.

   How long to keep the Message-ID state is a local matter.  We
   RECOMMEND it be at least 5 minutes.

   If the B2BUA receives an IMDN that does not match an existing
   Message-ID, the B2BUA MUST discard the IMDN.

9.3.3.  No List-Action Specified

   If there is no List-Action header, or there is a List-Action header
   with no value, the Reporting UAS MUST follow the procedures for
   first-recipient.

9.3.4.  Unknown List-Action Specified

   If there is a List-Action header, but the Reporting UAS does not
   recognize the value of the List-Action header, the Reporting UAS MUST
   follow the procedures for first-recipient.


10.  IMDN Format

   The IMDN is an XML [7] document.  The document MUST be well formed
   and MUST be valid according to the schema presented in Section 12.2.
   The namespace identifier for elements defined by this specification
   is a URN [8], using the namespace identifier 'ietf' as defined by
   IETF URN Namespace [9] and extended by the IETF XML Registry [11].
   The URN is
   urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:imdn

   The root element is <imdn>.  The disposition tag takes the value
   described in Section 6.2.



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10.1.  disposition

   The Reporting UAS MUST include the message disposition in the
   disposition tag.

   We use a string value, rather than an attribute value, to enable
   future addition of state strings

   The value of the disposition tag may take the following values:
   read             The message was read.
   processed        The message was processed.
   error            There was an error processing the message.
   denied           The Reporting UAS denies reporting the disposition
                    of the message.

10.2.  original-message-id

   The Reporting UAS MUST include the value of the Message-ID of the IM
   as the value of the original-message-id tag.

10.3.  original-recipient-uri

   The Reporting UAS MUST include the value of the original message's
   Original-From as the value of the original-recipient-uri tag.  If the
   Reporting UAS specified a NULL Original-From, then the Reporting UAS
   MUST return an empty original-recipient-uri value.

10.4.  reporting-uas-uri

   The Reporting UAS SHOULD include its URI in the reporting-uas-uri
   tag.  One condition where the Reporting UAS will not include its URI
   is if it wants to keep its URI private.  In this case the Reporting
   UAS MUST NOT include this tag in the IMDN.

10.5.  original-recipient

   If there is an Original-To header in the IM, the Reporting UAS MUST
   include the value of the Original-To header as the value to the
   original-recipient tag.

10.6.  disposition-time

   The Reporting UAS MUST include the disposition time reflecting when
   the reported disposition occured as the value of the disposition-time
   tag.  The format of the time value MUST follow the format specified
   in RFC 3339 [10], using UTC.





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11.  Examples

11.1.  Simple End-to-End IMDN Request

   Request

   From: Eric Burger <im:eburger@example.com>
   To: Hisham Khartabil <im:hisham.khartabil@example.net>
   DateTime: 2005-10-18T09:27:22-5
   Subject: Did you get this?
   NS: imdn <urn:ietf:params:cpim-headers:imdn>
   imdn.Disposition-Notification:
   imdn.Message-ID: 1542af3e8b@eburger@example.com

   Content-type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
   Content-ID: <1542af3e8b-12@eburger@example.com>

   <body>
   Did you get this message?
   </body>


   Response




























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   From: Hisham Khartabil <im:hisham.khartabil@example.net>
   To: <im:eburger@example.com>
   DateTime: 2005-10-18T09:30:18+1
   Subject: Did you get this?
   NS: imdn <urn:ietf:params:cpim-headers:imdn>
   imdn.Message-ID: latida27@stuff@example.net

   Content-type: multipart/signed; boundary=next;
                 micalg=sha1;
                 protocol=application/pkcs7-signature

   --next
   Content-type: application/imdn+xml; charset=utf-8

   <imdn>
     <disposition>read</disposition>
     <reporting-uas-uri>
       im:hisham.khartabil@example.net
     </reporting-uas-uri>
     <original-recipient-uri>
       im:hisham.khartabil@example.net
     </original-recipient-uri>
     <original-message-id>
       1542af3e8b@eburger@example.com
     </original-message-id>
   </imdn>
   --next
   Content-type: application/pkcs7-signature

   {signature stuff}
     :
     :
   --next--

   Note the IMDN plaintext would not have the CRLF's in the data
   elements.  We do that here simply for readability.

11.2.  Gateway Endpoint

   Happy Path for gateway reporting it forwarded.  Same request as
   above, but with processed response.

11.3.  List Exploder - Forward

   Happy Path for forwarding case.  Note the different responses, but
   with same Original-To and Original-Message-Id.





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11.4.  List Exploder - Private Forward

   Show no Original-Sender

11.5.  List With Lists

   Show wrapped, wrapped responses.

11.6.  End-to-End Encryption Forwarded

   Gateway scenario where Reporting UAS encrypts IMDN document for read
   only by Requesting UAC.


12.  Formal Syntax

12.1.  IMDN CPIM Request

   TODO: collect syntax from above.

12.2.  IMDN Document

   Coming soon.


13.  IANA Considerations

   URN name in IETF namespace: urn:ietf:params:cpim-headers:imdn

   IMDN schema in Section 12.2.


14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [1]   Klyne, G. and D. Atkins, "Common Presence and Instant Messaging
         (CPIM): Message Format", RFC 3862, August 2004.

   [2]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [3]   Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
         Specifications: ABNF", RFC 4234, October 2005.

   [4]   Campbell, B., "The Message Session Relay Protocol",
         draft-ietf-simple-message-sessions-13 (work in progress),
         December 2005.



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   [5]   Fajman, R., "An Extensible Message Format for Message
         Disposition Notifications", RFC 2298, March 1998.

   [6]   Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
         (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Certificate Handling", RFC 3850,
         July 2004.

   [7]   Yergeau, F., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C., Bray, T., and E.
         Maler, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Third Edition)",
         W3C REC REC-xml-20040204, February 2004.

   [8]   Moats, R., "URN Syntax", RFC 2141, May 1997.

   [9]   Moats, R., "A URN Namespace for IETF Documents", RFC 2648,
         August 1999.

   [10]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
         Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.

   [11]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
         January 2004.

14.2.  Informative References

   [12]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 2821,
         April 2001.

   [13]  Jennings, C., "Relay Extensions for the Message Sessions Relay
         Protocol (MSRP)", draft-ietf-simple-msrp-relays-06 (work in
         progress), December 2005.

   [14]  Hansen, T. and G. Vaudreuil, "Message Disposition
         Notification", RFC 3798, May 2004.

   [15]  Hansen, T., "Message Tracking Model and Requirements",
         RFC 3888, September 2004.

   [16]  Garcia-Martin, M. and G. Camarillo, "Multiple-Recipient MESSAGE
         Requests in the Session Initiation Protocol  (SIP)",
         draft-ietf-sipping-uri-list-message-06 (work in progress),
         January 2006.


Appendix A.  Contributors


Appendix B.  Acknowledgements




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   Thanks go to Ben Campbell for continuously prodding me.  Thanks also
   to Hisham for the relay idea and threatening some text to force me
   back to the task.  Dean kept reminding me that 3GPP really, really
   wants this done and to work.















































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Author's Address

   Eric Burger
   Brooktrout Technology, Inc.
   18 Keewaydin Dr.
   Salem, NH  03079-2839
   USA

   Phone: +1 603 890 7587
   Fax:   +1 603 457 5944
   Email: eburger@brooktrout.com








































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