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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04                                                
INTERNET DRAFT                                             Pat R. Calhoun
Category: Standards Track                          Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Title: draft-calhoun-diameter-proxy-04.txt                 William Bulley
Date: October 1999                                    Merit Network, Inc.

                            Secure Proxying

Status of this Memo

   This document is an individual contribution for consideration by the
   AAA Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force.  Comments
   should be submitted to the diameter@ipass.com mailing list.

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at:


   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at:



   The DIAMETER base protocol [2] allows for secure communication
   between two DIAMETER nodes, and introduces the concept of proxying
   through the Proxy-State AVP. However, the base protocol only allows
   for hop-by-hop security, and the work done in the ROAMOPS WG [8]
   shows that support for end-to-end security through proxies. This
   document describes the extensions necessary to provide for secure

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   communication through DIAMETER proxies.

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Table of Contents

      1.0  Introduction
            1.1  Copyright Statement
            1.2  Requirements language
            1.3  Changes in version -02
            1.4  Changes in version -03
      2.0  Extended AVP Format
      3.0  DIAMETER AVPs
            3.1  Digital-Signature
            3.2  X509-Certificate
            3.3  X509-Certificate-URL
            3.4  Next-Hop
      4.0  Protocol Definition
            4.1  Feature Advertisement/Discovery
            4.2  DIAMETER Secure Proxying
            4.3  Data Integrity
                  4.3.1 Using Digital Signatures
                  4.3.1 Using Mixed Data Integrity AVPs
            4.4  AVP Data Encryption
                  4.4.1 AVP Encryption with Public Keys
            4.5  Public Key Cryptography Support
                  4.5.1 X509-Certificate
                  4.5.2 X509-Certificate-URL
                  4.5.3 Static Public Key Configuration
      5.0  IANA Considerations
      6.0  References
      7.0  Acknowledgements
      8.0  Author's Address
      9.0  Full Copyright Statement

1.0  Introduction

   Many services, including ROAMOPS and MobileIP, have a requirement for
   DIAMETER Server to proxy a request to another DIAMETER Server. The
   concept of proxying AAA requests was introduced by RADIUS and has
   been in use for many years.

   The DIAMETER base protocol [2] does provide the basic capability for
   proxying, but only defines hop-by-hop security, which has some known
   security flaws.  Specifically a fraudulent proxy server can modify
   some portions of an AAA request in order to make the next hop
   improperly believe that some services were rendered. For example, a
   DIAMETER Proxy Server could modify an accounting request, such as the
   number of bytes that a user transfered, and the end system would have
   no way of determining that this change occured.

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   This specification contains the extensions necessary to DIAMETER to
   allow for end-to-end AVP integrity and privacy. The document also
   describes a method that DIAMETER can provide referal services to

   The Extension number for this draft is two (2). This value is used in
   the Extension-Id AVP as defined in [2].

1.1  Copyright Statement

   Copyright   (C) The Internet Society 1999.  All Rights Reserved.

1.2  Requirements language

   In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST, "MUST NOT", "optional",
   "recommended", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT", are to be interpreted as
   described in [13].

1.3  Changes in version -02

   The following changes were made in version 02 of the document:

      - New title

      - A good cleanup of the abstract and the introduction.

      - Fixed up text in section 3.2 that stated that all AVPs with the
      'P' disabled were protected. This should have stated enabled.

      - Added Section 2 which describes the extended AVP Header Format.

      - Moved the Proxy State AVP to the base protocol.

      - Changed the description of the Digital-Signature AVP.

      - The Next-Hop AVP now requires a preceeding Digital-Signature AVP
      instead of a Host-IP-Address AVP. This change was necessary since
      the base protocol does not explicitely state that the Host-IP-
      Address AVP may appear multiple times in a single message. Such a
      change would be a big departure from the current RADIUS model
      where the Host-IP-Address contains the IP address of the
      originator of the message, not the address of intermediate hops.

      - Fixed various references to sections that were incorrect.

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      - Added clarification about the use of ICV and Digital Signatures
      within a single message.

      - Updated the AVP Header flags.

      - Re-wrote a good portion of section 4.1 ...

      - ... well, re-wrote a good portion of all everything in section

      - Added a reference to RFC 2459 (x.509 certs)

      - Added an IANA Considerations section.

1.3  Changes in version -03

   The following changes were made in version 03 of the document:

      - Removed the DDR and DDA Commands. The new base protocol defines
      an error message that allows a broker to return a redirect
      indication. This new method really simplifies the protocol.

      - Changed the AVP Command Code for Next-Hop from 278 to 290.

2.0  Extended AVP Format

   The DIAMETER Proxy specification introduces a new bit in the AVP
   flags field of the AVP Header. The following AVP header is used when
   proxy support is enabled.

   The attribute format is shown below and MUST be sent in network byte

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      |                           AVP Code                            |
      |          AVP Length           | Cmd Flags |Reservd|P|E|T|V|H|M|
      |                        Vendor ID (opt)                        |
      |                           Tag (opt)                           |
      |    Data ...

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   Command Flags

      All Command Codes defined in this spec MUST set all bits in this
      field to zero (0).

   AVP Flags

      The AVP Flags field informs the DIAMETER host how each attribute
      must be handled.

      The 'P' bit, known as the protected AVP bit, is used to indicate
      whether the AVP is protected by a Digital Signature AVP. When set,
      the AVP is protected and the contents cannot be changed by a
      DIAMETER proxy server. An AVP MUST NOT have both the 'P' and the
      'H' bits set simultaneously, since the 'H' bit implies that the
      AVP will change on a hop-by-hop basis, and the 'P' requires that
      the AVP NOT change along a proxy chain.

      Note that unless noted, the 'P' bit can be set on any DIAMETER
      AVP. The Proxy-State AVP MUST not have the 'P' bit set since this
      AVP will be removed at each hop. Any other AVP that have similar
      properties (e.g.  it will be removed or modified at each hop) MUST
      NOT have the 'P' bit enabled.

      When the 'E' bit is enabled it indicates that the AVP data is
      encrypted using end-to-end encryption.

      Note that the User-Name AVP [2] MUST NOT have the 'E' bit set
      since intermediate proxies require the domain information in order
      to determine the target proxy.


   This section will define the mandatory AVPs which MUST be supported
   by all DIAMETER implementations claiming support for this

   The following AVPs are defined in this document:

      Attribute Name       Attribute Code    Definition in Section
      Digital-Signature         260                  3.1
      X509-Certificate          264                  3.2
      X509-Certificate-URL      265                  3.3
      Next-Hop                  290                  3.4

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3.1  Digital-Signature


      The Digital-Signature AVP is used to provide for authentication,
      integrity and non-repudiation of DIAMETER AVPs. A DIAMETER entity
      adding AVPs to a message that must be protected by the Digital
      Signature MUST ensure that they apprear prior to this AVP. Two are
      two exceptions to this rule.  The Integrity-Check-Value AVP, which
      MUST appear after the Digital-Signature AVP, since it is stripped
      at each hop. Any AVP that has the 'H' bit set CANNOT be included
      in the Digital-Signature. Any other AVP that is stripped at each
      hop (e.g. Proxy-State AVP) also MUST NOT be protected by the
      Digital-Signature AVP. AVPs are marked as being protected by
      enabling their 'P' bit.

      A DIAMETER node adding a Digital-Signature to a message that
      already has such an AVP MUST sign all of the existing AVP that
      have the 'P' bit set in addition to the new protected AVPs added.

      It is imperative that Proxy servers NOT change the order of the
      AVPs with the 'P' bit set, otherwise the signature verification
      would fail.  Proxy servers also MUST NOT remove, add, or change
      any AVP that has the 'P' bit set.

      The Digital Signature also includes the DIAMETER header. However,
      when computing the signature, it is necessary for the header's
      length, Ns and Nr fields to be set to zero (0). This is necessary
      since the message size and windowing information may change from
      one proxy server to another as AVPs are added and others are

      The Digital-Signature is generated in the method described in
      section 4.4.1.

      All DIAMETER implementations supporting this extension MUST
      support this AVP.

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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
                         AVP Header (AVP Code = 260)
      |                            Address                            |
      |                          Transform ID                         |
      |    Data ...

      AVP Length
         The length of this attribute MUST be at least 17.

      AVP Flags
         The 'M' bit MUST be set. The 'P', 'V', 'H' and 'T' bits MUST
         NOT be set.

         The Address field contains the IP address of the DIAMETER host
         which generated the Digital-Signature.

      Transform ID
         The Transform ID field contains a value that identifies the
         transform that was used to compute the signature. The following
         values are defined in this document:

            RSA [9]          1

         The Data field contains the digital signature of the message up
         to this AVP.

3.2  X509-Certificate


      The X509-Certificate [12] is used in order to send a DIAMETER peer
      the local system's X.509 certificate chain, which is used in order
      to validate the Digital-Signature attribute.

      Section 4.6 contains more information about the use of

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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
                         AVP Header (AVP Code = 264)
      |    Data ...

      AVP Flags
         The 'M' bit MUST be set. The 'P' bits MAY be set if end to end
         message integrity is required.  The 'V', 'H' and 'T' bits MUST
         NOT be set.

         The Data field contains the X.509 Certificate Chain.

3.3  X509-Certificate-URL


      The X509-Certificate-URL is used in order to send a DIAMETER peer
      a URL to the local system's X.509 certificate chain [12], which is
      used in order to validate the Digital-Signature attribute.

      Section 4.6 contains more information about the use of

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
                         AVP Header (AVP Code = 265)
      |   String ...

      AVP Flags
         The 'M' bit MUST be set. The 'P' bits MAY be set if end to end
         message integrity is required.  The 'V', 'H' and 'T' bits MUST
         NOT be set.

         The String field contains the X.509 Certificate Chain URL.

3.4  Next-Hop


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      The Next-Hop AVP MUST preceed a Digital-Signature AVP and is used
      to validate that a message traversed the proxy chain that was
      intended.  A DIAMETER message with the Next-Hop Address being
      different than the address found in the preceeding Digital-
      Signature AVP is considered invalid.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
                         AVP Header (AVP Code = 290)
      |                            Address                            |

      AVP Flags
         The 'M' bit and 'P' bits MUST be set.  The 'V', 'H' and 'T'
         bits MUST NOT be set.

         This field contains the IP Address of the next DIAMETER Server.

4.0  Protocol Definition

   This section will describe how the base protocol works (or is at
   least an attempt to).

4.1  Feature Advertisement/Discovery

   As defined in [2], the Reboot-Ind and Device-Feature-Query messages
   can be used to inform a peer about locally supported DIAMETER
   Extensions. In order to advertise support of this extension, the
   Extension-Id AVP must be transmitted with a value of two (2).

4.2  DIAMETER Secure Proxying

   The ROAMOPS specification [11] discusses how RADIUS servers can be
   arranged in a hierarchical manner, allowing message exchanges across
   domain boundaries. The specification also describes some security
   flaws encountered when RADIUS is used in a proxy environment. The
   DIAMETER extension described in this document introduces end-to-end
   security, which solves many of the problems encountered when RADIUS
   is used.

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                   (Request)                   (Request)
      +------+       ----->       +------+      ------>       +------+
      |      |                    |      |                    |      |
      | NASB +--------------------+ DIA2 +--------------------+ DIA1 |
      |      |                    |      |                    |      |
      +------+       <-----       +------+      <------       +------+
                     (Answer)                   (Answer)

   In this example NASB generates a Request that is forwarded to DIA2.
   The Request contains a Digital-Signature AVP which "protects" all
   preceeding AVPs bit the 'P' bit set (known as protected AVPs) within
   the request. All AVPs which may be modified, or removed by
   intermediate DIAMETRE Proxies MUST NOT have the 'P' bit set. Such
   AVPs include the Integrity-Check-Value, Proxy-State, etc. Once DIA2
   receives the request, it MAY validate the signature in the request to
   ensure that it was originated by NASB. Verification may not be
   necessary if the signature was added by a DIAMETER node one hop away
   since the Integrity-Check-Value (or any whatever security mechanism
   used for hop-by-hop security) may be sufficient.

   The DIA2 Server SHOULD add the Proxy-State AVP [2], which contains
   opaque data that MUST be present in the response and is used to
   identify state information related to the request or response. If a
   Proxy-State AVP is found in the request, it SHOULD be replaced with a
   locally generated Proxy-State AVP. This means that the Proxy-State
   AVP cannot have the 'P' bit set. The Server MAY also add other new
   AVPs to the request. All new AVPs that are protected by the new
   Digital-Signature AVP MUST have the 'P' bit set, and MUST preceed the
   Digital-Signature AVP. The message is then forwarded towards the DIA1

   The use of network level encryption, such as IPSec, cannot be used
   for end-to-end AVP integrity between NASB and DIA1, since all
   messages are processed by DIA2. What is needed is an application
   level security mechanism, which is what the Digital-Signature AVP
   provides. However, Digital-Signatures may not be necessary if the
   messages do not traverse proxies, unless non-repudiation is required.

   This mechanism now provides a method for DIA1 to be able to identify
   that NAS was the initiator of the request, and that no "critial" AVPs
   were modified mid-stream by intermediate proxies. Therefore, DIA2
   cannot modify any protected AVPs (such as duration of a call, number
   of bytes transfered, etc). This mechanism also provides the
   application with the integrity, and non-repudiation, information it
   may need should it deem it necessary to log such information.

   This extension also provides for end-to-end AVP encryption, by using
   the peer's public key. However, given that asymetric encryption is

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   very costly, it's use should be minimal.

   An attack has been identified in this proposal which allows a
   malicous man in the middle attack as shown in the following diagram.

              (Request)         (Request)         (Request)
      +------+  ----->  +------+  ----->  +------+  ----->  +------+
      |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |
      | NASB +----------+ DIA2 +----------+ DIA3 +----------+ DIA1 |
      |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |
      +------+  <-----  +------+  <-----  +------+  <-----  +------+
                (Answer)         (Answer)          (Answer)

   In this example, DIA3 traps messages generated from DIA2 towards
   DIA1, removes the AVPs added by DIA2 and inserts its own AVPs
   (possibly by trying to convince DIA1 to pay DIA3 for the services).
   This attack can be prevented by supporting a new Next-Hop AVP. In
   this case when NASB prepares a request it inserts a protected Next-
   Hop AVP which contains DIA2's identitity. DIA2 also adds a Next-Hop
   AVP with DIA1 as the next hop.

   This mechanism ensures that a man in the middle cannot alter the
   message by overriding the previous hop's additions and signature.
   DIA1 could easily validate the message's path with the use of the
   Next-Hop AVPs.

4.3  Data Integrity

   This section will describe how data integrity and non-repudiation is
   achieved using the Digital-Signature AVP.

   Note that the Timestamp and Nonce AVPs MUST be present in the message
   PRIOR to the Digital-Signature AVPs discussed in this section. The
   Timestamp AVP provides replay protection and the Nonce AVP provides

4.3.1  Using Digital Signatures

   In the case of a simple peer to peer relationship the use of IPSEC is
   sufficient for data integrity and confidentiality. However there are
   instances where a peer must communicate with another peer through the
   use of a proxy server. IPSEC does not provide a mechanism to protect
   traffic when two peers must use an intermediary node to communicate
   at the application layer therefore the Digital-Signature AVP MUST be

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   The following diagram shows an example of a router initiating a
   DIAMETER message to DIA1. Once DIA1 has finished processing the
   message it adds its signature and forwards the message to the non-
   trusted DIA2 proxy server. If DIA2 needs to add any protected AVPs it
   SHOULD add its digital signature before forwarding the message to

      +------+  ----->  +------+  ----->  +------+  ----->  +------+
      |      |          |      |          | non- |          |      |
      |router+----------+ DIA1 +----------+trustd+----------+ DIA3 |
      |      |          |      |          | DIA2 |          |      |
      +------+  <-----  +------+  <-----  +------+  <-----  +------+

   Since intermediate DIAMETER proxies may add, or delete unprotected
   AVPs "en route" towards the final DIAMETER destination, it is
   necessary for the length, Ns and Nr in the header to be set to zero
   (0) prior to the signature computation. The fields must be restored
   once the computation is complete.

   The following is an example of a message that include end-to-end

      <DIAMETER Message> ::= <DIAMETER Header>
                             <Command AVP>
                             [<Additional AVPs>]
                             <Next-Hop AVP>
                             <Timestamp AVP>
                             <Nonce AVP>
                             <Digital-Signature AVP>

   The AVP Header's 'P' bit is used to identify which AVPs are
   considered protected when applying a digital signature to a DIAMETER
   message. Protected AVPs cannot be changed "en route" since they are
   protected by the Digital Signature AVP. All protected AVPs added by a
   DIAMETER entity MUST appear prior to the new Digital Signature AVP.

   The Next-Hop AVP indicates the intended recipient of the DIAMETER
   message.  When a DIAMETER message is received with a Next-Hop AVP
   that does not correspond with the address information with the
   preceeding Digital-Signature AVP, the message MUST be considered
   invalid and MUST be rejected. The Next-Hop AVP MUST be protected.

   The Data field of the Digital-Signature AVP contains the RSA/MD5
   signature algorithm as defined in [9].

4.3.2  Using Mixed Data Integrity AVPs

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   The previous sections described the Integrity-Check-Value and the
   Digital-Signature AVP. Since the ICV offers hop-by-hop integrity and
   the digital signature offers end to end integrity, it is possible to
   use both AVPs within a single DIAMETER message. In fact, the use of
   the ICV and the Digital-Signature is recommended to provide both
   types of AVP integrity, which is necessary when messages are proxied.
   In the event that two peers use an underlying integrity mechanism
   (e.g.  IPSec) for hop-by-hop AVP integrity, the ICV AVP is not
   necessary and should not be used.

   The following diagram provides an example where DIAMETER Server 1
   (DIA1) communicates with DIA3 using Digital-Signatures through DIA2.
   In this example ICVs are used between DIA1 and DIA2 as well as
   between DIA2 and DIA3.

            <Shared-Secret>   <Shared-Secret>
      +------+  ----->  +------+  ----->  +------+
      |      |          |      |          |      |
      | DIA1 +----------+ DIA2 +----------+ DIA3 |
      |      |          |      |          |      |
      +------+          +------+          +------+

   Using the previous diagram, the following message would be sent
   between DIA1 and DIA2:

      <DIAMETER Message> ::= <DIAMETER Header>
                             <Command AVP>
                             [<Additional AVPs>]
                             <Timestamp AVP>
                             <Nonce AVP>
                             <Digital-Signature AVP>
                             <Integrity-Check-Value AVP (DIA1->DIA2)>

   The following message would be sent between DIA2 and DIA3:

      <DIAMETER Message> ::= <DIAMETER Header>
                             <Command AVP>
                             [<Additional AVPs>]
                             <Timestamp AVP>
                             <Nonce AVP>
                             <Digital-Signature AVP>
                             <Timestamp AVP>
                             <Nonce AVP>
                             <Integrity-Check-Value AVP (DIA2->DIA3)>

   Note that in the above example messages the ICV AVP appear after the

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   Digital-Signature AVP. This is necessary since DIA2 above removes the
   ICV AVP (DIA1->DIA2) and adds its own ICV AVP (DIA2->DIA3). The ICVs
   provide hop-by-hop security while the Digital-Signature provides
   integrity of the message between DIA1 and DIA3.

            <Shared-Secret>   <Shared-Secret>   <Shared-Secret>
      +------+  ----->  +------+  ----->  +------+  ----->  +------+
      |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |
      |router+----------+ DIA1 +----------+ DIA2 +----------+ DIA2 |
      |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |
      +------+  <-----  +------+  <-----  +------+  <-----  +------+

   There are cases, such as in remote access, where the device
   initiating the DIAMETER request does not have the processing power to
   generate Digital-Signatures as required by the protocol. In such an
   arrangement, there normally exists a first hop DIAMETER Server (DIA1)
   which acts as a proxy to relay the request to the final
   authenticating DIAMETER server (DIA2). It is valid for the first hop
   server to remove the Integrity-Check-Value AVP inserted by the router
   and replace it with a Digital-Signature AVP.

4.4  AVP Encryption with Public Keys

   AVP encryption using public keys is much more complex than the
   previously decribed method, yet it is desirable to use it in cases
   where the DIAMETER message will be processed by an untrusted
   intermediate node (proxy).

   Public Key encryption SHOULD be supported, however it is permissible
   for a low powered device initiating the DIAMETER message to use
   shared secret encryption with the first hop (proxy) DIAMETER server,
   which would decrypt and encrypt using the Public Key method.

   The PK-Encrypted-Data bit MUST only be set if the final DIAMETER host
   is aware of the sender's public key. This information can be relayed
   in three different methods as described in section 4.6.

   The AVP is encrypted in the method described in [9].

4.5  Public Key Cryptography Support

   A DIAMETER peer's public key is required in order to validate a
   message which includes the the Digital-Signature AVP. There are three
   possibilities on retrieving public keys:

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4.5.1  X509-Certificate

   A message which includes a Digital-Signature MAY include the X509-
   Certificate AVP. Given the size of a typical certificate, this is
   very wasteful and in most cases DIAMETER peers would cache such
   information in order to minimize per message processing overhead.

   It is however valid for a DIAMETER host to provide its X509-
   Certificate in certain cases, such as when issuing the Device-
   Reboot-Indication, or in the Domain-Discovery messages. It is
   envisioned that the peer would validate and cache the certificate at
   that time.

4.5.2  X509-Certificate-URL

   The X509-Certificate-URL is a method for a DIAMETER host sending a
   message that includes the Digital-Signature to provide a pointer to
   its certificate.

   Upon receiving such a message a DIAMETER host MAY choose to retrieve
   the certificate if it is not locally cached. Of course the process of
   retrieving and validating a certificate is lengthy and will require
   the initiator of the message to retransmit the request. However once
   cached the certificate can be used until it expires.

4.5.3  Static Public Key Configuration

   Given that using certificates requires a PKI infrastructure which is
   very costly, it is also possible to use this technology by locally
   configuring DIAMETER peers' public keys.

   Note that in a network involving many DIAMETER proxies this may not
   scale well.

5.0  IANA Considerations

   The numbers for the Command Code AVPs (section 3) is taken from the
   numbering space defined for Command Codes in [2]. The numbers for the
   various AVPs defined in section 4 were taken from the AVP numbering
   space defined in [2].  The numbering for the AVP and Command Codes
   MUST NOT conflict with values specified in [2] and other DIAMETER
   related Internet Drafts.

   This document also introduces two new bits to the AVP Header, which
   MUST NOT conflict with the base protocol [2] and any other DIAMETER

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6.0  References

    [1] Rigney, et alia, "RADIUS", RFC-2138, April 1997
    [2] Calhoun, Rubens, "DIAMETER Base Protocol", Internet-Draft,
        draft-calhoun-diameter-08.txt, August 1999.
    [3] Rivest, Dusse, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",
        RFC 1321, April 1992.
    [4] Kaufman, Perlman, Speciner, "Network Security: Private
        Communications in a Public World", Prentice Hall,
        March 1995, ISBN 0-13-061466-1.
    [5] Krawczyk, Bellare, Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
        Authentication", RFC 2104, January 1997.
    [6] Calhoun, Bulley, "DIAMETER User Authentication Extensions",
        draft-calhoun-diameter-authen-06.txt, August 1999.
    [7] Aboba, Beadles "The Network Access Identifier." RFC 2486.
        January 1999.
    [8] Aboba, Zorn, "Criteria for Evaluating Roaming Protocols",
        RFC 2477, January 1999.
    [9] Kaliski, "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5", Internet-
        Draft, draft-hoffman-pkcs-rsa-encrypt-03.txt, October 1997.
    [10] Calhoun, Zorn, Pan, "DIAMETER Framework",
         draft-calhoun-diameter-framework-02.txt, Work in Progress,
         December 1998.
    [11] Aboba, Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy Implementation in
         Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.
    [12] Housley, Ford, Polk, Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key
         Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459,
         January 1999.
    [13] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
         Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

7.0  Acknowledgements

   The Authors would like to acknowledge the following people for their
   contribution in the development of the DIAMETER protocol:

   Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, Daniel C. Fox, Lol Grant, Nancy Greene,
   Peter Heitman, Ryan Moats, Victor Muslin, Kenneth Peirce, Allan
   Rubens, Sumit Vakil, John R. Vollbrecht, Jeff Weisberg and Glen Zorn

8.0  Author's Address

   Questions about this memo can be directed to:

Calhoun, Bulley            expires April 2000                  [Page 17]

INTERNET DRAFT                                              October 1999

      Pat R. Calhoun
      Network and Security Research Center, Sun Labs
      Sun Microsystems, Inc.
      15 Network Circle
      Menlo Park, California, 94025

       Phone:  1-650-786-7733
         Fax:  1-650-786-6445
      E-mail:  pcalhoun@eng.sun.com

      William Bulley
      Merit Network, Inc.
      4251 Plymouth Road, Suite C
      Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48105-2785

       Phone:  1-734-764-9993
         Fax:  1-734-647-3185
      E-mail:  web@merit.edu

9.0  Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied  and  furnished
   to others,  and  derivative works that comment on or otherwise
   explain it or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied,
   published  and distributed,  in  whole  or  in part, without
   restriction of any kind, provided that the  above  copyright  notice
   and  this  paragraph  are included on all such copies and derivative
   works.  However, this docu- ment itself may not be modified in any
   way, such as  by  removing  the copyright notice or references to the
   Internet Society or other Inter- net organizations, except as needed
   for  the  purpose  of  developing Internet standards in which case
   the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards
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   languages other than   English.  The limited permis- sions granted
   above are perpetual and  will  not  be  revoked  by  the Internet
   Society or its successors or assigns.  This document and the
   information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis  and

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