Individual Contribution                                   Pat R. Calhoun
Internet-Draft                                    Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Category: Standards Track                                 William Bulley
<draft-calhoun-diameter-strong-crypto-07.txt>        Merit Network, Inc.
                                                         Stephen Farrell
                                                  Baltimore Technologies
                                                              March 2001

                   Diameter Strong Security Extension

                          Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at:

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at:

   This document is an individual contribution for consideration by the
   AAA Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force.  Comments
   should be submitted to the mailing list.

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

   Copyright   (C) The Internet Society 1999.  All Rights Reserved.

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   The Diameter base protocol defines message integrity and AVP
   encryption using symmetric transforms to secure the communication
   between two Diameter nodes. The base protocol also defines a Diameter
   proxy server, that forwards requests to other servers when it detects
   that a given request cannot be satisfied locally.

   The ROAMOPS Working Group has defined a requirement that allows for
   the Diameter servers communicating through the proxy to be able to
   provide for end-to-end AVP integrity and confidentiality, making it
   difficult for the proxy to be able to modify, and/or be able to view
   sensitive information, within the message. The Mobile-IP and NASREQ
   Working Groups have stated that strong authentication is a
   requirement for AAA data, such as accounting records, for the
   purposes of non-repudiation.

   This Diameter extension specifies how strong AVP authentication,
   integrity and encryption can be done using a mixture of symmetric and
   asymmetric transforms, by encapsulating Cryptographic Message Syntax
   (CMS) data into  Diameter AVPs. The CMS data can also be used to
   carry X.509 certificates.

Table of Contents

      1.0  Introduction
            1.1  Requirements language
      2.0  Extended AVP Format
      3.0  Key Mangagement
            3.1  Usage Scenario
            3.2  Certificate Requirements
      4.0  Command-Codes Values
            4.1  E2E-SA-Setup-Request (ESSR) Command
            4.2  E2E-SA-Setup-Answer (ESSA) Command
      5.0  Strong Security AVPs
            5.1  CMS-Data AVP
            5.2  Local-CA-Info AVP
                  5.2.1  CA-Name AVP
                  5.2.2  Key-Hash AVP
      6.0  Result-Code AVP Values
            6.1  Permanent Failures
      7.0  IANA Considerations
      8.0  Security Considerations
      9.0  References
      10.0 Acknowledgements
      11.0 Authors' Addresses
      12.0 Full Copyright Statement
      13.0  Expiration Date

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1.0  Introduction

   The Diameter base protocol [1] defines message integrity and AVP
   encryption using symmetric transforms to secure the communication
   between two Diameter nodes. The base protocol also defines a Diameter
   proxy server, that forwards requests to other servers when it detects
   that a given request cannot be satisfied locally.

   The ROAMOPS Working Group has defined a requirement in [10] that
   allows for the Diameter servers communicating through the proxy to be
   able to provide for end-to-end AVP integrity and confidentiality,
   making it difficult for the proxy to be able to modify and see
   sensitive information within the message.  The Mobile-IP and NASREQ
   Working Groups have stated in [6, 7, 8] that non-repudiation is a
   requirement for AAA data, such as accounting records.

   When a chain of proxies use hop-by-hop security, each node in the
   proxy chain MUST recompute the Integrity-Value-Check (ICV) [1],
   making it easy for a malicious proxy to modify information in a
   Diameter message. It is virtually impossible for the rest of the
   nodes in the proxy chain to know that the message was modified in
   mid-stream. Figure 1 shows an example of such a network, where DIA3
   modifies the contents of "foo" in both the request and the response.

              (Request)         (Request)         (Request)
             [AVP(foo)=x]      [AVP(foo)=x]      [AVP(foo)=y]
      +------+  ----->  +------+  ----->  +------+  ----->  +------+
      |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |
      | NASB +----------+ DIA2 +----------+ DIA3 +----------+ DIA1 |
      |      |          |      |          |      |          |      |
      +------+  <-----  +------+  <-----  +------+  <-----  +------+
               (Answer)          (Answer)          (Answer)
             [AVP(foo)=b]      [AVP(foo)=b]      [AVP(foo)=a]
                           Figure 1: Proxy Chain

   This document describes how strong authentication and encryption can
   be provided in the Diameter protocol, by encapsulating CMS objects
   [3] in AVPs. The CMS object can also be used to carry X.509
   certificates and revocation lists.

   In the example provided in Figure 1, the originator of the request
   and response adds a digital signature that covers a set of AVPs
   within the message. The protected AVPs MUST NOT be changed by an
   intermediate proxy server (DIA2, DIA3), since the signature
   validation performed by the end server would fail.

   The Diameter base protocol also allows a Diameter broker to provide
   redirect services, as shown in Figure 2. The Diameter broker MAY

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   return information to a requesting server that would allow the
   servers to interact directly, bypassing the broker. This optimized
   approach reduces the complexity associated with end-to-end security.

                             |     Diameter     |
                             |      Broker      |
                      Request |  Response +
                              |  Result Code =
                     Local    |  Redirect          Home
                      ISP     v                    ISP
                     +----------+              +----------+
                     |  |              |  |
                     | Diameter |<------------>| Diameter |
                     |  Server  |              |  Server  |
                     +----------+    Direct    +----------+
          Figure 2: Diameter Broker Returning Redirect Indication

   When redirect services are used, a network layer security protocol,
   such as IP Security, MAY be used to secure the traffic between the
   two Diameter servers. However, security at the application level may
   still be necessary in this network configuration, specifically the
   ability to authenticate a select set of AVPs. Brokers that operate in
   a redirect mode typically require that both Diameter servers sign
   accounting records. The accounting record, signed by both parties is
   then forwarded to the broker via the local Diameter server. This
   provides the broker with some assurances that both networks agreed on
   the accounting data, which it MAY use for settlement purposes. If the
   underlying security protocol provides confidentiality, strong
   encryption MAY not be necessary in the redirect case.

   Given that asymmetric transform operations are expensive, Diameter
   servers MAY wish to use them only when dealing with inter-domain
   servers, as shown in Figure 3. This configuration is normally
   desirable since Diameter entities within a given administrative
   domain MAY inherently trust each other. Further, it is desirable to
   move this functionality to the edges, since NASes do not necessarily
   have the CPU power to perform expensive cryptographic operations.

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     |    Foreign Network     |
     |+-----+      +--------+ |      +--------+        +--------+
     ||     |      |Diameter| |      |Diameter|        |Diameter|
     || NAS +------+        +--------+        +--------+  Home  |
     ||     |      | Proxy  | |      | Broker |        | Server |
     |+-----+      +--------+ |      +--------+        +--------+
     |                        |
          <------------>    <-------------------------->
           <Hop-by-Hop>             <End-to-End>

                 Figure 3: Mixed Diameter Security Models

   The Extension number for this draft is two (2). This value is used in
   the Extension-Id AVP as defined in [1].

1.1  Restricted Use Cases

   [ed: This section is up for discussion in Minneapolis.]

   Altough this document specifies both authentication and
   confidentiality services, it is expected that the most common use
   cases will only require confidentiality service from a NAS to a
   "home" AAA server. It also appears that there is no use case where
   the "home" AAA server requires the NAS to be authenticated.

   This has a number of consequences:-

         - It is much simpler since the (many) NASes do not need to
           store or process secret information (also much more
           computationally intensive with asymmetric mechanisms).
         - In principle, the "P" bit and the use of SignedData could be
           deprecated in this document, or at least changed from "MUST"
           or "SHOULD" to "MAY", again making conformance simpler.
         - It means that the PKI required to support this Diameter
           extension is basically (from the PKI perspective) analagous
           to what has been demonstrated to work in the HTTP/SSL case -
           where servers on the Internet are certified and where clients
           verify those server certificates. PKIs that establish server
           identities are much easier to setup and operate in comparison
           to those which establish both client and server identities.

1.2  Requirements language

   In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST", "MUST NOT",

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   "optional", "recommended", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT", are to be
   interpreted as described in [5].

2.0  Extended AVP Format

   This specification introduces the 'P' bit in the AVP Header, which is
   defined in [1]. The 'P' bit, known as the protected AVP bit, is used
   to indicate whether the AVP is protected by a digital signature.
   When set, the AVP is protected and the contents cannot be changed by
   a Diameter proxy server without detection.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      |                           AVP Code                            |
      |          AVP Length           |     Reserved        |P|R|V|R|M|
      |                        Vendor ID (opt)                        |
      |    Data ...
                  Figure 4: Extended Diameter AVP Header

   Note that unless stated otherwise, the 'P' bit can be set on any
   Diameter AVP. The Proxy-State and Integrity-Check-Value AVPs [1] MUST
   NOT have the 'P' bit set. The Encrypted-Payload AVP MAY have the 'P'
   bit set if there is no intermediate proxy server. Any additional AVPs
   that MUST be removed, or changed, at each hop in a proxy chain MUST
   NOT have the 'P' bit set.

3.0 Key Management

   For e2e origin authentication, CMS itself already provides
   sufficicent key management without the need for additional
   specification. Basically, the originating Diameter node signs and
   includes whatever certificates are necessary for validation of the
   digital signature.

   However, for encryption of AVPs more work is needed. In order to be
   able to encrypt AVPs for a recipient, the originating Diameter node
   must have a copy of the recipient's public key. There are many well-
   known key retrieval schemes (e.g. using LDAP [17]), however, in order
   to simplify Diameter implementations a specific Diameter key
   distribution mechanism is defined here.

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   Another issue that must be addressed is how a Diameter node is to
   "know" that certain AVPs are required to use the strong security
   extension. The model here is that this information is to be included
   into the public key certificates of the Diameter servers (see below
   for details.)

   Finally, this section addresses the certificate profile to be used
   for this Diameter extension, which is a simplified profile of [4].

3.1  Usage Scenario

   When a Diameter node is about to send a messsage which MAY use strong
   security, it must determine whether to use the strong security
   service or not. We assume the Diameter node knows the user's NAI,
   which determines the user's realm.

   In the present discussion we assume that the Diameter node has not
   cached any information. Where information can be cached this is

   We use Diameter E2E-SA-Setup-Request (ESSR) and E2E-SA-Setup-Answer
   (ESSA) messages to establish whether strong security is required and
   if so, for which AVPs and which public key(s) to use.

   The originating node sends the ESSR message to a server in the
   destination realm. The ESSR message contains:

       - the realm part of the user's NAI
       - the list of direct trust CA's that the originating Diameter
         node has configured into it for certificate validation
       - (optionally) a nonce to be used by the destination Diameter
         node in OCSP requests determining certificate status

   (Note: A "direct trust" CA is one that the node is willing to use as
   the "top" of a certificate chain, sometimes confusingly known as a
   "root CA.")

   The destination node returns the ESSA message which contains:

       - TTL for this SA (seconds)
       - a chain of CA certificates (possibly empty)
       - public key certificates for the AAA servers in the realm, all
         of which MUST validate up to one of the CA's contained in the
         ESSR message, via the chain of CA certificates above; each of
         these public key certificates SHOULD contain a list of AVPs
         that MUST be protected (and how) for this realm
       - (optionally, if nonce received and OCSP supported) a list of

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         OCSP responses for the certificates in question, each of which
         uses the nonce from the ESSR message [ED: question - if 1 ocsp
         responder used, do we need to append to the nonce for each

   The originating Diameter node now has to check the response. Any
   failure results in error messages and auditing and not sending the
   Diameter message.


       - the certificate chain selected is cryptographically correct,
         passes the (relevant parts of the) rfc2459 path validation
         algorithm and terminates at a CA mentioned in the ESSR message
       - the realm part of the user's NAI must occur as a subjectAltName
         (with the rfc822Address option) in the AAA server's
         certificate. This rfc822Address MUST be of the form "Diameter-
         <XXX>@<domain>" where <domain> is the NAI's domain component
         and <XXX> can be anything (e.g. "",
         "") chosen by the AAA server

   The list of AVPs which are to be protected are included as a
   Diamater-specific X.509 certificate extension contained within the
   public key certificate of the AAA server. This extension uses the
   Extension object identifier <<TBD>> and has an IA5String syntax. The
   string value consists of a space separated list of AVP numbers to be
   encrypted, followed by a comma, followed by a space separated list of
   AVP numbers where origin authentication is required. For example:

         "123 456, 768" ",768 910" "123 456"

   [ed: Note: The alternative is to add this information explicitly to
   the ESSA message, which would require origin authentication of the
   ESSA message itself. With the above (PKI based) approach, the sender
   of the ESSA is only being trusted for the TTL part of the ESSA which
   is not (very) sensitive.]

   If certificate status (revocation) is an issue for the Diameter node,
   then the ESSR message MAY contain a nonce value. The idea is that the
   sender of the ESSA makes OCSP requests on behalf of the Diameter node
   and returns the OCSP responses to the Diameter node as part of the
   ESSA message. The use of the nonce value ensures that the sender of
   the ESSA cannot return cached or otherwise fake OCSP responses to the
   Diameter node.  The nonce value is to be (the beginning of) the nonce
   in the OCSP response. <<Note: The reason for "beginning" above is
   that an OCSP responder might produce an error if presented with the
   same nonce more than once. This is to be investigated.>>

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   If e2e confidentiality is required, then the originating node
   prepares the CMS-Data AVP as required.

3.2  Certificate Requirements

   [Ed: Some repetition here. To be fixed later.]

   Certificates used for the purposes of Diameter MUST conform to the
   PKIX profile [4], and MUST also include a Diameter node's NAI, which
   is typically added in the Host-Name AVP [1], as one of the values of
   the subjectAltName extension of the Certificate.  The NAI is to be
   encoded as an rfc822Name within the subjectAltName.

   For Diameter nodes (capable of acting as recipients for e2e
   confidentiality), the NAI MUST be of the form "Diameter-
   <xxx>@<realm>". Other Diameter nodes MAY use this naming scheme.

   These names are used for two purposes:

      1. Where a Diameter node is verifying a signature it needs to be
         able to compare the identity of the signer against the identity
         in the Host-Name AVP.

      2. Where a Diameter node is encrypting AVPs, it needs to be able
         to ensure that it uses a public key for the intended recipient.
         This requries comparing the identity in a Certificate against
         the NAI of the intended recipient (which is assumed to be

   In either case, the presence of the required NAI as an rfc822Name
   value in the subjectAltName extension of a verified public key
   certificate satisfies the matching requirement.

   Note that there MAY also be other values in the subjectAltName
   extension, (either using rfc822Name or other elements of the CHOICE),
   these can be safely ignored, but implementations MUST be able to
   handle their presence.

   Note also that the PKIX profile [4], section, specifies the
   rules for the relationship between the subjectAltName extension and
   the subject field of public key certificates.

   As noted above the public key certificates are to include the
   information about which AVPs are to be protected. This information is
   encoded using the new certificate extension documented above.

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4.0  Command-Codes Values

   This section defines new Command-Code [1] values that MUST be
   supported by all Diameter implementations that conform to this
   specification. The following Command Codes are currently defined in
   this document:

      Command-Name             Abbrev.    Code       Reference
      E2E-SA-Setup-Request      ESSR      304           4.1
      E2E-SA-Setup-Answer       ESSA      305           4.2

   [ed: The messages will be formally described in more detail later.]

4.1  E2E-SA-Setup-Request (ESSR) Command

   The E2E-SA-Setup-Request command, indicated by the Command-Code field
   set to 304, is sent by a Diameter node to establish a Diameter End-
   to-End Security Association.

      <E2E-SA-Setup-Request> ::= < Diameter-Header: 304 >
                                 { Origin-FQDN }
                                 { Origin-Realm }
                                 { Destination-Realm }
                               + { Local-CA-info }
                                 [ Destination-FQDN ]
                               * [ Ocsp-nonce ]
                               * [ Proxy-State ]
                               * [ Route-Record ]
                              0*1< Integrity-Check-Value >

4.2  E2E-SA-Setup-Answer (ESSA) Command

   The E2E-SA-Setup-Answer command, indicated by the Command-Code field
   set to 305, is sent by a Diameter node in response to an ESSR

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   <E2E-SA-Setup-Answer> ::= < Diameter-Header: NNN+1 >
                             { Origin-FQDN }
                             { Origin-Realm }
                             { Destination-Realm }
                          0*1{ Ca-chain }
                           + { AAA-server-certs }
                           * { Ocsp-responses }
                             [ Destination-FQDN ]
                           * [ Proxy-State ]
                           * [ Route-Record ]
                          0*1< Integrity-Check-Value >

5.0  Strong Security AVPs

   This section contains AVPs that are used to establish a Diameter
   End-to-End Security Association.

                                            |    AVP Flag rules   |
                   AVP  Section             |    |     |SHLD| MUST|MAY |
   Attribute Name  Code Defined  Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT|  NOT|Encr|
   CMS-Data         310  5.1     OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | N  |
   Local-CA-Info    348  5.2     Grouped    | M  |  P  |    |  V  | N  |
   CA-Name          349  5.2.1   OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | N  |
   Key-Hash         350  5.2.2   OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | N  |

5.1  CMS-Data AVP

   The CMS-Data AVP (AVP Code 310) is of type OctetString and contains
   the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) encoding of a CMS object [3]
   of type ContentInfo. The profile of CMS algorithm and structure usage
   is as specified in the S/MIME v3 message specification [11]. This
   means that where a set of AVPs is protected using CMS, the set MUST
   first be encoded according to MIME encoding rules specified below.
   This method of encapsulating AVPs allows existing S/MIME toolkits to
   be used without changes in order to produce strongly protected
   Diameter messages.  The CMS object MAY contain any of the three
   methods; signed-only, enveloped-only and signed-and-enveloped.
   Optional certificates and CRLs MAY be present in all three methods.

   To package a set of AVPs as a MIME type, the AVPs are first
   concatenated in the order in which they occur in the Diameter
   message. The entire AVP MUST be input to the signing/encryption

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   process, from the first byte of the AVP code to the last byte of the
   AVP data, including all other fields, length, reserved/flags, and
   optional vendor IDs, and padding. The AVP MUST be input to the
   signing/encryption process in network byte order. If AVPs are to be
   enciphered, then the encryptor is free to order AVPs whatever way it
   chooses. This value is then used as the value of a new MIME type
   application/x-Diameter-avps, which MUST be prepared in accordance
   with the rules specified in section 3.1 of [11]. If a receiver
   detects that the contents of the CMS-Data AVP is invalid, it SHOULD
   return the new Result-Code AVP value defined in section 6.0.

   Where signing only is performed, the signature is calculated over the
   canonical encoding of the application/x-Diameter-avps MIME type, but
   the AVPs themselves are not carried within the CMS-Data AVP. Instead,
   the digest value within the SignedData structure contains the digest
   over the canonicalized encoding of application/x-Diameter-avps.
   Multiple Diameter entities MAY add their signatures to an existing
   CMS-Data AVP using the countersignature attribute, defined in section
   11.4 of [3]. The countersignature attribute requires that the
   signatures occur sequentially, meaning that each node's signature
   covers the existing signatures in the CMS object.

   Where encryption only is performed, the encryptedContent MUST contain
   the canonical encoding of the application/x-Diameter-avps MIME type.

   Where signing and encryption are both performed, signing MUST occur
   first, the resulting CMS object MUST then be MIME encoded producing
   an application/pkcs7-mime MIME type which is then used as the content
   of the EnvelopedData.

   There is no need for an 'outer' MIME encoding when only signing, or
   only encryption is applied.

   Where AVPs are encapsulated within a CMS-Data AVP, the eContentType
   of the EncapsulatedContentInfo MUST be id-data [11].

   The signing and encryption algorithms supported MUST be those
   specified in sections 2.2 and 2.3 of [11].

   Conformant implementations MUST emit a CMS-Data AVP which contains
   only one application/x-Diameter-avps MIME type. Implementations which
   receive any other MIME type MUST indicate an error.

   Where a CMS-Data AVP contains a set of certificates then both public
   key certificates (Certificate) and attribute certificates
   (AttributeCertificate) are allowed by CMS (as well as one other
   legacy format which MUST NOT be used). Support for use of the
   Certificate structure is REQUIRED, implementations SHOULD support use

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   of the AttributeCertificate structure as defined in the PKIX
   attribute certificate profile [12]. This allows Diameter
   implementations to include a certifiate from a trusted party that
   they are authorized to emit the AVPs contained in the message.

   When a SignedData object is present, the eContent field of the
   EncapsulatedContentInfo structure MUST be absent since the
   authentication covers data outside of the object. The signature is
   computed over all AVPs prior to the AVP that have the 'P' bit
   enabled. The order of the AVPs MUST be preserved and the computation
   begins with the first AVP immediately following the Diameter header.
   If the CMS-Data AVP is present in a Grouped-AVP, it covers all AVPs
   within the Grouped-AVP AVP that has the 'P' bit set. An Integrity-
   Check-Value (ICV) AVP MUST NOT preceed a CMS-Data AVP containing a
   SignedData object. If the signature cannot be verified correctly, a
   response with the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_INVALID_AUTH [1]
   MUST be returned.

   When an EnvelopedData object is present, the encryptedContentInfo
   field MUST contain the Host-Name AVP, containing the host name of the
   encryptor, and one or more additional AVPs.

   When a conforming implementation receives a Diameter message which
   contains encrypted AVPs within a CMS EnvelopedData, then the
   recipient MUST check to see if it is on the list of recipients
   specified in the RecipientInfos of the EnvelopedData. If not, the
   recipient MAY choose to process the message or indicate an error. If
   the recipient is in the RecipientInfos and an error occurs during
   decryption, then the recipient MUST indicate an error.

   Diameter nodes SHOULD implement content encryption key re-use.

   A CMS-Data MAY also contain a certs-only CMS structure, which is a
   degenerate form of CMS structure containing only PKI related
   information (see section 3.6 of [11] for details of the CMS certs-
   only structure). This use of the CMS-Data AVP can be used to "push"
   public key and attribute certificates and CRLs using Diameter, which
   MAY be useful in environments where repositories (e.g.  LDAP servers)
   are either not used or not available (e.g. due to crossing a domain
   boundary). Conforming implementations MUST be able to emit a certs-
   only CMS structure which contains relevant PKI related information
   and MUST be able to process a CMS-Data AVP which contains a certs-
   only CMS structure. Of course, the recipient of such a certs-only CMS
   structure SHOULD NOT use the PKI related information without first
   verifying it, e.g. by checking that issuer's are trusted, signatures
   verify etc.

   When the CMS-Data AVP contains certificates in the certificates field

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   of the SignedData, a CRL [4] MAY also be provided in the crls field
   of the SignedData, which MAY be used to assist in determining whether
   a certificate has been revoked. Optionally, the Diameter node MAY
   check the status of certificates using another mechanism, such as
   Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [9].

   This AVP MUST have the 'M' bit enabled. The 'P' and 'V' bits MUST NOT
   be enabled.

   The following is an example of a message that includes strong
   security and hop-by-hop security:

      Example-Command ::= < Diameter-Header: 9999999 >
                          [ AVP ]
                          { CMS-Data }
                        * [ Proxy-State ]
                        * [ Route-Record ]
                        * [ Routing-Realm ]
                       0*1< Integrity-Check-Value >

5.2  Local-CA-Info AVP

   The Local-CA-Info AVP (AVP Code = 348) is of type Grouped.  The
   Grouped Data field has the following ABNF grammar:

      Local-CA-Info   = CA-Name Key-Hash
         CA-Name       = ; See Section 5.2.1
         Key-Hash      = ; See Section 5.2.2

   The Local-CA-Info AVP Data field contains the Certificate Authority's
   name in the CA-Name AVP, as well as a hash of the key in the Key-Hash

      |                 AVP Header (AVP Code = 348)                   |
      |                         CA-Name AVP                           |
      |                         Key-Hash AVP                          |

5.2.1  CA-Name AVP

   The CA-Name AVP (AVP Code = 349) is of type OctetString, encoded in
   the UTF-8 [24] format. The AVP contains the FQDN of the Certificate

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5.2.2  Key-Hash AVP

   The Key-Hash AVP (AVP Code = 350) is of type OctetString, and
   contains a hash of the key. [ed: More later on how this is

6.0  Result-Code AVP Values

   This section defines new Result-Code [1] values that MUST be
   supported by all Diameter implementations that conform to this

6.1  Permanent Failures

   Errors that fall within the permanent failures category are used to
   inform the peer that the request failed, and should not be attempted

      DIAMETER_INVALID_CMS_DATA          5018
         This error code is returned when a CMS-Data AVP is received
         with an invalid ContentInfo object.

7.0  IANA Considerations

   The AVPs defined in Section 5.0 are AVPs whose identifiers were
   allocated from the AVP numbering space [1], and extended in [13],
   [14] and [15]. IANA should assign the values in section 5.0.

   The Result-Code values defined in Section 6.0 are error codes as
   defined in [1] and extended in [13], [14] and [15]. They correspond
   to error values specific to the Strong Security extension. IANA
   should record the values as defined in Section 6.0.

8.0  Security Considerations

   This document describes how strong security can be achieved in the
   Diameter protocol by allowing S/MIME Cryptographic Message Syntax [3]
   objects to be carried as a Diameter AVP.

   Section 5.1 states that a certificate received in a CMS-Data AVP
   SHOULD NOT be used prior to cert verification. In most cases, the
   verification will be according to the rules specified in [4],
   however, some communities have indicated that they wish to be allowed
   to specify alternative certificate verification mechanisms, hence the

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   "SHOULD NOT" rather than the more typical "MUST NOT".  The authors do
   however strongly RECOMMEND that the verification procedures specified
   in [4] are always applied, regardless of whatever other verification
   mechanisms are in use.

9.0  References

   [1]  P. Calhoun, A. Rubens, H. Akhtar, E. Guttman, "Diameter Base
        Protocol", draft-ietf-aaa-Diameter-01.txt, IETF work in pro-
        gress, March 2001.

   [2]  Kaufman, Perlman, Speciner, "Network Security: Private Communi-
        cations in a Public World", Prentice Hall, March 1995, ISBN 0-

   [3]  R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630, June 1999.

   [4]  Housley, Ford, Polk, Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infras-
        tructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.

   [5]  S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [6]  M. Beadles, D. Mitton, "Criteria for Evaluating Network Access
        Server Protocols", draft-ietf-nasreq-criteria-05.txt, IETF work
        in progress, June 2000.

   [7]  T. Hiller et al., "Cdma2000 Wireless Data Requirements for AAA",
        draft-hiller-cdma2000-AAA-02.txt, IETF work in progress, Sep-
        tember 2000.

   [8]  S. Glass, S. Jacobs, C. Perkins, "Mobile IP Authentication,
        Authorization, and Accounting Requirements". RFC 2977. October

   [9]  Myers, Ankney, Malpani, Galperin, Adams, "X.509 Internet Public
        Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)",
        RFC 2560, June 1999.

   [10] Aboba, Zorn, "Criteria for Evaluating Roaming Protocols", RFC
        2477, January 1999.

   [11] B. Ramsdell, "S/MIME v2 Message Specification", RFC2633, June

   [12] S. Farrell, R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute Certificate

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        Profile for Authorization", draft-ietf-pkix-ac509prof-05.txt,
        IETF work in progress, August 2000.

   [13] P. Calhoun, W. Bulley, G. Zorn, "Diameter NASREQ Extension",
        draft-ietf-aaa-Diameter-nasreq-01.txt, IETF work in progress,
        March 2001.

   [14] P. Calhoun, C. Perkins, "Diameter Mobile IP Extensions", draft-
        ietf-aaa-Diameter-mobileip-01.txt, IETF work in progress, March

   [15] Arkko, Calhoun, Patel, Zorn, "Diameter Accounting Extension",
        draft-ietf-aaa-Diameter-accounting-01.txt, IETF work in pro-
        gress, March 2001.

   [16] Farrell, Turner, "Reuse of CMS Content Encryption Keys", draft-
        ietf-smime-rcek-01.txt, IETF work in progress, February 2001.

   [17] Boyen, Howes, Richard, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
        Operational Protocols - LDAPv2", RFC 2559, April 1999.

10.0  Acknowledgements

   The authors would also like to acknowledge the following people for
   their contribution in the development of the Diameter protocol:

   Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, William Bulley, Daniel C. Fox, Lol Grant,
   Ignacio Goyret, Nancy Greene, Peter Heitman, Paul Krumviede, Fergal
   Ladley, Ryan Moats, Victor Muslin, Kenneth Peirce, Sumit Vakil, John
   R. Vollbrecht, Jeff Weisberg and Glen Zorn

11.0  Authors' Addresses

   Questions about this memo can be directed to:

      Pat R. Calhoun
      Network and Security Research Center, Sun Labs
      Sun Microsystems, Inc.
      15 Network Circle
      Menlo Park, California, 94025

       Phone:  +1 650-786-7733
         Fax:  +1 650-786-6445

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      William Bulley
      Merit Network, Inc.
      Building One, Suite 2000
      4251 Plymouth Road
      Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48105-2785

       Phone:  +1 734-764-9993
         Fax:  +1 734-647-5185

      Stephen Farrell
      Baltimore Technologies
      39 Parkgate Street,
      Dublin 8,

       Phone:  +353-1-881-6000
         Fax:  +353-1-881-7000

12.0  Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied  and  furnished
   to others,  and  derivative works that comment on or otherwise
   explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied,
   published and distributed,  in  whole  or  in part, without restric-
   tion of any kind, provided that the  above  copyright  notice  and
   this  paragraph  are included on all such copies and derivative
   works.  However, this docu- ment itself may not be modified in any
   way, such as  by  removing  the copyright notice or references to the
   Internet Society or other Inter- net organizations, except as needed
   for  the  purpose  of  developing Internet standards in which case
   the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards pro-
   cess must be followed, or as required  to translate it into languages
   other than   English.  The limited permis- sions granted above are
   perpetual and  will  not  be  revoked  by  the Internet  Society or
   its successors or assigns.  This document and the information con-
   tained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis  and  THE INTERNET

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13.0  Expiration Date

   This memo is filed as <draft-calhoun-Diameter-strong-crypto-07.txt>
   and expires in August 2001.

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