PCN K. Chan
Internet-Draft Nortel Networks
Intended status: Informational A. Charny
Expires: April 25, 2007 Cisco Systems
P. Eardley
BT Research
October 22, 2006
Pre-Congestion Notification Problem Statement
draft-chan-pcn-problem-statement-01
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
DiffServ mechanisms have been developed to support Quality of Service
(QoS). However, the level of assurance that can be provided with
DiffServ without substantial over-provisioning is limited. Pre-
Congestion Notification (PCN) investigates the use of per-flow
admission control to provide the required service guarantees for the
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admitted traffic. While admission control will protect the QoS under
normal operating conditions, an additional flow pre-emption mechanism
is necessary in the times of heavy congestion (e.g. caused by route
changes due to link or node failure).
This document provides a problem statement on the addition of flow
admission control and flow pre-emption functionality to a DiffServ
network, in particular for the support of real time services such as
voice and video.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Architecture and Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Functional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Notion of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Assumptions and Constraints on Problem Scope . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Assumption 1: Controlled Environment . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Assumption 2: Many Flows and Additional Load . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Assumption 3: Real-Time Applications . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Open Design Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
IP networks were initially designed to perform per IP packet
forwarding treatment without discrimination. With the increased use
of the IP network by applications with different transport functional
requirement, the notion of Quality of Service (QoS) was introduced
[19].
DiffServ [10] introduced differentiated per packet forwarding
treatment to provide QoS: some packets are served at a higher
scheduling priority than others. Diffserv Service Classes [18]
categorises various DiffServ traffic and recommends how they can be
used for packets from applications with different transport
requirements. For instance there are Telephony and Real-time
Interactive service classes. Applications like these need low loss,
low delay and low jitter. A suitable Per Hop Behavior (PHB) is
Expedited Forwarding (EF) [16], which works by assuring that packets
(usually) encounter very short or empty queues. Each router is
allocated a certain amount of bandwidth for the EF PHB, for instance.
Excess packets are dropped and delayed, thus leading to poorer QoS
for an end user running an application like voice-over-IP. Even if
average traffic levels are known, due to traffic variations the level
of assurance that can be provided with DiffServ without substantial
over-provisioning is limited.
To help ensure that the average traffic loads remain within the
allocated bandwidth limits, the DiffServ Architecture [10] introduces
the idea of policing the amount of traffic in a class as it enters
the network. The acceptable traffic level is described by a traffic
conditioning agreement (TCA). However, in practice, TCAs police the
aggregate traffic in a class at the network ingress, and for
scalability reasons typically includes traffic to different
destinations. As a result, TCA's do not guarantee that EF aggregate
at any given node in the network does not exceed the allocated
capacity [21], and so don't ensure that a particular end user's QoS
is guaranteed. Also, in practice TCAs are static and so require
accurate and/or conservative prediction of the traffic matrix.
To cope with the issue of exceeding bandwidth allocation to EF on
some links, in practice a policer or shaper is assumed to be
installed at the interior nodes as well. However, shaping or
policing traffic causes excess packets be dropped and delayed, thus
leading to poorer QoS for an end user running an application like
voice-over-IP. Even if average traffic levels remain within the
allocated bandwidth limits, traffic variations may limit the level of
assurance that can be provided with DiffServ without substantial
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over-provisioning.
These factors motivate us to work on per flow admission control for a
DiffServ network, and in particular on measurement-based admission
control, ie new flow requests are blocked dynamically in response to
actual (incipient) congestion on a router within the DiffServ
network.
However, despite flow admission control, sometimes there can be heavy
congestion - for example caused by link or node failure that
effectively reduces the network's capacity. The default option is
that the QoS of all flows is degraded. However, by pre-empting some
flows the QoS of the remaining flows can be protected. The work
reported in [7] indicates that in the context where calls have
different recongizable precedence levels (e.g. in the context of
military/emergency calls [20]), this problem can be partially
addressed by dropping lower-precedence calls preferentially while
protecting higher precedence calls. However, as it was shown in [6],
the need to pre-empt some flows of a given precedence level, while
protecting the QoS of the rest of the flows of this precedence level
remains.
This motivates us to work on per flow pre-emption for a DiffServ
network, and in particular on measurement-based pre-emption, ie
existing flows are dropped dynamically in response to actual
congestion on a router within the DiffServ network.
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [15] introduced the idea of a
router indicating that it is congested by changing the header of
packets ("marking" them). However, ECN in RFC3168 [15] is designed
for TCP applications. This motivates us to develop the concept for
real-time applications. A router "PCN-marks" packets as an early
warning of its incipient congestion ("pre-congestion"). These
markings are then used by the admission control and pre-emption
mechanisms.
The rest of this document discusses our proposed goals, assumptions
and some functional architecture directions.
1.2. Goals
From the functional standpoint, the goal of the proposed PCN approach
is twofold:
o Flow Admission Control: block admission of new flows as soon as
signs of incipient congestion are detected, to prevent congestion
/ overload.
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o Flow Pre-emption: If traffic exceeds the desired/allocated
capacity (e.g. due to a failure), pre-empt sufficient flows so
that the QoS of the remaining flows is protected.
The following are proposed as design goals:
o The PCN-enabled packet forwarding network should be simple,
scalable and robust
o Compatibility with other traffic (i.e. a proposed solution should
work well when non-PCN traffic is also present in the network)
o Support of different types of real-time traffic (eg should work
well with CBR and VBR voice and video sources)
o Reaction time of the mechanisms should be commensurate with the
desired application-level requirements (e.g. a pre-emption
mechanism needs to pre-empt flows before significant QoS issues
are experienced by all real-time traffic, and before a user hangs
up)
o Compatibility with different precedence levels of real-time
applications (e.g. preferential treatment of higher precedence
calls over lower precedence calls, MLPP [20].
2. Architecture and Deployment Scenarios
The above goals point to a high-level approach where functionality is
split between:
o Nodes in the PCN-enabled network, which monitor their own state of
(pre) congestion and mark packets if appropriate
o Nodes at the edge of the PCN-enabled network, which control
admission of new flows and pre-emption of existing flows, based on
information from nodes in the network. This information is in the
form of the marked packets and not explicit signalling messages.
The aim of this split is to keep the bulk of the network simple,
scalable and robust, whilst confining policy, application-level and
security interactions to the edge of the PCN network.
Section 2.1 provides a high-level description of the functional
architecture, and Section 2.2 considers some possible deployment
scenarios.
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2.1. Functional Architecture
Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the high-level functional
architecture:
+------------------------------------+
| PCN-Region |
+------+ +------+ +------+
| | | | | |
|PEN A | ----> |PIN A | ----> |PEN B |
| | | | | |
+------+ +------+ +------+
| |
+------------------------------------+
Figure 1: PCN-based Functional Architecture
The terms are defined as follows:
PCN-Region:
A DiffServ region of the Internet running PCN, that is the PCN-
based mechanisms are used to decide whether to admit a new flow
to the DiffServ region and whether to pre-empt an existing
flow. All traffic enters/leaves the PCN-Region through a PCN
End Node. Please note that the PCN-Region is also defined by
the Diffserv Service Class [18] that is subject to the PCN
mechanisms.
PCN Interior Node (PIN) (function):
The PCN Interior Node is an "on-path" function. It performs
traffic metering and PCN-marking: the function that enables a
network element to give an early warning of its own incipient
congestion ("pre-congestion") on one of its interfaces, ie
traffic is above a certain level, by marking, e.g. changing the
header of packet(s).
PCN End Node (PEN) (function):
The PCN End Node is an "on-path" function. The PCN End Node is
where the PCN Region ends. It indicates the significance of
the PCN packet marking which terminates at this functional
node. This functional description does not imply which
physical device will implement this function (e.g., edge
router, media gateway or end-host). This "on-path" function
performs the detection of PCN-marks: the function that monitors
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PCN-marking to obtain on-path congestion information as
signaled through PCN-marking by PCN-enabled Interior Nodes.
For PCN's purpose, these actions may include but not be limited
to:
+ Make Flow Admission Control and/or Flow Pre-emption
decisions.
+ Signalling the PCN information to others for making the Flow
Admission Control and/or Flow Pre-emption decisions.
+ Perform measurement of marked packets across multiple IP
packets of a flow to derive network information for a flow
that a single packet can not provide.
+ Perform measurement of marked packets across multiple IP
flows to derive additional network information.
2.2. Notion of Trust
With the above Functional Architecture, there exists a notion of
trust between the different functional elements:
o PENs trusting PINs to provide the correct network information.
o PINs trusting PENs that admission control and pre-emption will be
administered correctly so the PINs will not be over-whelmed with
traffic.
o Users/Applications trusting the PENs that they will provide
dependable informations for taking application actions.
o PENs trusting other PENs that when one PEN performs its task of
flow admission control, other PENs will also perform their flow
admission control actions. So that the "good citizens" does not
get penelized.
We discuss some notion of trust further in section 4.1 Assumption 1:
Controlled Environment and in section 6 Security Implications.
2.3. Deployment Scenarios
The previous section describes the functional architecture. The
association of these functions to physical devices may depend on the
deployment scenario. We make some general comments about the
physical devices where the functions above will typically reside:
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o The PCN Interior Node function typically resides in a network
element like a router or a switch where packet forwarding is
handled.
o The PCN End Node function typically resides in a router, but may
also be on a host or a proxy. It is typically the closest PCN-
enabled device to the user.
Operators of networks will want to use the PCN functions (and
standards) in various arrangements, for instance depending on how
they are performing admission control outside the PCN-region, their
goals beyond those in Section 1.2, and assumptions in addition to
those in Section 4.
Hence we shall work on several deployment scenarios. Initially we
have the following possibilities in mind:
o IntServ over DiffServ [14], the DiffServ region is PCN-enabled.
This is described in CL Architecture [2].
o SIP-controlled Admission and Pre-emption: trusted SIP endpoints
(gateway or host) perform application flow admission and flow pre-
emption, based on network information provided by PCN marking.
This is described in SIP Controlled Admission and Preemption [4].
o Pseudowire: PCN may be used as a congestion avoidance mechanism
for end-user deployed pseudowires (collaborate with the PWE3 WG in
investigation of this possibility).
3. Standards
To solve the PCN functionality described above, we will work on
developing a standard for each of the following problems:
o How should the measurement of pre-congestion be done at the PINs?
For determining when an interior node should mark a packet in
order to give early warning of its own congestion? Should there
be a standardized algorithm? Or just the required behavior should
be standardized?
o How should such a mark be encoded by the PINs in a packet (in the
ECN and/or DSCP fields)?
o How should these markings (at packet granularity) be interpreted
by the PENs for making flow admission control and flow pre-emption
decisions (at flow granularity)?
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Initial work addressing these questions has been reported to the IETF
in CL Architecture [2], RT ECN [1], NSIS RMD [5]. Note that other
options are possible.
One of the key questions that need to be answered in the context of
standardisation is, what level of detail of standardisation is
appropriate for the first bullet? For example, should PCN be
specified as an algorithm relating the probability of PCN-marking a
packet to (some specific description of the) traffic level? Or
something more detailed (e.g. implementation specifics) or less
detailed (describe the behaviour in more general terms than an
algorithm). We want flexibility, but also want to be sure that
different standards-compliant implementations will work together.
A similar issue arises for the third bullet. Additionally, it might
be possible to specify more than one way of reacting to the PCN-
markings. On the plus side, different reaction behaviours may be
more suited to different deployment scenarios. But this could
require coordination of the PCN End Nodes for a particular PCN-
region, so they agreed to use the same reaction behaviour.
On the second bullet, CL PHB [3] has some options for how to do the
encoding, focussed on use of the ECN field, and an initial analysis
of their pros and cons. Another possibility is to use the DSCP
field, as in NSIS RMD [5], or a combination of the two. The WG will
study the trade-offs between different encoding options.
4. Assumptions and Constraints on Problem Scope
In order to make rapid progress, initially we will restrict the
problem space in several ways. NOTE: Subsequent re-chartering may
investigate solutions for when some of these restrictions are not in
place. The working assumption is that the standards developed in the
initial phase should not need to be modified to satisfy the solutions
for when these restrictions are removed.
4.1. Assumption 1: Controlled Environment
We assume that the PCN-enabled Internet Region is a controlled
environment, i.e. all the interior and end nodes of the region run
PCN and trust each other.
There are several reasons for proposing this assumption:
o The PCN-Region has to be fully encircled by a ring of PCN End
Nodes, otherwise packets could enter the PCN-Region without being
subject to admission control, which would potentially destroy the
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QoS of existing flows.
o Similarly, a PCN End Node has to trust that all the interior
routers are doing PCN-marking. A non-PCN router won't be able to
alert that it's suffering pre-congestion, which potentially would
lead to too many calls being admitted (or too few being pre-
empted). Worse, a rogue router could perform attacks such as
marking all packets so that no flows were admitted.
One way of assuring the above two points is that the entire PCN-
region is run by a single operator. Another possibility is that
there are several operators but they trust each other to a sufficient
level. Please note that this restriction applies to packets in the
traffic class that is subject to the PCN mechanisms.
4.2. Assumption 2: Many Flows and Additional Load
We assume that there are many flows on any bottleneck link in the
PCN-enabled region.
Measurement-based admission control assumes that the past is a
reasonable reflection of the future: the network conditions are
measured at the time of a new flow request, however the actual
network performance must be OK during the call some time later.
One issue is that if there are only a few variable rate flows, then
the aggregate traffic level may vary a lot, perhaps enough to cause
some packets to get dropped. If there are many flows then the
aggregate traffic level should be statistically smoothed. How many
flows is enough depends on a number of things such as the variation
in each flow's rate, the total PCN bandwidth, and the size of the
"safety margin" between the traffic level at which we start PCN-
marking and at which packets are dropped.
4.3. Assumption 3: Real-Time Applications
We assume that packets come from real time applications generating
inelastic traffic like voice and video requiring low delay, jitter
and packet loss, i.e. as defined by the Controlled Load Service [9].
This assumption is to help focus the effort where it looks like PCN
would be most useful, ie the sorts of applications where per flow QoS
is a known requirement. For instance, the impact of this assumption
would be to guide simulations work. NOTE: PCN should be readily
extendible to other applications like ones that typically use Assured
Forwarding [12].
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5. Open Design Issues
Whilst working on the general issues of flow admission control and
flow pre-emption, we have found several issues that proved hard to
solve. They are briefly documented here - further details are in
[2]. In general they seem to be characteristics of most measurement-
based admission control schemes, but some may not be relevant to
particular deployment scenarios. From the perspective of this
problem statement, besides just noting the issue the PCN WG could:
o Upgrade the issue, so it's added to the "Goals" section earlier,
or to the "Assumptions" section as appropriate
o Downgrade the issue, either because it isn't that important or
because it's better dealt with outside the PCN solution
o Wait and see, ie as the PCN solution is developed assess how much
extra complexity solving the issue would add
The comments below are about admission control, but generally a
similar issue arises for flow pre-emption.
ECMP (Equal Cost Multi-Path) Routing:
In order to decide whether to admit a new flow, the CL
Architecture [2] scheme determines what the ingress and egress
PENs would be and measures the current level of PCN-marking
between them (Congestion-Level-Estimate). If routers in the
PCN-region run ECMP, then traffic between a particular pair of
PENs may follow several different paths. The problem is that
if just one of the paths is congested such that packets are
being PCN-marked, then the Congestion-Level-Estimate measured
by the egress PEN will be diluted by unmarked packets from
other non-congested paths.
Bi-Directional Sessions:
CL Architecture [2] describes a flow admission control
mechanism. However, from the application perspective, for a
bi-directional session the two flows should be admitted as a
pair - for instance a bi-directional voice call only makes
sense if flows in both directions are admitted.
Global Coordination:
CL Architecture [2] makes its admission decision based on PCN-
markings between a particular pair of PENs. Decisions about
flows through a different pair of PENs are made independently.
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However, one can imagine network topologies and traffic
matrices where from a global perspective it would be better to
make a coordinated decision across all the pairs of PENs for
the whole PCN-region. For example, to block (or even pre-empt)
flows on one PEN pair so that more important flows through a
different pair could be admitted.
Aggregate Traffic Characteristics:
Even when the number of flows is stable, the traffic level
through the PCN-region will vary because the sources vary their
traffic rates. The CL Architecture [2] mechanism works best
when there's "some" variability in the total traffic level at a
router's interface (ie in the aggregate traffic from all
sources). Too much variation means that a router may (at one
moment) not be doing any PCN-marking and then (at another
moment) be overloaded, ie drop packets. This makes it hard to
tune the admission control scheme to stop admitting new flows
at the right time. However, too little variation can also be a
problem. For example, if all the sources are constant bit rate
and are synchronised, then the total traffic level at a
router's interface could be (almost) at its capacity and all
packets could still be serviced instantly. However, admitting
one more flow could tip the router over its capacity, so its
queue grew indefinitely until it had to drop packets. "Some"
traffic variation means that as the traffic level nears the
capacity limit, some packets are PCN-marked but there's still
enough capacity to cope with the traffic fluctuations. Hence
new flows can be blocked and packets are never dropped.
Speed of Reaction:
The CL Architecture [2] mechanism has a limited speed of
reaction: if a big burst of admission requests occurs in a very
short space of time (eg prompted by a televote), they could all
get admitted before enough PCN-marks are seen to block new
flows. In other words, any additional load offered within the
reaction time of the mechanism mustn't move the CL-Region
directly from no congestion to overload.
6. Security Implications
Packets from normal precedence and higher precedence sessions [20]
aren't distinguishable by PCN Interior Nodes. This prevents an
attacker specifically targeting, in the data plane, higher precedence
packets (perhaps for DoS or for eavesdropping). However, PCN End
Nodes can access this information to help decide whether to admit or
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pre-empt a flow. The separation of network information provided by
the Interior Nodes and the precedence information at the PCN End
Nodes allows simpler, easier and better focused security enforcement.
PCN End Nodes police packets to ensure a flow sticks within its
agreed limit. This is similar to the existing IntServ behaviour.
Between them the PCN End Nodes must fully encircle the PCN-Region,
otherwise packets could enter the PCN-Region without being subject to
admission control, which would potentially destroy the QoS of
existing flows.
It is assumed that all the Interior Nodes and PCN End Nodes run PCN
and trust each other (ie the PCN-enabled Internet Region is a
controlled environment). For instance a non-PCN router wouldn't be
able to alert that it's suffering pre-congestion, which potentially
would lead to too many calls being admitted (or too few being pre-
empted). Worse, a rogue router could perform attacks such as marking
all packets so that no flows were admitted.
So security requirements are focussed at specific parts of the PCN-
Region:
The PCN End Nodes become the trust points. The degree of trust
required depends on the kinds of decisions it has to make and the
kinds of information it needs to make them. For example when the
PCN End Node needs to know the contents of the sessions for making
the decisions, when the contents are highly classified, the
security requirements for the PCN End Nodes involved will also
need to be high.
PCN-marking by the Interior Nodes along the packet forwarding path
needs to be trusted, because the PCN End Nodes rely on this
information.
7. IANA Considerations
To be completed.
8. Acknowledgements
To be completed.
9. Informative References
[1] Babiarz, J., "Congestion Notification Process for Real-Time
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Traffic", draft-babiarz-tsvwg-rtecn-05 (work in progress),
October 2005.
[2] Briscoe, B., "An edge-to-edge Deployment Model for Pre-
Congestion Notification: Admission Control over a DiffServ
Region", draft-briscoe-tsvwg-cl-architecture-03 (work in
progress), June 2006.
[3] Briscoe, B., "Pre-Congestion Notification marking",
draft-briscoe-tsvwg-cl-phb-03 (work in progress), October 2006.
[4] Babiarz, J., "SIP Controlled Admission and Preemption",
draft-babiarz-pcn-sip-cap-00 (work in progress), October 2006.
[5] Bader, A., "RMD-QOSM - The Resource Management in Diffserv QOS
Model", draft-ietf-nsis-rmd-08 (work in progress),
October 2006.
[6] Baker, F. and J. Polk, "MLEF Without Capacity Admission Does
Not Satisfy MLPP Requirements",
draft-ietf-tsvwg-mlef-concerns-00 (work in progress),
February 2005.
[7] Silverman, S., "Multi-Level Expedited Forwarding Per Hop
Behavior (MLEF PHB)", draft-silverman-tsvwg-mlefphb-03 (work in
progress), October 2005.
[8] Braden, B., Clark, D., and S. Shenker, "Integrated Services in
the Internet Architecture: an Overview", RFC 1633, June 1994.
[9] Wroclawski, J., "Specification of the Controlled-Load Network
Element Service", RFC 2211, September 1997.
[10] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black, "Definition of
the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and
IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474, December 1998.
[11] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z., and W.
Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated Services", RFC 2475,
December 1998.
[12] Heinanen, J., Baker, F., Weiss, W., and J. Wroclawski, "Assured
Forwarding PHB Group", RFC 2597, June 1999.
[13] Awduche, D., Malcolm, J., Agogbua, J., O'Dell, M., and J.
McManus, "Requirements for Traffic Engineering Over MPLS",
RFC 2702, September 1999.
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[14] Bernet, Y., Ford, P., Yavatkar, R., Baker, F., Zhang, L.,
Speer, M., Braden, R., Davie, B., Wroclawski, J., and E.
Felstaine, "A Framework for Integrated Services Operation over
Diffserv Networks", RFC 2998, November 2000.
[15] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition of
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC 3168,
September 2001.
[16] Davie, B., Charny, A., Bennet, J., Benson, K., Le Boudec, J.,
Courtney, W., Davari, S., Firoiu, V., and D. Stiliadis, "An
Expedited Forwarding PHB (Per-Hop Behavior)", RFC 3246,
March 2002.
[17] Charny, A., Bennet, J., Benson, K., Boudec, J., Chiu, A.,
Courtney, W., Davari, S., Firoiu, V., Kalmanek, C., and K.
Ramakrishnan, "Supplemental Information for the New Definition
of the EF PHB (Expedited Forwarding Per-Hop Behavior)",
RFC 3247, March 2002.
[18] Babiarz, J., Chan, K., and F. Baker, "Configuration Guidelines
for DiffServ Service Classes", RFC 4594, August 2006.
[19] "Supporting Real-Time Applications in an Integrated Services
Packet Network: Architecture and Mechanisms", Proceedings of
SIGCOMM '92 at Baltimore MD, August 1992.
[20] "Multilevel Precedence and Pre-emption Service (MLPP)", ITU-T
Recommendation I.255.3, 1990.
[21] "Economics and Scalability of QoS Solutions", BT Technology
Journal Vol 23 No 2, April 2005.
[22] Braden, B., Clark, D., Crowcroft, J., Davie, B., Deering, S.,
Estrin, D., Floyd, S., Jacobson, V., Minshall, G., Partridge,
C., Peterson, L., Ramakrishnan, K., Shenker, S., Wroclawski,
J., and L. Zhang, "Recommendations on Queue Management and
Congestion Avoidance in the Internet", RFC 2309, April 1998.
Chan, et al. Expires April 25, 2007 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Document October 2006
Authors' Addresses
Kwok Ho Chan
Nortel Networks
600 Technology Park Drive
Billerica, MA 01821
USA
Email: khchan@nortel.com
Anna Charny
Cisco Systems
14164 Massachusetts Ave
Boxborough, MA 01719
USA
Email: acharny@cisco.com
Philip Eardley
BT Research
B54/77, Sirius House Adastral Park Martlesham Heath
Ipswich, Suffolk IP5 3RE
United Kingdom
Email: philip.eardley@bt.com
Chan, et al. Expires April 25, 2007 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Document October 2006
Full Copyright Statement
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Chan, et al. Expires April 25, 2007 [Page 17]
