RATS M. Chen
Internet-Draft Li. Su
Intended status: Informational China Mobile
Expires: September 8, 2020 March 7, 2020
Use Cases for RATS
draft-chen-rats-usecase-00
Abstract
This document presents two demand scenarios from the Internet Service
Providers' perspective as an supplement use case of the RATS work
group. And make some discussions from the two dimensions of access
authentication and application authentication.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Access authentication based on different method . . . . . 3
3.2. Application authentication based on different system . . 4
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
At present, it is necessary to complete the authentication before
accessing the operator's network to obtain the service. RATS aimed
at the solutions to provide interoperable way for domain-specific
attestation mechanisms, within RATS relying party may not to maintain
the authentication background, as an ISP what may be involved at the
level of access authentication is preshared secret keys based
authentication, the authentication based on PSK(Preshared secret
keys) is different from identity-based authentication, such as
IBC(Identity-Based Cryptograph).
After access to the network, operators can also provide application
layer authentication services for a variety of applications. At
present, there are many application layer authentication methods, it
can be divided into certificate-based and non-certificate-based
certification systems, so there are the following situations. One
application authenticated by certificate-based PKI system may request
resource access to a server or service, but the server or service's
authentication function is based on identity which is belong to non-
certificate-based certification systems. These are all possible
future demand scenarios, also in the context of the RATS. Due to
limitation of resource, many companies are unable to operate their
own certification and willing to rely on the result from operator to
reduce their cost, and operator can provide authentication services.
Multiple certification centers would be made due to different kinds
of request from service and perspective of deployment, before
obtaining a certification center's service, certification center need
proof for identification, including software and hardware health
information. These certification centers are based on regions then
there have manage barriers, how can clients from a certification
center asstest themselves' identities to another certification
center. Especially now there are more virtual resources, cloud
resources, one need to prove whether it has access to the resources
and can protect the data. From an internal business perspective, how
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to integrate resources, achieve cross-domain trust and break down
management barriers in order to streamline and improve flexibility
will also be something rats[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] can do.
2. Terminology
The readers should be familiar with the terms defined in.
In addition, this document makes use of the following terms:
PSK: Preshared secret keys means keys are shared in advance between
the authentication parties.
IBC: Identity-Based Cryptograph, it is an asymmetric public key
cryptosystem.
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure, an infrastructure built with a
public-key mechanism.
3. Use Cases
This section describes use cases which happens inside an ISP.
3.1. Access authentication based on different method
This section considers the level of access authentication. For
operators, the access of users is usually based on preshared secret
keys, preset with symmetric secret keys before the release. The
first access only needs to be activated, and subsequent
authentication uses PSK to complete data protection which is based on
Symmetric secret key system. In addition, there are other identity-
based authentication methods, the access authentication based on
identity is asymmetric and the identity is the public key, this
approach makes it easier for the peer to obtain the public key of the
other peer.
In short, these are two different authentication methods. When a
psk-based authentication device needs to request an identity-based
service, it needs to prove its' trustworthiness to the other party
and the whole process need to ensure the confidentiality of evidences
and attestation results.
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（relying party1) (relying party2)
+---------------+ +---------------+
|PSK Auth_Center| |IBC Auth_Center|
+---------------+ +---------------+
|\ +------------// |
|Evidence /Attestation |
Attestation | / Result |
Result \| / |
+-------------------+ +-------------------+
|App/SIMCard/IoTCard| |App/SIMCard/IoTCard|
+-------------------+ +-------------------+
(attester)
Figure 1: different access authentication methods within RATS
The format and content of the evidence: TBD
The format of the Attestation Result: TBD
The transmission protocol for evidence or attestation result: TBD
3.2. Application authentication based on different system
At the application level, due to limitation of resource, many
applications need operators to provide business authentication
services. At present, there are two business authentication methods:
one is certification-based PKI system authentication, because the
management of certificates is always a very big problem, so the other
is non-certificated, such as identity-based authentication whose
identity is readable.
When cross-business authentication is required, how to prove one's
identity to the other will be a common problem.
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(relying party1) (relying party2)
+-----------------------------------+ +-----------------------------------+
|Application authentication platform| |Application authentication platform|
| based on certificate |-----| based on non-certificate |
+-----------------------------------+ +-----------------------------------+
| {Attestation} /| |
| { Result } / |
| ---------- |
| / |
+---------------+ +---------------+
| application | | application |
+---------------+ +---------------+
(attester1) (attester2)
Figure 2: different application authentication methods in RATS architecture
The format and content of the evidence: TBD
The format of the Attestation Result: TBD
The transmission protocol for evidence or attestation result: TBD
Certification-based authentication process: TBD
Identity-based authentication process: TBD
4. Security Considerations
TBD
5. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any action from IANA.
6. Acknowledgement
TBD
7. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture",
draft-ietf-rats-architecture-02 (work in progress), March
2020.
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Authors' Addresses
Meiling Chen
China Mobile
32, Xuanwumen West
BeiJing, BeiJing 100053
China
Email:
chenmeiling@chinamobile.com
Li Su
China Mobile
32, Xuanwumen West
BeiJing
100053
China
Email:
suli@chinamobile.com
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