CGA & SEND maintenance T. Cheneau
Internet-Draft M. Maknavicius
Updates: RFC3971 TMSP
(if approved) S. Shen
Expires: August 25, 2009 Huawei
M. Vanderveen
Qualcomm
February 21, 2009
Signature Algorithm Agility in the Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
Protocol
draft-cheneau-send-sig-agility-00
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Abstract
This draft describes a mechanism to enable the Secure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) protocol to select between different signature
algorithms to use with Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA).
It also provides optional support for interoperability between nodes
that do not share any common signature algorithms.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Compatibility with existing specifications . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Classification of SEND nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Principal Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Agility Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Mechanism for Agility Support of CGA and SeND . . . . . . 7
3. Supported Signature Algorithm Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Processing Rules for Senders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Processing Rules for Receivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. SEND Universal Signature Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Processing Rules for Senders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. Processing Rules for Receivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Basic negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Router-as-a-notary function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. Signature check request message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2. Signature status message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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1. Introduction
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) [RFC3972] have been
designed primarily for securing Neighbor Discovery [RFC3971]. At the
time when they were specified, CGAs allowed only one signing
algorithm, namely RSA. While mandating a single public key signing
algorithm does help with interoperability, it does not address the
issue of computational efficiency. It is well known that the RSA
signature generation and verification is computationally expensive.
The usage scenarios associated with neighbor discovery have recently
been extended to include environments with mobile or nomadic nodes.
Many of these nodes have limited battery power and computing
resources. Therefore, heavy public key signing algorithms like RSA
are not feasible to support on such constrained nodes. Fortunately,
more lightweight yet secure signing algorithms do exist and have been
standardized, e.g. Elliptic Curve based algorithms.
It is then a worthwhile goal to extend secure neighbor discovery to
support signing algorithm agility. Besides accommodating power-
constrained nodes, signing algorithm agility is also desired as a
safety measure over time, to offer alternatives when cryptanalysis of
one type of algorithm makes significant progress.
The aim of this memo is to outline options for allowing public key
signing algorithm agility for nodes configured to perform secure
neighbor discovery operations when attaching to a new link. The
extent to which these options impact existing specifications
[RFC3971] and [RFC3972] is also addressed.
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2. Overview
2.1. Compatibility with existing specifications
The current SEND protocol specification, [RFC3971], mandates the use
of the RSA signature algorithm. Since the time of its writing,
different signature algorithms have been shown to be secure and have
been adopted by other protocols in an effort to reduce key length,
signature generation and verification time, and increase security
level. This shift in signature algorithm adoption particularly
benefits lightweight devices, which are power and memory-limited but
in need of secure signing algorithms support. For these reasons, we
feel that the restriction on the signature algorithm for SEND is no
longer warranted.
2.1.1. Classification of SEND nodes
At the time of this writing, there are no known large-scale or even
small-scale deployments of [RFC3971]-compatible devices. However, in
the interest of caution, we assume that there exist nodes that
support only the RSA algorithm and that are configured to perform
secure neighbor discovery when attaching to a new link. Such nodes
may not be updated in the near term or for the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, it appears that there will be deployments of nodes
that support only Elliptic Curve Cryptography as their public key
algorithm, i.e. ECDSA as a signature algorithm, rather than
traditional RSA.
To ensure that all possible network/link configurations are
considered when designing a signature agility solution, we categorize
nodes (hosts and routers) according to their support for different
signature algorithms, as follows:
Type H1 host:
A host that only supports one type of signature algorithm and has
a CGA generated with the public key of this algorithm.
Examples of this type of hosts: an old host that does not support
signature agility, i.e. only supports RSA signature algorithm; or,
a host that only supports ECDSA signature.
Type H2 host:
A host that supports multiple signature algorithms and has a CGA
generated with only one key selected from among its supported
algorithms.
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Examples of this type of hosts: (1) a host that supports RSA and
ECDSA signature algorithms, but only has a CGA derived with an RSA
public key; (2) a host that supports RSA and ECDSA signature
algorithms, but only has a CGA derived with an ECC public key.
Type H3 host:
A host that supports multiple signature algorithms and has a CGA
generated with multiple keys of different supported algorithms.
Such CGA generation is made possible by the introduction of a new
CGA extension (see companion draft [cheneau-cga-pk-agility]).
Such hosts can be compatible with hosts of other types for secure
neighbor discovery.
Type H4 host:
A host that supports multiple signature algorithms and has
multiple CGAs, each of which is associated with a single key of
one supported algorithm. For simplicity, we do not consider hosts
that have multiple CGAs, one or more of which are generated from
multiple public keys.
A node MUST select and settle on one CGA when building a trust
relationship with another device via SeND (more below). In such
cases, a destination node may be reached at a CGA associated with
a signature algorithm that the originating node cannot verify.
The destination node will need to securely redirect the
originating node to one of its other CGA(s) (presumably with a
common signature algorithm). The need for and method to secure
the binding between the two CGAs of the destination node is still
an open problem.
Based on this reasoning, consideration of H4 type nodes is left
for future work.
Routers are more likely to possess the resources necessary to support
multiple signature algorithms. It is also more feasible that routers
employ certificates. However, for a basic signature agility
solution, we do not mandate that routers support multiple signature
algorithms.
Possible router devices with different signature algorithm support
ability are:
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Type R1 router:
A router that only supports one type of signature algorithm and
has a CGA and Certificate with a public key of this algorithm.
Such routers are expected to be commonplace, as compliance with
[RFC3971] suffices for them.
Type R2 router:
A router that supports multiple types of signature algorithms and
has one CGA and Certificate with a public key of one of the
algorithm types.
This type of router can sign and verify signatures of the type of
certificate it owns, and additionally, it can verify signatures of
other algorithm types.
Type R3 router:
A router that supports multiple types of signature algorithms and
has multiple CGAs and Certificates with public key of several
different algorithm types.
This type of router can sign and verify signatures of multiple
types. Such routers may not be attractive to build and deploy due
to increased requirements on its resources. Moreover using
multiple CGAs (with no bindings) may make that router appear as
having multiple identities.
Type R4 router:
A router that supports multiple types of signature algorithms and
has one CGA composed of multiple Publics Keys and multiple
certificates containing each a Public Key.
2.1.2. Principal Scenarios
Based on the discussion above, a SEND agility solution should at
least properly deal with the communication between devices of type
H1, H2, H3, R1 and R2.
An H1 or R1 node interacting with an H2 or R2 node: i.e., a node
supporting only RSA (for example, an old non-agility node which
only supports RFC3971) and a node supporting both RSA and ECDSA
(or other new algorithms). These two nodes must be able to
perform secure neighbor discovery.
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An H1 or R1 node interacting with another H1 or R1 node, but their
algorithms differ: e.g., a node supporting only RSA (for example,
an old non-agility node which only supports RFC3971) and a node
supporting only ECDSA (or other new algorithms). In this case,
implementations supporting SEND signature agility solution may
likely realize the incompatibility, while older implementations
may not.
A node of any type (H1, H2, H3, R1, R2, R3 or R4) interacting with
another node, their algorithms differ but there is a 3rd party
willing/able to help: this is an optional solution applicable to
the previous scenario, where two nodes that support SEND but do
not have any signature algorithms in common can talk through a
third party (router). In this case they should be able to perform
facilitated secure neighbor discovery.
An H2, H3 or R2 node interacting with another H2, H3, or R2 node:
e.g., two nodes that support at least two signature algorithms in
common (one of which is likely preferred over the other), will be
able to perform secure neighbor discovery with any of the two
algorithms.
2.2. Agility Requirements
We hold the following to be requirements on a signing algorithm
agility solution for SEND:
o A Signature-Algorithm-Agility-Node should be able to communicate
with a Non-Signature-Algorithm-Agility-Node, but not necessarily
employ SEND. Traditional ND should suffice, to accommodate nodes
that only support one type of Signature Algorithm, which may not
be RSA. Local policy MAY disable this behavior, namely the use of
unsecured ND messages when communicating with a node that does not
share any common signature algorithm.
o Two Signature-Algorithm-Agility nodes that support a common
Signature Algorithm should be able to communicate using SEND and
sign messages using the common Signature Algorithm.
o The current SEND/CGA specifications should incur as few changes as
possible.
2.3. Mechanism for Agility Support of CGA and SeND
To achieve signature agility for SeND, it must be possible for a CGA
to be generated from and to be securely associated with multiple
public keys corresponding to different signature algorithms. This
capability is described in the companion draft
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[cheneau-cga-pk-agility].
This document proposes an update to [RFC3971] to allow two SEND nodes
to chose an appropriate signature algorithm. This solution
encompasses the following:
o A "Supported Signature Algorithm" NDP option which contains a list
of signing algorithms that the sender node supports for SEND
purposes;
o A modification of the "RSA Signature" option defined in the SEND
specification;
o An optional solution to support secure communication through a
router acting as a third party when nodes don't share any common
Signature Algorithm.
We define the aforementioned options format and provide processing
rules for both senders and receivers of SEND messages employing the
new options, as well as example negotiation message flows.
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3. Supported Signature Algorithm Option
The Supported Signature Algorithm NDP option contains a list of
signing algorithms that the sender nodes supports. The format of
this option is described in Figure 1:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |R| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sig. Alg. 1 | Sig. Alg. 2 | Sig. Alg 3. | Sig. Alg 4. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ ~
| ... |
~ ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ... | Sig. Alg. N |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Supported Signature Algorithm option
Type
NDP option type, TBA. See Section 8.
Length
The length of the option (including the Type, Length fields), in
octets. 8-bit unsigned integer, the value 0 is invalid.
R
"Resend" flag. If this bit is set, it indicates that the sender
of this packet was not able to validate the packet that this
packet was sent in response to. Spontaneous packets (i.e. those
not sent in response to a [request] packet) MUST leave this bit
cleared.
Reserved
Reserved for future use. This 15-bit field MUST be set to zero by
the sender, and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Signature Algorithm
A one-octet long field indicating a signature algorithm that is
supported by the node, this support implies at least ability to
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verify signatures of this PK algorithm.
The first leftmost bit, bit 0, if set to 0, indicates that the
emitter is able to perform signature checks only (i.e. no
signature generation with this type on signature algorithm). If
this bit is set to 1, it indicates that the emitter has a public
key of this type and can generate signatures. Bit 1 and 2 are
reserved. Bit 3 to 7 are named Signature Type Identifier subfield
and encode the signature algorithm identifier. This signature
algorithm identifier binds a Public Key algorithm with an hash
algorithm. Default values for the Signature Type Identifier
subfield defined in this document are:
* Value 1 is RSA/SHA-256
* Value 2 is ECDSA/SHA-256
* Value 0 is reserved for future use.
The Signature Algorithms SHOULD be included in order of
preference.
3.1. Processing Rules for Senders
If a node has been configured to use SEND, then all Neighbor
Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Solicitation, Router
Advertisement, and Redirect messages it sends MUST contain the
Supported Signature Algorithm option. This option MUST contain in
the Signing Algorithm field all signature algorithms it is willing to
use in signature verification.
3.2. Processing Rules for Receivers
Upon receiving a SEND packet with a Supported Signature Algorithm
Option, a receiver checks the 'R' flag:
o when the 'R' flag is not set and the message is a Neighbor
Advertisement or Router Advertisement, a host need not parse this
option any further. A router MAY choose not to parse this option.
o when the 'R' flag is not set and the message is a Neighbor
Solicitation, the receiving node computes the intersection between
the set of Supported Signature Algorithms indicated by the option
and its own. If the set is empty, this means the node will not be
able to use a Signature Algorithm that the initiating node can
check. Given the local policy, a receiver node will still respond
to the received message using its "preferred" Signature Algorithm
(even if the node knows the receiver will not be able to verify
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the Signature Algorithm). If the set is not empty, the receiving
node will choose among the set one of the algorithms in order to
generate a Universal Signature Option.
o when the 'R' flag is set, the receiver checks if it supports any
of sender's supported signature algorithms. If more than one
signature algorithms is found to be mutually supported, the
receiver MAY decide to use the sender's most preferred one
according to the order of appearance in the aforementioned NDP
option. In any case, if at least one mutually supported signature
algorithm exists, the receiver uses one of these algorithms to
generate a Universal Signature Option for protection of the resent
packet. This resent packet contains the same information that the
other node couldn't verify (except for the signature). If the 'R'
flag is set, and if no matching signature algorithm is found, the
receiver processes the packet as if the 'R' flag was not set.
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4. SEND Universal Signature Option
We propose replacing the RSA Signature Option by a new algorithm-
independent signature option. The "Universal Signature Option" is an
updated version of the RSA Signature Option, that allows a node to
specify which of its potential multiple keys it is using. To achieve
this, we use the 16-bits reserved field of the RSA Signature Option,
and define a new 8-bit field that contains the position of the Public
Key associated with the signature and a new 5-bit Signature Type
Identifier field that details the type of algorithms used to generate
the Digital Signature.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Key Position | Res.| Sig ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Key Hash |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. Digital Signature .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. Padding .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Signature Option format
Type
Same value as in [RFC3971]: 12.
Length
The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Reserved,
Key Hash, Digital Signature, and Padding fields) in units of 8
octets.
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Key Position
An 8-bit field indicating which Public Key in the CGA parameter
structure (carried in the CGA option) has been used to compute the
Digital Signature. The index starts at 0, meaning the key is the
one in the Public Key field. Values over 1 refer to Public Key
found in the CGA Extension field (as defined in the companion
document [cheneau-cga-pk-agility]]).
Reserved
A 3-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be set to
zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Signature Type Identifier
Signature Type Identifier is a 5-bit field. It corresponds to the
Signature Algorithm field in the Supported Signature Algorithm
option. It indicates the type of Signature contained in the
Digital Signature field.
Key Hash
The Key Hash field is a 128-bit field containing the most
significant (leftmost) 128 bits of a hash function of the public
key used. If the Signature Type Identifier value is 0 then this
field is a is computed using SHA-1 value of the public key used
for constructing the signature. This Key Hash is computed the
same way as the Key Hash in RSA Signature Option described
[RFC3971]. If the Signature Type Identifier value is different
than 0 then this field is computed using SHA-256 [FIPS.180-2]
value of the public key used for constructing the signature. The
SHA-256 hash is computed over the presentation used in the Public
Key field of the CGA Parameters data structure carried in the CGA
option. Its purpose is to associate the signature with a
particular key known by the receiver. Such a key can either be
stored in the certificate cache of the receiver or be received in
the CGA option in the same message.
Digital Signature
A variable-length field containing a signature constructed by
using the sender's private key associated to the public key
pointed by the Key Position field. The signature type is
determined from the value of the Signature Type Identifier field.
If the value of the Signature Type Identifier field is 0, then the
Key Position field must be set to 0 and this Digital Signature
field is computed the same way as the Digital Signature field of
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the RSA Signature Option described in [RFC3971]. If the value of
the Signature Type Identifier field is 1, then this Digital
Signature field is computed the same way as the Digital Signature
field of the RSA Signature Option described in [RFC3971] except
that the signature is computed with the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
algorithm and the SHA-256 hash, as defined in [PKCS1]. If the
value of the Signature Type Identifier field is 2, then this
Digital Signature field is computed using the ECDSA signature
algorithm (as defined on [SEC1]) and SHA-256 on the following
datas:
1. The 128-bit CGA Message Type tag [RFC3972] value for SEND,
0x086F CA5E 10B2 00C9 9C8C E001 6427 7C08. (The tag value has
been generated randomly by the editor of the [RFC3971]
specification.).
2. The 128-bit Source Address field from the IP header.
3. The 128-bit Destination Address field from the IP header.
4. The 8-bit Type, 8-bit Code, and 16-bit Checksum fields from
the ICMP header.
5. The NDP message header, starting from the octet after the ICMP
Checksum field and continuing up to but not including NDP
options.
6. All NDP options preceding, but not including, any of the
Universal Signature options.
This field starts after the Key Hash field. The length of the
Digital Signature field is determined by the length of the
Universal Signature option minus the length of the other fields
(including the variable length Pad field).
Padding This variable-length field contains padding, as many bytes
long as remain after the end of the signature.
A Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement, Router Solicitation/
Advertisement and Redirect message MAY contain more than one
Universal Signature Option, as long as it does not exceed the MTU.
This is particularly useful for routers operating in heterogeneous
networks, where hosts have a disjoint set of supported signature
algorithms.
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4.1. Processing Rules for Senders
When sending a SEND message spontaneously or in response to message
with the 'R' flag cleared in the Supported Signature Algorithm
Option, an emitter node CAN choose a signature algorithm of its
preference (defined by local policy) among the corresponding Public
Keys carried in the CGA option. Using this signature algorithm, the
node computes the Digital Signature and fills the Key Position field
with the position of the key in the CGA parameter data structure.
If the node has been configured to use SEND, then all Neighbor
Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement, and
Redirect messages MUST contain at least one Universal Signature
option. Router Solicitation messages not sent with the unspecified
source address MUST contain the Universal Signature option.
A node sending a message with one or more Universal Signature option
MUST construct the message as follows:
o If the node as previously received hints (e.g. an NDP message with
a Supported Signature Algorithm option and the 'R' flag on) on the
type of Signature Algorithm it should use, it MUST restrain its
choice on those Signature Algorithm. its choice on those Signature
Algorithm.
o The message is constructed in its entirety, without any of the
Universal Signature options.
o The Universal Signature option(s) is (are) added as the last
option in the message.
o The data to be signed is constructed as explained in Figure 2,
under the description of the Digital Signature field.
o The message, in the form defined above, is signed by using the
configured private key associated to the selected Signature
Algorithm, and the resulting signature is put in the Digital
Signature field. When using RSA, this signature is a PKCS#1 v1.5
signature. When using ECDSA, the signature value is as defined in
[FIPS-186-3]. The length of the Digital Signature field is
determined by the length of the Universal Signature option minus
the length of the other fields (including the variable length
Padding field).
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4.2. Processing Rules for Receivers
Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement,
and Redirect messages without any Universal Signature option MUST be
treated as unsecured (i.e., processed in the same way as NDP messages
sent by a non-SEND node). See Section 8 of [RFC3971].
Router Solicitation messages without any Universal Signature option
MUST also be treated as unsecured, unless the source address of the
message is the unspecified address.
Redirect, Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router
Solicitation, and Router Advertisement messages containing one or
more Universal Signature option MUST be checked as follows:
o The receiver MUST ignore any options that come after the first
Universal Signature option. (The options are ignored for both
signature verification and NDP processing purposes.)
o The Key Hash field MUST correspond to a known public key, either
one learned from the CGA option in the same message by the
position indicated in the Key Position field message, or one known
by other means.
o The Digital Signature field MUST have correct encoding and MUST
not exceed the length of the Universal Signature option minus the
Padding.
o The Digital Signature verification MUST show that the signature
has been calculated as specified in the previous section .
o If the use of a trust anchor has been configured, a valid
certification path (see Section 6.3 of [RFC3971]) between the
receiver's trust anchor and the sender's public key MUST be known.
When checks fail due to an unsupported signature algorithm type, and
if the Supported Signature Algorithm Option of the message shows that
a common Signature Algorithm is available, the node MUST send back a
packet to indicate to the emitter that the packet needs to be resent.
Depending on the received packet, the node will have to send:
o A Router Solicitation if the message was a Router Advertisement or
Redirect message; or
o A Neighbor Solicitation is the message was a Neighbor
Advertisement or a Neighbor Solicitation (e.g. during the DAD
procedure)
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Messages that do not pass all the above tests MUST be silently
discarded if the host has been configured to accept only secured ND
messages. The messages MAY be accepted if the host has been
configured to accept both secured and unsecured messages but MUST be
treated as unsecured messages. The receiver MAY also otherwise
silently discard packets (e.g., as a response to an apparent CPU
exhausting DoS attack).
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5. Basic negotiation
5.1. Overview
Two nodes sharing a common Signing Algorithm must be able to securely
communicate. Below is an example of such a message flow.
Node A Node B
NS
{CGA option,
RSA Signature option.
Supported-Signature-Algo option
(RSA, ECC, R=0)} -------->
NA
{CGA option,
ECC Signature option
Supported-Signature-Algo option
<-------- (ECC, R=1)}
NA
{CGA option,
ECC Signature option.
Supported-Signature-Algo option
(RSA, ECC, R=0)} -------->
IPv6 traffic <-------> IPv6 traffic
Basic Negotiation- Case 1
When both nodes support the same two algorithms, then we have the
following case:
Node A Node B
NS
{CGA option,
RSA Signature option.
Supported-Signature-Algo option
(RSA, ECC, R=0)} -------->
NA
{CGA option,
ECC Signature option
Supported-Signature-Algo option
<-------- (ECC, RSA, R=0)}
IPv6 traffic <-------> IPv6 traffic
Basic Negotiation- Case 2
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6. Router-as-a-notary function
This optional functionality enhances backward compatibility by
introducing a new entity. Here, the entity named "notary" serves to
certify the authenticity of a node's message. This improves
communication when two nodes have a disjoint set of supported
Signature Algorithm types and still require secure neighbor
discovery.
In this specification, the notary function is offered by routers,
although other nodes may offer this capability in the future.
Authorization for the router to act as a notary is provided through
router's certificate (could be store in a KeyPurposeID as defined in
[krishnan-cgaext-send-cert-eku]) provided by the trust anchor.
The notary function requires the two specific messages: Signature
check request and signature status.
6.1. Signature check request message
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Packet Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Checksum | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request ID. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ SEND secured packet +
| (NDP packets should fit completely) |
Signature check request message format
Type
TBA.
Code
TBA.
Packet Length
Packet length is the size of the SEND secured packet
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Checksum
Checksum is a CRC-16 of the whole packet. During the CRC-16
computation, this field is set to 0. The purpose of this field is
to quickly invalidate transmission errors.
Reserved
This 16-bit field is reserved. MUST be set to 0 by senders and
ignored by receivers.
Request Identifier
Request Identifier helps matching a signature check request and
the signature status (response) messages. Request Identifier
field is randomly generated.
SEND secured packet
SEND secured packet is the packet that the node was not able to
verify on his own, subject of the verification. Note that the
encapsulated packet MUST not make the whole Signature Check
Request message exceed the MTU (as no fragmentation support is
available).
This message is protected by usual SEND NDP options (TS, Nonce,
Signature). It contains the whole packet that the node wants to be
checked on the router (so packet may not be tampered with).
A router acting as notary processes the packet this way:
o Verifies the CGA of the emitter
o Verifies the signature of the message (linked to CGA of the source
address)
o Verifies the CGA and signature of the inner packet
o Responds with a Signature status message (defined in the following
section)
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6.2. Signature status message
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Status |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request ID. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Signature status message format
Type
TBA.
Code
TBA.
Status
The 16-bit status field can be set to any of the following values:
0: all validation checks passed
1: inner packet CGA verification check failed
2: inner packet signature verification check failed
3: unsupported hash algorithm (to compute Hash1/Hash2)
4: unsupported Public Key algorithm
5: ask later (router is busy)
Request Identifier
The Request Identifier helps match a signature check request and
the signature status (response) message. The Request Identifier
is copied from the Signature Check Request message.
This message is a response to a Notary signature check request
message and is protected by SEND options generated using the public
key contained in the certificate of the router authorized to act as
notary. On reception of this message, a node performs CGA check and
Universal Signature option check . Then, if the status message is 0,
that node can now trust the original packet that created the need for
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a Notary signature check request message. This amounts to resuming
the SEND protocol using secure packets. On a status value different
from 0, the packet will be considered as unsecure and be treated as
such.
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7. Security Considerations
Section 4 presents a new Universal Signature Option. A recommended
use of this option is to allow signatures of equivalent security
level (i.e. Public Keys with equivalent key lengths, see section 4
of the companion draft [cheneau-cga-pk-agility]).
The Universal Signature Option is vulnerable to downgrade attacks.
That is, given that a node can employ multiple signature types, an
attacker may choose to use a flawed one. To mitigate this issue,
nodes are allowed, on a local policy, to refuse to check certain
types of signature (i.e. those which are know to be flawed) and will
treat the associated messages as unsecured.
To be completed.
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8. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to allocate types for the two new notary
ICMP messages.
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9. Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Marcello
Bagnulo-Braun, and other participants of the SEND working group.
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10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, March 2005.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC4982] Bagnulo, M. and J. Arkko, "Support for Multiple Hash
Algorithms in Cryptographically Generated Addresses
(CGAs)", RFC 4982, July 2007.
[cheneau-cga-pk-agility]
Cheneau, T., Laurent-Maknavicius, M., Shen, S., and M.
Vanderveen, "Support for Multiple Signature Algorithms in
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs)",
draft-cheneau-cga-pk-agility-00 (work in progress),
Feb 2009.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC4581] Bagnulo, M. and J. Arkko, "Cryptographically Generated
Addresses (CGA) Extension Field Format", RFC 4581,
October 2006.
[krishnan-cgaext-send-cert-eku]
Krishnan, S., Kukec, A., and K. Ahmed, "Certificate
profile and certificate management for SEND",
draft-krishnan-cgaext-send-cert-eku-02 (work in progress),
November 2008.
[FIPS-186-3]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Draft
Digital Signature Standard", FIPS PUB 186-3, March 2006.
[PKCS1] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 2.1",
PKCS 1, November 2002.
[FIPS.180-2]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002, <http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", September 2000,
<http://secg.org>.
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Authors' Addresses
Tony Cheneau
Institut TELECOM, TELECOM SudParis, CNRS SAMOVAR UMR 5157
9 rue Charles Fourier
Evry 91011
France
Email: tony.cheneau@it-sudparis.eu
Maryline Laurent-Maknavicius
Institut TELECOM, TELECOM SudParis, CNRS SAMOVAR UMR 5157
9 rue Charles Fourier
Evry 91011
France
Email: maryline.maknavicius@it-sudparis.eu
Sean Shen
Huawei
No. 9 Xinxi Road
Beijing 100085
China
Email: sshen@huawei.com
Michaela Vanderveen
Qualcomm
Email: mvandervn@gmail.com
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