TLS Working Group Grigorij Chudov, CRYPTO-PRO
Internet Draft Serguei Leontiev, CRYPTO-PRO
Expires October 1, 2004 April 1, 2004
Intended Category: Informational
Addition of GOST Ciphersuites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)
<draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-01.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Abstract
This document is intended to register new cipher suites for the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, according to the procedure
specified in section A.5 of [TLS], and to register a new TLS
extension, according to section 5 of [TLSEXT]. Those cipher suites
are based on Russian national cryptographic standards - key
derivation algorithms based on GOST R 3410-94 and GOST R 3410-2001
public keys, GOST 28147-89 encryption algorithm and GOST R 34.11-94
digest algorithm.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Proposed Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 CipherSuite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1 Key Exchange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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3.2 PRF, Signature and Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.3 Cipher and MAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4 TLS Extensions for GOST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5 Data Structures and Computations. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1 Algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2 Keys Calculation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.3 Client Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.4 Server Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.5 Server Certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.6 Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.7 Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.8 Client Key Exchange Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.9 Certificate Verify. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.10 Finished. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7 Appendix ASN.1 Modules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Addresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Full Copyright Statement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1 Introduction
This document proposes the addition of new cipher suites and
extensions to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to support
GOST R 34.11-94 digest, GOST 28147-89 encryption and VKO GOST R
34.10-94/2001 key exchange algorithms. The cipher suites defined
here were proposed by CRYPTO-PRO Company for "Russian Cryptographic
Software Compatibility Agreement" community.
Algorithms GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST 28147-89 and GOST
R 34.11-94 have been developed by Russian Federal Agency of
Governmental Communication and Information (FAGCI) and "All-Russian
Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization". They are
described in [GOSTR341094], [GOSTR34102001], [GOSTR3411] and
[GOST28147]. Algorithms VKO GOST R 34.10-94/2001 and PRF_GOSTR3411
are described in [CPALGS].
This document defines two configurations:
anonymous client - authenticated server (only server provides a
certificate);
authenticated client - authenticated server (client and server
exchange certificates).
The presentation language used here is the same as in [TLS]. Since
this specification extends TLS, these descriptions should be merged
with those in the TLS specification and any others that extend TLS.
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This means, that enum types may not specify all possible values and
structures with multiple formats chosen with a select() clause may
not indicate all possible cases.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT","SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
2 Proposed CipherSuites
The new cipher suites proposed here have the following definitions:
CipherSuite TLS_GOST341094_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 = {0x00,0x80}
CipherSuite TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147= {0x00,0x81}
CipherSuite TLS_GOST341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 = {0x00,0x82}
CipherSuite TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 = {0x00,0x83}
Note: The above numeric definitions for CipherSuites have not yet
been registered.
3 CipherSuite Definitions
3.1 Key exchange
The cipher suites defined here use the following key exchange
algorithms:
CipherSuite Key Exchange Algorithm
TLS_GOST341094_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 VKO GOST R 34.10-94
TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 VKO GOST R 34.10-2001
TLS_GOST341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 VKO GOST R 34.10-94
TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 VKO GOST R 34.10-2001
Key derivation algorithms based on GOST R 3410-94 and GOST R
3410-2001 public keys (VKO GOST R 34.10-94, VKO GOST R 34.10-2001)
are described in [CPALGS].
3.2 PRF, Signature and Hash
For a PRF, described in section 5 of [TLS], the cipher suites
described here use PRF_GOSTR3411 (refer to section 5.1)
GOST R 3410-94/2001 signature is used for CertificateVerify message.
GOST R 34.11 digest algorithm ([GOSTR341194]) is used for
CertificateVerify.signature.gostR3411_hash and Finished.verify_data
(see sections 7.4.8 and 7.4.9 of [TLS])
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3.3 Cipher and MAC
The following cipher algorithm and MAC functions are used (for
details refer to section 5.1):
CipherSuite Cipher MAC
TLS_GOST341094_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 GOST28147 IMIT_GOST28147
TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 GOST28147 IMIT_GOST28147
TLS_GOST341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 - HMAC_GOSTR3411
TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 - HMAC_GOSTR3411
For all four cipher suites, the use of MAC is slighttly different
from the one, described in section 6.2.3.1 of [TLS]. In [TLS], MAC
is calculated from the following data:
MACed_data[seq_num] = seq_num +
TLSCompressed.type +
TLSCompressed.version +
TLSCompressed.length +
TLSCompressed.fragment;
These cipher suites use the same input for first record, but for each
next record the input from all previous records is concatenated:
MACed_data[0] + ... + MACed_data[n]
4 TLS Extensions for GOST
A new TLS extension -- the Hash, HMAC and PRF Select Extension --
allows a client and server to negotiate the use of a different hash,
HMAC and PRF algorithm, instead of those, defined in [TLS]. It
follows the general approach outlined in [TLSEXT]. The client
enumerates supported hash/HMAC/PRF combinations, by including the
appropriate extension in its ClientHello message. By echoing that
extension in its ServerHello, the server selects one of them for this
TLS connection. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 describe the structure of this
extension in further details.
5 Data Structures and Computations
5.1 Algorithms
GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147] uses 256-bit key size and 8-byte IV.
Cipher suites, defined here, use GOST 28147-89 as a stream cipher in
OFB mode with S-box gost28147-89-UZ-CryptoPro-A (see [CPALGS]) and
CryptoPro key meshing algorithm. This is very similar to
gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSetAI parameter set, except for
different cipher mode.
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IMIT_GOST28147 is GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147] in "IMITOVSTAVKA" mode (4
bytes)
HMAC_GOSTR3411(secret, data) is based on GOST R 34.11 digest and
described in [CPALGS].
PRF_GOSTR3411(secret, label, seed) is based on HMAC_GOSTR3411 and
described in [CPALGS].
5.2 Key Calculation
Key calculation is done according to section 6.3 of [TLS], with
PRF_GOSTR3411 function used instead of PRF. The parameters are as
follows:
SecurityParameters.hash_size = 32
SecurityParameters.key_material_length = 32
SecurityParameters.IV_size = 8
Length of necessary key material is 144 bytes.
5.3 Client Hello Extensions
When this message is sent:
The Hash, HMAC and PRF Select Extension SHOULD be sent along with any
ClientHello message that includes cipher suites, proposed in this
document.
Meaning of this message:
This extension allows client and server to override algorithms,
predefined in [TLS], and select the appropriate set of algorithms and
parameters for the chosen cipher suite.
Structure of this message:
The general structure of TLS extensions is described in [TLSEXT] and
this specification adds a new type to ExtensionType.
enum { hash_alg_select(60000) } ExtensionType;
hash_alg_select: Indicates the set of hash/HMAC/PRF algorithms
supported by the client. For this extension, the opaque
extension_data field contains DER-encoding of the
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient structure.
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect ::=
SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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hmacAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
prfAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
}
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient ::=
SEQUENCE OF
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect
Actions of the sender:
A client that proposes algorithm selection in its ClientHello appends
this extension along with any others.
Actions of the receiver:
A server that receives a ClientHello containing this extension MUST
use one of the proposed algorithm sets.
If a server does not understand this extension or is unable to
perform handshake using any of the proposed algorithm sets, it MUST
NOT negotiate the use of GOST cipher suites. Depending on what other
cipher suites are proposed by the client and supported by the server,
this may result in a fatal handshake failure alert due to the lack of
common cipher suites.
If Client Hello contains GOST cipher suites, but does not contain
this extension, the server MUST assume that client proposes the use
of the following default set:
hashAlgorithm ::= id-GostR3411-94 with NULL algorithmParameters
hmacAlgorithm ::= id-Gost28147-89-MAC with NULL algorithmParameters
prfAlgorithm ::= id-PRF-GostR3411-94 with NULL algorithmParameters
5.4 Server Hello Extensions
When this message is sent:
The ServerHello Hash, HMAC and PRF Select Extension is sent in
response to a Client Hello message containing this extension.
Meaning of this message:
This extension indicates the server's agreement to use one of the
sets of algorithms, given by client, during handshake.
Structure of this message:
"extension_data" field of the Server Hello extension contains DER-
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encoding of the TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectServer structure.
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectServer ::=
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect
This MUST be one the elements of TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient
sequence.
Actions of the sender:
A server chooses one algorithm set from the client list, and makes
sure that it can complete a handshake using the chosen cipher suite
and this algorithm set before sending this extension.
Actions of the receiver:
A client that receives a ServerHello with this extension makes sure,
that server selected one of the algorithm sets, specified in the
corresponding ClientHello extension, and proceeds with a handshake,
using the algorithms specified in it.
5.5 Server Certificate
For these cipher suites this message is required and it MUST contain
a certificate, with a public key algorithm matching
ServerHello.cipher_suite.
5.6 Server Key Exchange
This message MUST NOT be used in these cipher suites, because all the
parameters necessary are present in server certificate (see [CPPK]).
5.7 Certificate Request
This message is used as described in section 7.4.4 of [TLS], and
extended as follows:
enum {
gost341094(21), gost34102001(22),(255)
} ClientCertificateType;
gost341094 and gost34102001 certificate types identify that the
server accepts GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 public key
certificates.
5.8 Client Key Exchange Message
This message is used as described in section 7.4.7 of [TLS], it is
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required for these suites, and contains DER-encoded
TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure.
enum { vko_gost } KeyExchangeAlgorithm;
struct {
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case vko_gost: TLSGostKeyTransportBlob;
} exchange_keys;
} ClientKeyExchange;
ASN1-syntax for this structure is:
TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE {
keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
proxyKeyBlobs SEQUENCE OF TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob OPTIONAL
}
TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE {
keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
cert OCTET STRING
}
GostR3410-KeyTransport is defined in [CPCMS].
keyBlob.transportParameters MUST be present.
keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey MUST be present if the
server didn't request client certificate or client's public key
algorithm and parameters do not match those of the recipient. Else it
SHOULD be omited.
proxyKeyBlobs - (optional) contains key exchange for secondary
recipients (for example, for the firewall, which audits
connections).
cert - contains secondary recipient's certificate.
Actions of client:
First, the client generates a random 32-byte premaster_secret.
Then ukm is calculated as first 8 bytes of digest of concatenated
client random and server random: keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm =
GOSTR3411(client_random|server_random)[0..7]
Then client chooses a sender key. If
keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey is present, the
corresponding secret key MUST be used as a sender key. If it is
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missing, the secret key, corresponding to the client certificate MUST
be used.
Using the sender key and recipient's public key, algorithm VKO GOST R
34.10-94 or VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 (described in [CPALGS]) is applied
to produce KEK. VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 is used with
keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm as IV.
Then key wrap algorithm, specified by encryptionParamSet, is applied
to encrypt premaster_secret and produce CEK_ENC and CEC_MAC. Again,
keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm is used as IV.
keyBlob.transportParameters.encryptionParamSet is used for all
encryption operations.
The resulting encrypted key (CEK_ENC) is placed in
keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.encryptedKey field, it's mac (CEK_MAC) is
placed in keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.macKey field, and synchrovector
(IV) is placed in keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm field.
Actions of server:
Server MUST verify, that keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm is equal to
GOSTR3411(client_random|server_random)[0..7], before decrypting the
premaster_secret.
Server applies VKO GOST R 34.10-94 or VKO GOST R 34.10-2001,
(depending on the client public key type), and key wrap algorithm
(depending on encryptionParamSet) in the simillar manner to decrypt
the premaster_secret.
Server MUST verify keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.macKey after
decrypting the premaster_secret.
5.9 Certificate Verify
This message is used as described in section 7.4.8 of [TLS]. If the
client have sent both a client certificate and an ephemeral public
key, it MUST send a certificate verify message, as a proof of
possession of the private key for provided certificate.
The TLS structures are extended as follows:
enum { gost341094, gost34102001 }
SignatureAlgorithm;
select (SignatureAlgorithm) {
case gost341094:
digitally-signed struct {
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opaque gost341194_hash[32];
};
case gost34102001:
digitally-signed struct {
opaque gost341194_hash[32];
};
} Signature;
CertificateVerify.signature.gostR3411_hash =
GOSTR3411(handshake_messages)
5.10 Finished
This message is used as described in section 7.4.9 of [TLS].
Finished.verify_data = PRF_GOSTR3411(master_secret, finished_label +
GOSTR3411(handshake_messages)) [0..11]
6 Security Considerations
It is RECCOMENDED, that applications verify signature values and
subject public keys to conform to [GOSTR34102001], [GOSTR341094]
standards prior to their use.
Use of the same key for signature and key derivation is NOT
RECOMMENDED.
It is RECOMENDED for both client and server to verify the private key
usage period, if this extension is present in the certificate.
The cipher suites TLS_GOST341094_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 and
TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 proposed hereby, have
been analyzed by special certification laboratory of Scientific and
Technical Centre "ATLAS" in appropriate levels of
target_of_evaluation (TOE).
It is RECCOMENDED to perform an examination of cipher suites
implementations by authorized agency with approved methods of
cryptographic analysis.
7 Appendix ASN.1 Modules
Additional ASN.1 modules, referenced here, can be found in [CPALGS]
and [CPCMS].
7.1 Gost-CryptoPro-TLS
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Gost-CryptoPro-TLS
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2)
cryptopro(2) other(1) modules(1)
gost-CryptoPro-TransportLayerSecurity(16) 1 }
DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All --
-- The types and values defined in this module are exported for
-- use in the other ASN.1 modules contained within the Russian
-- Cryptography "GOST" & "GOST R" Specifications, and for the use
-- of other applications which will use them to access Russian
-- Cryptography services. Other applications may use them for
-- their own purposes, but this will not constrain extensions and
-- modifications needed to maintain or improve the Russian
-- Cryptography service.
IMPORTS
Certificate,
AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
id-CryptoPro-algorithms, gostR3410-EncryptionSyntax
FROM Cryptographic-Gost-Useful-Definitions
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2)
cryptopro(2) other(1) modules(1)
cryptographic-Gost-Useful-Definitions(0) 1 }
GostR3410-KeyTransport
FROM GostR3410-EncryptionSyntax
gostR3410-EncryptionSyntax
;
id-PRF-GostR3411-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-CryptoPro-algorithms prf-gostr3411-94(23) }
TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob ::=
SEQUENCE {
keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
cert OCTET STRING
}
TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::=
SEQUENCE {
keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
proxyKeyBlobs SEQUENCE OF
TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob OPTIONAL
}
TLSGostSrvKeyExchange ::=
SEQUENCE OF
OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {Certificate})
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect ::=
SEQUENCE {
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hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hmacAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
prfAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
}
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient ::=
SEQUENCE OF
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectServer ::=
TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect
END -- Gost-CryptoPro-TLS
8 References
[CPALGS] V. Popov, I. Kurepkin, S. Leontiev "Additional cryp-
tographic algorithms for use with GOST 28147-89, GOST
R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
algorithms.", draft-popov-cryptopro-cpalgs-01.txt,
work in progress
[CPCMS] "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) algorithms for
GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001,
GOST R 34.11-94", IETF draft, <draft-ietf-smime-
gost-01.txt>, work in progress
[CPPK] "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificates and Certifi-
cate Revocation List (CRL), corresponding to the
algorithms GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST R
34.11-94", IETF draft, <draft-ietf-pkix-gost-
cppk-00.txt>, work in progress
[GOST28147] "Cryptographic Protection for Data Processing Sys-
tem", GOST 28147-89, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of
USSR, Government Committee of the USSR for Standards,
1989. (In Russian);
[GOSTR341094] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Produce and check procedures of Electronic Digital
Signatures based on Asymmetric Cryptographic Algo-
rithm.", GOST R 34.10-94, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of
Russian Federation, Government Committee of the Rus-
sia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian);
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[GOSTR34102001] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Secu-
rity.Signature and verification processes of [elec-
tronic] digital signature.", GOST R 34.10-2001, Gosu-
darstvennyi Standard of Russian Federation, Govern-
ment Committee of the Russia for Standards, 2001. (In
Russian);
[GOSTR341194] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Hashing function.", GOST R 34.10-94, Gosudarstvennyi
Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee
of the Russia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian);
[RFC 3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC
3280, April 2002.
[RFC 3279] Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile. L. Bassham, W.
Polk, R. Housley. April 2002.
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[Schneier95] B. Schneier, Applied cryptography, second edition,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995;
[TLS] The TLS Protocol Version 1.0. T. Dierks, C. Allen.
January 1999, RFC 2246.
[TLSEXT] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D.,
Mikkelsen, J. and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Secu-
rity (TLS) Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003.
[X.660] ITU-T Recommendation X.660 Information Technology -
ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Dis-
tinguished Encoding Rules (DER), 1997.
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Acknowledgments
This document was created in accordance with "Russian Cryptographic
Software Compatibility Agreement", signed by FGUE STC "Atlas",
CRYPTO-PRO, Factor-TC, MD PREI, Infotecs GmbH, SPRCIS (SPbRCZI),
Cryptocom, R-Alpha. The aim of this agreement is to achieve mutual
compatibility of the products and solutions.
The authors wish to thank:
Microsoft Corporation Russia for provided information about
company products and solutions, and also for technical consulting
in PKI.
RSA Security Russia and Demos Co Ltd for active colaboration and
critical help in creation of this document.
NIP Informzachita for compatibility testing of the proposed data
formats while incorporating them into company products.
Citrix Inc for help in compatibility testing Citrix products for
Microsoft Windows.
Russ Hously (Vigil Security, LLC, housley@vigilsec.com) and
Vasilij Sakharov (DEMOS Co Ltd, svp@dol.ru) for initiative,
creating this document.
This document is based on a contribution of CRYPTO-PRO company. Any
substantial use of the text from this document must acknowledge
CRYPTO-PRO. CRYPTO-PRO requests that all material mentioning or
referencing this document identify this as "CRYPTO-PRO CPTLS".
Author's Addresses
Serguei Leontiev
CRYPTO-PRO
38, Obraztsova,
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
EMail: lse@cryptopro.ru
Grigorij Chudov
CRYPTO-PRO
38, Obraztsova,
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
EMail: chudov@cryptopro.ru
Alexandr Afanasiev
Factor-TC
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office 711, 14, Presnenskij val,
Moscow, 123557, Russian Federation
EMail: aaaf@factor-ts.ru
Nikolaj Nikishin
Infotecs GmbH
p/b 35, 80-5, Leningradskij prospekt,
Moscow, 125315, Russian Federation
EMail: nikishin@infotecs.ru
Boleslav Izotov
FGUE STC "Atlas"
38, Obraztsova,
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
EMail: izotov@stcnet.ru
Elena Minaeva
MD PREI
build 3, 6A, Vtoroj Troitskij per.,
Moscow, Russian Federation
EMail: evminaeva@mo.msk.ru
Serguei Murugov
R-Alpha
4/1, Raspletina,
Moscow, 123060, Russian Federation
EMail: msm@office.ru
Igori Ustinov
Cryptocom
office 239, 51, Leninskij prospekt,
Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation
EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru
Anatolij Erkin
SPRCIS (SPbRCZI)
1, Obrucheva,
St.Petersburg, 195220, Russian Federation
EMail: erkin@nevsky.net
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
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Internet-Draft GOST Cipher suites for TLS April 2004
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