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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04                                                
TLS Working Group                          Grigorij Chudov, CRYPTO-PRO
Internet Draft                            Serguei Leontiev, CRYPTO-PRO
Expires October 1, 2004                                  April 1, 2004
Intended Category: Informational

    Addition of GOST Ciphersuites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)

                 <draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls-01.txt>

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

Abstract


   This document is intended to register new cipher suites for the
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, according to the procedure
   specified in section A.5 of [TLS], and to register a new TLS
   extension, according to section 5 of [TLSEXT]. Those cipher suites
   are based on Russian national cryptographic standards - key
   derivation algorithms based on GOST R 3410-94 and GOST R 3410-2001
   public keys, GOST 28147-89 encryption algorithm and GOST R 34.11-94
   digest algorithm.

Table of Contents

   1     Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   2     Proposed Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3     CipherSuite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.1   Key Exchange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3



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   3.2   PRF, Signature and Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.3   Cipher and MAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   4     TLS Extensions for GOST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5     Data Structures and Computations. . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.1   Algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.2   Keys Calculation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.3   Client Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.4   Server Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.5   Server Certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.6   Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.7   Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.8   Client Key Exchange Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.9   Certificate Verify. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.10  Finished. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6     Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7     Appendix ASN.1 Modules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8     References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Author's Addresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Full Copyright Statement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1  Introduction


   This document proposes the addition of new cipher suites and
   extensions to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to support
   GOST R 34.11-94 digest, GOST 28147-89 encryption and VKO GOST R
   34.10-94/2001 key exchange algorithms.  The cipher suites defined
   here were proposed by CRYPTO-PRO Company for "Russian Cryptographic
   Software Compatibility Agreement" community.

   Algorithms GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST 28147-89 and GOST
   R 34.11-94 have been developed by Russian Federal Agency of
   Governmental Communication and Information (FAGCI) and "All-Russian
   Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization". They are
   described in [GOSTR341094], [GOSTR34102001], [GOSTR3411] and
   [GOST28147]. Algorithms VKO GOST R 34.10-94/2001 and PRF_GOSTR3411
   are described in [CPALGS].

   This document defines two configurations:
      anonymous client - authenticated server (only server provides a
      certificate);
      authenticated client - authenticated server (client and server
      exchange certificates).

   The presentation language used here is the same as in [TLS].  Since
   this specification extends TLS, these descriptions should be merged
   with those in the TLS specification and any others that extend TLS.



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   This means, that enum types may not specify all possible values and
   structures with multiple formats chosen with a select() clause may
   not indicate all possible cases.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
   NOT","SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
   this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].

2  Proposed CipherSuites

   The new cipher suites proposed here have the following definitions:

 CipherSuite TLS_GOST341094_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147  = {0x00,0x80}
 CipherSuite TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147= {0x00,0x81}
 CipherSuite TLS_GOST341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411           = {0x00,0x82}
 CipherSuite TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411         = {0x00,0x83}

   Note: The above numeric definitions for CipherSuites have not yet
   been registered.

3  CipherSuite Definitions

3.1  Key exchange

   The cipher suites defined here use the following key exchange
   algorithms:

 CipherSuite                                     Key Exchange Algorithm
 TLS_GOST341094_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147     VKO GOST R 34.10-94
 TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147   VKO GOST R 34.10-2001
 TLS_GOST341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411              VKO GOST R 34.10-94
 TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411            VKO GOST R 34.10-2001

   Key derivation algorithms based on GOST R 3410-94 and GOST R
   3410-2001 public keys (VKO GOST R 34.10-94, VKO GOST R 34.10-2001)
   are described in [CPALGS].

3.2 PRF, Signature and Hash

   For a PRF, described in section 5 of [TLS], the cipher suites
   described here use PRF_GOSTR3411 (refer to section 5.1)

   GOST R 3410-94/2001 signature is used for CertificateVerify message.

   GOST R 34.11 digest algorithm ([GOSTR341194]) is used for
   CertificateVerify.signature.gostR3411_hash and Finished.verify_data
   (see sections 7.4.8 and 7.4.9 of [TLS])




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3.3 Cipher and MAC

   The following cipher algorithm and MAC functions are used (for
   details refer to section 5.1):

 CipherSuite                                  Cipher    MAC
 TLS_GOST341094_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147   GOST28147 IMIT_GOST28147
 TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 GOST28147 IMIT_GOST28147
 TLS_GOST341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411               -      HMAC_GOSTR3411
 TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411             -      HMAC_GOSTR3411

   For all four cipher suites, the use of MAC is slighttly different
   from the one, described in section 6.2.3.1 of [TLS].  In [TLS], MAC
   is calculated from the following data:

     MACed_data[seq_num] = seq_num +
                           TLSCompressed.type +
                           TLSCompressed.version +
                           TLSCompressed.length +
                           TLSCompressed.fragment;

   These cipher suites use the same input for first record, but for each
   next record the input from all previous records is concatenated:

     MACed_data[0] + ... + MACed_data[n]

4  TLS Extensions for GOST

   A new TLS extension -- the Hash, HMAC and PRF Select Extension --
   allows a client and server to negotiate the use of a different hash,
   HMAC and PRF algorithm, instead of those, defined in [TLS]. It
   follows the general approach outlined in [TLSEXT].  The client
   enumerates supported hash/HMAC/PRF combinations, by including the
   appropriate extension in its ClientHello message.  By echoing that
   extension in its ServerHello, the server selects one of them for this
   TLS connection. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 describe the structure of this
   extension in further details.

5  Data Structures and Computations

5.1  Algorithms

   GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147] uses 256-bit key size and 8-byte IV.
   Cipher suites, defined here, use GOST 28147-89 as a stream cipher in
   OFB mode with S-box gost28147-89-UZ-CryptoPro-A (see [CPALGS]) and
   CryptoPro key meshing algorithm. This is very similar to
   gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSetAI parameter set, except for
   different cipher mode.



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   IMIT_GOST28147 is GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147] in "IMITOVSTAVKA" mode (4
   bytes)

   HMAC_GOSTR3411(secret, data) is based on GOST R 34.11 digest and
   described in [CPALGS].

   PRF_GOSTR3411(secret, label, seed) is based on HMAC_GOSTR3411 and
   described in [CPALGS].

5.2  Key Calculation

   Key calculation is done according to section 6.3 of [TLS], with
   PRF_GOSTR3411 function used instead of PRF.  The parameters are as
   follows:
      SecurityParameters.hash_size = 32
      SecurityParameters.key_material_length = 32
      SecurityParameters.IV_size = 8
   Length of necessary key material is 144 bytes.

5.3  Client Hello Extensions

   When this message is sent:

   The Hash, HMAC and PRF Select Extension SHOULD be sent along with any
   ClientHello message that includes cipher suites, proposed in this
   document.

   Meaning of this message:

   This extension allows client and server to override algorithms,
   predefined in [TLS], and select the appropriate set of algorithms and
   parameters for the chosen cipher suite.

   Structure of this message:

   The general structure of TLS extensions is described in [TLSEXT] and
   this specification adds a new type to ExtensionType.

      enum { hash_alg_select(60000) } ExtensionType;

      hash_alg_select:  Indicates the set of hash/HMAC/PRF algorithms
      supported by the client.  For this extension, the opaque
      extension_data field contains DER-encoding of the
      TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient structure.

       TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect ::=
           SEQUENCE {
               hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,



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               hmacAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
               prfAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
           }

       TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient ::=
           SEQUENCE OF
               TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect

   Actions of the sender:

   A client that proposes algorithm selection in its ClientHello appends
   this extension along with any others.

   Actions of the receiver:

   A server that receives a ClientHello containing this extension MUST
   use one of the proposed algorithm sets.

   If a server does not understand this extension or is unable to
   perform handshake using any of the proposed algorithm sets, it MUST
   NOT negotiate the use of GOST cipher suites.  Depending on what other
   cipher suites are proposed by the client and supported by the server,
   this may result in a fatal handshake failure alert due to the lack of
   common cipher suites.

   If Client Hello contains GOST cipher suites, but does not contain
   this extension, the server MUST assume that client proposes the use
   of the following default set:

 hashAlgorithm ::= id-GostR3411-94 with NULL algorithmParameters
 hmacAlgorithm ::= id-Gost28147-89-MAC with NULL algorithmParameters
 prfAlgorithm  ::= id-PRF-GostR3411-94 with NULL algorithmParameters

5.4  Server Hello Extensions

   When this message is sent:

   The ServerHello Hash, HMAC and PRF Select Extension is sent in
   response to a Client Hello message containing this extension.

   Meaning of this message:

   This extension indicates the server's agreement to use one of the
   sets of algorithms, given by client, during handshake.

   Structure of this message:

   "extension_data" field of the Server Hello extension contains DER-



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   encoding of the TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectServer structure.

       TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectServer ::=
           TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect

   This MUST be one the elements of TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient
   sequence.

   Actions of the sender:

   A server chooses one algorithm set from the client list, and makes
   sure that it can complete a handshake using the chosen cipher suite
   and this algorithm set before sending this extension.

   Actions of the receiver:

   A client that receives a ServerHello with this extension makes sure,
   that server selected one of the algorithm sets, specified in the
   corresponding ClientHello extension, and proceeds with a handshake,
   using the algorithms specified in it.

5.5  Server Certificate

   For these cipher suites this message is required and it MUST contain
   a certificate, with a public key algorithm matching
   ServerHello.cipher_suite.

5.6  Server Key Exchange

   This message MUST NOT be used in these cipher suites, because all the
   parameters necessary are present in server certificate (see [CPPK]).

5.7  Certificate Request

   This message is used as described in section 7.4.4 of [TLS], and
   extended as follows:

    enum {
        gost341094(21), gost34102001(22),(255)
    } ClientCertificateType;

   gost341094 and gost34102001 certificate types identify that the
   server accepts GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 public key
   certificates.

5.8  Client Key Exchange Message

   This message is used as described in section 7.4.7 of [TLS], it is



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   required for these suites, and contains DER-encoded
   TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure.

    enum { vko_gost } KeyExchangeAlgorithm;

    struct {
        select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
            case vko_gost: TLSGostKeyTransportBlob;
        } exchange_keys;
    } ClientKeyExchange;

   ASN1-syntax for this structure is:

    TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE {
        keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
        proxyKeyBlobs SEQUENCE OF TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob OPTIONAL
    }

    TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE {
        keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
        cert    OCTET STRING
    }

   GostR3410-KeyTransport is defined in [CPCMS].

   keyBlob.transportParameters MUST be present.

   keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey MUST be present if the
   server didn't request client certificate or client's public key
   algorithm and parameters do not match those of the recipient. Else it
   SHOULD be omited.

      proxyKeyBlobs   - (optional) contains key exchange for secondary
      recipients (for example, for the firewall, which audits
      connections).
      cert            - contains secondary recipient's certificate.

   Actions of client:

   First, the client generates a random 32-byte premaster_secret.

   Then ukm is calculated as first 8 bytes of digest of concatenated
   client random and server random: keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm =
   GOSTR3411(client_random|server_random)[0..7]

   Then client chooses a sender key.  If
   keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey is present, the
   corresponding secret key MUST be used as a sender key.  If it is



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   missing, the secret key, corresponding to the client certificate MUST
   be used.

   Using the sender key and recipient's public key, algorithm VKO GOST R
   34.10-94 or VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 (described in [CPALGS]) is applied
   to produce KEK.  VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 is used with
   keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm as IV.

   Then key wrap algorithm, specified by encryptionParamSet, is applied
   to encrypt premaster_secret and produce CEK_ENC and CEC_MAC. Again,
   keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm is used as IV.
   keyBlob.transportParameters.encryptionParamSet is used for all
   encryption operations.

   The resulting encrypted key (CEK_ENC) is placed in
   keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.encryptedKey field, it's mac (CEK_MAC) is
   placed in keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.macKey field, and synchrovector
   (IV) is placed in keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm field.

   Actions of server:

   Server MUST verify, that keyBlob.transportParameters.ukm is equal to
   GOSTR3411(client_random|server_random)[0..7], before decrypting the
   premaster_secret.

   Server applies VKO GOST R 34.10-94 or VKO GOST R 34.10-2001,
   (depending on the client public key type), and key wrap algorithm
   (depending on encryptionParamSet) in the simillar manner to decrypt
   the premaster_secret.

   Server MUST verify keyBlob.sessionEncryptedKey.macKey after
   decrypting the premaster_secret.

5.9  Certificate Verify

   This message is used as described in section 7.4.8 of [TLS].  If the
   client have sent both a client certificate and an ephemeral public
   key, it MUST send a certificate verify message, as a proof of
   possession of the private key for provided certificate.

   The TLS structures are extended as follows:

    enum { gost341094, gost34102001 }
        SignatureAlgorithm;

    select (SignatureAlgorithm) {
        case gost341094:
            digitally-signed struct {



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                opaque gost341194_hash[32];
            };
        case gost34102001:
            digitally-signed struct {
                opaque gost341194_hash[32];
            };
    } Signature;

    CertificateVerify.signature.gostR3411_hash =
        GOSTR3411(handshake_messages)

5.10 Finished

   This message is used as described in section 7.4.9 of [TLS].

   Finished.verify_data = PRF_GOSTR3411(master_secret, finished_label +
                              GOSTR3411(handshake_messages)) [0..11]


6  Security Considerations

   It is RECCOMENDED, that applications verify signature values and
   subject public keys to conform to [GOSTR34102001], [GOSTR341094]
   standards prior to their use.

   Use of the same key for signature and key derivation is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.

   It is RECOMENDED for both client and server to verify the private key
   usage period, if this extension is present in the certificate.

   The cipher suites TLS_GOST341094_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 and
   TLS_GOST34102001_WITH_GOST28147_OFB_GOST28147 proposed hereby, have
   been analyzed by special certification laboratory of Scientific and
   Technical Centre "ATLAS" in appropriate levels of
   target_of_evaluation (TOE).

   It is RECCOMENDED to perform an examination of cipher suites
   implementations by authorized agency with approved methods of
   cryptographic analysis.

7  Appendix ASN.1 Modules

   Additional ASN.1 modules, referenced here, can be found in [CPALGS]
   and [CPCMS].


7.1  Gost-CryptoPro-TLS



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Gost-CryptoPro-TLS
    { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2)
      cryptopro(2) other(1) modules(1)
      gost-CryptoPro-TransportLayerSecurity(16) 1 }
DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All --
-- The types and values defined in this module are exported for
-- use in the other ASN.1 modules contained within the Russian
-- Cryptography "GOST" & "GOST R" Specifications, and for the use
-- of other applications which will use them to access Russian
-- Cryptography services. Other applications may use them for
-- their own purposes, but this will not constrain extensions and
-- modifications needed to maintain or improve the Russian
-- Cryptography service.
    IMPORTS
        Certificate,
        AlgorithmIdentifier
        FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
        dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
        id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
        id-CryptoPro-algorithms, gostR3410-EncryptionSyntax
        FROM Cryptographic-Gost-Useful-Definitions
            { iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2)
              cryptopro(2) other(1) modules(1)
              cryptographic-Gost-Useful-Definitions(0) 1 }
        GostR3410-KeyTransport
        FROM GostR3410-EncryptionSyntax
             gostR3410-EncryptionSyntax
    ;
    id-PRF-GostR3411-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { id-CryptoPro-algorithms prf-gostr3411-94(23) }
    TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob ::=
        SEQUENCE {
            keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
            cert    OCTET STRING
        }
    TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::=
        SEQUENCE {
            keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport,
            proxyKeyBlobs SEQUENCE OF
                TLSProxyKeyTransportBlob OPTIONAL
        }
    TLSGostSrvKeyExchange ::=
        SEQUENCE OF
            OCTET STRING (CONSTRAINED BY {Certificate})
    TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect ::=
        SEQUENCE {



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            hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
            hmacAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
            prfAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
        }
    TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectClient ::=
        SEQUENCE OF
            TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect
    TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelectServer ::=
        TLSGostExtensionHashHMACSelect

END -- Gost-CryptoPro-TLS

8  References


   [CPALGS]        V. Popov, I. Kurepkin, S. Leontiev "Additional cryp-
                   tographic algorithms for use with GOST 28147-89, GOST
                   R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
                   algorithms.", draft-popov-cryptopro-cpalgs-01.txt,
                   work in progress


   [CPCMS]         "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) algorithms for
                   GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001,
                   GOST R 34.11-94", IETF draft, <draft-ietf-smime-
                   gost-01.txt>, work in progress


   [CPPK]          "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509
                   Public Key Infrastructure Certificates and Certifi-
                   cate Revocation List (CRL), corresponding to the
                   algorithms GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST R
                   34.11-94", IETF draft, <draft-ietf-pkix-gost-
                   cppk-00.txt>, work in progress


   [GOST28147]     "Cryptographic Protection for Data Processing Sys-
                   tem", GOST 28147-89, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of
                   USSR, Government Committee of the USSR for Standards,
                   1989. (In Russian);


   [GOSTR341094]   "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
                   Produce and check procedures of Electronic Digital
                   Signatures based on Asymmetric Cryptographic Algo-
                   rithm.", GOST R 34.10-94, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of
                   Russian Federation, Government Committee of the Rus-
                   sia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian);



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   [GOSTR34102001] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Secu-
                   rity.Signature and verification processes of [elec-
                   tronic] digital signature.", GOST R 34.10-2001, Gosu-
                   darstvennyi Standard of Russian Federation, Govern-
                   ment Committee of the Russia for Standards, 2001. (In
                   Russian);


   [GOSTR341194]   "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
                   Hashing function.", GOST R 34.10-94, Gosudarstvennyi
                   Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee
                   of the Russia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian);


   [RFC 3280]      Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W.  and D.  Solo,
                   "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
                   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC
                   3280, April 2002.


   [RFC 3279]      Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509
                   Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
                   Revocation List (CRL) Profile.  L.  Bassham, W.
                   Polk, R.  Housley.  April 2002.


   [RFC 2119]      Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
                   Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.


   [Schneier95]    B.  Schneier, Applied cryptography, second edition,
                   John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995;


   [TLS]           The TLS Protocol Version 1.0.  T.  Dierks, C.  Allen.
                   January 1999, RFC 2246.


   [TLSEXT]        Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D.,
                   Mikkelsen, J. and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Secu-
                   rity (TLS) Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003.


   [X.660]         ITU-T Recommendation X.660 Information Technology -
                   ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
                   Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Dis-
                   tinguished Encoding Rules (DER), 1997.




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Acknowledgments

   This document was created in accordance with "Russian Cryptographic
   Software Compatibility Agreement", signed by FGUE STC "Atlas",
   CRYPTO-PRO, Factor-TC, MD PREI, Infotecs GmbH, SPRCIS (SPbRCZI),
   Cryptocom, R-Alpha.  The aim of this agreement is to achieve mutual
   compatibility of the products and solutions.

   The authors wish to thank:

      Microsoft Corporation Russia for provided information about
      company products and solutions, and also for technical consulting
      in PKI.

      RSA Security Russia and Demos Co Ltd for active colaboration and
      critical help in creation of this document.

      NIP Informzachita for compatibility testing of the proposed data
      formats while incorporating them into company products.

      Citrix Inc for help in compatibility testing Citrix products for
      Microsoft Windows.

      Russ Hously (Vigil Security, LLC, housley@vigilsec.com) and
      Vasilij Sakharov (DEMOS Co Ltd, svp@dol.ru) for initiative,
      creating this document.

   This document is based on a contribution of CRYPTO-PRO company.  Any
   substantial use of the text from this document must acknowledge
   CRYPTO-PRO.  CRYPTO-PRO requests that all material mentioning or
   referencing this document identify this as "CRYPTO-PRO CPTLS".

Author's Addresses

   Serguei Leontiev
   CRYPTO-PRO
   38, Obraztsova,
   Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
   EMail: lse@cryptopro.ru

   Grigorij Chudov
   CRYPTO-PRO
   38, Obraztsova,
   Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
   EMail: chudov@cryptopro.ru

   Alexandr Afanasiev
   Factor-TC



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   office 711, 14, Presnenskij val,
   Moscow, 123557, Russian Federation
   EMail: aaaf@factor-ts.ru

   Nikolaj Nikishin
   Infotecs GmbH
   p/b 35, 80-5, Leningradskij prospekt,
   Moscow, 125315, Russian Federation
   EMail: nikishin@infotecs.ru

   Boleslav Izotov
   FGUE STC "Atlas"
   38, Obraztsova,
   Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
   EMail: izotov@stcnet.ru

   Elena Minaeva
   MD PREI
   build 3, 6A, Vtoroj Troitskij per.,
   Moscow, Russian Federation
   EMail: evminaeva@mo.msk.ru

   Serguei Murugov
   R-Alpha
   4/1, Raspletina,
   Moscow, 123060, Russian Federation
   EMail: msm@office.ru

   Igori Ustinov
   Cryptocom
   office 239, 51, Leninskij prospekt,
   Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation
   EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru

   Anatolij Erkin
   SPRCIS (SPbRCZI)
   1, Obrucheva,
   St.Petersburg, 195220, Russian Federation
   EMail: erkin@nevsky.net


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published



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   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
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   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.































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