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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04                                                
Network Working Group                                          T. Clancy
Internet-Draft                                                       LTS
Intended status: Standards Track                                 A. Lior
Expires: November 4, 2009                                            BWS
                                                            G. Zorn, Ed.
                                                             Network Zen
                                                             May 3, 2009


            EAP Method Support for Transporting AAA Payloads
                     draft-clancy-emu-aaapay-02.txt

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the



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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
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Abstract

   This document defines bindings for existing EAP methods to transport
   Diameter AVPs, called "AAA payloads".  The primary application is to
   support EAP channel bindings, but this could be used for other
   applications as well.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

   3.  Overview and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

   4.  AAA Payload Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

   5.  Bindings for Existing EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     5.1.  Generalized Pre-Shared Key (GPSK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     5.2.  Pre-Shared Key (PSK)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     5.3.  Passord Authenticated Exchange (PAX)  . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     5.4.  Tunneled Transport Layer Security (TTLS)  . . . . . . . . . 6
     5.5.  Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (FAST) . . . . 6

   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8









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1.  Introduction

   This document defines a payload which can be securely transported by
   an Extensible Authentication Method (EAP) method [RFC3748] that
   carries arbitrary Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) [RFC3588].
   While it may seem strange for EAP to encapsulate Authorization,
   Authentication, and Accounting (AAA) messages, since AAA typically
   encapsulates EAP, the security properties are different.  In
   particular, AAA data transported by EAP between the client and server
   will be protected by an end-to-end security relationship.  This
   provides a secure channel for doing things like channel bindings
   [RFC5056].


2.  Terminology

   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
   of the specification.  These words are often capitalized.  The key
   words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
   "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
   are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


3.  Overview and Requirements

   Many EAP [RFC3748] methods have extensible properties that allow you
   to embed arbitrary data within a secure channel.  This channel is
   secured using keys derived during the EAP authentication.  These
   channels vary in the properties that they provide, typically either
   providing integrity protection or both confidentiality and integrity
   protection.

   In this document we define a payload format for encapsulating
   Diameter AVPs [RFC3588], and via backwards compatability [RFC4005],
   RADIUS TLVs [RFC2865].  We provide bindings for a variety of existing
   EAP methods that would allow them to transport this data.  One
   specific application of this is to support EAP channel bindings
   [RFC5056][I-D.clancy-emu-chbind].

   The main goal is to provide the peer and server to exchange AAA
   messages protected by an end-to-end security association.  As such,
   any EAP method transporting the AAA payloads defined in this document
   MUST support integrity protection.  To accomplish this, a method
   supporting AAA payloads MUST perform mutual authentication and derive
   session keys (i.e.  MSK, etc), and during this derivation process
   MUST derive a unique, cryptographically independent, fresh key for
   protecting AAA payloads.  Protocols SHOULD also support
   confidentiality in addition to integrity protection.  Confidentiality



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   is important for identity protection, as a variety of identities can
   be passed over this channel.


4.  AAA Payload Format

   This section describes the formatting for the AAA Payloads.  Each
   payload consists of the following fields:

   o  Version, 1 octet
   o  Flags, 1 octet
   o  length(Session-ID), 2 octets
   o  Session-ID [I-D.ietf-eap-keying], arbitrary length
   o  One or more Diameter AVPs [RFC3588], arbitrary length

   The version field is 1 octet.  This documents defines version 0x01.

   The flags field is 1 octet, and is the logical AND of the following
   applicable values:

   o  0x01: Validation Failed
   o  0x02: Validation Inconclusive
   o  0x04: Validation Successful

   The validation flag fields are used by the EAP server to convey the
   success of the consistency check to the EAP peer.  These flags SHOULD
   NOT be used in messages from the peer to server.

   The Session-ID field is arbitrary length and is proceeded by its
   2-octet length specified in network-byte order.

   Following the Session-ID is an arbitrary number of Diameter AVPs.
   AVPs already contain a length field internally, so they can be parsed
   without additional information.

   The payload can be graphically depicted as:















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   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Version=0x01 |     Flags     |       length(Session-ID)      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                         Session-ID                        ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                       Diameter AVP 1                      ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ...                                                           ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                       Diameter AVP N                      ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                                 Figure 1


5.  Bindings for Existing EAP Methods

   This section describes how binding tokens can be included in all
   current EAP methods that support secure transport of arbitrary data.
   Future EAP methods SHOULD describe how they can implement binding
   tokens.

5.1.  Generalized Pre-Shared Key (GPSK)

   EAP-GPSK [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-gpsk] defines protected data payloads.
   Use by GPSK simply requires instantiation of a new protected data
   specifier (PData/Specifier):

   o  0x0000002 (IANA-TBD): AAA Payload

5.2.  Pre-Shared Key (PSK)

   EAP-PSK [RFC4764] defines a protected channel.  Use by PSK simply
   requires instantiation of a new EXT_Type value:

   o  0x01 (IANA-TBD): AAA Payload






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5.3.  Passord Authenticated Exchange (PAX)

   EAP-PAX [RFC4746] defines an authenticated data exchange (ADE).  Use
   by PAX simply requires instantiation of a new ADE type:

   o  0x04 (IANA-TBD): AAA Payload

5.4.  Tunneled Transport Layer Security (TTLS)

   EAP-TTLS [I-D.funk-eap-ttls-v0] uses Diameter Attribute-Value-Pairs
   (AVPs) for its messaging.  As such it natively supports transporting
   AAA payloads.  No protocol changes are necessary.

5.5.  Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (FAST)

   EAP-FAST [RFC4851] uses Type-Length-Values (TLVs) for its messaging.
   To embed binding tokens, a new TLV must be defined:

   o  0x15 (IANA-TBD): AAA Payload


6.  Security Considerations

   Section 3 documented a variety of requirements for EAP methods to
   transport these AAA payloads.  They MUST support identity protection
   of arbitrary payloads, and SHOULD support confidentiality.  Each
   method's security considerations section would detail how they
   achieve those requirements.

   The payload includes the EAP Session-ID field.  This is to prevent
   replay attacks.  In particular, depending on how an EAP method
   implements their secured channel, it may or may not be
   cryptographically bound to the rest of the session.  By explicitly
   including the EAP Session-ID, we prevent replay attacks.
   Implementations MUST verify the consistency of the Session-ID
   received in the AAA payloads.

   Certainly there are a whole host of issues surrounding the security
   of what may be contained within the AAA payload format.  If the
   information being transported requires confidentiality, then the
   method SHOULD support that.  Otherwise sensitive data could be
   disclosed.


7.  IANA Considerations

   We require registry from a variety of IANA repositories.




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   From "EAP-GPSK PData/Specifier":

   o  0x0000002 (IANA-TBD): AAA Payload

   From "EAP EXT_Type Numbers":

   o  0x01 (IANA-TBD): AAA Payload

   From "EAP-PAX ADE Type Namespace":

   o  0x04 (IANA-TBD): AAA Payload

   From "EAP-FAST TLV Types":

   o  0x15 (IANA-TBD): AAA Payload


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3588]  Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
              Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
              Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
              draft-ietf-eap-keying-22 (work in progress),
              November 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-gpsk]
              Clancy, C. and H. Tschofenig, "EAP Generalized Pre-Shared
              Key (EAP-GPSK) Method", draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-17 (work
              in progress), November 2008.

   [I-D.funk-eap-ttls-v0]
              Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "EAP Tunneled TLS
              Authentication Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)",
              draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-05 (work in progress), April 2008.



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   [I-D.clancy-emu-chbind]
              Clancy, T. and K. Hoeper, "Channel Binding Support for EAP
              Methods", Internet Draft draft-clancy-emu-chbind-02,
              July 2008.

   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, June 2000.

   [RFC4005]  Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton,
              "Diameter Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005,
              August 2005.

   [RFC4746]  Clancy, T. and W. Arbaugh, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol (EAP) Password Authenticated Exchange", RFC 4746,
              November 2006.

   [RFC4764]  Bersani, F. and H. Tschofenig, "The EAP-PSK Protocol: A
              Pre-Shared Key Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
              Method", RFC 4764, January 2007.

   [RFC4851]  Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The
              Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible
              Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851,
              May 2007.

   [RFC5056]  Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
              Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.


Authors' Addresses

   T. Charles Clancy
   Laboratory for Telecommunications Sciences
   US Department of Defense
   College Park, MD
   USA

   Email: clancy@LTSnet.net












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   Avi Lior
   Bridgewater Systems Corporation
   303 Terry Fox Drive
   Suite 100
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 3J1
   Canada

   Phone: +1 (613) 591-6655
   Email: avi@bridgewatersystems.com
   URI:   http://www.bridgewatersystems.com/


   Glen Zorn (editor)
   Network Zen
   1310 East Thomas Street
   Seattle, Washington  98102
   US

   Phone: +1 (206) 377-9035
   Email: gwz@net-zen.net































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