DNS Extensions working group V.Dolmatov, Ed.
Internet-Draft Cryptocom Ltd.
Intended status: Standards Track August 05, 2009
Expires: Febuary 05, 2010
Use of GOST signature algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
for DNSSEC
draft-dolmatov-dnsext-dnssec-gost-01
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Abstract
This document describes how to produce GOST signature and hash algorithms
DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System
Security Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035).
V.Dolmatov Expires February 05, 2010 [Page 1]
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries. . 3
2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. DS Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Key Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. Signature Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.3. Digest Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.1. Support for GOST signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.2. Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Security consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical distributed
database for Internet Naming. The DNS has been extended to use
cryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the
authenticity and integrity of its data. RFC 4033 [RFC4033], RFC 4034
[RFC4034], and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] describe these DNS Security
Extensions, called DNSSEC.
RFC 4034 describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records,
and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use. This
document extends that list with the signature and hash algorithms
GOST [GOST3410, GOST3411],
and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce
RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms.
Familiarity with DNSSEC and GOST signature and hash
algorithms is assumed in this document.
The term "GOST" is not officially defined, but is usually used to
refer to the collection of the Russian cryptographic algorithms
GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST R 34.11-94, GOST 28147-89. Since GOST 28147-89
is not used in DNSSEC, GOST will only refer to GOST R 34.10-2001
(signatire algorithm) and GOST R 34.11-94 (hash algorithm) in this
document.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
V.Dolmatov Expires February 05, 2010 [Page 2]
2. DNSKEY Resource Records
The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys are stored with the algorithm number {TBA1}.
The public key parameters are those identified by
id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.35.1) [RFC4357].
The digest parameters for signature are those identified by
id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.30.1) [RFC4357].
The wire format of the public key is compatible with RFC 4491 [RFC4491]:
According to [GOSTR341001], a public key is a point on the elliptic
curve Q = (x,y).
The wire representation of a public key MUST contain 64 octets, where the
first 32 octets contain the little-endian representation of x and the
second 32 octets contain the little-endian representation of y. This
corresponds to the binary representation of (<y>256||<x>256) from
[GOSTR341001], ch. 5.3.
2.1. Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries
Existing GOST-aware cryptographic libraries at time of this document
writing are capable to read GOST public keys via generic X509 API if the
key is encoded according to RFC 4491 [RFC4491], section 2.3.2.
To make this encoding from the wire format of a GOST public key, prepend
a key data with the following 37-byte sequence:
0x30 0x63 0x30 0x1c 0x06 0x06 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x13 0x30 0x12
0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x23 0x01 0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03
0x02 0x02 0x1e 0x01 0x03 0x43 0x00 0x04 0x40
2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example
The following DNSKEY RR stores a DNS zone key for example.com
example.com. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 {TBA1} ( RamuUwTG1r4RUqsgXu/xF6B+Y
tJLzZEykiZ4C2Fa1gV1pI/8GA
el2Wm69Cz5h1T9eYAQKFAGwzW
m4Lke0E26aw== )
3. RRSIG Resource Records
The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follows the RFC 4490
[RFC4490] and is calculated as follows. The values for the RDATA fields
that precede the signature data are specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
hash = GOSTR3411(data)
where "data" is the wire format data of the resource record set that is
signed, as specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. Hash MUST be calculated with
GOST R 34.11-94 parameters identified by
id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
Signature is calculated from the hash according to the GOST R 34.10-2001
standard and its wire format is compatible with RFC 4490 [RFC4490].
Quoting RFC 4490:
"The signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 generates a digital
signature in the form of two 256-bit numbers, r and s. Its octet
string representation consists of 64 octets, where the first 32
octets contain the big-endian representation of s and the second 32
octets contain the big-endian representation of r."
V.Dolmatov Expires February 05, 2010 [Page 3]
4. DS Resource Records
GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm is denoted in DS RR by the digest type
{TBA2}. The wire format of a digest value is compatible with RFC 4490
[RFC4490]. Quoting RFC 4490:
"A 32-byte digest in little-endian representation."
The digest MUST always be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters
identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
5. Deployment Considerations
5.1. Key Sizes
According to RFC4357 [RFC4357] key size of GOST public keys MUST
be 512 bits.
5.2. Signature Sizes
According to GOST signature algorithm [GOST3410] size of GOST signature
is 512 bit.
5.3. Digest Sizes
According to GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3411] size of GOST digest is 256 bit.
6. Implementation Considerations
6.1. Support for GOST signatures
DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG and
DNSKEY resource records created with the GOST algorithms as
defined in this document.
6.2. Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence
NSEC3 support is not described in this document.
7. Security considerations
Current cryptographic resistance of GOST 34.10-2001 digital signature
algorithm is estimated as 2**128 operations of elliptic curve point
computations on simple modulus 2**256.
Current cryptographic resistance of GOST 34.11-94 hash algorithm is
estimated as 2**128 operations of copmutations of step hash function.
(There is known method to reduce this estimate to 2**105 operations,
but it demands padding the colliding message with 1024 random bit
blocks each of 256 bit length, thus it cannot be used in any
practical implementation).
8. IANA Considerations
This document updates the IANA registry "DNS SECURITY ALGORITHM
NUMBERS -- per [RFC4035] "
(http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers). The following
entries are added to the registry:
Zone Trans.
Value Algorithm Mnemonic Signing Sec. References Status
{TBA1} GOST R 34.10-2001 GOST Y * (this memo) OPTIONAL
This document updates the RFC 4034 [RFC4034] Digest Types assignment
(RFC 4034, section A.2):
V.Dolmatov Expires February 05, 2010 [Page 4]
Value Algorithm Status
{TBA2} GOST R 34.11-94 OPTIONAL
9. Acknowledgments
This document is a minor extension to RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. Also, we
try to follow the documents RFC 3110 [RFC3110], RFC 4509 [RFC4509]
and RFC 4357 [RFC4357] for consistency. The authors of and
contributors to these documents are gratefully acknowledged for
their hard work.
The following people provided additional feedback and text: Dmitry
Burkov, Jaap Akkerhuis, Olafur Gundmundsson,Jelte Jansen
and Wouter Wijngaards.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3110] Eastlake D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain
Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
[RFC4033] Arends R., Austein R., Larson M., Massey D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends R., Austein R., Larson M., Massey D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends R., Austein R., Larson M., Massey D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[GOST3410] "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
digital signature.", GOST R 34.10-2001, Gosudarstvennyi
Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
the Russia for Standards, 2001. (In Russian)
[GOST3411] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Hashing function.", GOST R 34.11-94, Gosudarstvennyi
Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
the Russia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian)
[RFC4357] Popov V., Kurepkin I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89,
GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms", RFC 4357, January 2006.
V.Dolmatov Expires February 05, 2010 [Page 5]
[RFC4490] S. Leontiev and G. Chudov, "Using the GOST 28147-89,
GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R 34.10-2001
Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 4490, May 2006.
[RFC4491] S. Leontiev and D. Shefanovski, "Using the GOST
R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491,
May 2006.
10.2. Informative References
[NIST800-57]
Barker E., Barker W., Burr W., Polk W., and M. Smid,
"Recommendations for Key Management", NIST SP 800-57,
March 2007.
[RFC3447] Jonsson J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC4509] Hardaker W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
[DRAFT1] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S.,
"GOST R 34.10-2001 digital signature algorithm"
draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost3410-2001-02,
work in progress
[DRAFT2] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S.,
"GOST R 34.11-94 Hash function algorithm"
draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost341194-01, work in progress
[DRAFT3] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Emelyanova I.,
"GOST 28147-89 encryption, decryption and MAC algorithms"
draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost2814789-01, work in progress
Authors' Addresses
Vasily Dolmatov, Ed.
Cryptocom Ltd.
Bolotnikovskaya, 23
Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation
EMail: dol@cryptocom.ru
V.Dolmatov Expires February 05, 2010 [Page 6]
Artem Chuprina
Cryptocom Ltd.
Bolotnikovskaya, 23
Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation
EMail: ran@cryptocom.ru
Igor Ustinov
Cryptocom Ltd.
Bolotnikovskaya, 23
Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation
EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru