Service Function Chaining                                      D. Dolson
Internet-Draft                                                  Sandvine
Intended status: Informational                                  S. Homma
Expires: September 8, 2016                                           NTT
                                                                D. Lopez
                                                          Telefonica I+D
                                                            M. Boucadair
                                                            Orange Group
                                                                  D. Liu
                                                           Alibaba Group
                                                                   T. Ao
                                                         ZTE Corporation
                                                           March 7, 2016


                 Hierarchical Service Function Chaining
                    draft-dolson-sfc-hierarchical-05

Abstract

   Hierarchical Service Function Chaining (hSFC) is a network
   architecture allowing an organization to compartmentalize a large-
   scale network into multiple domains of administration.

   The goals of hSFC are to make a large-scale network easier to reason
   about, simpler to control and to support independent functional
   groups within large operators.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2016.







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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Hierarchical Service Function Chaining (hSFC) . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Top Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Lower Levels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Internal Boundary Node (IBN)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  IBN Path Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.1.  Flow-Stateful IBN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.2.  Encoding Upper-Level Paths in Metadata  . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.3.  Using Unique Paths per Upper-Level Path . . . . . . .  10
       3.1.4.  Nesting Upper-Level NSH within Lower-Level NSH  . . .  10
     3.2.  Gluing Levels Together  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.3.  Decrementing Service Index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Sub-domain Classifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Control Plane Elements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Examples of Hierarchical Service Function Chaining .  15
     A.1.  Reducing the Number of Service Function Paths . . . . . .  15
     A.2.  Managing a Distributed Data-Center Network  . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   Service Function Chaining (SFC) is a technique for prescribing
   differentiated traffic forwarding policies within the SFC domain.




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   SFC is described in detail in the SFC architecture document
   [RFC7665], and is not repeated here.

   In this document we consider the difficult problem of implementing
   SFC across a large, geographically dispersed network comprised of
   millions of hosts and thousands of network forwarding elements,
   involving multiple operational teams (with varying functional
   responsibilities).  We expect asymmetrical routing is inherent in the
   network, while recognizing that some Service Functions (SFs) require
   bidirectional traffic for transport-layer sessions (e.g., NATs,
   firewalls).  We assume that some Service Function Paths (SFPs) need
   to be selected on the basis of application-specific data visible to
   the network, with transport-layer coordinate (typically, 5-tuple)
   stickiness to specific Service Function instances.

   Note: in this document, the notion of the "path" of a packet is the
   series of SF instances traversed by a packet.  The means of
   delivering packets between SFs (the forwarding mechanisms of the
   underlay network) is not relevant to the current discussion.

   Difficult problems are often made easier by decomposing them in a
   hierarchical (nested) manner.  So instead of considering an
   omniscient SFC Control Plane that can manage (create, withdraw,
   supervise, etc.) complete SFPs from one end of the network to the
   other, we decompose the network into smaller sub-domains.  Each sub-
   domain may support a subset of the network applications or a subset
   of the users.  The criteria for determining decomposition into SFC-
   enabled sub-domains are beyond the scope of this document.

   Note that decomposing a network into multiple SFC-enabled domains
   should permit end-to-end visibility of Service Functions and Service
   Function Paths.  Decomposition should also be implemented with
   special care to ease monitoring and troubleshooting of the network as
   a whole.

   An example of simplifying a network by using multiple SF domains is
   further discussed in [I-D.ietf-sfc-dc-use-cases].

   We assume the SF technology uses NSH [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh] or a similar
   labeling mechanism.

   The "domains" discussed in this document are assumed to be under
   control of a single organization, such that there is a strong trust
   relationship between the domains.  The intention of creating multiple
   domains is to improve the ability to operate a network.  It is
   outside of the scope of the document to consider domains operated by
   different organizations.




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1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Hierarchical Service Function Chaining (hSFC)

   A hierarchy has multiple levels.  The top-most level encompasses the
   entire network domain to be managed, and lower levels encompass
   portions of the network.

2.1.  Top Level

   Considering the example in Figure 1, a top-level network domain
   includes SFC components distributed over a wide area, including:

   o  classifiers (CFs),

   o  Service Function Forwarders (SFFs) and

   o  Sub-domains.

   For the sake of clarity, components of the underlay network are not
   shown; an underlay network is assumed to provide connectivity between
   SFC components.

   Top-level service function paths carry packets from classifiers
   through a series of SFFs and sub-domains, with the operations within
   sub-domains being opaque to the higher levels.

   We expect the system to include a top-level control-plane having
   responsibility for configuring forwarding and classification.  The
   top-level Service Chaining control-plane manages end-to-end service
   chains and associated service function paths from network edge points
   to sub-domains and configuring top-level classifiers at a coarse
   level (e.g., based on source or destination host) to forward traffic
   along paths that will transit appropriate sub-domains.  The figure
   shows one possible service chain passing from edge, through two sub-
   domains, to network egress.  The top-level control plane does NOT
   configure classification or forwarding within the sub-domains.

   At this network-wide level, the number of SFPs required is a linear
   function of the number of ways in which a packet is required to
   traverse different sub-domains and egress the network.  Note that the
   various paths which may be taken within a sub-domain are not
   represented by distinct network-wide SFPs; specific policies at the
   ingress nodes of each sub-domain bind flows to sub-domain paths.



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   Packets are classified at the edge of the network to select the paths
   by which sub-domains are to be traversed.  At the ingress of each
   sub-domain, paths are reclassified to select the paths by which SFs
   in the sub-domain are to be traversed.  At the egress of each sub-
   domain, packets are returned to the top-level paths.  Contrast this
   with an approach requiring the top-level classifier to select paths
   to specify all of the SFs in each sub-domain.

   It should be assumed that some service functions in the network
   require bidirectional symmetry of paths (see more in Section 4).
   Therefore the classifiers at the top level must be configured with
   policies ensuring server-to-client packets take the reverse path of
   client-to-server packet through sub-domains.  (Recall the "path"
   denotes the series of service functions; the precise physical network
   path within the underlay network is not relevant here.)

                    +------------+
                    |Sub-domain#1|
                    |  in DC1    |
                    +----+-------+
                         |
                  .---- SFF1 ------.   +--+
          +--+   /     /  |         \--|CF|
      --->|CF|--/---->'   |          \ +--+
          +--+ /  SC#1    |           \
               |          |            |
               |          V    .------>|--->
               |         /    /        |
               \         |   /        /
          +--+  \        |  /        /  +--+
          |CF|---\       | /        /---|CF|
          +--+    '---- SFF2 ------'    +--+
                         |
                    +----+-------+
                    |Sub-domain#2|
                    |   in DC2   |
                    +------------+

   One path is shown from edge classifier to SFF1 to Sub-domain#1
   (residing in data-center1) to SFF1 to SFF2 (residing in data-center
   2) to Sub-domain#2 to SFF2 to network egress.

           Figure 1: Network-wide view of top level of hierarchy








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2.2.  Lower Levels

   Each of the sub-domains in Figure 1 is an SFC domain.

   Unlike the top level, however, data packets entering the sub-domain
   are already encapsulated within SFC transport.  Figure 2 shows a sub-
   domain interfaced with a higher-level domain by means of an Internal
   Boundary Node (IBN).  It is the purpose of the IBN to remove packets
   from the SFC encapsulation, apply Classification rules, and direct
   the packets to the selected local service function paths terminating
   at an egress IBN.  The egress IBN finally restores packets to the
   original SFC transport and hands them off to SFFs.

   Each sub-domain intersects a subset of the total paths that are
   possible in the higher-level domain.  An IBN is concerned with
   higher-level paths, but only those traversing the sub-domain.  A top-
   level controller may configure the IBN as an SF (the IBN plays the SF
   role in the top-level domain).

   We expect each sub-domain to have a control-plane that can operate
   independently of the top-level control-plane.  The sub-domain
   control-plane configures the classification and forwarding rules in
   the sub-domain.  The classification rules reside in the IBN, where
   packets are moved from SFC encapsulation of the top-level domain to
   and from SFC encapsulation of the lower-level domain.


























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     +----+    +-----+  +----------------------+   +-----+
     |    |SC#1| SFF |  |       IBN 1          |   | SFF |
   ->|    |================*                *===============>
     |    |    +-----+  |  # (in DC 1)      #  |   +-----+
     | CF |             |  V                #  |
     |    |             |+---+            +---+|   Top domain
     |    |    * * * * *||CF | * * * * * *|SFF|| * * * * *
     |    |    *        |+---+            +-+-+|         *
     +----+    *        | | |              | | |    Sub  *
               *        +-o-o--------------o-o-+   domain*
               *     SC#2 | |SC#1          ^ ^       #1  *
               *    +-----+ |              | |           *
               *    |       V              | |           *
               *    |     +---+  +------+  | |           *
               *    |     |SFF|->|SF#1.1|--+ |           *
               *    |     +---+  +------+    |           *
               *    V                        |           *
               *  +---+  +------+  +---+  +------+       *
               *  |SFF|->|SF#2.1|->|SFF|->|SF#2.2|       *
               *  +---+  +------+  +---+  +------+       *
               * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

   *** Sub-domain boundary; === top-level chain; --- low-level chain.

             Figure 2: Sub-domain within a higher-level domain

   If desired, the pattern can be applied recursively.  For example,
   SF#1.1 in Figure 2 could be a sub-domain of the sub-domain.

3.  Internal Boundary Node (IBN)

   A network element termed "Internal Boundary Node" (IBN) bridges
   packets between domains.  It looks like an SF to the higher level,
   and looks like a classifier and end-of-chain to the lower level.

   To achieve the benefits of hierarchy, the IBN should be applying more
   granular traffic classification rules at the lower level than the
   traffic passed to it.  This means that the number of SF Paths within
   the lower level is greater than the number of SF Paths arriving to
   the IBN.

   The IBN is also the termination of lower-level SF paths.  This is
   because the packets exiting lower-level SF paths must be returned to
   the higher-level SF paths and forwarded to the next hop in the
   higher-level domain.






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3.1.  IBN Path Configuration

   An operator of a lower-level SF Domain may be aware of which high-
   level paths transit their domain, or they may wish to accept any
   paths.

   When packets enter the sub-domain, the Service Path Identifier (SPI)
   and Service Index (SI) are re-marked according to the path selected
   by the classifier.

   After exiting a path in the sub-domain, packets can be restored to an
   original upper-level SF path by these methods:

   1.  Saving SPI and SI in transport-layer flow state,

   2.  Pushing SPI and SI into metadata,

   3.  Using unique lower-level paths per upper-level path coordinates.

   4.  Nesting NSH headers, encapsulating the higher-level NSH headers
       within the lower-level NSH headers.

3.1.1.  Flow-Stateful IBN

   An IBN can be flow-aware, returning packets to the correct higher-
   level SF path on the basis of the transport-layer coordinates
   (typically, a 5-tuple) of packets exiting the lower-level SF paths.

   When packets are received by the IBN on a higher-level path, the
   encapsulated packets are parsed for IP and transport-layer (TCP,
   UDP...) coordinates.  State is created, indexed by these coordinates
   (a 5-tuple of {source-IP, destination-IP, source-port, destination-
   port and transport protocol} in a typical case).  The state contains
   critical fields of the encapsulating SFC header (or perhaps the
   entire header).

   The simplest approach has the packets return to the same IBN at the
   end of the chain that classified the packet at the start of the
   chain.  This is because the required transport-coordinates state is
   rapidly changing and most efficiently kept locally.  If the packet is
   returned to a different IBN for egress, transport-coordinates state
   must be synchronized between the IBNs.

   When a packet returns to the IBN at the end of a chain, the SFC
   header is removed, the packet is parsed for IP and transport-layer
   coordinates, and state is retrieved from them.  The state contains
   the information required to forward the packet within the higher-
   level service chain.



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   State cannot be created by packets arriving from the lower-level
   chain; when state cannot be found for such packets, they MUST be
   dropped.

   This stateful approach is limited to use with SFs that retain the
   transport coordinates of the packet.  This approach cannot be used
   with SFs that modify those coordinates (e.g., as done by a NAT) or
   otherwise create packets for new coordinates other than those
   received (e.g., as an HTTP cache might do to retrieve content on
   behalf of the original flow).  In both cases, the fundamental problem
   is the inability to forward packets when state cannot be found for
   the packet transport-layer coordinates.

   In the stateful approach, there are issues caused by having state,
   such as how long the state should be maintained (it MUST time out
   eventually), as well as whether the state needs to be replicated to
   other devices to create a highly available network.

   It is valid to consider the state to be disposable after failure,
   since it can be re-created by each new packet arriving from the
   higher-level domain.  For example, if an IBN loses all flow state,
   the state is re-created by an end-point retransmitting a TCP packet.

   If an SFC domain handles multiple network regions (e.g., multiple
   private networks), the coordinates may be augmented with additional
   parameters, perhaps using some metadata to identify the network
   region.

   In this stateful approach, it is not necessary for the sub-domain's
   control-plane to modify paths when higher-level paths are changed.
   The complexity of the higher-level domain does not cause complexity
   in the lower-level domain.

3.1.2.  Encoding Upper-Level Paths in Metadata

   An IBN can push the upper-level Service Path Identifier (SPI) and
   Service Index (SI) (or encoding thereof) into a metadata field of the
   lower-level encapsulation (e.g., placing upper-level path information
   into a metadata field of NSH).  When packets exit the lower-level
   path, the upper-level SPI and SI can be restored from the metadata
   retrieved from the packet.

   This approach requires the SFs in the path to be capable of
   forwarding the metadata and appropriately attaching metadata to any
   packets injected for a flow.

   Using new metadata may inflate packet size when variable-length
   metadata (type 2 from NSH [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh]) is used.



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   It is conceivable that the MD-type 1 Mandatory Context Header fields
   of NSH [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh] are not all relevant to the lower-level
   domain.  In this case, one of the metadata slots of the Mandatory
   Context Header could be repurposed within the lower-level domain, and
   restored when leaving.

   In this metadata approach, it is not necessary for the sub-domain's
   controller to modify paths when higher-level paths are changed.  The
   complexity of the higher-level domain does not cause complexity in
   the lower-level domain.

3.1.3.  Using Unique Paths per Upper-Level Path

   In this approach, paths within the sub-domain are constrained so that
   a SPI (of the sub-domain) unambiguously indicates the egress SPI and
   SI (of the upper domain).  This allows the original path information
   to be restored at sub-domain egress from a look-up table using the
   sub-domain SPI.

   Whenever the upper-level domain provisions a path via the lower-level
   domain, the lower-level domain controller must provision
   corresponding paths to traverse the lower-level domain.

   A down-side of this approach is that the number of paths in the
   lower-level domain is multiplied by the number of paths in the
   higher-level domain that traverse the lower-level domain.  I.e., a
   sub-path must be created for each combination of upper SPI/SI and
   lower chain.

3.1.4.  Nesting Upper-Level NSH within Lower-Level NSH

   In this approach, when packets arrive at the IBN in the top-level
   domain, the classifier in the IBN determines the path for the lower-
   level domain and pushes the new NSH header in front of the original
   NSH header.

   As shown in figure Figure 3 the Lower-NSH Header used to forward
   packets in the lower-level domain precedes the Upper-NSH Header from
   the top-level domain.












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                           +------------------+
                           | Overlay Header   |
                           +------------------+
                           | Lower-NSH Header |
                           +------------------+
                           | Upper-NSH Header |
                           +------------------+
                           | Original Packet  |
                           +------------------+


                 Figure 3: Encapsulation of NSH within NSH

   The traffic with the above stack of two-layer-NSH header is to be
   forwarded according to the Lower-NSH header in the lower-level SFC
   domain.  The Upper-NSH header is preserved in the packets but not
   used for forwarding.  At the last SFF of the Service Function Chain
   of the lower-level domain (which resides in the IBN), the Lower-NSH
   header is removed from the packet, and then the packet is forwarded
   by the IBN to an SFF of the upper-level domain, which will be
   forwarded according to the Upper-NSH header.

   With such encapsulation, Upper-NSH information is carried along the
   extent of the lower-level chain without modification.

   A benefit of this approach is that it does not require state in the
   IBN or configuration to encode fields in meta-data.

   However, the down-side is it does require SFs in the lower-level
   domain to be able to parse multiple layers of NSH.  If the SF injects
   packets, it must also be able to deal with adding appropriate
   multiple layers of headers to injected packets.

   This approach requires a new Next Protocol value to be allocated for
   NSH.

3.2.  Gluing Levels Together

   The SPI or metadata on a packet received by the IBN may be used as
   input to reclassification and path selection within the lower-level
   domain.

   In some cases the meanings of the various path IDs and metadata must
   be coordinated between domains.

   One approach is to use well-known identifier values in metadata,
   communicated by some organizational registry.




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   Another approach is to use well-known labels for chain identifiers or
   metadata, as an indirection to the actual identifiers.  The actual
   identifiers can be assigned by control-plane systems.  For example, a
   sub-domain classifier could have a policy, "if pathID=classA then
   chain packet to path 1234"; the higher-level controller would be
   expected to configure the concrete higher-level pathID for classA.

3.3.  Decrementing Service Index

   Because the IBN acts as a Service Function to the higher-level
   domain, it must decrement the Service Index in the NSH headers of the
   higher-level path.

   A good strategy seems to be to do this when the packet is first
   received by the IBN, before applying any of the strategies of
   Section 3.1, immediately prior to classification.

4.  Sub-domain Classifier

   Within the sub-domain (referring to Figure 2), after the IBN removes
   higher-level encapsulation from incoming packets, it sends the
   packets to the classifier, which selects the encapsulation for the
   packet within the sub-domain.

   One of the goals of the hierarchical approach is to make it easy to
   have transport-flow-aware service chaining with bidirectional paths.
   For example, it is desired that for each TCP flow, the client-to-
   server packets traverse the same SFs as the server-to-client packets,
   but in the opposite sequence.  We call this bidirectional symmetry.
   If bidirectional symmetry is required, it is the responsibility of
   the control-plane to be aware of symmetric paths and configure the
   classifier to chain the traffic in a symmetric manner.

   Another goal of the hierarchical approach is to simplify the
   mechanisms of scaling in and scaling out service functions.  All of
   the complexities of load-balancing among multiple SFs can be handled
   within a sub-domain, under control of the classifier, allowing the
   higher-level domain to be oblivious to the existence of multiple SF
   instances.

   Considering the requirements of bidirectional symmetry and load-
   balancing, it is useful to have all packets entering a sub-domain to
   be received by the same classifier or a coordinated cluster of
   classifiers.  There are both stateful and stateless approaches to
   ensuring bidirectional symmetry.






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5.  Control Plane Elements

   Controllers have been mentioned in this document without much
   explanation.  Although control protocols have not yet been
   standardized, from the point of view of hierarchical service function
   chaining we have these expectations:

   o  Each control-plane instance manages a single level of hierarchy of
      a single domain.

   o  Each control-plane is agnostic about other levels of hierarchy.
      This aspect allows humans to reason about the system within a
      single domain and allows control-plane algorithms to use only
      domain-local inputs.  Top-level control does not need visibility
      to sub-domain policies, nor does sub-domain control need
      visibility to higher-level policies.

   o  Sub-domain control-planes are agnostic about control-planes of
      other sub-domains.  This allows both humans and machines to
      manipulate sub-domain policy without considering policies of other
      domains.

   Recall that the IBN acts as an SF in the higher-level domain
   (receiving SF instructions from the higher-level control-plane) and
   as a classifier in the lower-level domain (receiving classification
   rules from the sub-domain control-plane).  In this view, it is the
   IBN that glues the layers together.

   The above expectations are not intended to prohibit network-wide
   control.  A control hierarchy can be envisaged to distribute
   information and instructions to multiple domains and sub-domains.
   Control hierarchy is outside the scope of this document.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The concept of Hierarchical Service Path Domains was introduced in
   draft-homma-sfc-forwarding-methods-analysis-01
   [I-D.homma-sfc-forwarding-methods-analysis] as a means to improve
   scalability of service chaining in large networks.

   The concept of nested NSH headers was introduced in
   [I-D.ao-sfc-for-dc-interconnect] as a means of creating hierarchical
   SFC in a data center.

   The authors would like to thank the following individuals for taking
   the time to read and provide valuable feedback:

      Ron Parker



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      Christian Jacquenet

      Jie Cao

7.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

8.  Security Considerations

   Hierarchical service function chaining makes use of service chaining
   architecture, and hence inherits the security considerations
   described in the architecture document.

   Furthermore, hierarchical service function chaining inherits security
   considerations of the data-plane protocols (e.g., NSH) and control-
   plane protocols used to realize the solution.

   The systems described in this document bear responsibility for
   forwarding internet traffic.  In some cases the systems are
   responsible for maintaining separation of traffic in private
   networks.

   This document describes systems within different domains of
   administration that must have consistent configurations in order to
   properly forward traffic and to maintain private network separation.
   Any protocol designed to distribute the configurations must be secure
   from tampering.

   All of the systems and protocols must be secure from modification by
   untrusted agents.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7665]  Halpern, J., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Service Function
              Chaining (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7665, October 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7665>.






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9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ao-sfc-for-dc-interconnect]
              Ao, T. and W. Bo, "Hierarchical SFC for DC
              Interconnection", draft-ao-sfc-for-dc-interconnect-01
              (work in progress), October 2015.

   [I-D.homma-sfc-forwarding-methods-analysis]
              Homma, S., Kengo, K., Lopez, D., Stiemerling, M., and D.
              Dolson, "Analysis on Forwarding Methods for Service
              Chaining", draft-homma-sfc-forwarding-methods-analysis-01
              (work in progress), January 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-sfc-dc-use-cases]
              Surendra, S., Tufail, M., Majee, S., Captari, C., and S.
              Homma, "Service Function Chaining Use Cases In Data
              Centers", draft-ietf-sfc-dc-use-cases-02 (work in
              progress), January 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh]
              Quinn, P. and U. Elzur, "Network Service Header", draft-
              ietf-sfc-nsh-02 (work in progress), January 2016.

Appendix A.  Examples of Hierarchical Service Function Chaining

   The advantage of hierarchical service function chaining compared with
   normal or flat service function chaining is that it can reduce the
   management complexity significantly.  This section discusses examples
   that show those advantages.

A.1.  Reducing the Number of Service Function Paths

   In this case, hierarchical service function chaining is used to
   simplify service function chaining management by reducing the number
   of Service Function Paths.

   As shown in Figure 4, there are two domains, each with different
   concerns: a Security Domain that selects Service Functions based on
   network conditions and an Optimization Domain that selects Service
   Functions based on traffic protocol.

   In this example there are five security functions deployed in the
   Security Domain.  The Security Domain operator wants to enforce the
   five different security policies, and the Optimization Domain
   operator wants to apply different optimizations (either cache or
   video optimization) to each of these two types of traffic.  If we use
   flat SFC (normal branching), 10 SFPs are needed in each domain.  In
   contrast, if we use hierarchical SFC, only 5 SFPs in Security Domain



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   and 2 SFPs in Optimization Domain will be required, as shown in
   Figure 5.

   In the flat model, the number of SFPs is the product of the number of
   functions in all of the domains.  In the hSFC model, the number of
   SFPs is the sum of the number of functions.  For example, adding a
   "bypass" path in the Optimization Domain would cause the flat model
   to require 15 paths (5 more), but cause the hSFC model to require one
   more path in the Optimization Domain.

              . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . . . . . . .
              . Security Domain     .   .  Optimization Domain  .
              .                     .   .                       .
              .    +-1---[     ]----------------->[Cache  ]------->
              .    |     [ WAF ]    .   .                       .
              .    +-2-->[     ]----------------->[Video Opt.]---->
              .    |                .   .                       .
              .    +-3---[Anti ]----------------->[Cache  ]------->
              .    |     [Virus]    .   .                       .
              .    +-4-->[     ]----------------->[Video Opt.]---->
              .    |                .   .                       .
              .    +-5-->[     ]----------------->[Cache  ]------->
   [DPI]--->[CF]---|     [ IPS ]    .   .                       .
              .    +-6-->[     ]----------------->[Video Opt.]---->
              .    |                .   .                       .
              .    +-7-->[     ]----------------->[Cache  ]------->
              .    |     [ IDS ]    .   .                       .
              .    +-8-->[     ]----------------->[Video Opt.]---->
              .    |                .   .                       .
              .    +-9-->[Traffic]--------------->[Cache  ]------->
              .    |     [Monitor]  .   .                       .
              .    +-10->[       ]--------------->[Video Opt.]---->
              . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   The classifier must select paths that determine the combination of
   Security and Optimization concerns. 1:WAF+Cache, 2:WAF+VideoOpt,
   3:AntiVirus+Cache, 4:AntiVirus+VideoOpt, 5: IPS+Cache,
   6:IPS+VideoOpt, 7:IDS+Cache, 8:IDS+VideoOpt, 9:TrafficMonitor+Cache,
   10:TrafficMonitor+VideoOpt

                   Figure 4: Flat SFC (normal branching)










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        . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
        .     Security Domain       .    .   Optimization Domain     .
        .                           .    .                           .
   [CF]---->[  [CF]    IBN      ]---------->[  [CF]   IBN         ]---->
        .    |                  ^   .    .  |                     ^  .
        .    +----->[ WAF ]-----+   .    .  +-->[ Cache ]---------+  .
        .    |                  |   .    .  |                     |  .
        .    +-->[Anti-Virus]---+   .    .  +-->[Video Opt]-------+  .
        .    |                  |   .    .                           .
        .    +----->[ IPS ]-----+   .    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
        .    |                  |   .
        .    +----->[ IDS ]-----+   .
        .    |                  |   .
        .    +-->[ Traffic ]----+   .
        .        [ Monitor ]        .
        . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

        Figure 5: Simplified path management with Hierarchical SFC

A.2.  Managing a Distributed Data-Center Network

   Hierarchical service function chaining can be used to simplify inter-
   data-center SFC management.  In the example of Figure 6, shown below,
   there is a central data center (Central DC) and multiple local data
   centers (Local DC#1, #2, #3) that are deployed in a geographically
   distributed manner.  All of the data centers are under a single
   administrative domain.

   The central DC may have some service functions that the local DC
   needs, such that the local DC needs to chain traffic via the central
   DC.  This could be because:

   o  Some service functions are deployed as dedicated hardware
      appliances, and there is a desire to lower the cost (both CAPEX
      and OPEX) of deploying such service functions in all data centers.

   o  Some service functions are being trialed, introduced or otherwise
      handle a relatively small amount of traffic.  It may be cheaper to
      manage these service functions in a single central data center and
      steer packets to the central data center than to manage these
      service functions in all data centers.










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                   +-----------+
                   |Central DC |
                   +-----------+
                      ^  ^   ^
                      |  |   |
                  .---|--|---|----.
                 /   /   |   |      \
                /   /    |    \      \
     +-----+   /   /     |     \      \    +-----+
     |Local|  |   /      |      \     |    |Local|
     |DC#1 |--|--.       |       .----|----|DC#3 |
     +-----+  |          |            |    +-----+
               \         |            /
                \        |           /
                 \       |          /
                  '----------------'
                         |
                      +-----+
                      |Local|
                      |DC#2 |
                      +-----+


                Figure 6: Simplify inter-DC SFC management

   For large data center operators, one local DC may have tens of
   thousands of servers and hundred of thousands of virtual machines.
   SFC can be used to manage user traffic.  For example, SFC can be used
   to classify user traffic based on service type, DDoS state etc.

   In such large scale data center, using flat SFC is very complex,
   requiring a super-controller to configure all data centers.  For
   example, any changes to Service Functions or Service Function Paths
   in the central DC (e.g., deploying a new SF) would require updates to
   all of the Service Function Paths in the local DCs accordingly.
   Furthermore, requirements for symmetric paths add additional
   complexity when flat SFC is used in this scenario.

   Conversely, if using hierarchical SFC, each data center can be
   managed independently to significantly reduce management complexity.
   Service Function Paths between data centers can represent abstract
   notions without regard to details within data centers.  Independent
   controllers can be used for the top level (getting packets to pass
   the correct data centers) and local levels (getting packets to
   specific SF instances).






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Authors' Addresses

   David Dolson
   Sandvine
   408 Albert Street
   Waterloo, ON  N2L 3V3
   Canada

   Phone: +1 519 880 2400
   Email: ddolson@sandvine.com


   Shunsuke Homma
   NTT, Corp.
   3-9-11, Midori-cho
   Musashino-shi, Tokyo  180-8585
   Japan

   Email: homma.shunsuke@lab.ntt.co.jp


   Diego R. Lopez
   Telefonica I+D
   Don Ramon de la Cruz, 82
   Madrid  28006
   Spain

   Phone: +34 913 129 041
   Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com


   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange Group
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com


   Dapeng Liu
   Alibaba Group
   Beijing  100022
   China

   Email: max.ldp@alibaba-inc.com






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   Ting Ao
   ZTE Corporation
   No.889,Bibo Rd.,Zhangjiang Hi-tech Park
   Shanghai   201203
   China

   Phone: +86-21-688976442
   Email: ao.ting@zte.com.cn











































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