DIME V. Fajardo
Internet-Draft Telcordia Technologies
Expires: January 14, 2010 A. McNamee
Openet-Telecom
H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
J. Bournelle
France Telecom R&D
July 13, 2009
Diameter Base Protocol Interoperability Test Suite
draft-fajardo-dime-base-test-suite-02.txt
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Abstract
This document describes a collection of test cases to be used for
Diameter base protocol interoperability testing.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Diameter Base Protocol Test Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Connectivity and Peering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.2. Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3. Relay Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.4. Redirection Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Optional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. General Statemachine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.2. Dynamic Peer Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Diameter Base Protocol Application Support . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Authentication and/or Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.1. Stateful Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.2. Stateless Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.1. Client Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.2. Server Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. Introduction
The document is meant to aid in the identifying the functional test
cases of a Diameter implementation. The Diameter interoperability
test suites are categorized by required and optional functionality.
The required functionality is the baseline capability that an
implementation must support to allow basic interoperability for that
category. Optional functionality covers features that not all
implementations support or may wish to test. This document also
covers test suites for common application support provided by the
diameter base protocol.
At its current state, this document provides only a collection of
test cases designed for interoperability. Test plans may be included
in future revisions of this work or maybe provided in some other
document.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Within this document the terms defined in [RFC2119] refer to the
functionality that has to be provided by an implementation for the
usage within this interoperability test document.
3. Diameter Base Protocol Test Suite
All implementation must conform to [RFC3588].
3.1. Required
3.1.1. Connectivity and Peering
Implementations must conform to Section 5.6 of [RFC3588]. Typical
test topology for statemachine test uses peer pairs as shown in
Figure 1. It is left to the testers if one-to-many or many-to-one
connections will be performed to test scalability and loading. The
test cases described below references Figure 1 below.
+--------+ +--------+
|Vendor A|<---wired link---->|Vendor B|
+--------+ +--------+
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Figure 1: Peer Statemachine Test Topology
3.1.1.1. Capabilities Negotiation
Implementations must be able to perform at least the following
behavior described in Section 5.3 of [RFC3588].
o Positive test for establishment of connection with test pairs
advertising support for common application ids (auth, accounting
or vendor). Vendor A initiates transport connection to B and
trigger the process.
o Positive test for establishment of connection with test pairs of
which one of them is advertising support for only relay app and no
other app is in common.
o Positive test for establishment of connection advertising the
relay app in auth app id, acct app id & VSA.
o Positive test for establishment of connection with test pairs
advertising support common transport security, specifically the
use of TLS and/or IPSec. It is left up to the participants to
generate appropriate keys and certificates specific for this test.
Vendor A initiates transport connection to B and trigger the
process and advertised proper Inband-Security support.
o Positive test for DWR/DWA exchange after connection is
established. Vendor A and B both exchange watchdogs as per
Section 3.4.1 of [RFC3539].
o Negative test where DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_APPLICATION is returned by
a peer with no common application id (auth, accounting or vendor).
Intentionally configure vendor A not to advertise any
applications, different applications than B or vendor id's known
only to A.
o Negative test where DIAMETER_NO_COMMON_SECURITY is returned by a
peer with no common application id. Intentionally configure
vendor A to send Inband-Security-AVP with value 1 (TLS) that B
will not support.
o Negative test for unknown peers. Use of DIAMETER_UNKNOWN_PEER or
silent discard to disconnect unknown peers. Intentionally
configure vendor A to send an origin-host that is not in B's peer
table.
o Negative test case for TLS handshake failure. In the case where
the negotiated Inband-Security involves subsequent TLS
negotiation, participants can simulate a TLS handshake failure
(i.e. via invalid certificates, TLS/SSL version mis-match etc)
that must result in the peers being disconnected.
Verification of each test result can be done manually.
3.1.1.2. Election
This test case refers to Section 5.6.4 of [RFC3588]. Responders must
be able to resolve contention with initiator peers.
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o Positive test for establishment of connection with responder
having higher identity than initiator. Vendor A initiates
connection followed by B doing the same a few milliseconds later.
Vendor A having a higher identity should close B's connection
attempt.
o Positive test for disconnection with initiator having lower
identity than the responder. Vendor A initiates a connection
followed by B doing the same a few milliseconds later. Vendor A
having a lower identity should close its initial connection
attempt.
o Negative test for disconnection when initiator and responder have
equal identity. Vendor A and B will advertise the equal identity.
Verify that both peers closed the connection.
Verification of test results can be done manually.
3.1.1.3. Disconnection
Implementations must conform to Section 5.6.4 of [RFC3588] and
Section 3.4.1 of [RFC3539]. Peers must be able to quickly determine
disconnection events. Verification of test results can be done
manually.
o Positive test for peer disconnection using DPR/DPA exchange.
Vendor A initiates shutdown while connected to B. Implementations
behavior may vary depending on disconnection cause such as an
eventual connection retry if a disconnection cause of REBOOTING is
received.
o Positive test for detecting disconnection via system level events
(i.e., transport resets, socket error, system link-down signals,
etc). Implementation must be able to initiate failover procedure.
Implementation should also attempt re-connection with lost peer.
Hard disconnection of vendor A and B's wired link can be done to
simulate this scenario.
o Positive test for detecting disconnection via watchdog timeout.
If there is no activity after a watchdog timer expires with
pending request then the peer becomes suspect and implementation
must be able to initiate failover procedure. [RFC3539] suggest a
minimum watchdog timeout at 6 sec. Vendor B can setup a transport
level filter to silently drop AAA traffic from B to simulate
unresponsiveness of B.
o Positive test for resetting connection after at least two(2)
watchdog has expired. If a connection is already suspect, the
peers must reset the connection. Vendor A or B can setup a
transport level filter to silently drop AAA traffic and simulate
unresponsiveness of both peers.
Verification of test results can be done manually.
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3.1.1.4. Re-Connection Algorithms
Implementations must conform to Section 2.1 of [RFC3588]. Although a
vendor can implement other algorithms and policies than those
proposed in [RFC3588], a default reconnection scheme must be
implemented.
o Positive test for peer re-connection after disconnection has been
detected. The link between vendor A and B is temporarily
disconnected until such time that disconnection is detected by
both peers. The link can then be restored to test the re-
connection behavior of both peers. Verify that at least three(3)
watchdog exchanges occur before both peers are no longer suspect.
3.1.1.5. Failover and Failback
Implementations must conform to Section 5.4.5 of [RFC3588] and
Section 3.4.2 of [RFC3539]. Testing failover mechanism requires
alternate peer connections. A basic ring topology to test failover
and failback is shown in Figure 2 where vendor A has a primary route
to vendor C via vendor B and secondary route via vendor D. The same
symmetry is applied to all other vendors. As an example, vendor C
has a symmetric topology where D is its primary connection and B is
its secondary. This allows the same tests to be performed for all
vendors. For testing failover on vendor A and B, link0 can be
disconnected. For vendor C and D, link2 can be disconnected and so
on.
+---------+
|Vendor B |
+---------+
/ \
link0 link3
+---------+/ \+---------+
|Vendor A | |Vendor C |
+---------+\ /+---------+
link1 link2
\+---------+/
|Vendor D |
+---------+
Figure 2: Failover Test Topology
The enumerated test cases refers only to vendor A but can be applied
to any of the vendor implementations in Figure 2. Conditions for a
positive test requires that realm routes to C is present in A and
host routing is not used. Initial traffic should flow from A to C
via B (as the primary peer of A).
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o Positive test for failover when link0 is disconnected. Vendor A
should have pending requests queued prior to disconnection. Upon
disconnection (see Section 3.1.1.3), verify that the pending
request with T-flag set has been forwarded to C via D.
o Positive test for failover by using device watchdog as a means of
triggering link0 disconnection. Vendor A should have pending
requests queued prior to disconnection. Upon disconnection (see
Section 3.1.1.3), verify that the pending request with T-flag set
has been forwarded to C via D.
o Positive test for failback when link0 is restored and re-
connection succeeds (See Section 3.1.1.4). Verify that new
request message is routed back to B.
o Negative test to generate DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER on answer
message from B to A when Destination-Host is set to C. This can be
simulated when link3 is disconnected and Vendor C is not reachable
from Vendor. Note that alternate path via Vendor D should not be
used.
o Negative test to detect duplicate messages on C. Vendor B can
disable watchdog processing but still allow request message
forwarding. This makes B a suspect peer from A and trigger
failover procedure. Forwarding of queue request will then be done
through D. However, the original request messages would have
reached C via B.
3.1.2. Routing
Implementation must conform to Section 6 of [RFC3588]. A basic
topology to test Diameter routing is shown in Figure 3 where vendor A
and vendor B can deploy two(2) Diameter peers to test host, realm and
answer message routing. Vendor A1 and A2 shares the same realm
(realmA). Vendor B1 and B2 share a different realm (realmB). Test
between both realms are symmetric although the description focuses
mostly to vendor A for editorial reasons. The topology is also
designed so that multi-hop forwarding, message loopback and agent
configuration can be tested. Note that some test cases in this
section require link disconnection overlap with the test cases
outline in Section 3.1.1.3. An implementation experiencing link
disconnection must update its peer and realm route table accordingly.
Verification for usage of proper routing AVPs in Section 6.7 of
[RFC3588] must be done when testing routing functionality.
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+---------+
|Vendor A2| (realmA)
+---------+
/ | \
(realmA) link1 | link2
+---------+/ | \+---------+
|Vendor A1| link0 |Vendor B2| (realmB)
+---------+\ | /+---------+
link4 | link3
\+---------+/
|Vendor B1|
+---------+
(realmB)
Figure 3: Routing Test Topology
3.1.2.1. Peer Based Request Routing
Implementation must conform to Section 6.1.5 of [RFC3588]. In order
to perform the test cases the peer requesting the AAA routing must
have the destination-host and the destination-realm present in the
request message.
o Positive test for request forwarding from originator. Request
messages generated from A1 should reach B2 via B1 if destination-
host of the request is B2 and destination-realm is realmB and all
links are up. A1 must perform realm routing to reach B1 and B1
must perform forwarding to reach B2. Verification of routing can
be done manually if message has reached B2 via link4 and link3.
o Positive test for multi-hop request forwarding. Request messages
generated from A1 with destination-host B2 and destination-realm
realmB should reach B2 via A2 and B1 if all links are up except
for link4 and link2. A1 and A2 must perform realm routing while
B1 performs forwarding. A1 and A2 must be able to route the
request message to B1 even if it does not have B2 in its peer
table. Verification of routing can be done manually if message
has reached B2 via link1, link0 and link3.
o Negative test for request forwarding. If a request message
generated from A1 has a destination-host B2 and destination-realm
realmB with all links up except for link0, link2 and link4 then A2
must send an answer message to A1 with result-code
DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER. Verification can be done manually if
the answer message has reached A1 with E-bit set.
3.1.2.2. Realm Based Routing
Implementation must conform to Section 6.1 and Section 6.1.6 of
[RFC3588]. Test cases for realm-based request routing must have
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destination-realm present but must not have destination-host present
in the request message. Note that there is some test overlap with
the test cases defined in Section 3.1.2.1.
o Positive test for request routing from originator. Request
messages generated from A1 should reach B2 via B1 if the
destination-realm is realmB and all links are up. A1 and B1 must
perform realm routing to reach B2. The request must have an id
(app, auth or vendor) that B1 must route and B2 must process
locally. Verification of routing can be done manually if message
has reached B2 via link4 and link3.
o Positive test for multi-hop request routing. Request messages
generated from A1 with destination-realm realmB should reach B2
via A2 and B1 if all links are up except for link4 and link2. A1,
A2 and B1 must perform realm routing. The request must have an id
(app, auth or vendor) that A1, A2 and B1 must route and B2 must
process locally. Verification of routing can be done manually if
message has reached B2 via link1, link0 and link3.
o Negative test for request routing. If a request message generated
from A1 has a destination-realm realmB with all links up except
for link0, link2 and link4 then A2 must send an answer message to
A1 with result-code DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER. Verification can
be done manually if the answer message has reached A1 with E-bit
set.
3.1.2.3. Answer Message Routing
Implementations must conform to Section 6.2 of [RFC3588]. Answer
routing can be verified using test cases in Section 3.1.2.1 and
Section 3.1.2.2.
3.1.2.4. Loop Detection
Implementation must conform to Section 6.1.3 of [RFC3588]. All
forwarders must verify that their local identity is not present in
the route-record of the request. If it is present, the forwarder
must send an answer with result-code DIAMETER_LOOP_DETECTED. If it
is not present, implementations must also insert route-records into
the request messages.
o Positive test for loop detection can be done if a request
originating from A1 has a destination-realm realmA and A1 is
configure to route request for realmA to A2, A2 will route request
for realmA to B1 and B1 will route request back to A1. Though A1
originated the request, it must be able to send an answer message
with the E-bit set through the request path.
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3.1.3. Relay Agent
Implementations must conform to Section 2.8.1, 6.1.8 and 6.2.2 of
[RFC3588]. The topology shown in Figure 3 is also used for testing
relay agent functionality. Note that an overlap exists with the test
case described in Section 3.1.2 when testing relay agents and those
test cases should be used here as well. Verification for usage of
routing AVPs in Section 6.7 of [RFC3588] must be done when testing
agent functionality. Testing of proxy agents that keep vendor
specific state, such as proxy-info, proxy-state, proxy-host, is out
of scope of this document and can be done in parallel or independent
of the test cases enumerated here.
3.1.4. Redirection Agent
Implementation must conform to Section 6.1.7 of [RFC3588].
Verification can be made by inspecting the redirect answer message
whether the result-code is set to DIAMETER_REDIRECT_INDICATION with
the E-bit enabled and redirect-hosts added.
o Positive test for redirection. Request messages generated from A1
should reach B2 via B1 using redirect from A2 and all links are up
except link0 and link2. A1 must be configured to forward request
message for realmB/B2 via A2. A2 must be configured to act as a
redirect agent and signal a redirect indication to A1 to use B1
instead. Verification of redirection can be done manually if
messages have reached B2 and re-direct indication was processed by
A1.
3.2. Optional
Implementations must conform to Section 5.6 of [RFC3588]. Test
topology uses Figure 1. This section describes optional test cases.
3.2.1. General Statemachine
Implementations must conform to Section 5.6.1 of [RFC3588]. The same
topology in Figure 1 can be used to perform the test scenarios listed
in this section.
o Negative test for non-CEA message received during CER/CEA
exchange. Silent discard and peer disconnection. Vendor B can
initiate a non Diameter server listening on a Diameter defined
port number to simulate unrecognizable messages from vendor B. Or
the AAA peer of vendor B is modified to generate a non-CEA message
once a transport connection setup has been initiated. Verify that
vendor A has closed the connection.
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3.2.2. Dynamic Peer Discovery
Implementations must conform to Section 5.3 of [RFC3588].
Implementations must be able to perform at least the following
behavior.
o Positive test for establishment of connection with unknown peer.
The topology for this test is Figure 1. Test case is dependent on
implementation accepting dynamic peer table updates. In such
case, lifetime of new peer entry should be check against lifetime
of connection. Intentionally configure vendor A to send an
origin-host that is not in B's peer table. Verification of result
can be done manually by inspecting the resulting peer table of B.
o Positive test after redirection (Section 3.1.4). The topology for
this test is Figure 3. Additional verification can be done if
Section 3.1.4 is successful. Redirect-host routes can be cached
by an implementation as a new route entry. Same scenarios as in
the redirect test case except subsequent request messages will be
forwarded to B1 by A1. Verify that only the initial message
results in a redirect process.
4. Diameter Base Protocol Application Support
4.1. Authentication and/or Authorization
Applications intending to use authentication and/or authorization
must conform to the statemachine specification in Section 8.1 of
[RFC3588]. Since these test cases are session level, any topology
can be used by a pair of vendors performing interoperability. The
minimum topology will be based on Figure 1. Note that majority of
these test are performed as part of other Diameter application test
cases. Therefore, implementations must be able to comply with these
common cases.
4.1.1. Stateful Session
Implementations must conform to Section 8.1 of [RFC3588].
Implementations must be able to perform at least the following
behavior.
o Positive test for proper stateful session establishment. Verify
that auth-session-state with STATE_MAINTAINED is enforced in the
client session. Verify that auth-session-lifetime and auth-
session-grace-period are negotiated properly and enforced between
vendor implementations. Must conform to Section 8.4 of [RFC3588].
o Positive test for proper stateful session re-auth. Verify server
initiated RAR/RAA exchange occurs on auth-lifetime and auth-grace
period expiration. Must conform to Section 8.3 of [RFC3588].
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o Positive test for proper stateful session disconnection. Verify
client initiated STR/STA exchange occurs for auth failure and
session timeout. Verify values of auth-lifetime and auth-grace
period against session-lifetime according to Section 8.9 of
[RFC3588]. Verify application id value carried by the STR/STA
message is that of the target application.
o Positive test for proper stateful session disconnection. Verify
server initiated ASR/ASA exchange occurs when server decides to
discontinue service. Implementations that allow for hard session
termination should be able to perform these tests. Must conform
to Section 8.5 of [RFC3588]. Verify application id value carried
by the STR/STA message is that of the target application.
o Positive test for proper stateful session disconnection using
origin-state-id. Verify a vendor implementation can at least
cleanup stateful sessions once it has received a value of origin-
state-id greater than a previously known value from the same
issuer. Verification can be done in the absence of an STR/STA
exchange. Must conform to Section 8.6 of [RFC3588].
4.1.2. Stateless Session
Implementations must conform to Section 8.1 of [RFC3588].
Implementations must be able to perform at least the following
behavior.
o Positive test for proper stateless session establishment. Verify
that auth-session-state negotiation between vendor implementation
with NO_STATE_MAINTAINED is enforced in the client session.
o Positive test for proper stateless session disconnection. Verify
that session-lifetime is enforced in the client session.
4.2. Accounting
Applications intending to use Diameter accounting may conform to
Section 8.2 and 9 of [RFC3588] if the particular application has not
already defined its own statemachine. Since these test cases are
also session level, any topology can be used by a pair of vendors
performing interoperability. The minimum topology will be based on
Figure 1. Note that majority of these test are performed as part of
other Diameter application test cases. Therefore, implementations
must be able to comply with these common cases.
4.2.1. Client Session
Implementations must conform to Section 8.2 of [RFC3588].
Implementations must be able to perform at least the following
behavior. Verification of test results for these cases can be done
manually.
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o Positive test for proper client session establishment. Verify
that sub-session id is supported and that the client can support
event record generation at the least. Verify that the client
should at least be able to support DELIVER_AND_GRANT. Test
entities must be able to configure their server implementation to
send this avp. Must conform to Section 9.4 and 9.8.7 of
[RFC3588].
o Positive test for proper client session termination. Verify that
session termination causes transmission of stop record events if
any and that all records generated are accounted for. Validation
of accounting records can be Diameter application specific and is
left to the tester to confirm.
o Negative test for client session when server reports a failure.
Verify that client session can cope wistatemachine draft
submissionth failed accounting starts or server storage failure
and act accordingly based on Section 8.2 [RFC3588]. Behavior of
the client can be policy and implementation specific and is left
to the tester to confirm. Failed accounting starts and storage
failures can be simulated by mis-configuration of the server test
peer.
o Negative test for client session when connectivity fails. Verify
that client session can cope with connectivity failure and act
accordingly based on Section 9.4 [RFC3588]. The test can overlap
with Section 3.1.1.3 and Section 3.1.1.5.
4.2.2. Server Session
Implementations must conform to Section 8.2 and 9 of [RFC3588].
Implementations must be able to perform at least the following
behavior. Verification of test results for these cases can be done
manually. Since server sessions must support record storage it is
left to the testers to validate storage (Section 9.5 [RFC3588]),
sequencing and co-relation (Section 9.6 [RFC3588]) of records.
o Positive test for proper server session establishment. Verify
that sub-session id is supported and that the server enforces
record generation on the client based on accounting-record-type.
Verify that supervision timer is enforced when using stateful
sessions. Must conform to Section 9.5 of [RFC3588].
o Positive test for proper server session termination. Verify that
expiration of supervision timer in a stateful session terminates
both client and server session on any vendor implementation.
o Negative test for server session when local storage failure
occurs. Verify that server can notify client of its state and act
accordingly based on Section 8.2 of [RFC3588]. Validation is
policy and implementation specific and is left to the tester to
confirm. Storage failure can be simulated by mis-configuration on
the server test peer. This test is mostly a local validation but
it can be used in parallel with Section 4.2.1.
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5. Security Considerations
This document defines test cases and therefore tests various aspects
of the Diameter base specification and various Diameter applications.
6. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by IANA.
7. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3539] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and
Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539, June 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
Authors' Addresses
Victor Fajardo
Telcordia Technologies
1 Telcordia Drive #1S-222
Piscataway, NJ 08854
USA
Email: vfajardo@research.telcordia.com
Alan McNamee
Openet Telecom Inc
6 Beckett Way, Park West Business Park
Clondalkin, Dublin 12
Ireland
Phone: +353 1 620 4600
Email: alan.mcnamee@openet-telecom.com
Fajardo, et al. Expires January 14, 2010 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Base Interoperability Test Suite July 2009
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Linnoitustie 6
Espoo 02600
Finland
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Julien Bournelle
France Telecom R&D
38-4O rue du general Leclerc
Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794
France
Email: julien.bournelle@orange-ftgroup.com
Fajardo, et al. Expires January 14, 2010 [Page 15]