DNS-Based Authentication of Named T. Finch
Entities (DANE) University of Cambridge
Internet-Draft May 25, 2012
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: November 26, 2012
Secure inter-domain SMTP with TLS, DNSSEC and TLSA records.
draft-fanf-dane-smtp-00
Abstract
SMTP supports STARTTLS for inter-domain mail transfer, but it only
provides very limited security because the server's certificate
cannot be authenticated. This memo specifies how TLSA records in the
DNS can be used for proper MX target server authentication.
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2012.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Details of SMTP with TLSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Rationale - choice of certificate identity . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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1. Introduction
The specification for SMTP over TLS [RFC3207] does not describe how
to authenticate a server: which identity relating to the connection
ought to be authenticated by the server's certificate. In practice,
most certificates presented by publicly-referenced SMTP servers
either cannot be validated with respect to a well-known certification
authority, or do not verify any identity expected by the client.
As a result, inter-domain SMTP clients cannot require working server
authentication if they want to successfully send mail using TLS.
Therefore TLS currently provides only a limited amount of additional
security for inter-domain SMTP. Its encryption protects against on-
path passive eavesdropping; but it does not protect against an active
attack, since the client has no way to detect when an attacker is
spoofing the server.
This memo describes how to fix this using DNSSEC [RFC4033] and TLSA
records [I-D.ietf-dane-protocol].
We use DNSSEC to secure the association between a mail domain and its
SMTP server host names. A server's TLS certificate authenticates its
host name.
As well as its normal function of providing an association between a
domain name and a certificate, we are using the existance of a TLSA
record to signal to the client that it can expect a valid server
certificate.
The protocol described in this memo adds new security checks that can
cause email delivery to be delayed when a security failure is
detected.
2. Terminology
ADMD: An ADministrative Management Domain, as described in the
Internet Mail Architecture [RFC5598].
SMTP server host name: The target of a (possibly implicit) MX
record.
Inter-domain SMTP: SMTP between different ADMDs across the public
Internet, where a client sends mail to a publicly-referenced SMTP
server.
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Mail domain: The part of an email address after the "@"; also the
owner name of a (possibly implicit) MX record.
MX resolution: The algorithm for resolving a mail domain into a set
of SMTP server hosts, described in [RFC5321] section 5.
Publicly-referenced SMTP server: An SMTP server which runs on port
25 of an Internet host located using MX resolution. (This term is
from [RFC3207].)
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
memo are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Details of SMTP with TLSA
In the following we describe some additions to the usual MX
resolution algorithm described in [RFC5321] section 5. If there is
any conflict between [RFC5321] and this memo, that is an error in
this memo.
The client SHALL look up the MX RRset for the mail domain. There are
three succesful results that yield a list of SMTP server host names:
o A list of one or more MX records;
o An implicit MX record, in lieu of an empty list of MX records;
o A CNAME to a successful result.
If the lookup is not successful, the client SHALL proceed as usual.
All of these DNS RRsets MUST be "secure" according to DNSSEC
validation ([RFC4033] section 5). In the case of an implicit MX
record, there MUST be a secure denial of existence of an MX RRset for
the mail domain. In the case of a (chain of) CNAME RRs, all the
CNAMEs MUST be secure as well as their ultimate target.
If any of the responses is "bogus", the client MUST treat this as a
temporary error.
If these security requirements are not satisfied, this protocol does
not take effect. The client SHOULD fall back to insecure delivery
(which might be over unauthenticated TLS).
The client now has an authentic list of SMTP server host names and
priority values. It processes this list as usual.
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The rest of this section applies to each SMTP server host name
individually.
When connecting to a server, the client SHALL look up its TLSA RRset
as described in [I-D.ietf-dane-protocol] section 3. That is, the
TLSA RRset owner name SHALL be "_25._tcp.hostname" where "hostname"
is the SMTP server host name. The response can be one of the
following (as listed in [I-D.ietf-dane-protocol] section 4.1):
o A secure answer containing one or more TLSA records, in which case
the client SHALL proceed as descrbed below.
o A bogus answer, which the client SHALL treat as a temporary error.
o In the other cases the client SHOULD deliver to this server
insecurely (which might be over unauthenticated TLS).
The client now has one or more TLSA records for the server it is
connecting to.
The client MUST ensure that the server offers the STARTTLS service
extension [RFC3207] in its response to the client's EHLO command
([RFC5321] section 4.1.1.1).
The client SHALL then issue the STARTTLS command which MUST be
successful. It then proceeds with TLS negotiation.
The client SHALL validate the server's certificate as described in
[I-D.ietf-dane-protocol] section 2.1.
The client SHALL verify the server's identity as described in
[RFC6125] section 6. Its list of reference identifiers MUST include
the SMTP server host name with type DNS-ID, and MAY include a second
copy of the host name with type CN-ID.
If any of these checks fail, the client MUST disconnect from the
server and treat this as a temporary failure.
The client can now proceed to deliver mail securely.
The client MAY wish to insert a header at the start of the message to
record the fact that it authenticated the server. XXX: Perhaps the
form of this header should be specified here.
4. IANA Considerations
No IANA action is required.
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5. Security considerations
This memo provides only conditional security. It allows a server to
publish in the DNS the details of how it can be authenticated.
Clients that implement this protocol can use it to provide a strong
guarantee that they are sending mail to the correct place.
There is no way for a server to tell if a client has authenticated it
using this protocol, since SMTP has no mechanism to signal this
information.
We do not specify that clients check that all of a mail domain's SMTP
server host names consistently have or do not have TLSA records.
This is so that partial or incremental deployment does not break mail
delivery. Inconsistencies are likely if a domain has a third-party
backup MX, for example.
We do not specify that clients check the DNSSEC state of the SMTP
server address records. This is not necessary since the certificate
checks ensure that the client has connected to the correct server.
(The address records will normally have the same security state as
the TLSA records, but they can differ if there are CNAME or DNAME
indirections.)
This memo does not make any changes to SMTP client authentication.
Inter-domain SMTP client authentication remains extremely weak.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3207] Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, February 2002.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
October 2008.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
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(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[I-D.ietf-dane-protocol]
Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", draft-ietf-dane-protocol-21 (work in
progress), May 2012.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC6066] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.
[RFC5598] Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
July 2009.
Appendix A. Rationale - choice of certificate identity
There are a number of reasons for the certificate to authenticate the
SMTP server host name rather than the mail domain.
SMTP allows a client to transfer mail to recipients at multiple
domains in the same connection. If the certificate identifies the
host name then it does not need to list all the possible mail
domains.
It is not in general feasible for the server to select a mail domain
certificate based on the recipient domains when the connection is
established (using Server Name Indication, [RFC6066] section 3),
because an SMTP client might not know all of the recipients when it
establishes the connection.
Outgoing SMTP relays and message submission servers handle mail for
any domain, so in those cases the only sensible option is for the
certificate to contain the host name. It is more consistent for
incoming MX server certificates to match.
It is common for SMTP servers to act in multiple roles, as outgoing
relays or as incoming MX servers, depending on the client identity.
It is simpler if the server can present the same certificate
regardless of the role in which it is to act.
Sometimes the server does not know its role until the client has
authenticated, which usually occurs after TLS has been established.
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Author's Address
Tony Finch
University of Cambridge Computing Service
New Museums Site
Pembroke Street
Cambridge CB2 3QH
ENGLAND
Phone: +44 797 040 1426
Email: dot@dotat.at
URI: http://dotat.at/
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