Internet Engineering Task Force                               S. Farrell
Internet-Draft                                    Trinity College Dublin
Intended status: Standards Track                             D. Kutscher
Expires: October 7, 2012                                             NEC
                                                            C. Dannewitz
                                                 University of Paderborn
                                                               B. Ohlman
                                                              A. Keranen
                                                         P. Hallam-Baker
                                                       Comodo Group Inc.
                                                           April 5, 2012

                       Naming Things with Hashes


   This document defines a set of ways to identify a thing using the
   output from a hash function, specifying URI, URL, binary and human
   "speakable" formats for these names.  The various formats are
   designed to support, but not require, a strong link to the referenced
   object such that the referenced object may be authenticated to the
   same degree as the reference to it.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 7, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  ni URI Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  .well-known URL Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  URL Fragment Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Binary Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  Human-readable Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     9.1.  Assignment of Network Information (ni) URI Scheme  . . . . 11
     9.2.  Assignment of Well Known URI prefix ni . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.3.  Binary Suite IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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1.  Introduction

   Names or identifiers are used in various protocols for identifying
   resources.  In many scenarios those names or identifiers contain
   values that are hash function outputs.  However, different
   deployments have chosen various different ways to include hash
   function outputs in such names or identifiers.  There is a benefit in
   specifying a standard way to include hash function outputs in such
   names or identifiers so we do that here.

   Hash function outputs can be used to ensure uniqueness in terms of
   mapping URIs [RFC3986] to a specific resource, or to make URIs hard
   to guess for security reasons.  Since, there is no standard way to
   interpret those strings, today in general only the creator of the URI
   knows how to use the hash function output.  Other protocols, such as
   application layer protocols for accessing "smart objects" in
   constrained environments also require more compact (e.g., binary)
   forms of such identifiers, while in other situations people may have
   to input such values or talk about them, e.g., in a voice call.

   As another example, protocols for accessing in-network storage
   servers need a way to identify stored resources uniquely and in a
   location-independent way so that replicas on different servers can be
   accessed by the same name.  Also, such applications may require
   verifying that a resource representation that has been obtained
   actually corresponds to the name that was used to request the
   resource, i.e., verifying the name-content binding.

   Similarly, in the context of information-centric networking
   [ref.netinf-design] [ref.ccn] and elsewhere there is value in being
   able to compare a presented resource against the URI that was
   dereferenced in order to access that resource.  If a
   cryptographically-strong comparison function can be used then this
   allows for many forms of in-network storage, without requiring as
   much trust in the infrastructure used to present the resource.  The
   outputs of hash functions can be used in this manner, if presented in
   a standard way.

   Additional applications might include creating references from web
   pages delivered over HTTP/TLS; DNS resource records signed using
   DNSSEC or Data values embedded in certificates, Certificate
   Revocation Lists (CRLs), or other signed data objects.

   The new URI scheme defined here allows for the use of a query-string,
   similar to how query-strings are used in HTTP URLs.  A companion
   specification [niexts] describes specific values that can be used in
   such query strings for various purposes and other extensions to this
   basic format specification.

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   The "ni" URI scheme defined here is very similar to the "magnet link"
   informally defined in various other protocols. [magnet]

   In addition to the URI form we also define a ".well-known" URL
   equivalent, and a way to include a hash as a fragment of an HTTP URL,
   as well as a binary format for use in protocols that require more
   compact names and a human-speakable text form that could be used,
   e.g. for reading out (parts of) the name over a voice connection.

   Not all uses of these names require use of the full hash output -
   truncated hashes can be safely used in some environments.  For this
   reason, we define a new IANA registry for hash functions to be used
   with this specification so as not to mix strong and weak hash
   algorithms in other protocol registries.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   Syntax definitions in this memo are specified according to ABNF

   [[Comments are included in double-square brackets, like this.]]

2.  Basics

   This section contains basic considerations common to all formats.

   When verifying whether two names refer to same object, an
   implementation MUST only consider the digest algorithm identifier and
   the digest value, i.e., it MUST NOT consider the authority field from
   a URI or any parameters and MUST consider two hashes identical
   regardless of encoding, if they encode the same binary value, and are
   the same length.

   The sha-256 algorithm as specified in [RFC4055] is mandatory to
   implement, that is, implementations MUST be able to generate/send and
   to accept/process names based on a sha-256 hash.  However
   implementations MAY support additional hash algorithms and MAY use
   those for specific names, for example in a constrained environment
   where sha-256 is non-optimal or where truncated names are needed to
   fit into corresponding protocols (when a higher collision probability
   can be tolerated).

   Truncated hashes MAY be supported if needed.  When a hash value is
   truncated the name MUST indicate this.  Therefore we use different
   hash algorithm strings for these, such as sha-256-32 for a 32-bit

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   truncation of a sha-256 output.  (Note that a 32-bit truncated hash
   is essentially useless for security but might be useful for naming.)

   When a hash value is truncated to N bits the left-most or most
   significant in network byte order N bits from the binary
   representation of the hash value MUST be used as the truncated value.
   An example of a 128-bit hash output truncated to 32 bits is shown in
   Figure 1.

              128-bit hash: 0x265357902fe1b7e2a04b897c6025d7a2
     32-bit truncated hash: 0x26535790

                    Figure 1: Example of Truncated Hash

   When the input to the hash algorithm is a public key value, as may be
   used by various security protocols, the hash SHOULD be calculated
   over the public key in an X.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
   (Section 4.1 of [RFC5280]).  This input has been chosen primarily for
   compatibility with DANE [I-D.ietf-dane-protocol], but also includes
   any relevant public key parameters in the hash input, which is
   sometimes necessary for security reasons.  Note also that this does
   not force use of X.509 or full compliance with [RFC5280] since
   formatting any public key as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo is relatively
   straightforward and well supported by libraries.

   Any of the formats defined below can be used to represent the
   resulting name for a public key.

3.  ni URI Format

   An ni URI consists of the following components:

   Scheme Name [Required]  The scheme name is 'ni'.

   Colon and Slashes [Required]  The literal "://"

   Authority [Optional]  The optional authority component may assist
      applications in accessing the object named by an ni URI.  Note
      that while the ni names with and without an authority differ
      syntactically, both names will almost always refer to the same

   One slash [Required]  The literal "/"

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   Digest Algorithm [Required]  The name of the digest algorithm, as
      specified in the IANA registry defined in Section 9.1 below.

   Separator [Required]  The literal ";"

   Digest Value [Required]  The digest value encoded in the specified

   Query Parameter separator [Optional] '?'  The query parameter
      separator acts a separator between the digest value and the query
      parameters (if specified).

   Query Parameters [Optional]  A tag=value list of optional query
      parameters as are used with HTTP URLs.

   It is OPTIONAL for implementations to check the integrity of the URI/
   resource mapping when sending, receiving or processing "ni" URIs.

   The digest value MUST be encoded using base64url [RFC4648] encoding.

   The query segment of an URI is NOT hierarchical.  Thus escape
   encoding of slash '/' characters is NOT required.  Since application
   code often attempts to enforce such encoding, decoders MUST recognize
   the use of URI escape encoding.  Section 3.4 of [RFC3986] states that
   "The characters slash ("/") and question mark ("?") may represent
   data within the query component."

   Consequently no special escaping mechanism is required for the query
   parameter portion of ni URIs.  URI escaping is however frequently
   imposed automatically by scripting environments.  Thus to ensure
   interoperability, implementations SHOULD NOT generate URIs that
   employ URI character escaping, and implementations MUST NOT reject
   any URIs that employ URI character escaping.

   The Named Information URI has the following syntax:

         niname ="ni://" [ authority ] "/" algval [ "?" query ]
         algval = alg ";" val
         alg = 1*CHAR
         val = 1*CHAR

                         Figure 2: ni Name syntax

   The "authority" and "query" types are as in the URI specification.

   The "val" field MUST contain the output of applying the hash function
   ("alg") to its defined input, which defaults to the object bytes that

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   are expected to be returned when the URI is dereferenced.

4.  .well-known URL Format

   We define a mapping between URIs following the ni URI scheme and HTTP
   or HTTPS URLs that makes use of the .well-known URI [RFC5785] by
   defining an "ni" suffix (see Section 9).

   The HTTP(S) mapping MAY be used in any context where clients without
   support for ni URIs are needed without loss of interoperability or

   For an ni name of the form "ni://n-authority/alg;val?query-string"
   the corresponding HTTP(S) URL produced by this mapping is
   "http://h-authority/.well-known/ni/alg/val?query-string", where
   "h-authority" is derived as follows: If the ni name has a specified
   authority (i.e., the n-authority is non-empty) then the h-authority
   MUST have the same value.  If the ni name has no authority specified
   (i.e. the n-authority string is empty), a h-authority value MAY be
   derived from the application context.  For example, if the mapping is
   being done in the context of a web page then the origin [RFC6454] for
   that web site can be used.  Of course, there are in general no
   guarantees that the object named by the ni URI will be available at
   the corresponding HTTP(S) URL.  But in the case that any data is
   returned, the retreiver can determine whether or not it is content
   that matches the ni URI.

   If an application is presented with a HTTP(S) URL with "/.well-
   known/ni/" as the start of its pathname component, then the reverse
   mapping to an ni URI either including or excluding the authority
   might produce an ni URI that is meaningful, but there is no guarantee
   that this will be the case.

   When mapping from a ni URI to a .well-known URL, an implementation
   will have to decide between choosing an "http" or "https" URL.  If
   the object referenced does in fact match the hash in the URL, then
   there is arguably no need for additional data integrity, if the ni
   URI or .well-known URL was received "securely."  However TLS also
   provides confidentiality, so there may still be reasons to use the
   "https" URL scheme even in this case.  In general however, whether to
   use "http" or "https" is something that needs to be decided by the

5.  URL Fragment Format

   Some applications may benefit from using hashes in existing HTTP URLs

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   or other URLs.  To do this one simply uses the "algval" production
   from the ni name scheme ABNF which may be included in the pathname
   component of HTTP URLs.  In such cases there is nothing present in
   the URL that ensures that a client can depend on compliance with this
   specification, so clients MUST NOT assume that any URL with a
   pathname component that matches the "algval" production was in fact
   produced as a result of this specification.  That URL might or might
   not be related to this specification, only the context will tell.

6.  Binary Format

   When a more space-efficient version of the name is needed, we can use
   a binary format.  The binary format name consists of two fields: a
   header and the hash value.  The header field defines how the
   identifier has been created and the hash value contains a (possibly
   truncated) result of a one-way hash over the whatever is being
   identified by the hash value.  The binary representation of the name
   is shown in Figure 3.

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       |Res| Suite ID  |              Hash Value                       /
       /                             ...                               /
       /      ...      |

                       Figure 3: Binary Name Format

   The Res field is a reserved 2-bit field for future use and MUST be
   set to zero for this specification.

   The hash algorithm and truncation length are specified by the Suite
   ID.  For maintaining efficient encoding for the binary presentation,
   only a few hash algorithms and truncation lengths are supported.  See
   Section Section 9.3 for details.

   Note that a hash value that is truncated to 120 bits will result in
   the overall name being a 128-bit value which may be useful with
   certain use-cases.

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7.  Human-readable Format

   Sometimes the name may need to be used in a format that is easy for
   humans to read and possibly communicate, for example, over the phone.
   For this purpose, the following more verbose but less ambiguous (when
   spoken) format is defined.

   As with the ni URI format, the fields are separated by a semi-colon
   (;) character.  The first field is a hash algorithm string, as in the
   ni URI format.  Then the hash value is encoded using base32 encoding
   [RFC4648] and lower-case alphabets.  Since the length of the hash
   value is known from the hash algorithm string, padding characters are
   not needed and SHOULD NOT be used when the result of the base32
   encoding is used in the hash value field.  When decoding the base32-
   encoded string, only first N bits of the result, depending on the
   truncation as indicated by the hash algorithm string, MUST be used.

   The hash value is OPTIONALLY followed by a checksum.  The checksum
   MUST be calculated as a crc16 over the parts preceding the checksum,
   i.e., the algorithm string, the first delimiter, (";") the hash
   value, and the second delimiter (also ";") is also included in the
   input to the crc16 calculation.  The result of crc16 is encoded like
   the hash value with base32 encoding and lower-case alphabets (only
   the first 4 characters of the base32 encoded result are used to
   exclude padding).

   The crc16 MUST use the CRC-CCITT polynomial: x^16 + x^12 + x^5 + 1.

   [[CCITT crc16 needs a proper reference]]

         humanname = algval [ ";" checksum ]
         algval = alg ";" val
         alg = 1*CHAR
         val = 1*CHAR
         checksum = 1*CHAR

                      Figure 4: Human-readable syntax

8.  Examples

   The following digest URI specifies a reference to the text "Hello
   World !" using the SHA-2 algorithm with 256-bit output and no
   authority field:


   And the same example shown with an authority would be:

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   The following HTTP URL represents a mapping from the previous ni name
   based on the algorithm outlined above.

   Given the SubjectPublicKeyInfo in Figure 5 we derive the names shown
   in Figure 6 for this value.

   0000000 8230 2201 0d30 0906 862a 8648 0df7 0101
   0000020 0501 0300 0182 000f 8230 0a01 8202 0101
   0000040 a200 835f 9bda f1d9 3a7a 6736 fdba 945a
   0000060 cf0e d516 555a 5e3a 03d4 65b1 6d8e a3cf
   0000100 dbb7 e7a4 0fcc c652 357d c41d c268 7bbd
   0000120 db9d 0ae4 10d7 f9cd 2053 0dee 56d7 5b6e
   0000140 ae7a 5f2c 0a83 3c19 5872 d696 e886 e60e
   0000160 eb94 f25c 3e90 a8f3 888a b656 36cd 7638
   0000200 9722 6bb1 9c3c f307 974f a108 29bc 9b38
   0000220 0681 742b 3860 937a 392f 12be 0934 0b6e
   0000240 1057 a3b7 f27b eec6 c1d6 ece5 c5ae 839c
   0000260 f414 586b dee2 fff2 77c9 e307 4cf3 cf97
   0000300 281a 389e b3a1 4193 a175 76a4 4d3f d778
   0000320 d644 e31a e2ce c55d 4c78 31b5 2e22 4bc7
   0000340 6f8c 7856 a15c c0c4 ca1d b9e5 d744 90e9
   0000360 bc9c b0ee b1a2 dadc a06d f60f 1ead 122c
   0000400 a7a2 6066 363e 91d4 c241 e7f2 3969 9d2c
   0000420 dfd2 a3b5 9544 7c48 6487 dd89 05bf ee01
   0000440 02dd 0103 0100

   0000000 2653 5790 2fe1 b7e2 a04b 897c 6025 d7a2
   0000020 8753 b67e f42f 5a4d 0019 3025 97ed e4ff

     Figure 5: A SubjectPublicKeyInfo used in examples and its sha-256

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   | URI:                                                              |
   | ni:///sha-256;UyaQV-Ev4rdLoHyJJWCi11OHfrYv9E1aGQAlMO2X_-Q         |
   | .well-known URL (split over 2 lines):                             |
   |                              |
   | UyaQV-Ev4rdLoHyJJWCi11OHfrYv9E1aGQAlMO2X_-Q                       |
   | URL Fragment:                                                     |
   | sha-256;UyaQV-Ev4rdLoHyJJWCi11OHfrYv9E1aGQAlMO2X_-Q               |
   | Binary name (ASCII hex encoded) with 120-bit truncated hash value |
   | which is Suite ID 0x03:                                           |
   | 0326 5357 902f e1b7 e2a0 4b89 7c60 25d7                           |
   | Human-readable form of a name for this key (truncated to 120 bits |
   | in length) with checksum:                                         |
   | sha-256-120;ezjvpebp4g36ficlrf6gajox;eokv                         |
   | Human readable form of a name for this key (truncated to 32 bits  |
   | in length) with checksum:                                         |
   | sha-256-32;ezjvpea;csdh                                           |

                          Figure 6: Example Names

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  Assignment of Network Information (ni) URI Scheme

   The procedures for registration of a URI scheme are specified in RFC
   4395 [RFC4395].  The following is the proposed assignment template.

   URI scheme name: ni

   Status: Permanent

   URI scheme syntax.  See Section 3

   URI scheme semantics.  See Section 3

   Encoding considerations.  See Section 3

   Applications/protocols that use this URI scheme name: General
   applicability with initial use cases provided by WEBSEC and DECADE

   Interoperability considerations: Defined here.

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   Security considerations: See Section 10


   Author/Change controller: IETF

   References: As specified in this document

9.2.  Assignment of Well Known URI prefix ni

   The procedures for registration of a Well Known URI entry are
   specified in RFC 5785 [RFC5785].  The following is the proposed
   assignment template.

   URI suffix: ni

   Change controller: IETF

   Specification document(s): This document

   Related information: None

9.3.  Binary Suite IDs

   IANA is requested to create a new registry for hash algorithms as
   used in the name formats specified here.  This registry has four
   fields, the binary suite ID, the hash algorithm name string, the
   truncation length and the underlying algorithm reference.  Future
   assignments are to be made through expert review.  [RFC5226].
   Initial values are specified below.

            ID  Hash name String     Value length     Reference
            0   Reserved
            1   sha-256              256 bits         [RFC4055]
            2   sha-256-128          128 bits         [RFC4055]
            3   sha-256-120          120 bits         [RFC4055]
            4   sha-256-96           96 bits          [RFC4055]
            5   sha-256-64           64 bits          [RFC4055]
            6   sha-256-32           32 bits          [RFC4055]
            32  Reserved

                        Figure 7: Suite Identifiers

   The Suite ID value 32 is reserved for compatibility with ORCHIDs
   [RFC4843].  The referenced hash algorithm matching to the Suite ID,
   truncated to the length indicated, according to the description given

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   in Section 2, MUST be used for generating the hash.

   [[Do we need sha-1 here?  Its been asked for, but in a new standards
   track spec is dodgy...]]

10.  Security Considerations

   No secret information is required to generate or verify a name of the
   form described here.  Therefore a name like this can only provide
   evidence for the integrity for the referenced object and the proof of
   integrity provided is only as good as the proof of integrity for the
   name from which we started.  In other words, the hash value can
   provide a name-data integrity binding between the name and the bytes
   returned when the name is de-referenced using some protocol.

   Disclosure of a name value does not necessarily entail disclosure of
   the referenced object but may enable an attacker to determine the
   contents of the referenced object by reference to a search engine or
   other data repository or, for a highly formatted object with little
   variation, by simply guessing the value and checking if the digest
   value matches.  So the fact that these names contain hashes does not
   necessarily protect the confidentiality of the object that was input
   to the hash.

   The integrity of the referenced content would be compromised if a
   weak hash function were used.  So don't use those.  SHA-256 is
   currently our preferred hash algorithm which is why we've only added
   SHA-256 based suites to the initial IANA registry.

   If a truncated hash value is used, certain security properties might
   be affected.  In general a hash algorithm is designed to produce
   sufficient bits to prevent a 'birthday attack' collision occurring.
   To ensure that the difficulty of discovering two pieces of content
   that result in the same digest with a work factor O(2^x) by brute
   force requires a digest length of 2x.  Many security applications
   only require protection against a 2nd pre-image attack which only
   requires a digest length of x to achieve the same work factor.
   Basically, the shorter the hash value used, the less security benefit
   you can possibly get.

11.  Acknowledgements

   This work has been supported by the EU FP7 project SAIL.  The authors
   would like to thank SAIL participants to our naming discussions,
   especially Jean-Francois Peltier, for their input.

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   The authors would also like to thank Bob Moskowitz, Tero Kivinen,
   Zach Shelby, Carsten Bormann, David McGrew, Eric Rescorla, and Tobias
   Heer for their comments and input to the document.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, January 2005.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              June 2005.

   [RFC4395]  Hansen, T., Hardie, T., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines and
              Registration Procedures for New URI Schemes", BCP 35,
              RFC 4395, February 2006.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5785]  Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
              Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
              April 2010.

12.2.  Informative References

              Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol for Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", draft-ietf-dane-protocol-18 (work in
              progress), March 2012.

   [RFC4843]  Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix
              for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers

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              (ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC6454]  Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              December 2011.

   [magnet]   Wikipedia article, "Magnet URI Scheme", April 2012,

   [niexts]   Hallam-Baker, P., Stradling, R., Farrell, S., Kutscher,
              C., and B. Ohlman, "The Network Information (ni) URI
              Scheme: Parameters", draft-hallambaker-decade-ni-params-00
              (work in progress), October 2011.

   [ref.ccn]  Jacobsen, K, D, F, H, and L, "Networking Named Content",
              CoNEXT 2009 , December 2009.

              Ahlgren, D'Ambrosio, Dannewitz, Marchisio, Marsh, Ohlman,
              Pentikousis, Rembarz, Strandberg, and Vercellone, "Design
              Considerations for a Network of Information", Re-Arch 2008
              Workshop , December 2008.

Authors' Addresses

   Stephen Farrell
   Trinity College Dublin
   Dublin,   2

   Phone: +353-1-896-2354

   Dirk Kutscher
   Kurfuersten-Anlage 36


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   Christian Dannewitz
   University of Paderborn


   Borje Ohlman
   Stockholm  S-16480


   Ari Keranen
   Jorvas  02420


   Phillip Hallam-Baker
   Comodo Group Inc.


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