Internet Draft: Message Submission for Mail R. Gellens
Document: draft-gellens-submit-bis-02.txt QUALCOMM
Expires: September 2005 J. Klensin
Obsoletes: RFC 2476 March 2005
Message Submission for Mail
Status of this Memo
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with RFC 3668 (BCP 79).
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
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Abstract
This memo splits message submission from message relay, allowing
each service to operate according to its own rules (for security,
policy, etc.), and specifies what actions are to be taken by a
submission server.
Message relay is unaffected, and continues to use SMTP [SMTP-MTA]
over port 25.
When conforming to this document, message submission uses the
protocol specified here, normally over port 587.
This separation of function offers a number of benefits, including
the ability to apply specific security or policy requirements.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Document Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Definitions of Terms Used in this Memo . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Conventions Used in this Document . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Message Submission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Submission Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Message Rejection and Bouncing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Authorized Submission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Mandatory Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. General Submission Rejection Code . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Ensure All Domains are Fully-Qualified . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Require Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Recommended Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Enforce Address Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Log Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Optional Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Enforce Submission Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Enforce Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. Check Message Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4 Support for the Postmaster Address . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Interaction with SMTP Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Message Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Add 'Sender' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Add 'Date' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.3. Add 'Message-ID' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.4. Transfer Encode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.5. Sign the Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.6. Encrypt the Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.7. Resolve Aliases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.8. Header Rewriting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
13. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
14. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A: Changes from RFC 2476 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Intellectual Property Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Disclaimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
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SMTP was defined as a message *transfer* protocol, that is, a means
to route (if needed) and deliver finished (complete) messages.
Message Transfer Agents (MTAs) are not supposed to alter the message
text, except to add 'Received', 'Return-Path', and other header
fields as required by [SMTP-MTA].
However, SMTP is now also widely used as a message *submission*
protocol, that is, a means for message user agents (MUAs) to
introduce new messages into the MTA routing network. The process
which accepts message submissions from MUAs is termed a Message
Submission Agent (MSA).
In order to permit unconstrained communications, SMTP is not often
authenticated during message relay.
Authentication and authorization of initial submissions has become
increasingly important, driven by changes in security requirements
and rising expectations that submission servers take responsibility
for the message traffic they originate. For example, many sites now
prohibit outbound port 25 traffic, funneling all mail submissions
through submission servers, due to the prevalence of machines that
have worms, viruses, or other malicious software which generate
large amounts of spam.
In addition to authentication and authorization issues, messages
being submitted are in some cases finished (complete) messages, and
in other cases are unfinished (incomplete) in one or more aspects.
Unfinished messages may need to be completed to ensure they conform
to [MESSAGE-FORMAT], and later requirements. For example, the
message may lack a proper 'Date' header field, and domains might not
be fully qualified. In some cases, the MUA may be unable to
generate finished messages (for example, it might not know its time
zone). Even when submitted messages are complete, local site policy
may dictate that the message text be examined or modified in some
way. Such completions or modifications have been shown to cause
harm when performed by downstream MTAs -- that is, MTAs after the
first-hop submission MTA -- and are in general considered to be
outside the province of standardized MTA functionality.
Separating messages into submissions and transfers allows developers
and network administrators to more easily:
* Implement security policies and guard against unauthorized mail
relaying or injection of unsolicited bulk mail
* Implement authenticated submission, including off-site
submission by authorized users such as travelers
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* Separate the relevant software code differences, thereby making
each code base more straightforward and allowing for
different programs for relay and submission
* Detect configuration problems with a site's mail clients
* Provide a basis for adding enhanced submission services in the
future
This memo describes a low cost, deterministic means for messages to
be identified as submissions, and specifies what actions are to be
taken by a submission server.
2. Document Information
2.1. Definitions of Terms Used in this Memo
Fully-Qualified
Containing or consisting of a domain which can be globally resolved
using the global Domain Name Service; that is, not a local alias or
partial specification.
Message Submission Agent (MSA)
A process which conforms to this specification. An MSA acts as a
submission server to accept messages from MUAs, and either delivers
them or acts as an SMTP client to relay them to an MTA.
Message Transfer Agent (MTA)
A process which conforms to [SMTP-MTA]. An MTA acts as an SMTP
server to accept messages from an MSA or another MTA, and either
delivers them or acts as an SMTP client to relay them to another
MTA.
Message User Agent (MUA)
A process which acts (often on behalf of a user and with a user
interface) to compose and submit new messages, and process delivered
messages. In what is commonly referred to as a split-MUA model, POP
[POP3] or IMAP [IMAP4] is used to access delivered messages while
the protocol defined here (or SMTP) is used to submit messages.
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2.2. Conventions Used in this Document
In examples, "C:" is used to indicate lines sent by the client, and
"S:" indicates those sent by the server. Line breaks within a
command example are for editorial purposes only.
Examples use the 'example.net' domain.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
in this document are to be interpreted as defined in [KEYWORDS].
3. Message Submission
3.1. Submission Identification
Port 587 is reserved for email message submission as specified in
this document. Messages received on this port are defined to be
submissions. The protocol used is ESMTP [SMTP-MTA, ESMTP], with
additional restrictions or allowances as specified here.
While most email clients and servers can be configured to use port
587 instead of 25, there are cases where this is not possible or
convenient. A site MAY choose to use port 25 for message
submission, by designating some hosts to be MSAs and others to be
MTAs.
3.2. Message Rejection and Bouncing
MTAs and MSAs MAY implement message rejection rules that rely in
part on whether the message is a submission or a relay.
For example, some sites might configure their MTAs to reject all
RCPT TOs for messages that do not reference local users, and
configure their MSA to reject all message submissions that do not
come from authorized users, with authorization based either on the
submitting endpoint being within a protected IP environment, or
authenticated identity.
NOTE: It is better to reject a message than to risk sending one
that is damaged. This is especially true for problems that are
correctable by the MUA, for example, an invalid 'From' field.
If an MSA is not able to determine a return path to the submitting
user, from a valid MAIL FROM, a valid source IP address, or based on
authenticated identity, then the MSA SHOULD immediately reject the
message. A message can be immediately rejected by returning a 550
code to the MAIL FROM command.
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Note that a null return path, that is, MAIL FROM:<>, is permitted
and MUST NOT in itself be cause for rejecting a message. (MUAs need
to generate null return-path messages for a variety of reasons,
including disposition notifications.)
Except in the case where the MSA is unable to determine a valid
return path for the message being submitted, text in this
specification which instructs an MSA to issue a rejection code MAY
be complied with by accepting the message and subsequently
generating a bounce message. (That is, if the MSA is going to reject
a message for any reason except being unable to determine a return
path, it can optionally do an immediate rejection or accept the
message and then mail a bounce.)
NOTE: In the normal case of message submission, immediately
rejecting the message is preferred, as it gives the user and MUA
direct feedback. To properly handle delayed bounces the client MUA
needs to maintain a queue of messages it has submitted, and match
bounces to them. Note that many contemporary MUAs do not have this
capability.
3.3. Authorized Submission
Numerous methods have been used to ensure that only authorized users
are able to submit messages. These methods include authenticated
SMTP, IP address restrictions, secure IP, and prior POP
authentication.
Authenticated SMTP [SMTP-AUTH] has seen widespread deployment. It
allows the MSA to determine an authorization identity for the
message submission, which is not tied to other protocols.
IP address restrictions are very widely implemented, but do not
allow for travelers and similar situations, and can be easily
spoofed unless all transport paths between the MUA and MSA are
trustworthy.
Secure IP [IPSEC] can also be used, and provides additional benefits
of protection against eavesdropping and traffic analysis.
Requiring a POP [POP3] authentication (from the same IP address)
within some amount of time (for example, 20 minutes) prior to the
start of a message submission session has also been used, but this
does impose restrictions on clients as well as servers which may
cause difficulties. Specifically, the client must do a POP
authentication before an SMTP submission session, and not all
clients are capable and configured for this. Also, the MSA must
coordinate with the POP server, which may be difficult. There is
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also a window during which an unauthorized user can submit messages
and appear to be a previously authorized user. Since it is
dependent on the MUA's IP addresses, this technique is substantially
as subject to IP address spoofing as validation based on known IP
addresses alone (see above).
4. Mandatory Actions
An MSA MUST do all of the following:
4.1. General Submission Rejection Code
Unless covered by a more precise response code, response code 554 is
to be used to reject a MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, or DATA command that
contains something improper.
4.2. Ensure All Domains are Fully-Qualified
The MSA MUST ensure that all domains in the SMTP envelope are
fully-qualified.
If the MSA examines or alters the message text in any way, except to
add trace header fields [SMTP-MTA], it MUST ensure that all domains
in address header fields are fully-qualified.
Reply code 554 is to be used to reject a MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, or DATA
command which contains improper domain references.
A frequent local convention is to accept single-level domains (for
example, 'sales') and then to expand the reference by adding the
remaining portion of the domain name (for example, to
'sales.example.net'). Local conventions that permit single-level
domains SHOULD reject, rather than expand, incomplete multi-level
domains, since such expansion is particularly risky.
4.3. Require Authentication
The MSA MUST by default issue an error response to the MAIL FROM
command if the session has not been authenticated using [SMTP-AUTH],
unless it has already independently established authentication or
authorization (such as being within a protected subnetwork).
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Section 3.3 discusses authentication mechanisms.
Reply code 530 [SMTP-AUTH] is used for this purpose.
5. Recommended Actions
The MSA SHOULD do all of the following:
5.1. Enforce Address Syntax
An MSA SHOULD reject messages with illegal syntax in a sender or
recipient SMTP envelope address.
If the MSA examines or alters the message text in way, except to add
trace header fields, it SHOULD reject messages with illegal address
syntax in address header fields.
Reply code 501 is to be used to reject a MAIL FROM or RCPT TO
command that contains a detectably improper address.
When addresses are resolved after submission of the message body,
reply code 554 (with a suitable enhanced status code from
[SMTP-CODES]) is used after end-of-data, if the message contains
invalid addresses in the header.
5.2. Log Errors
The MSA SHOULD log message errors, especially apparent
misconfigurations of client software.
It can be very helpful to notify the administrator when problems are
detected with local mail clients. This is another advantage of
distinguishing submission from relay: system administrators might be
interested in local configuration problems, but not in client
problems at other sites.
Note that it is important to impose limits on such logging to
prevent certain forms of DOS attacks.
6. Optional Actions
The MSA MAY do any of the following:
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6.1. Enforce Submission Rights
The MSA MAY issue an error response to the MAIL FROM command if the
address in MAIL FROM appears to have insufficient submission rights,
or is not authorized with the authentication used (if the session
has been authenticated).
Reply code 550 with an appropriate enhanced status code per
[SMTP-CODES], such as 5.7.1, is used for this purpose.
6.2. Enforce Permissions
The MSA MAY issue an error response to the RCPT TO command if
inconsistent with the permissions given to the user (if the session
has been authenticated).
Reply code 550 with an appropriate enhanced status code per
[SMTP-CODES], such as 5.7.1, is used for this purpose.
6.3. Check Message Data
The MSA MAY issue an error response to the DATA command or send a
failure result after end-of-data if the submitted message is
syntactically invalid, or seems inconsistent with permissions given
to the user (if known), or violates site policy in some way.
Reply code 554 is used for syntactic problems in the data. Reply
code 501 is used if the command itself is not syntactically valid.
Reply code 550 with an appropriate enhanced status code per
[SMTP-CODES] (such as 5.7.1) is used to reject based on the
submitting user. Reply code 550 with an appropriate enhanced status
code (such as 5.7.0) is used if the message violates site policy.
6.4 Support for the Postmaster Address
If appropriate under local conditions and to facilitate conformance
with the "postmaster" requirements of [SMTP-MTA], the MSA MAY permit
a reduced degree of authentication for mail addressed to the
"postmaster" (or one of its alternate spelling forms, see
[SMTP-MTA]), in one or more domains, as compared to requirements
enforced for other addresses. Among other benefits, this provides
an address of last resort that can be used by authorized users to
report problems that otherwise prevent them from submitting mail.
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7. Interaction with SMTP Extensions
The following table lists the current standards-track and
Experimental SMTP extensions. Listed are the EHLO keyword, name, an
indication as to the use of the extension on the submit port, and a
reference:
Keyword Name Submission Reference
---------- --------------------- ---------- ------------------
PIPELINING Pipelining SHOULD [PIPELINING]
ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
Enhanced Status Codes SHOULD [CODES-EXTENSION]
ETRN Extended Turn MUST NOT [ETRN]
... Extended Codes SHOULD [SMTP-CODES]
DSN Delivery Status Notification
SHOULD [DSN]
SIZE Message size MAY [SIZE]
... 521 reply code MUST NOT [521REPLY]
CHECKPOINT Checkpoint/Restart MAY [Checkpoint]
BINARYMIME Binary MIME MAY [CHUNKING]
CHUNKING Chunking MAY [CHUNKING]
8BITMIME Use 8-bit data SHOULD [8BITMIME]
AUTH Authentication MUST [SMTP-AUTH]
STARTTLS Start TLS MAY [Start-TLS]
NO-SOLICITING
Notification of no soliciting
MAY [Msg-Track]
MTRK Message Tracking MAY [Msg-Track]
Future SMTP extensions SHOULD explicitly specify if they are valid
on the Submission port.
Some SMTP extensions are especially useful for message submission:
Extended Status Codes [SMTP-CODES] SHOULD be supported and used
according to [CODES-EXTENSION]. This permits the MSA to notify the
client of specific configuration or other problems in more detail
than the response codes listed in this memo. Because some
rejections are related to a site's security policy, care should be
used not to expose more detail than is needed to correct the
problem.
[PIPELINING] SHOULD be supported by the MSA.
[SMTP-AUTH] allows the MSA to validate the authority and determine
the identity of the submitting user and MUST be supported by the
MSA.
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Any references to the DATA command in this memo also refer to any
substitutes for DATA, such as the BDAT command used with [CHUNKING].
8. Message Modifications
Sites MAY modify submissions to ensure compliance with standards and
site policy. This section describes a number of such modifications
that are often considered useful.
NOTE: As a matter of guidance for local decisions to implement
message modification, a paramount rule is to limit such actions to
remedies for specific problems that have clear solutions. This is
especially true with address elements. For example,
indiscriminately appending a domain to an address or element which
lacks one typically results in more broken addresses. An
unqualified address must be verified to be a valid local part in the
domain before the domain can be safely added.
8.1. Add 'Sender'
The MSA MAY add or replace the 'Sender' field, if the identity of
the sender is known and this is not given in the 'From' field.
The MSA MUST ensure that any address it places in a 'Sender' field
is in fact a valid mail address.
8.2. Add 'Date'
The MSA MAY add a 'Date' field to the submitted message, if it lacks
it, or correct the 'Date' field if it does not conform to
[MESSAGE-FORMAT] syntax.
8.3. Add 'Message-ID'
The MSA SHOULD add or replace the 'Message-ID' field, if it lacks
it, or it is not valid syntax (as defined by [MESSAGE-FORMAT]).
Note that a number of clients still do not generate Message-Id
fields.
8.4. Transfer Encode
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The MSA MAY apply transfer encoding to the message according to MIME
conventions, if needed and not harmful to the MIME type.
8.5. Sign the Message
The MSA MAY (digitally) sign or otherwise add authentication
information to the message.
8.6. Encrypt the Message
The MSA MAY encrypt the message for transport to reflect
organizational policies.
NOTE: To be useful, the addition of a signature and/or encryption
by the MSA generally implies that the connection between the MUA and
MSA must itself be secured in some other way, e.g., by operating
inside of a secure environment, by securing the submission
connection at the transport layer, or by using an [SMTP-AUTH]
mechanism that provides for session integrity.
8.7. Resolve Aliases
The MSA MAY resolve aliases (CNAME records) for domain names, in the
SMTP envelope and optionally in address fields of the header,
subject to local policy.
NOTE: Unconditionally resolving aliases could be harmful. For
example, if www.example.net and ftp.example.net are both aliases for
mail.example.net, rewriting them could lose useful information.
8.8. Header Rewriting
The MSA MAY rewrite local parts and/or domains in the SMTP envelope,
and optionally in address fields of the header, according to local
policy. For example, a site may prefer to rewrite 'JRU' as
'J.Random.User' in order to hide login names, and/or to rewrite
'squeaky.sales.example.net' as 'zyx.example.net' to hide machine
names and make it easier to move users.
However, only addresses, local-parts, or domains which match
specific local MSA configuration settings should be altered. It
would be very dangerous for the MSA to apply data-independent
rewriting rules, such as always deleting the first element of a
domain name. So, for example, a rule which strips the left-most
element of the domain if the complete domain matches
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'*.foo.example.net' would be acceptable.
9. Security Considerations
Separation of submission and relay of messages can allow a site to
implement different policies for the two types of services,
including requiring use of additional security mechanisms for one or
both. It can do this in a way which is simpler, both technically
and administratively. This increases the likelihood that policies
will be applied correctly.
Separation also can aid in tracking and preventing unsolicited bulk
email.
For example, a site could configure its mail servers such that the
MSA requires authentication before accepting a message, and the MTA
rejects all RCPT TOs for non-local users. This can be an important
element in a site's total email security policy.
If a site fails to require any form of authorization for message
submissions (see section 3.3 for discussion), it is allowing open
use of its resources and name; unsolicited bulk email can be
injected using its facilities.
Section 3 includes further discussion of issues with some
authentication methods.
Section 5.2 includes a cautionary note that unlimited logging can
enable certain forms of denial of service attacks.
10. IANA Considerations
The registration for port 587 should be updated to refer to this
memo rather than RFC 2476.
11. Acknowledgments
Nathaniel Borenstein and Barry Leiba were instrumental in the
development of this update to RFC 2476.
The original memo (RFC 2476) was developed in part based on comments
and discussions which took place on and off the IETF-Submit mailing
list. The help of those who took the time to review that draft and
make suggestions is appreciated, especially that of Dave Crocker,
Ned Freed, Keith Moore, John Myers, and Chris Newman.
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Special thanks to Harald Alvestrand, who got this effort started.
12. Normative References
[ABNF] D. Crocker, Ed., P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", November 1997, RFC 2234,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2234.txt>
[ESMTP] J. Klensin, N. Freed, M. Rose, E. Stefferud, and D. Crocker,
"SMTP Service Extensions", November 1995, STD 10, RFC 1869,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1869.txt>
[KEYWORDS] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997, BCP 14, RFC 2119,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2119.txt>
[SMTP-MTA] J. Postel, "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", August 1982,
STD 10, RFC 821, <ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc821.txt>; C.
Partridge, "Mail Routing and the Domain System", January 1986, STD
14, RFC 974, <ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc974.txt>; R. Braden,
Editor, "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and
Support", October 1989, STD 3, RFC 1123,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1123.txt>; note that an updated
document which unifies and clarifies material has been published as:
J. Klensin, "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", April 2001, RFC 2821,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2821.txt>
13. Informative References
[521REPLY] A. Durand, and F. Dupont, "SMTP 521 Reply Code",
September 1995, <ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1846.txt>
[8BITMIME] J. Klensin, N. Freed, M. Rose, E. Stefferud, and D.
Crocker, "SMTP Service Extension for 8bit-MIMEtransport", July 1994,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1652.txt>
[CHECKPOINT] D. Crocker, N. Freed, and A. Cargille, "SMTP Service
Extension for Checkpoint/Restart, September 1995, RFC 1845,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1845.txt>
[CHUNKING] G. Vaudreuil, "SMTP Service Extensions for Transmission
of Large and Binary MIME Messages", December 2000, RFC 3030,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3030.txt>
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[CODES-EXTENSION] N. Freed, "SMTP Service Extension for Returning
Enhanced Error Codes", October 1996, RFC 2034,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2034.txt>
[DSN] K. Moore, "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) Service
Extension for Delivery Status Notifications (DSNs)", January 2003,
RFC 3461, <ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3461.txt>
[ETRN] J. De Winter, "SMTP Service Extension for Remote Message
Queue Starting", August 1996, RFC 1985,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1985.txt>
[] J. Palme, "Common Internet Message Headers", February
1997, RFC 2076, <ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2076.txt>
[IMAP4] M. Crispin, "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
4rev1", March 2003, RFC 3501,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3501.txt>
[IPSEC] S. Kent, R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", November 1998, RFC 2401,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2401.txt>
[MESSAGE-FORMAT] D. Crocker, "Standard for the format of ARPA
Internet text messages", August 1982, STD 11, RFC 822,
<ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc822.txt>; R. Braden, Editor,
"Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and Support",
October 1989, STD 3, RFC 1123,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1123.txt>
[Msg-Track] E. Allman, T. Hansen, "SMTP Service Extension for
Message Tracking", September 2004, RFC 3885,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3885.txt>
[PIPELINING] N. Freed, "SMTP Service Extension for Command
Pipelining", September 2000, RFC 2920, STD 60,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2920.txt>
[POP3] J. Myers, M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol -- Version 3", STD
53, May 1996, RFC 1939, <ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1939.txt>
[SIZE] J. Klensin, N. Freed, and K. Moore, "SMTP Service Extension
for Message Size Declaration, November 1995, RFC 1870, STD 10,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1870.txt>
[SMTP-AUTH] J. Myers, "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication",
March 1999, RFC 2554, <ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2554.txt>
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Internet Draft Message Submission for Mail March 2005
[SMTP-CODES] G. Vaudreuil, "Enhanced Mail System Status Codes",
January 2003, RFC 3463, <ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3463.txt>
[Start-TLS] P. Hoffman, "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
Transport Layer Security", February 2002, RFC 3207,
<ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3207.txt>
14. Authors' Addresses
Randall Gellens
QUALCOMM Incorporated
6455 Lusk Blvd.
San Diego, CA 92121-2779
USA
randy@qualcomm.Com
John C. Klensin
1770 Massachusetts Ave, #322
Cambridge, MA 02140
USA
john+ietf@jck.com
Appendix A: Changes from RFC 2476
o Support for [SMTP-AUTH] is now mandatory
o Message-ID changed from MAY to SHOULD
o Added NO-SOLICITING and MTRK (RFC 3885) to list of SMTP
extensions
o Deleted normative use of specific enhanced status codes, to
avoid conflicting with [SMTP-CODES]
o Section 4.2 text no longer in a note
o Fixed a few typographical errors
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Internet Draft Message Submission for Mail March 2005
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