ACE Working Group                                              S. Gerdes
Internet-Draft                                               O. Bergmann
Intended status: Standards Track                              C. Bormann
Expires: January 5, 2015                         Universitaet Bremen TZI
                                                           July 04, 2014


    Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF)
                   draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize-00

Abstract

   This specification defines a protocol for delegating client
   authentication and authorization in a constrained environment for
   establishing a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) channel
   between resource-constrained nodes.  The protocol relies on DTLS to
   transfer authorization information and shared secrets for symmetric
   cryptography between entities in a constrained network.  A resource-
   constrained node can use this protocol to delegate authentication of
   communication peers and management of authorization information to a
   trusted host with less severe limitations regarding processing power
   and memory.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Features  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       1.2.1.  Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       1.2.2.  Other Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  System Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Unauthorized Resource Request Message . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  AS Information Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Access Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  Ticket Request Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.6.  Ticket Grant Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.7.  Ticket Transfer Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.8.  DTLS Channel Setup Between C and RS . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.9.  Authorized Resource Request Message . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.10. Dynamic Update of Authorization Information . . . . . . .  15
       3.10.1.  Handling of Ticket Transfer Messages . . . . . . . .  16
   4.  Ticket  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.1.  Face  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.2.  Verifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.3.  Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.3.1.  Lifetime  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.3.2.  Revocation Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  Payload Format and Encoding (application/dcaf+cbor) . . . . .  18
     5.1.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   6.  DTLS PSK Generation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.1.  DTLS PSK Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.2.  Distributed Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   7.  Authorization Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  Trust Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  Listing Authorization Server Information in a Resource
       Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     9.1.  The "auth-request" Link Relation  . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   10. Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.1.  Access Granted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.2.  Access Denied  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     10.3.  Access Restricted  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     10.4.  Implicit Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   11. Specific Usage Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     11.1.  Combined Authentication Manager and Client . . . . . . .  30
       11.1.1.  Creating the Ticket Request Message  . . . . . . . .  30
       11.1.2.  Processing the Ticket Grant Message  . . . . . . . .  31
     11.2.  Combined Authentication Manager and Authorization Server  31
       11.2.1.  Processing the Access Request Message  . . . . . . .  31
       11.2.2.  Creating the Ticket Transfer Message . . . . . . . .  32
     11.3.  Combined Authorization Server and Resource Server  . . .  32
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     13.1.  DTLS PSK Key Generation Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     13.2.  dcaf+cbor Media Type Registration  . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     13.3.  CoAP Content Format Registration . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36

1.  Introduction

   The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a transfer
   protocol similar to HTTP which is designed for the special
   requirements of constrained environments.  A serious problem with
   constrained devices is the realization of secure communication.  The
   devices only have limited resources such as memory, stable storage
   (such as disk space) and transmission capacity and often lack input/
   output devices such as keyboards or displays.  Therefore, they are
   not readily capable of using common protocols.  Especially
   authentication mechanisms are difficult to realize, because the lack
   of stable storage severely limits the number of keys the system can
   store.  Moreover, CoAP has no mechanism to distinguish access rights
   for different clients (authorization).

   The DCAF architecture is designed to relieve the constrained nodes
   from managing keys for numerous devices by introducing authorization
   servers which conduct the authentication and authorization for their
   nodes.  To achieve this, access tokens are used.  A device which
   wants to access a constrained node's resource first has to gain
   permission in the form of a token from the node's authorization
   server.

   As fine-grained authorization is not always needed on constrained
   devices, DCAF supports an implicit authorization mode where no
   authorization information is exchanged.

   The main goals of DCAF are the setup of a Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] channel with symmetric pre-shared keys
   (PSK) [RFC4279] and to securely transmit authorization tickets.



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


1.1.  Features

   o  Utilize DTLS communication with pre-shared keys.

   o  Authenticated exchange of authorization information.

   o  Simplified authentication on constrained nodes by handing the more
      sophisticated authentication over to less-constrained devices.

   o  Simplified authorization mechanism for cases where implicit
      authorization is sufficient.

   o  Using only symmetric encryption on constrained nodes.

1.2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

1.2.1.  Roles

   Resource Server (RS): A constrained device that hosts resources the
   Client wants to access.

   Client (C): A device that wants to access resources on the Resource
   Server.

   Authorization Server (AS): The node that conducts authentication and
   authorization for a Resource Server.  An Authorization Server can be
   responsible for a single or multiple devices or even for a whole
   network.  A Resource Server can have multiple Authorization Servers.

   Authentication Manager (AM): The node that conducts authentication on
   behalf of the Client.

   Resource Owner: The principal that owns the resource and controls its
   access permissions.

1.2.2.  Other Terms

   Access ticket: Contains the authentication and, if necessary, the
   authorization information needed to access a resource.  A Ticket
   consists of the Ticket Face and the Ticket Verifier

   Authorization information: Contains all information needed by RS to
   decide if C is privileged to access a resource in a specific way.




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   Authentication information: Contains all information needed by RS to
   decide if the entity in possession of a certain key is verified by
   the authorization server.

   Access information: Contains authentication information and, if
   necessary, authorization information.

   Ticket Face: The part of the ticket which is generated for the
   Resource Server.  It contains the authorization information and all
   information needed by the Resource Server to verify that it was
   granted by AS.

   Ticket Verifier: The part of the ticket which is generated for the
   Client.  It enables the client to verify that it is communicating
   with an appropriate RS.

   Explicit authorization: The Authorization Server informs the Resource
   Server in detail which privileges are granted to the Client.

   Implicit authorization: The Authorization Server informs the Resource
   Server that the Client is authorized to access any resource on RS in
   any way, without specifying the privileges in detail.

2.  System Overview

   Within the DCAF Architecture each Resource Server (RS) has one or
   more Authorization Servers (AS) which conduct the authentication and
   authorization for RS.  RS and AS share a symmetric key which has to
   be exchanged initially to provide for a secure channel.  The
   mechanism used for this is not in the scope of this document.

   To gain access to a specific resource on a Resource Server, a client
   (C) has to request an access ticket from one of the Authorization
   Servers serving RS either directly or, if it is a constrained device,
   using its Authentication Manager (AM).  In the following, we always
   discuss the AM role separately, even if that is co-located within a
   (more powerful) C.

   If AS decides that C is allowed to access the resource, it generates
   a DTLS pre-shared key (PSK) for the communication between C and RS
   and wraps it into an access ticket.  For explicit access control, AS
   adds the detailed access permissions to the ticket in a way that RS
   can interpret.  After presenting the ticket to RS, C and RS can
   communicate securely.

   To be able to provide for the authentication and authorization
   services, the Authorization Servers have to fulfill several
   requirements:



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   o  An AS must have enough stable storage (such as disk space) to
      store the necessary number of credentials (matching the number of
      clients and Resource Servers).

   o  An AS must possess means for user interaction, for example
      directly or indirectly connected input/output devices like
      keyboard and display, to allow for configuration of authorization
      information by the Resource Owner.

   o  An AS must have enough processing power to handle the
      authorization requests for all RS devices it is responsible for.

3.  Protocol

   The DCAF protocol comprises three parts:

   1.  transfer of authentication and, if necessary, authorization
       information between C and RS;

   2.  transfer of access requests and the respective ticket grants
       between C and AM; and

   3.  transfer of access requests and the respective ticket grants
       between AS and AM.

3.1.  Overview

   In Figure 1, a DCAF protocol flow is depicted (messages in square
   brackets are optional):

   AM                     C                    RS                   AS
     | <== DTLS chan. ==> |                    | <== DTLS chan. ==> |
     |                    | [Resource Req.-->] |                    |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     |                    | [<-- AS Info.]     |                    |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | <-- Access Req.    |                    |                    |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | <===== TLS/DTLS channel (AM/AS Mutual Authentication) =====> |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | Ticket Request   ------------------------------------------> |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | <------------------------------------------    Ticket Grant  |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | Ticket Transf. --> |                    |                    |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     |                    | <== DTLS chan. ==> |                    |
     |                    | Auth. Res. Req. -> |                    |



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


                        Figure 1: Protocol Overview

   To determine the Authorization Server in charge of a resource hosted
   at the Resource Server (RS), the Client (C) MAY send an initial
   Unauthorized Resource Request message to RS.  RS then denies the
   request and sends the address of its Authorization Server (AS) back
   to the Client.

   Instead of the initial Unauthorized Resource Request message, C MAY
   look up the desired resource in a resource directory (cf.
   [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]) that lists RS's resources as
   discussed in Section 9.

   Once C knows AS' address, it can send a request for authorization to
   AS using its own Authentication Manager (AM).  AS authenticates AM,
   who serves as a trusted introducer for C, and decides if C is allowed
   to communicate with RS and access the requested resource.  If it is,
   AS generates an access ticket for C. The ticket contains keying
   material for the establishment of a secure channel and, if necessary,
   a representation of the permissions C has for the resource.  C keeps
   one part of the access ticket and presents the other part to RS to
   prove its right to access.  With their respective parts of the
   ticket, C and RS are able to establish a secure channel.

   The following sections specify how CoAP is used to interchange
   access-related data between RS and AS so that AS can provide C and RS
   with sufficient information to establish a secure channel, and
   simultaneously convey authorization information specific for this
   communication relationship to RS.

   Note:  Special implementation considerations apply when one single
      entity takes the role of more than one actors.  Section 11 gives
      additional advice on some of these usage scenarios.

   This document uses Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR,
   [RFC7049]) to express authorization information as set of attributes
   passed in CoAP payloads.  Notation and encoding options are discussed
   in Section 5.

3.2.  Unauthorized Resource Request Message

   The optional Unauthorized Resource Request message is a request for a
   resource hosted by RS for which no proper authorization is granted.
   RS MUST treat any CoAP request as Unauthorized Resource Request
   message when any of the following holds:

   o  The request has been received on an insecure channel.




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   o  RS has no valid access information for the sender of the request
      regarding the requested action on that resource.

   o  RS has valid access information for the sender of the request, but
      this does not allow the requested action on the requested
      resource.

   Note: These conditions ensure that RS can handle requests
   autonomously once access was granted and a secure channel has been
   established between C and RS.

   Unauthorized Resource Request messages MUST be denied with a client
   error response.  In this response, the Resource Server MUST provide
   proper AS Information to enable the Client to request an access
   ticket from RS's Authorization Server as described in Section 3.3.

   The response code MUST be 4.01 (Unauthorized) in case the sender of
   the Unauthorized Resource Request message is not authenticated, or if
   RS has no valid access ticket for C. If RS has authorization
   information for C but not for the resource that C has requested, RS
   MUST reject the request with a 4.03 (Forbidden).  If RS has
   authorization information for C but they do not cover the action C
   requested on the resource, RS MUST reject the request with a 4.05
   (Method Not Allowed).

   Note:  The use of the response codes 4.03 and 4.05 is intended to
      prevent infinite loops where a dumb Client optimistically tries to
      access a requested resource with any access token received from
      the AS.  As malicious clients could pretend to be C to determine
      C's privileges, these detailed response codes must be used only
      when a certain level of security is already available which can be
      achieved only when the Client is authenticated.

3.3.  AS Information Message

   The AS Information Message is sent by RS as a response to an
   Unauthorized Resource Request message (see Section 3.2) to point the
   sender of the Unauthorized Resource Request message to RS's
   Authorization Server.  The AS information is a set of attributes
   containing an absolute URI (see Section 4.3 of [RFC3986]) that
   specifies the Authorization Server in charge of RS.

   The message MAY also contain a timestamp generated by RS.

   Figure 2 shows an example for an AS Information message payload using
   CBOR diagnostic notation.  (Refer to Section 5 for a detailed
   description of the available attributes and their semantics.)




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


    4.01 Unauthorized
    Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
    {AS: "coaps://as-rs.example.com/authorize", TS: 168537}

                 Figure 2: AS Information Payload Example

   In this example, the attribute AS points the receiver of this message
   to the URI "coaps://as-rs.example.com/authorize" to request access
   permissions.  The originator of the AS Information payload (i.e. RS)
   uses a local clock that is loosely synchronized with a time scale
   common between RS and AS (e.g., wall clock time).  Therefore, it has
   included a time stamp on its own time scale that is used as a nonce
   for replay attack prevention.  Refer to Section 4.1 for more details
   concerning the usage of time stamps to ensure freshness of access
   tickets.

   The examples in this document are written in CBOR diagnostic notation
   to improve readability.  Figure 3 illustrates the binary encoding of
   the message payload shown in Figure 2.

   a2                                      # map(2)
          00                                   # unsigned(0) (=AS)
          78 23                                # text(35)
             636f6170733a2f2f61732d72732e6578
             616d706c652e636f6d2f617574686f72
             697a65             # "coaps://as-rs.example.com/authorize"
          05                                   # unsigned(5) (=TS)
          1a 00029259                          # unsigned(168537)

         Figure 3: AS Information Payload Example encoded in CBOR

3.4.  Access Request

   To retrieve an access ticket for the resource that C wants to access,
   C sends an Access Request to its authentication manager AM.  The
   Access Request is constructed as follows:

   1.  The request method is POST.

   2.  The request URI is set as described below.

   3.  The message payload contains a data structure that describes the
       action and resource for which C requests an access ticket.

   The request URI identifies a resource at AM for handling
   authorization requests from C. The URI SHOULD be announced by AM in
   its resource directory as described in Section 9.




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   Note:  Where capacity limitations of C do not allow for resource
      directory lookups, the request URI in Access Requests could be
      hard-coded during provisioning or set in a specific device
      configuration profile.

   The message payload is constructed from the AS information that RS
   has returned in its AS Information message (see Section 3.3) and
   information that C provides to describe its intended request(s).  The
   Access Request MUST contain the following attributes:

   1.  Contact information for the AS to use.

   2.  An absolute URI of the resource that C wants to access.

   3.  The actions that C wants to perform on the resource.

   4.  Any time stamp generated by RS.

   An example Access Request from C to AM is depicted in Figure 4.
   (Refer to Section 5 for a detailed description of the available
   attributes and their semantics.)

   POST client-authorize
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   {
     AS: "coaps://as-rs.example.com/authorize",
     AI: ["coaps://temp451.example.com/s/tempC", 5],
     TS: 168537
   }

                 Figure 4: Access Request Message Example

   The example shows an Access Request message payload for the resource
   "/s/tempC" on the Resource Server "temp451.example.com".  Requested
   operations in attribute AR are GET and PUT.

   The attributes AS (that denotes the Authorization Server to use) and
   TS (a nonce generated by RS) are taken from the AS Information
   message from RS.

   The response to an Authorization Request is delivered by AM back to C
   in a Ticket Transfer message.









Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


3.5.  Ticket Request Message

   When AM receives an Access Request message from C it MAY return a
   cached response if it is known to be fresh.  Otherwise, it checks
   whether the request payload is of type "application/dcaf+cbor and
   contains at least the fields AS and AI.  AM MUST respond with 4.00
   (Bad Request) if the type is "application/dcaf+cbor and any of these
   fields is missing or does not conform to the format described in
   Section 5.  Content formats other than application/dcaf+cbor are out
   of scope of this specification.

   When the payload is correct, AM creates a Ticket Request message from
   the Access Request received from C as follows:

   1.  The destination of the Ticket Request message is derived from the
       authority information in the URI contained in field "AS" of the
       Access Request message payload.

   2.  The request method is POST.

   3.  The request URI is constructed from the AS field received in the
       Access Request message payload.

   4.  The payload is copied from the Access Request sent by C.

   5.  A label that describes the Client is added to the payload

   To send the Ticket Request message to AS a secure channel between AM
   and AS MUST be used.  Depending on the URI scheme used in the AS
   field of the Access Request message payload (the less-constrained
   devices AM and AS do not necessarily use coap to communicate with
   each other), this could be, e.g., a DTLS channel (for "coaps") or a
   TLS connection (for "https").  AM and AS MUST be able to mutually
   authenticate each other, e.g. based on a public key infrastructure.
   (Refer to Section 8 for a detailed discussion of the trust
   relationship between authentication managers and authorization
   servers.)

   The descriptive label of C included in the Ticket Request is used to
   distinguish the clients within AS's namespace and MUST NOT be used
   for authenticating the client.

3.6.  Ticket Grant Message

   When AS has received a Ticket Request message it has to evaluate the
   access request information contained therein.  First, it checks
   whether the request payload is of type "application/dcaf+cbor" and
   contains at least the fields AS, D, and AI.  AS MUST respond with



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   4.00 (Bad Request) for CoAP (or 400 for HTTP) if the type is
   "application/dcaf+cbor" and any of these fields is missing or does
   not conform to the format described in Section 5.

   AS decides whether or not access is granted to the requested resource
   and then creates a Ticket Grant message that reflects the result.  To
   grant access to the requested resource, AS creates an access ticket
   comprised of a Face and a Verifier as described in Section 4.1.

   The Ticket Grant message then is constructed as a success response
   indicating attached content, i.e. 2.05 for CoAP, or 200 for HTTP,
   respectively.  The payload of the Ticket Grant message is a data
   structure that contains the result of the access request.  When
   access is granted, the data structure contains the ticket's Face, the
   Verifier and the Session Key Generation Method.

   The Ticket Grant message MAY provide cache-control options to enable
   intermediaries to cache the response.  The message MAY be cached
   according to the rules defined in [RFC7252] to facilitate ticket
   retrieval when C has crashed and wants to recover the DTLS session
   with RS.

   AS sets Max-Age according to the ticket lifetime in its response
   (Ticket Grant Message).

   Figure 5 shows an example Ticket Grant message using CoAP.  The Face/
   Verifier information is transferred as a CBOR data structure as
   specified in Section 5.  The Max-Age option tells the receiving AM
   how long this ticket will be valid.

   2.05 Content
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   Max-Age: 86400
   { F: {
           AI: [ "/s/tempC", 7 ],
           D: "2001:db8:ab9:1234:7920:3133:ae5f:87",
           TS: 0("2013-07-10T10:04:12.391"),
           L:  86400,
           G: hmac_sha256
     },
     V: h'b2dd4e409c2d36a7423da3c87e571999
           0b778ebd2c7d3730729a7fcde26c7201'
   }

                  Figure 5: Example Ticket Grant Message






Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   A Ticket Grant message that declines any operation on the requested
   resource is illustrated in Figure 6.  As no ticket needs to be
   issued, an empty payload is included with the response.

    2.05 Content
    Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor

            Figure 6: Example Ticket Grant Message With Reject

3.7.  Ticket Transfer Message

   A Ticket Transfer message delivers the access information sent by AS
   in a Ticket Grant message to the requesting client C.  The Ticket
   Transfer message is the response to the Access Request message sent
   from C to AM and includes any access information from AS contained in
   the Ticket Grant message.

3.8.  DTLS Channel Setup Between C and RS

   Using the information contained in a positive response to its Access
   Request (i.e. a Ticket Transfer message that contains a Face and a
   Verifier), C can initiate establishment of a new DTLS channel with
   RS.  To use DTLS with pre-shared keys, C follows the PSK key exchange
   algorithm specified in Section 2 of [RFC4279], with the following
   additional requirements:

   1.  C sets the psk_identity field of the ClientKeyExchange message to
       the ticket Face received in the Ticket Transfer message.

   2.  C uses the ticket Verifier as PSK when constructing the premaster
       secret.

   Note1: As RS cannot provide C with a meaningful PSK identity hint in
   response to C's ClientHello message, RS SHOULD NOT send a
   ServerKeyExchange message.

   Note2: According to [RFC7252], CoAP implementations MUST support the
   ciphersuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC6655].  C is therefore
   expected to offer at least this ciphersuite to RS.

   Note3: The ticket is constructed by AS such that RS can derive the
   authorization information as well as the PSK (refer to Section 6 for
   details).

3.9.  Authorized Resource Request Message

   Successful establishment of the DTLS channel between C and RS ties
   the authorization information contained in the psk_identity field to



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   this channel.  Any request that RS receives on this channel is
   checked against these authorization rules.  Incoming CoAP requests
   that are not Authorized Resource Requests MUST be rejected by RS with
   4.01 response as described in Section 3.2.

   RS SHOULD treat an incoming CoAP request as Authorized Resource
   Request if the following holds:

   1.  The message was received on a secure channel that has been
       established using the procedure defined in Section 3.8.

   2.  The authorization information tied to the secure channel is
       valid.

   3.  The request is destined for RS.

   4.  The resource URI specified in the request is covered by the
       authorization information.

   5.  The request method is an authorized action on the resource with
       respect to the authorization information.

   Note that the authorization information is not restricted to a single
   resource URI.  For example, role-based authorization can be used to
   authorize a collection of semantically connected resources
   simultaneously.  Implicit authorization also provides access rights
   to authenticated clients for all actions on all resources that RS
   offers.  As a result, C can use the same DTLS channel not only for
   subsequent requests for the same resource (e.g. for block-wise
   transfer as defined in [I-D.ietf-core-block] or refreshing observe-
   relationships [I-D.ietf-core-observe]) but also for requests to
   distinct resources.

   Incoming CoAP requests received on a secure channel according to the
   procedure defined in Section 3.8 MUST be rejected

   1.  with response code 4.03 (Forbidden) when the resource URI
       specified in the request is not covered by the authorization
       information, and

   2.  with response code 4.05 (Method Not Allowed) when the resource
       URI specified in the request covered by the authorization
       information but not the requested action.

   Since AS may limit the set of requested actions in its Ticket Grant
   message, C cannot know a priori if an Authorized Resource Request
   will succeed.




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 14]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


3.10.  Dynamic Update of Authorization Information

   Once a security association exists between a Client and a Resource
   Server, the Client can update the Authorization Information stored at
   the Resource Server at any time.  To do so, the Client creates a new
   Access Request for the intended action on the respective resource and
   sends this request to its Authentication Manager which relays this
   request to the Resource Server's Authorization Server as described in
   Section 3.4.

   Note:  Requesting a new Access Ticket also can be a Client's reaction
      on a 4.03 or 4.05 error that it has received in response to an
      Authorized Resource Request.

   Figure 7 depicts the message flow where C requests a new Access
   Tickets after a security association between C and RS has been
   established using this protocol.

   AM                     C                    RS                   AS
     | <== DTLS chan. ==> | <== DTLS chan. ==> | <== DTLS chan. ==> |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     |                    | [Unauth. R. Req->] |                    |
     |                    | [<- 4.0x+AS Info.] |                    |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | <-- Access Req.    |                    |                    |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | <===== TLS/DTLS channel (AM/AS Mutual Authentication) =====> |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | Ticket Request   ------------------------------------------> |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | <------------------------------------------    Ticket Grant  |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     | Ticket Transf. --> |                    |                    |
     |                    |                    |                    |
     |                    | <== Update AI ===> |                    |


              Figure 7: Overview of Dynamic Update Operation

   Processing the Ticket Request is done at the Authorization Server as
   specified in Section 3.6, i.e. the AS checks whether or not the
   requested operation is permitted by the Resource Owner's policy, and
   then return a Ticket Grant message with the result of this check.  If
   access is granted, the Ticket Grant message contains an Access Ticket
   comprised of a public Ticket Face and a private Ticket Verifier.
   This authorization payload is relayed by the Authorization Manager to
   the Client in a Ticket Transfer Message as defined in Section 3.7.




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 15]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   The major difference between dynamic update of Authorization
   Information and the initial handshake is the handling of a Ticket
   Transfer message by the Client that is described in Section 3.10.1.

3.10.1.  Handling of Ticket Transfer Messages

   If the security association with RS still exists and RS has indicated
   support for session renegotiation according to [RFC5746], the ticket
   Face SHOULD be used to renegotiate the existing DTLS session.  In
   this case, the ticket Face is used as psk_identity as defined in
   Section 3.8.  Otherwise, the Client MUST perform a new DTLS handshake
   according to Section 3.8 that replaces the existing DTLS session.

   After successful completion of the DTLS handshake RS updates the
   existing Authorization Information for C according to the contents of
   the ticket Face.

   Note:  No mutual authentication between C and RS is required for
      dynamic updates when a DTLS channel exists that has been
      established as defined in Section 3.8.  RS only needs to verify
      the authenticity and integrity of the ticket Face issued by AS
      which is achieved by having performed a successful DTLS handshake
      with the ticket Face as psk_identity.  This could even be done
      within the existing DTLS session by tunneling a CoDTLS
      [I-D.schmertmann-dice-codtls] handshake.

4.  Ticket

   Access tokens in DCAF are tickets that consist of two parts, namely
   the Face and the Verifier.  The Face goes to RS, the Verifier goes to
   the Client.  The Face and the Verifier are parts of the same ticket.

   RS only needs the information contained in the Ticket Face to
   authorize the client and make sure that AS generated the Ticket Face
   (RS cannot make authorization decisions by itself and hence needs AS
   to do it).  No additional information about the Client is needed.  RS
   keeps the Ticket Face as long as it is valid.

4.1.  Face

   Face is the part of the ticket generated for RS.  Face MUST contain
   all information needed for authorized access to a resource:

   o  Authorization Information

   o  Descriptive label

   o  A timestamp generated by AS



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 16]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   Optionally, Face MAY also contain:

   o  A lifetime (optional)

   o  A DTLS pre-shared key (optional)

   RS MUST verify the integrity of Face, i.e. the information contained
   in Face stems from AS and was not manipulated by anyone else.

   Face MUST contain a timestamp to verify that the contained
   information is fresh.  As constrained devices may not have a clock,
   timestamps MAY be generated using the clock ticks since the last
   reboot.  To circumvent synchronization problems the timestamp MAY be
   generated by RS and included in the first AS Information message.
   Alternatively, AS MAY generate the timestamp.  In this case, AS and
   RS MUST use a time synchronization mechanism to make sure that RS
   interprets the timestamp correctly.

   Face MAY be encrypted.  If Face contains a DTLS PSK, the whole
   content of Face MUST be encrypted.

   Note: The integrity of Face can be ensured by various means.  Face
   may be encrypted by AS with a key it shares with RS.  Alternatively,
   RS can use a mechanism to generate the DTLS PSK which includes Face
   and is only able to calculate the correct key with the correct Face
   (refer to Section 6 for details).

4.2.  Verifier

   The Verifier part of the ticket is generated for C. It contains the
   DTLS PSK for C. The Verifier MUST NOT be transmitted over insecure
   channels.

4.3.  Revocation

   The existence of access tickets SHOULD be limited in time.  This can
   be achieved either by explicit Revocation Messages to invalidate a
   ticket or implicitly by attaching a lifetime to the ticket.

4.3.1.  Lifetime

   Tickets MAY have a lifetime.  AS is responsible for defining the
   ticket lifetime.  If AS sets a lifetime for a ticket, AS and RS MUST
   use a time synchronization method to ensure that RS is able to
   interpret the lifetime correctly.  RS SHOULD end the DTLS connection
   to C if the lifetime of a ticket has run out and it MUST NOT accept
   new requests.  RS MUST NOT accept tickets with an invalid lifetime.




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 17]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   Note: Defining reasonable ticket lifetimes is difficult to
   accomplish.  How long a client needs to access a resource depends
   heavily on the application scenario and may be difficult to decide
   for AS.

4.3.2.  Revocation Messages

   AS MAY revoke tickets by sending a ticket revocation message to RS.
   If RS receives a ticket revocation message, it MUST end the DTLS
   connection to C and MUST NOT accept any further requests from C.

   If ticket revocation messages are used, RS MUST check regularly if AS
   is still available.  If RS cannot contact AS, it MUST end all DTLS
   connections and reject any further requests from C.

   Note: The loss of the connection between RS and AS prevents all
   access to RS.  This might especially be a severe problem if AS is
   responsible for several Resource Servers or even a whole network.

5.  Payload Format and Encoding (application/dcaf+cbor)

   Various messages types of the DCAF protocol carry payloads to express
   authorization information and parameters for generating the DTLS PSK
   to be used by C and RS.  In this section, a representation in Concise
   Binary Object Representation (CBOR, [RFC7049]) is defined.

   DCAF data structures are defined as CBOR maps that contain key value
   pairs.  For efficient encoding, the keys defined in this document are
   represented as unsigned integers in CBOR, i. e. major type 0.  For
   improved reading, we use symbolic identifiers to represent the
   corresponding encoded values as defined in Table 1.

                          +---------------+-----+
                          | Encoded Value | Key |
                          +---------------+-----+
                          | 0b000_00000   | AS  |
                          |               |     |
                          | 0b000_00001   | AI  |
                          |               |     |
                          | 0b000_00010   | D   |
                          |               |     |
                          | 0b000_00011   | E   |
                          |               |     |
                          | 0b000_00100   | K   |
                          |               |     |
                          | 0b000_00101   | TS  |
                          |               |     |
                          | 0b000_00110   | L   |



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 18]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


                          |               |     |
                          | 0b000_00111   | G   |
                          |               |     |
                          | 0b000_01000   | F   |
                          |               |     |
                          | 0b000_01001   | V   |
                          +---------------+-----+

              Table 1: DCAF field identifiers encoded in CBOR

   The following list describes the semantics of the keys defined in
   DCAF.

   AS:  Authorization Server.  This attribute denotes the authorization
      server that is in charge of the resource specified in attribute R.
      The attribute's value is a string that contains an absolute URI
      according to Section 4.3 of [RFC3986].

   AI:  Authorization Information.  A data structure used to convey
      authorization information from AS to RS and to describe the
      permissions requested from AS in a Ticket Request.  The AI
      attribute contains an AIF object as defined in
      [I-D.bormann-core-ace-aif].

   D: Description.  A descriptive label of the initiator of the
      authorization request.  This label MAY be a fully qualified domain
      name, an IP address, or any other character literal that is used
      by the Authorization Server to decide whether or not access is
      granted to the requesting entity.

   E: Encrypted Ticket Face.  A binary string containing an encrypted
      ticket Face.

   K: Key. A string that identifies the shared key between RS and AS
      that can be used to decrypt the contents of E. If the attribute E
      is present and no attribute K has been specified, the default is
      to use the current session key for the secured channel between RS
      and AS.

   TS:  Time Stamp.  An optional time stamp that indicates the instant
      when the access ticket request was formed.  This attribute can be
      used by the resource server in an AS Information message to convey
      a time stamp in its local time scale (e.g. when it does not have a
      real time clock with synchronized global time).  When the
      attribute's value is encoded as a string, it MUST contain a valid
      UTC timestamp without time zone information.  When encoded as
      integer, TS contains a system timestamp relative to the local time
      scale of its generator, usually RS.



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 19]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   L: Lifetime.  A lifetime of the ticket.  When encoded as a string, L
      MUST denote the ticket's expiry time as a valid UTC timestamp
      without time zone information.  When encoded as an integer, L MUST
      denote the ticket's validity period in seconds relative to TS.

   G: DTLS PSK Generation Method.  A numeric identifier for the method
      that RS MUST use to derive the DTLS PSK from the ticket Face.
      This attribute MUST NOT be used when attribute V is present within
      the contents of F.  This specification uses symbolic identifiers
      for improved readability.  The corresponding numeric values
      encoded in CBOR are defined in Table 2.  A registry for these
      codes is defined in Section 13.1.

   F: Ticket Face.  An object containing the fields AI, D, TS, and
      optionally G, L and V.

   V: Ticket Verifier.  A binary string containing the shared secret
      between C and RS.

                +---------------+-------------+-----------+
                | Encoded Value | Mnemonic    | Support   |
                +---------------+-------------+-----------+
                | 0b000_00000   | hmac_sha256 | mandatory |
                |               |             |           |
                | 0b000_00001   | hmac_sha384 | optional  |
                |               |             |           |
                | 0b000_00010   | hmac_sha512 | optional  |
                +---------------+-------------+-----------+

        Table 2: CBOR encoding for DTLS PSK Key Generation Methods

5.1.  Examples

   The following example specifies an Authorization Server that will be
   accessed using HTTP over TLS.  The request URI is set to "/
   a?ep=%5B2001:DB8::dcaf:1234%5D" (hence denoting the endpoint address
   to authorize).  TS denotes a local timestamp in UTC.

   POST /a?ep=%5B2001:DB8::dcaf:1234%5D HTTP/1.1
   Host: as-rs.example.com
   Content-Type: application/dcaf+cbor
   {AS: "https://as-rs.example.com/a?ep=%5B2001:DB8::dcaf:1234%5D",
    D: "2001:DB8::dcaf:1234",
    AI: ["coaps://temp451.example.com/s/tempC", 1],
    TS: 0("2013-07-14T11:58:22.923")}

   The following example shows a ticket for the distributed key
   generation method (cf. Section 6.2), comprised of a Face (F) and a



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 20]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   Verifier (V).  The Face data structure contains authorization
   information AI, a client descriptor, a timestamp using the local time
   scale of RS, and a lifetime relative to RS's time scale.

   The DTLS PSK Generation Method is set to hmac_sha256 denoting that
   the distributed key derivation is used as defined in Section 6.2 with
   SHA-256 as HMAC function.

   The Verifier V contains a shared secret to be used as DTLS PSK
   between C and RS.

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/dcaf+cbor
   {
     F: {
          AI: [ "/s/tempC", 1 ],
          D: "2001:db8:ab9:1234:7920:3133:ae5f:87",
          TS: 2938749,
          L:  3600,
          G: hmac_sha256
        },
     V: h'93b9448d4380304d5a574fc50b944958
          55bbd5ba1422cc09fde61665aa519cf9'
   }

   The Face may be encrypted as illustrated in the following example.
   Here, the field E carries an encrypted Face data structure that
   contains the same information as the previous example, and an
   additional Verifier.  Encryption was done with a secret shared by AS
   and RS.  (This example uses AES128_CCM with the secret { 0x00, 0x01,
   0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c,
   0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f } and RS's timestamp { 0x00, 0x2C, 0xD7, 0x7D } as
   nonce.)  Line breaks have been inserted to improve readability.

   The attribute K describes the identity of the key to be used by RS to
   decrypt the contents of attribute E. Here, The value "key0" in this
   example is used to indicate that the shared session key between RS
   and AS was used for encrypting E.

   {
    E: h'2e1c0c0ae1915711f1073f34e44bfc81
         12167f5bdbd8801d07686615b0b434
         cdca7a5453d0d582565e2f236948235d
         d353cef1114d64d138949f7ab01b92f0
         b6f2caccce3a43cb0a32f270a82cde0a
         98250e6ac2b79a26fb47c09ef4cb366f
         1aa38017cd8b891a6d796fa684294a60
         64f3665527c5890b65a33af73a5c66ef



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 21]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


         66cbb9e28ea30c89',
     K: "key0",
     V: h'93b9448d4380304d5a574fc50b944958
          55bbd5ba1422cc09fde61665aa519cf9'
   }

   The decrypted contents of E are depicted below (whitespace has been
   added to improve readability).  The presence of the attribute V
   indicates that the DTLS PSK Transfer is used to convey the session
   key (cf. Section 6.1).

   {
     F: {
          AI: [ "/s/tempC", 1 ],
          D: "2001:db8:ab9:1234:7920:3133:ae5f:87",
          TS: 2938749,
          L:  3600,
          G: hmac_sha256
        },
     V: h'93b9448d4380304d5a574fc50b944958
          55bbd5ba1422cc09fde61665aa519cf9'
   }

6.  DTLS PSK Generation Methods

   One goal of the DCAF protocol is to provide for a DTLS PSK shared
   between C and RS.  AS and RS MUST negotiate the method for the DTLS
   PSK generation.

6.1.  DTLS PSK Transfer

   The DTLS PSK is generated by AS and transmitted to C and RS using a
   secure channel.

   The DTLS PSK transfer method is defined as follows:

   o  AS generates the DTLS PSK using an algorithm of its choice

   o  AS MUST include a representation of the DTLS PSK in Face and
      encrypt it together with all other information in Face with a key
      K(AS,RS) it shares with RS.  How AS and RS exchange K(AS,RS) is
      not in the scope of this document.  AS and RS MAY use their
      preshared key as K(AS,RS).

   o  AS MUST include a representation of the DTLS PSK in the Verifier.

   o  As AS and C do not have a shared secret, the Verifier MUST be
      transmitted to C using encrypted channels.



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 22]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   o  RS MUST decrypt Face using K(AS,RS)

6.2.  Distributed Key Derivation

   AS generates a DTLS PSK for C which is transmitted using a secure
   channel.  RS generates its own version of the DTLS PSK using the
   information contained in Face (see also Section 4.1).

   The distributed key derivation method is defined as follows:

   o  AS and RS both generate the DTLS PSK using the information.
      included in Face.  They use an HMAC algorithm on Face with a
      shared key.  The result serves as the DTLS PSK.  How AS and RS
      negotiate the used HMAC algorithm is not in the scope of this
      document.  They MAY however use the HMAC algorithm they use for
      their DTLS connection.

   o  AS MUST include a representation of the DTLS PSK in the Verifier.

   o  As AS and C do not have a shared secret, the Verifier MUST be
      transmitted to C using encrypted channels.

   o  AS MUST NOT include a representation of the DTLS PSK in Face.

   o  AS MUST NOT encrypt Face.

7.  Authorization Configuration

   For the protocol defined in this document, proper configuration of AS
   is crucial.  The principal who owns the resources hosted by RS (i.e.
   the Resource Owner) needs to define permissions for the resources.
   The data representation of these permissions are not in the scope of
   this document.

8.  Trust Relationships

   C trusts AM, and RS trusts AS.  Obviously, AM trusts C with the
   specific permissions it hands over to it.  How this trust is
   established, is not in the scope of this document.  It may be
   achieved by using a bootstrapping mechanism similar to [bergmann12].

   Additionally, AS and AM need to have a trust relationship
   established.  Its establishment is also not in the scope of this
   document.  It fulfills the following conditions:

   1.  AS has means to authenticate AM (e.g. it has a certificate of AM
       or a PKI in which AM is included) and vice versa




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 23]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   2.  As far as AS needs to rely on the different clients of AM to
       receive different permissions, it can be sure that AM correctly
       identifies these clients towards AS and does not leak tickets
       that have been generated for a specific client C to another
       client.

   AS trusts C indirectly because it trusts AM and AM vouches for C. The
   DCAF Protocol does not provide any means for AS to validate that a
   resource requests stems from C.

   C indirectly trusts AS with some potentially confidential
   information, and that AS correctly represents RS, because AM trusts
   AS.

   AM trusts RS indirectly because it trusts AS and AS vouches for RS.

   C implicitly trusts RS with some potentially confidential information
   because it trusts AM and because RS can prove that it shares a key
   with AS.

      AM <--------------------> AS

      /|\                      /|\
       |                        |
      \|/                      \|/

       C .....................  RS


9.  Listing Authorization Server Information in a Resource Directory

   CoAP utilizes the Web Linking format [RFC5988] to facilitate
   discovery of services in an M2M environment.  [RFC6690] defines
   specific link parameters that can be used to describe resources to be
   listed in a resource directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

9.1.  The "auth-request" Link Relation

   This section defines a resource type "auth-request" that can be used
   by clients to retrieve the request URI for a server's authorization
   service.  When used with the parameter rt in a web link, "auth-
   request" indicates that the corresponding target URI can be used in a
   POST message to request authorization for the resource and action
   that are described in the request payload.

   The Content-Format "application/dcaf+cbor with numeric identifier
   TBD1 defined in this specification MAY be used to express access
   requests and their responses.



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 24]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   The following example shows the web link used by AM in this document
   to relay incoming Authorization Request messages to AS.  (Whitespace
   is included only for readability.)

   <client-authorize>;rt="auth-request";ct=TBD1
                     ;title="Contact Remote Authorization Server"

   The resource directory that hosts the resource descriptions of RS
   could list the following description.  In this example, the URI "ep/
   node138/a/switch2941" is relative to the resource context "coaps
   ://as-rs.example.com/", i.e. the authorization server AS.

   <ep/node138/a/switch2941>;rt="auth-request";ct=TBD1;ep="node138"
                            ;title="Request Client Authorization"
                            ;anchor="coaps://as-rs.example.com/"

10.  Examples

   This section gives a number of short examples with message flows for
   the initial Unauthorized Resource Request and the subsequent
   retrieval of a ticket from AS.  The notation here follows the role
   conventions defined in Section 1.2.1.  The payload format is encoded
   as proposed in Section 5.  The IP address of AS is 2001:DB8::1, the
   IP address of RS is 2001:DB8::dcaf:1234, and C's IP address is
   2001:DB8::c.

10.1.  Access Granted

   This example shows an Unauthorized PUT request from C to RS that is
   answered with an AS Information message.  C then sends a POST request
   to AM with a description of its intended request.  AM forwards this
   request to AS using CoAP over a DTLS-secured channel.  The response
   from AS contains an access ticket that is relayed back to AM.

   C --> RS
   PUT a/switch2941 [Mid=1234]
   Content-Format: application/senml+json
   {"e": [{"bv": "1"}]}

   C <-- RS
   4.01 Unauthorized  [Mid=1234]
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   {AS: "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941"}

   C --> AM
   POST client-authorize [Mid=1235,Token="tok"]
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   {



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 25]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


     AS: "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
     AI: ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 4]
   }

   AM --> AS [Mid=23146]
   POST ep/node138/a/switch2941
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   {
     AS: "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
     D:  "2001:DB8::c",
     AI: ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 4]
   }

   AM <-- AS
   2.05 Content  [Mid=23146]
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   { F: {
          AI: ["a/switch2941", 5],
          D:  "2001:DB8::c",
          TS: 0("2013-07-04T20:17:38.002"),
          G: hmac_sha256
        },
     V: h'50f18bf1d6f084eb0fd9d2ee6ec882d8
          a87ef66a332c86a45bff8f67fe19bc47'
   }

   C <-- AM
   2.05 Content  [Mid=1235,Token="tok"]
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   { F: {
          AI: ["a/switch2941", 5],
          D:  "2001:DB8::c",
          TS: 0("2013-07-04T20:17:38.002"),
          G: hmac_sha256
        },
     V: h'50f18bf1d6f084eb0fd9d2ee6ec882d8
          a87ef66a332c86a45bff8f67fe19bc47'
   }

   C --> RS
   ClientHello (TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8)

   C <-- RS
   ServerHello (TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8)
   ServerHelloDone

   C --> RS
   ClientKeyExchange



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 26]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


     psk_identity=0x6146a4624149826c612f737769746368
                  0x323934310561446b323030313a444238
                  0x3a3a63625453c077323031332d30372d
                  0x30345432303a31373a33382e30303261
                  0x476b686d61635f736861323536

   (C decodes the contents of V and uses the result as PSK)
   ChangeCipherSpec
   Finished

   (RS calculates PSK from AI, D, TS and its session key
    HMAC_sha256(0x6146a4624149826c612f737769746368
                0x323934310561446b323030313a444238
                0x3a3a63625453c077323031332d30372d
                0x30345432303a31373a33382e30303261
                0x476b686d61635f736861323536,
                0x66736563726574)
   = 0x0e70158e...
   )

   C <-- RS
   ChangeCipherSpec
   Finished


10.2.  Access Denied

   This example shows a denied Authorization request for the DELETE
   operation.

   C --> RS
   DELETE a/switch2941

   C <-- RS
   4.01 Unauthorized
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   {AS: "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941"}

   C --> AM
   POST client-authorize
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   {
     AS: "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
     AI: ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 8]
   }

   AM --> AS
   POST ep/node138/a/switch2941



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 27]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   {
     AS: "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
     D:  "2001:DB8::c",
     AI: ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 8]
   }

   AM <-- AS
   2.05 Content
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor

   C <-- AM
   2.05 Content
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor

10.3.  Access Restricted

   This example shows a denied Authorization request for the operations
   GET, PUT, and DELETE.  AS grants access for PUT only.

   AM --> AS
   POST ep/node138/a/switch2941
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   {
     AS: "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
     D:  "2001:DB8::c",
     AI: ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 13]
   }

   AM <-- AS
   2.05 Content
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   { F: {
          AI: ["a/switch2941", 5],
          D:  "2001:DB8::c",
          TS: 0("2013-07-04T21:33:11.930"),
          G: hmac_sha256
        },
     V: h'f5628265ec99349d2b1f3a1020223793
          7098512d555f085a775f1ae6a9c66950'
   }

10.4.  Implicit Authorization








Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 28]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   This example shows an Authorization request using implicit
   authorization.  AM initially requests the actions GET and POST on the
   resource "coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941".  AS returns a
   ticket that has no AI field in its ticket Face, hence implicitly
   authorizing C.

   AM --> AS
   POST ep/node138/a/switch2941
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   {
      AS: "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
      D:  "2001:DB8::c",
      AI: ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 3]
   }

   AM <-- AS
   2.05 Content
   Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
   { F: {
          D:  "2001:DB8::c",
          TS: 0("2013-07-16T10:15:43.663"),
          G: hmac_sha256
         },
     V: h'6d30f6162b54cd50c8b7421674d46150
          1baba2a34c0a86a7aacc0cfe3c2f2643'
   }

11.  Specific Usage Scenarios

   The general DCAF architure outlined in Section 3.1 illustrates the
   various actors who participate in the message exchange for
   authenticated authorization.  The message types defined in this
   document cover the most general case where all four actors are
   separate entities that may or may not reside on the same device.

   Special implementation considerations apply when one single entity
   takes the role of more than one actor.  This section gives advice on
   the most common usage scenarios where the Authentication Manager and
   Client, the Authorization Server and Resource Server or the
   Authentication Manager and Authorization Server reside on the same
   (less-constrained) device and have a means of secure communication
   outside the scope of this document.









Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 29]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


11.1.  Combined Authentication Manager and Client

   When AM and C reside on the same (less-constrained) device, the
   Access Request and Ticket Transfer messages can be substituted by
   other means of secure communication.  Figure 8 shows a simplified
   message exchange for a combined AM+C device.

     AM+C                 RS                   AS
     |                    | <== DTLS chan. ==> |
     | [Resource Req.-->] |                    |
     |                    |                    |
     | [<-- AS Info.]     |                    |
     |                    |                    |
     | <==== TLS/DTLS chan. (Mutual Auth) ===> |
     |                    |                    |
     | Ticket Request   ---------------------> |
     |                    |                    |
     | <---------------------    Ticket Grant  |
     |                    |                    |
     | <== DTLS chan. ==> |                    |
     | Auth. Res. Req. -> |                    |


           Figure 8: Combined Authentication Manager and Client

11.1.1.  Creating the Ticket Request Message

   When AM+C receives an AS Information message as a reaction to an
   Unauthorized Request message, it creates a Ticket Request message as
   follows:

   1.  The destination of the Ticket Request message is derived from the
       authority information in the URI contained in field "AS" of the
       AS Information message payload.

   2.  The request method is POST.

   3.  The request URI is constructed from the AS field received in the
       AS Information message payload.

   4.  The payload contains the AS field from the AS Information
       message, an absolute URI of the resource that AM+C wants to
       access, the the actions that AM+C wants to perform on the
       resource, and any time stamp generated by RS that was transferred
       with the AS Information message.

   5.  A label that describes AM+C is added to the payload.




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 30]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


11.1.2.  Processing the Ticket Grant Message

   Based on the Ticket Grant message, AM+C is able to establish a DTLS
   channel with RS.  To do so, AM+C sets the psk_identity field of the
   DTLS ClientKeyExchange message to the ticket Face received in the
   Ticket Grant message and uses the ticket Verifier as PSK when
   constructing the premaster secret.

11.2.  Combined Authentication Manager and Authorization Server

   In certain scenarios, AM and AS may be combined to a single entity
   that knows both, C and RS, and decides if their actions are
   authorized.  Therefore, no explicit communication between AM and AS
   is necessary, resulting in omission of the Ticket Request and Ticket
   Grant messages.  Figure 9 depicts the resulting message sequence in
   this simplified architecture.

     C                  AM+AS                  RS
     | <== DTLS chan. ==> | <== DTLS chan. ==> |
     |                    |                    |
     | [Resource Req.----------------------->] |
     |                    |                    |
     | [<--------------------- AS Information] |
     |                    |                    |
     | Access Request --> |                    |
     |                    |                    |
     | <-- Ticket Transf. |                    |
     |                    |                    |
     | <===========  DTLS channel ===========> |
     |                    |                    |
     | Authorized Resource Request ----------> |


    Figure 9: Combined Authentication Manager and Authorization Server

11.2.1.  Processing the Access Request Message

   When receiving an Access Request message, AM+AS performs the checks
   specified in Section 3.5 and returns a 4.00 (Bad Request) response in
   case of failure.  Otherwise, if the checks have succeeded, AM+AS
   evaluates the contents of Access Request message as described in
   Section 3.6.

   The decision on the access request is performed by AM+AS with respect
   to the stored policies.  When the requested action is permitted on
   the respective resource, AM+AS generates an access ticket as outlined
   in Section 4.1 and creates a Ticket Transfer message to convey the
   access ticket to the Client.



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 31]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


11.2.2.  Creating the Ticket Transfer Message

   A Ticket Transfer message is constructed as a 2.05 response with the
   access ticket contained in its payload.  The response MAY contain a
   Max-Age option to indicate the ticket's lifetime to the receiving
   Client.

   This specification defines a CBOR data representation for the access
   ticket as illustrated in Section 3.6.

11.3.  Combined Authorization Server and Resource Server

   If AS and RS are colocated in one entity (AS+RS), the main objective
   is to allow AM to delegate access to C.  Accordingly, the
   authorization information could be replaced by a nonce internal to
   AS+RS.  (TBD.)

   AM                     C                  AS+RS
     | <== DTLS chan. ==> |                    |
     |                    | [Resource Req.-->] |
     |                    |                    |
     |                    | [<-- AS Info.]     |
     |                    |                    |
     | <-- Access Req.    |                    |
     |                    |                    |
     | <========= TLS/DTLS channel  =========> |
     |                    |                    |
     | Ticket Request   ---------------------> |
     |                    |                    |
     | <---------------------    Ticket Grant  |
     |                    |                    |
     | Ticket Transf. --> |                    |
     |                    |                    |
     |                    | <== DTLS chan. ==> |
     |                    | Auth. Res. Req. -> |


       Figure 10: Combined Authorization Server and Resource Server

12.  Security Considerations

   As this protocol builds on transitive trust between authorization
   servers as mentioned in Section 8, AS has no direct means to validate
   that a resource request originates from C. It has to trust AM that it
   correctly vouches for C and that it does not give authorization
   tickets meant for C to another client nor disclose the contained
   session key.




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 32]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   The Authorization Server also could constitute a single point of
   failure.  If the Authorization Server fails, the resources on all
   Resource Servers it is responsible for cannot be accessed any more.
   Thus, it is crucial for large networks to use Authorization Servers
   in a redundant setup.

13.  IANA Considerations

   The following registrations are done following the procedure
   specified in [RFC6838].

   Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]"
   with the RFC number of this specification.

13.1.  DTLS PSK Key Generation Methods

   A sub-registry for the values indicating the PSK key generation
   method as contents of the field G in a payload of type application/
   dcaf+cbor is defined.  Values in this sub-registry are numeric
   integers encoded in Concise Binary Object Notation (CBOR, [RFC7049]).
   This document follows the notation of [RFC7049] for binary values,
   i.e. a number starts with the prefix "0b".  The major type is
   separated from the actual numeric value by an underscore to emphasize
   the value's internal structure.

   Initial entries in this sub-registry are as follows:

               +---------------+-------------+------------+
               | Encoded Value | Name        | Reference  |
               +---------------+-------------+------------+
               | 0b000_00000   | hmac_sha256 | [RFC-XXXX] |
               |               |             |            |
               | 0b000_00001   | hmac_sha384 | [RFC-XXXX] |
               |               |             |            |
               | 0b000_00010   | hmac_sha512 | [RFC-XXXX] |
               +---------------+-------------+------------+

                 Table 3: DTLS PSK Key Generation Methods

   New methods can be added to this registry based on designated expert
   review according to [RFC5226].

   (TBD: criteria for expert review.)

13.2.  dcaf+cbor Media Type Registration

   Type name: application




Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 33]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   Subtype name: dcaf+cbor

   Required parameters: none

   Optional parameters: none

   Encoding considerations: Must be encoded as using a subset of the
   encoding allowed in [RFC7049].  Specifically, only the primitive data
   types String and Number are allowed.  The type Number is restricted
   to unsigned integers (i.e., no negative numbers, fractions or
   exponents are allowed).  Encoding MUST be UTF-8.  These restrictions
   simplify implementations on devices that have very limited memory
   capacity.

   Security considerations: TBD

   Interoperability considerations: TBD

   Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]

   Applications that use this media type: TBD

   Additional information:

   Magic number(s): none

   File extension(s): dcaf

   Macintosh file type code(s): none

   Person & email address to contact for further information: TBD

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: None

   Author: TBD

   Change controller: IESG

13.3.  CoAP Content Format Registration

   This document specifies a new media type application/dcaf+cbor (cf.
   Section 13.2).  For use with CoAP, a numeric Content-Format
   identifier is to be registered in the "CoAP Content-Formats" sub-
   registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry.





Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 34]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "RFC-XXXX" with
   the RFC number of this specification.

         +-----------------------+----------+------+------------+
         |            Media type | Encoding | Id.  | Reference  |
         +-----------------------+----------+------+------------+
         | application/dcaf+cbor | -        | TBD1 | [RFC-XXXX] |
         +-----------------------+----------+------+------------+

14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
              3986, January 2005.

   [RFC4279]  Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December
              2005.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC5746]  Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
              Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

   [RFC6838]  Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
              Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC
              6838, January 2013.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, October 2013.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, June 2014.

14.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.bormann-core-ace-aif]



Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 35]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


              Bormann, C., "An Authorization Information Format (AIF)
              for ACE", draft-bormann-core-ace-aif-00 (work in
              progress), January 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-core-block]
              Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, "Blockwise transfers in CoAP",
              draft-ietf-core-block-15 (work in progress), July 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-core-observe]
              Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in CoAP", draft-ietf-
              core-observe-14 (work in progress), June 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]
              Shelby, Z., Bormann, C., and S. Krco, "CoRE Resource
              Directory", draft-ietf-core-resource-directory-01 (work in
              progress), December 2013.

   [I-D.schmertmann-dice-codtls]
              Schmertmann, L., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "CoDTLS: DTLS
              handshakes over CoAP", draft-schmertmann-dice-codtls-00
              (work in progress), February 2014.

   [RFC5988]  Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988, October 2010.

   [RFC6655]  McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
              Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, July 2012.

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, August 2012.

   [bergmann12]
              Bergmann, O., Gerdes, S., Schaefer, S., Junge, F., and C.
              Bormann, "Secure Bootstrapping of Nodes in a CoAP
              Network", IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking
              Conference Workshops (WCNCW), April 2012.

Authors' Addresses

   Stefanie Gerdes
   Universitaet Bremen TZI
   Postfach 330440
   Bremen  D-28359
   Germany

   Phone: +49-421-218-63906
   Email: gerdes@tzi.org





Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 36]


Internet-Draft                    DCAF                         July 2014


   Olaf Bergmann
   Universitaet Bremen TZI
   Postfach 330440
   Bremen  D-28359
   Germany

   Phone: +49-421-218-63904
   Email: bergmann@tzi.org


   Carsten Bormann
   Universitaet Bremen TZI
   Postfach 330440
   Bremen  D-28359
   Germany

   Phone: +49-421-218-63921
   Email: cabo@tzi.org

































Gerdes, et al.           Expires January 5, 2015               [Page 37]