CoRE Working Group S. Gerdes
Internet-Draft O. Bergmann
Intended status: Standards Track C. Bormann
Expires: August 18, 2014 Universitaet Bremen TZI
February 14, 2014
Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF)
draft-gerdes-core-dcaf-authorize-02
Abstract
This specification defines a protocol for delegating client
authentication and authorization in a constrained environment for
establishing a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) channel
between resource-constrained nodes. The protocol relies on DTLS to
transfer authorization information and shared secrets for symmetric
cryptography between entities in a constrained network. A resource-
constrained node can use this protocol to delegate authentication of
communication peers and management of authorization information to a
trusted host with less severe limitations regarding processing power
and memory.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1. Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2. Other Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. System Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Unauthorized Resource Request Message . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. AS Information Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Access Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5. Ticket Request Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.6. Ticket Grant Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.7. Ticket Transfer Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.8. DTLS Channel Setup Between C and RS . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.9. Authorized Resource Request Message . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.10. Dynamic Update of Authorization Information . . . . . . . 14
3.10.1. Handling of Ticket Transfer Messages . . . . . . . . 15
4. Ticket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1. Face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2. Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3. Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3.1. Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3.2. Revocation Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Payload Format and Encoding (application/dcaf+cbor) . . . . . 18
5.1. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. DTLS PSK Generation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. DTLS PSK Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2. Distributed Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Authorization Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Trust Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9. Listing Authorization Server Information in a Resource
Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1. The "auth-request" Link Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1. Access Granted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.2. Access Denied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.3. Access Restricted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.4. Implicit Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
12.1. dcaf+cbor Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12.2. CoAP Content Format Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Introduction
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [I-D.ietf-core-coap] is a
transfer protocol similar to HTTP which is designed for the special
requirements of constrained environments. A serious problem with
constrained devices is the realization of secure communication. The
devices only have limited resources such as memory, stable storage
(such as disk space) and transmission capacity and often lack input/
output devices such as keyboards or displays. Therefore, they are
not readily capable of using common protocols. Especially
authentication mechanisms are difficult to realize, because the lack
of stable storage severely limits the number of keys the system can
store. Moreover, CoAP has no mechanism to distinguish access rights
for different clients (authorization).
The DCAF architecture is designed to relieve the constrained nodes
from managing keys for numerous devices by introducing authorization
servers which conduct the authentication and authorization for their
nodes. To achieve this, access tokens are used. A device which
wants to access a constrained node's resource first has to gain
permission in the form of a token from the node's authorization
server.
As fine-grained authorization is not always needed on constrained
devices, DCAF supports an implicit authorization mode where no
authorization information is exchanged.
The main goals of DCAF are the setup of a Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] channel with symmetric pre-shared keys
(PSK) [RFC4279] and to securely transmit authorization tickets.
1.1. Features
o Utilize DTLS communication with pre-shared keys.
o Authenticated exchange of authorization information.
o Simplified authentication on constrained nodes by handing the more
sophisticated authentication over to less-constrained devices.
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o Simplified authorization mechanism for cases where implicit
authorization is sufficient.
o Using only symmetric encryption on constrained nodes.
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
1.2.1. Roles
Resource Server (RS): A constrained device that hosts resources the
Client wants to access.
Client (C): A device that wants to access resources on the Resource
Server.
Authorization Server (AS): The node that conducts authentication and
authorization for a Resource Server. An Authorization Server can be
responsible for a single or multiple devices or even for a whole
network. A Resource Server can have multiple Authorization Servers.
Authentication Manager (AM): The node that conducts authentication on
behalf of the Client.
Resource Owner: The principal that owns the resource and controls its
access permissions.
1.2.2. Other Terms
Access ticket: Contains the authentication and, if necessary, the
authorization information needed to access a resource. A Ticket
consists of the Ticket Face and the Ticket Verifier
Authorization information: Contains all information needed by RS to
decide if C is privileged to access a resource in a specific way.
Authentication information: Contains all information needed by RS to
decide if the entity in possession of a certain key is verified by
the authorization server.
Access information: Contains authentication information and, if
necessary, authorization information.
Ticket Face: The part of the ticket which is generated for the
Resource Server. It contains the authorization information and all
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information needed by the Resource Server to verify that it was
granted by AS.
Ticket Verifier: The part of the ticket which is generated for the
Client. It enables the client to verify that it is communicating
with an appropriate RS.
Explicit authorization: The Authorization Server informs the Resource
Server in detail which privileges are granted to the Client.
Implicit authorization: The Authorization Server informs the Resource
Server that the Client is authorized to access any resource on RS in
any way, without specifying the privileges in detail.
2. System Overview
Within the DCAF Architecture each Resource Server (RS) has one or
more Authorization Servers (AS) which conduct the authentication and
authorization for RS. RS and AS share a symmetric key which has to
be exchanged initially to provide for a secure channel. The
mechanism used for this is not in the scope of this document.
To gain access to a specific resource on a Resource Server, a client
(C) has to request an access ticket from one of the Authorization
Servers serving RS either directly or, if it is a constrained device,
using its Authentication Manager (AM). In the following, we always
discuss the AM role separately, even if that is co-located within a
(more powerful) C.
If AS decides that C is allowed to access the resource, it generates
a DTLS pre-shared key (PSK) for the communication between C and RS
and wraps it into an access ticket. For explicit access control, AS
adds the detailed access permissions to the ticket in a way that RS
can interpret. After presenting the ticket to RS, C and RS can
communicate securely.
To be able to provide for the authentication and authorization
services, the Authorization Servers have to fulfill several
requirements:
o An AS must have enough stable storage (such as disk space) to
store the necessary number of credentials (matching the number of
clients and Resource Servers).
o An AS must possess means for user interaction, for example
directly or indirectly connected input/output devices like
keyboard and display, to allow for configuration of authorization
information by the Resource Owner.
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o An AS must have enough processing power to handle the
authorization requests for all RS devices it is responsible for.
3. Protocol
The DCAF protocol comprises three parts:
1. transfer of authentication and, if necessary, authorization
information between C and RS;
2. transfer of access requests and the respective ticket grants
between C and AM; and
3. transfer of access requests and the respective ticket grants
between AS and AM.
3.1. Overview
In Figure 1, a DCAF protocol flow is depicted (messages in square
brackets are optional):
AM C RS AS
| <== DTLS chan. ==> | | <== DTLS chan. ==> |
| | [Resource Req.-->] | |
| | | |
| | [<-- AS Info.] | |
| | | |
| <-- Access Req. | | |
| | | |
| <===== TLS/DTLS channel (AM/AS Mutual Authentication) =====> |
| | | |
| Ticket Request ------------------------------------------> |
| | | |
| <------------------------------------------ Ticket Grant |
| | | |
| Ticket Transm. --> | | |
| | | |
| | <== DTLS chan. ==> | |
| | Auth. Res. Req. -> | |
Figure 1: Protocol Overview
To determine the Authorization Server in charge of a resource hosted
at the Resource Server (RS), the Client (C) MAY send an initial
Unauthorized Resource Request message to RS. RS then denies the
request and sends the address of its Authorization Server (AS) back
to the Client.
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Instead of the initial Unauthorized Resource Request message, C MAY
look up the desired resource in a resource directory (cf.
[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]) that lists RS's resources as
discussed in Section 9.
Once C knows AS' address, it can send a request for authorization to
AS using its own Authentication Manager (AM). AS authenticates AM,
who serves as a trusted introducer for C, and decides if C is allowed
to communicate with RS and access the requested resource. If it is,
AS generates an access ticket for C. The ticket contains keying
material for the establishment of a secure channel and, if necessary,
a representation of the permissions C has for the resource. C keeps
one part of the access ticket and presents the other part to RS to
prove its right to access. With their respective parts of the
ticket, C and RS are able to establish a secure channel.
The following sections specify how CoAP is used to interchange
access-related data between RS and AS so that AS can provide C and RS
with sufficient information to establish a secure channel, and
simultaneously convey authorization information specific for this
communication relationship to RS.
This document uses Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR,
[RFC7049]) to express authorization information as set of attributes
passed in CoAP payloads. Notation and encoding options are discussed
in Section 5.
3.2. Unauthorized Resource Request Message
The optional Unauthorized Resource Request message is a request for a
resource hosted by RS for which no proper authorization is granted.
RS MUST treat any CoAP request as Unauthorized Resource Request
message when any of the following holds:
o The request has been received on an insecure channel.
o RS has no valid access information for the sender of the request
regarding the requested action on that resource.
o RS has valid access information for the sender of the request, but
this does not allow the requested action on the requested
resource.
Note: These conditions ensure that RS can handle requests
autonomously once access was granted and a secure channel has been
established between C and RS.
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Unauthorized Resource Request messages MUST be denied with a client
error response. In this response, the Resource Server MUST provide
proper AS Information to enable the Client to request an access
ticket from RS's Authorization Server as described in Section 3.3.
The response code MUST be 4.01 (Unauthorized) in case the sender of
the Unauthorized Resource Request message is not authenticated, or if
RS has no valid access ticket for C. If RS has authorization
information for C but not for the resource that C has requested, RS
MUST reject the request with a 4.03 (Forbidden). If RS has
authorization information for C but they do not cover the action C
requested on the resource, RS MUST reject the request with a 4.05
(Method Not Allowed).
Note: The use of the response codes 4.03 and 4.05 is intended to
prevent infinite loops where a dumb Client optimistically tries to
access a requested resource with any access token received from
the AS. As malicious clients could pretend to be C to determine
C's privileges, these detailed response codes must be used only
when a certain level of security is already available which can be
achieved only when the Client is authenticated.
3.3. AS Information Message
The AS Information Message is sent by RS as a response to an
Unauthorized Resource Request message (see Section 3.2) to point the
sender of the Unauthorized Resource Request message to RS's
Authorization Server. The AS information is a set of attributes
containing an absolute URI (see Section 4.3 of [RFC3986]) that
specifies the Authorization Server in charge of RS.
The message MAY also contain a timestamp generated by RS.
Figure 2 shows an example for an AS Information message payload using
CBOR diagnostic notation. (Refer to Section 5 for a detailed
description of the available attributes and their semantics.)
4.01 Unauthorized
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{"AS": "coaps://as-rs.example.com/authorize", "TS": 168537}
Figure 2: AS Information Payload Example
In this example, the attribute AS points the receiver of this message
to the URI "coaps://as-rs.example.com/authorize" to request access
permissions. The originator of the AS Information payload (i.e. RS)
uses a local clock that is loosely synchronized with a time scale
common between RS and AS (e.g., wall clock time). Therefore, it has
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included a time stamp on its own time scale that is used as a nonce
for replay attack prevention. Refer to Section 4.1 for more details
concerning the usage of time stamps to ensure freshness of access
tickets.
The examples in this document are written in CBOR diagnostic notation
to improve readability. Figure 3 illustrates the binary encoding of
the message payload shown in Figure 2.
a2 # map(2)
62 # text(2)
4153 # "AS"
78 23 # text(35)
636f6170733a2f2f61732d72732e6578
616d706c652e636f6d2f617574686f72
697a65 # "coaps://as-rs.example.com/authorize"
62 # text(2)
5453 # "TS"
1a 00029259 # unsigned(168537)
Figure 3: AS Information Payload Example encoded in CBOR
3.4. Access Request
To retrieve an access ticket for the resource that C wants to access,
C sends an Access Request to its authentication manager AM. The
Access Request is constructed as follows:
1. The request method is POST.
2. The request URI is set as described below.
3. The message payload contains a data structure that describes the
action and resource for which C requests an access ticket.
The request URI identifies a resource at AM for handling
authorization requests from C. The URI SHOULD be announced by AM in
its resource directory as described in Section 9.
Note: Where capacity limitations of C do not allow for resource
directory lookups, the request URI in Access Requests could be
hard-coded during provisioning or set in a specific device
configuration profile.
The message payload is constructed from the AS information that RS
has returned in its AS Information message (see Section 3.3) and
information that C provides to describe its intended request(s). The
Access Request MUST contain the following attributes:
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1. Contact information for the AS to use.
2. An absolute URI of the resource that C wants to access.
3. The actions that C wants to perform on the resource.
4. Any time stamp generated by RS.
An example Access Request from C to AM is depicted in Figure 4.
(Refer to Section 5 for a detailed description of the available
attributes and their semantics.)
POST client-authorize
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{
"AS": "coaps://as-rs.example.com/authorize",
"AI": ["coaps://temp451.example.com/s/tempC", 5],
"TS": 168537
}
Figure 4: Access Request Message Example
The example shows an Access Request message payload for the resource
"/s/tempC" on the Resource Server "temp451.example.com". Requested
operations in attribute AR are GET and PUT.
The attributes AS (that denotes the Authorization Server to use) and
TS (a nonce generated by RS) are taken from the AS Information
message from RS.
The response to an Authorization Request is delivered by AM back to C
in a Ticket Transfer message.
3.5. Ticket Request Message
When AM receives an Access Request message from C it MAY return a
cached response if it is known to be fresh. Otherwise, it checks
whether the request payload is of type "application/dcaf+cbor and
contains at least the fields AS and AI. AM MUST respond with 4.00
(Bad Request) if the type is "application/dcaf+cbor and any of these
fields is missing or does not conform to the format described in
Section 5. Content formats other than application/dcaf+cbor are out
of scope of this specification.
When the payload is correct, AM creates a Ticket Request message from
the Access Request received from C as follows:
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1. The destination of the Ticket Request message is derived from the
authority information in the URI contained in field "AS" of the
Access Request message payload.
2. The request method is POST.
3. The request URI is constructed from the AS field received in the
Access Request message payload.
4. The payload is copied from the Access Request sent by C.
5. A label that describes the Client is added to the payload
To send the Ticket Request message to AS a secure channel between AM
and AS MUST be used. Depending on the URI scheme used in the AS
field of the Access Request message payload (the less-constrained
devices AM and AS do not necessarily use coap to communicate with
each other), this could be, e.g., a DTLS channel (for "coaps") or a
TLS connection (for "https"). AM and AS MUST be able to mutually
authenticate each other, e.g. based on a public key infrastructure.
(Refer to Section 8 for a detailed discussion of the trust
relationship between authentication managers and authorization
servers.)
The descriptive label of C included in the Ticket Request is used to
distinguish the clients within AS's namespace and MUST NOT be used
for authenticating the client.
3.6. Ticket Grant Message
When AS has received a Ticket Request message it has to evaluate the
access request information contained therein. First, it checks
whether the request payload is of type "application/dcaf+cbor" and
contains at least the fields AS, D, and AI. AS MUST respond with
4.00 (Bad Request) for CoAP (or 400 for HTTP) if the type is
"application/dcaf+cbor" and any of these fields is missing or does
not conform to the format described in Section 5.
AS decides whether or not access is granted to the requested resource
and then creates a Ticket Grant message that reflects the result. To
grant access to the requested resource, AS creates an access ticket
comprised of a Face and a Verifier as described in Section 4.1.
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The Ticket Grant message then is constructed as a success response
indicating attached content, i.e. 2.05 for CoAP, or 200 for HTTP,
respectively. The payload of the Ticket Grant message is a data
structure that contains the result of the access request. When
access is granted, the data structure contains the ticket's Face, the
Verifier and the Session Key Generation Method.
The Ticket Grant message MAY provide cache-control options to enable
intermediaries to cache the response. The message MAY be cached
according to the rules defined in [I-D.ietf-core-coap] to facilitate
ticket retrieval when C has crashed and wants to recover the DTLS
session with RS.
AS sets Max-Age according to the ticket lifetime in its response
(Ticket Grant Message).
Figure 5 shows an example Ticket Grant message using CoAP. The Face/
Verifier information is transferred as a CBOR data structure as
specified in Section 5. The Max-Age option tells the receiving AM
how long this ticket will be valid.
2.05 Content
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
Max-Age: 86400
{ "F": {
"AI": [ "/s/tempC", 7 ],
"D": "2001:db8:ab9:1234:7920:3133:ae5f:87",
"TS": 0("2013-07-10T10:04:12.391"),
"L": 86400,
"G": "hmac_sha256"
},
"V": h'b2dd4e409c2d36a7423da3c87e571999
0b778ebd2c7d3730729a7fcde26c7201'
}
Figure 5: Example Ticket Grant Message
A Ticket Grant message that declines any operation on the requested
resource is illustrated in Figure 6. As no ticket needs to be
issued, an empty payload is included with the response.
2.05 Content
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
Figure 6: Example Ticket Grant Message With Reject
3.7. Ticket Transfer Message
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A Ticket Transfer message delivers the access information sent by AS
in a Ticket Grant message to the requesting client C. The Ticket
Transfer message is the response to the Access Request message sent
from C to AM and includes any access information from AS contained in
the Ticket Grant message.
3.8. DTLS Channel Setup Between C and RS
Using the information contained in a positive response to its Access
Request (i.e. a Ticket Transfer message that contains a Face and a
Verifier), C can initiate establishment of a new DTLS channel with
RS. To use DTLS with pre-shared keys, C follows the PSK key exchange
algorithm specified in Section 2 of [RFC4279], with the following
additional requirements:
1. C sets the psk_identity field of the ClientKeyExchange message to
the ticket Face received in the Ticket Transfer message.
2. C uses the ticket Verifier as PSK when constructing the premaster
secret.
Note1: As RS cannot provide C with a meaningful PSK identity hint in
response to C's ClientHello message, RS SHOULD NOT send a
ServerKeyExchange message.
Note2: According to [I-D.ietf-core-coap], CoAP implementations MUST
support the ciphersuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC6655]. C is
therefore expected to offer at least this ciphersuite to RS.
Note3: The ticket is constructed by AS such that RS can derive the
authorization information as well as the PSK (refer to Section 6 for
details).
3.9. Authorized Resource Request Message
Successful establishment of the DTLS channel between C and RS ties
the authorization information contained in the psk_identity field to
this channel. Any request that RS receives on this channel is
checked against these authorization rules. Incoming CoAP requests
that are not Authorized Resource Requests MUST be rejected by RS with
4.01 response as described in Section 3.2.
RS SHOULD treat an incoming CoAP request as Authorized Resource
Request if the following holds:
1. The message was received on a secure channel that has been
established using the procedure defined in Section 3.8.
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2. The authorization information tied to the secure channel is
valid.
3. The request is destined for RS.
4. The resource URI specified in the request is covered by the
authorization information.
5. The request method is an authorized action on the resource with
respect to the authorization information.
Note that the authorization information is not restricted to a single
resource URI. For example, role-based authorization can be used to
authorize a collection of semantically connected resources
simultaneously. Implicit authorization also provides access rights
to authenticated clients for all actions on all resources that RS
offers. As a result, C can use the same DTLS channel not only for
subsequent requests for the same resource (e.g. for block-wise
transfer as defined in [I-D.ietf-core-block] or refreshing observe-
relationships [I-D.ietf-core-observe]) but also for requests to
distinct resources.
Incoming CoAP requests received on a secure channel according to the
procedure defined in Section 3.8 MUST be rejected
1. with response code 4.03 (Forbidden) when the resource URI
specified in the request is not covered by the authorization
information, and
2. with response code 4.05 (Method Not Allowed) when the resource
URI specified in the request covered by the authorization
information but not the requested action.
Since AS may limit the set of requested actions in its Ticket Grant
message, C cannot know a priori if a an Authorized Resource Request
will succeed.
3.10. Dynamic Update of Authorization Information
Once a security association exists between a Client and a Resource
Server, the Client can update the Authorization Information stored at
the Resource Server at any time. To do so, the Client creates a new
Access Request for the intended action on the respective resource and
sends this request to its Authentication Manager which relays this
request to the Resource Server's Authorization Server as described in
Section 3.4.
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Note: Requesting a new Access Ticket also can be a Client's reaction
on a 4.03 or 4.05 error that it has received in response to an
Authorized Resource Request.
Figure 7 depicts the message flow where C requests a new Access
Tickets after a security association between C and RS has been
established using this protocol.
AM C RS AS
| <== DTLS chan. ==> | <== DTLS chan. ==> | <== DTLS chan. ==> |
| | | |
| | [Unauth. R. Req->] | |
| | [<- 4.0x+AS Info.] | |
| | | |
| <-- Access Req. | | |
| | | |
| <===== TLS/DTLS channel (AM/AS Mutual Authentication) =====> |
| | | |
| Ticket Request ------------------------------------------> |
| | | |
| <------------------------------------------ Ticket Grant |
| | | |
| Ticket Transf. --> | | |
| | | |
| | <== Update AI ===> | |
Figure 7: Overview of Dynamic Update Operation
Processing the Ticket Request is done at the Authorization Server as
specified in Section 3.6, i.e. the AS checks whether or not the
requested operation is permitted by the Resource Owner's policy, and
then return a Ticket Grant message with the result of this check. If
access is granted, the Ticket Grant message contains an Access Ticket
comprised of a public Ticket Face and a private Ticket Verifier.
This authorization payload is relayed by the Authorization Manager to
the Client in a Ticket Transfer Message as defined in Section 3.7.
The major difference between dynamic update of Authorization
Information and the initial handshake is the handling of a Ticket
Transfer message by the Client that is described in Section 3.10.1.
3.10.1. Handling of Ticket Transfer Messages
If the security association with RS still exists and RS has indicated
support for session renegotiation according to [RFC5746], the ticket
Face SHOULD be used to renegotiate the existing DTLS session. In
this case, the ticket Face is used as psk_identity as defined in
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Section 3.8. Otherwise, the Client MUST perform a new DTLS handshake
according to Section 3.8 that replaces the existing DTLS session.
After successful completion of the DTLS handshake RS updates the
existing Authorization Information for C according to the contents of
the ticket Face.
Note: No mutual authentication between C and RS is required for
dynamic updates when a DTLS channel exists that has been
established as defined in Section 3.8. RS only needs to verify
the authenticity and integrity of the ticket Face issued by AS
which is achieved by having performed a successful DTLS handshake
with the ticket Face as psk_identity. This could even be done
within the existing DTLS session by tunneling a CoDTLS
[I-D.schmertmann-dice-codtls] handshake.
4. Ticket
Access tokens in DCAF are tickets that consist of two parts, namely
the Face and the Verifier. The Face goes to RS, the Verifier goes to
the Client. The Face and the Verifier are parts of the same ticket.
RS only needs the information contained in the Ticket Face to
authorize the client and make sure that AS generated the Ticket Face
(RS cannot make authorization decisions by itself and hence needs AS
to do it). No additional information about the Client is needed. RS
keeps the Ticket Face as long as it is valid.
4.1. Face
Face is the part of the ticket generated for RS. Face MUST contain
all information needed for authorized access to a resource:
o Authorization Information
o Descriptive label
o A timestamp generated by AS
Optionally, Face MAY also contain:
o A lifetime (optional)
o A DTLS pre-shared key (optional)
RS MUST verify the integrity of Face, i.e. the information contained
in Face stems from AS and was not manipulated by anyone else.
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Face MUST contain a timestamp to verify that the contained
information is fresh. As constrained devices may not have a clock,
timestamps MAY be generated using the clock ticks since the last
reboot. To circumvent synchronization problems the timestamp MAY be
generated by RS and included in the first AS Information message.
Alternatively, AS MAY generate the timestamp. In this case, AS and
RS MUST use a time synchronization mechanism to make sure that RS
interprets the timestamp correctly.
Face MAY be encrypted. If Face contains a DTLS PSK, the whole
content of Face MUST be encrypted.
Note: The integrity of Face can be ensured by various means. Face
may be encrypted by AS with a key it shares with RS. Alternatively,
RS can use a mechanism to generate the DTLS PSK which includes Face
and is only able to calculate the correct key with the correct Face
(refer to Section 6 for details).
4.2. Verifier
The Verifier part of the ticket is generated for C. It contains the
DTLS PSK for C. The Verifier MUST NOT be transmitted over insecure
channels.
4.3. Revocation
The existence of access tickets SHOULD be limited in time. This can
be achieved either by explicit Revocation Messages to invalidate a
ticket or implicitly by attaching a lifetime to the ticket.
4.3.1. Lifetime
Tickets MAY have a lifetime. AS is responsible for defining the
ticket lifetime. If AS sets a lifetime for a ticket, AS and RS MUST
use a time synchronization method to ensure that RS is able to
interpret the lifetime correctly. RS SHOULD end the DTLS connection
to C if the lifetime of a ticket has run out and it MUST NOT accept
new requests. RS MUST NOT accept tickets with an invalid lifetime.
Note: Defining reasonable ticket lifetimes is difficult to
accomplish. How long a client needs to access a resource depends
heavily on the application scenario and may be difficult to decide
for AS.
4.3.2. Revocation Messages
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AS MAY revoke tickets by sending a ticket revocation message to RS.
If RS receives a ticket revocation message, it MUST end the DTLS
connection to C and MUST NOT accept any further requests from C.
If ticket revocation messages are used, RS MUST check regularly if AS
is still available. If RS cannot contact AS, it MUST end all DTLS
connections and reject any further requests from C.
Note: The loss of the connection between RS and AS prevents all
access to RS. This might especially be a severe problem if AS is
responsible for several Resource Servers or even a whole network.
5. Payload Format and Encoding (application/dcaf+cbor)
Various messages types of the DCAF protocol carry payloads to express
authorization information and parameters for generating the DTLS PSK
to be used by C and RS. In this section, a representation in Concise
Binary Object Representation (CBOR, [RFC7049]) is defined.
DCAF data structures are defined as CBOR maps that contain key value
pairs. The following list describes the semantics of the keys
defined in DCAF:
AS: Authorization Server. This attribute denotes the authorization
server that is in charge of the resource specified in attribute R.
The attribute's value is a string that contains an absolute URI
according to Section 4.3 of [RFC3986].
AI: Authorization Information. A data structure used to convey
authorization information from AS to RS and to describe the
permissions requested from AS in a Ticket Request. The AI
attribute contains an AIF object as defined in
[I-D.bormann-core-ace-aif].
D: Description. A descriptive label of the initiator of the
authorization request. This label MAY be a fully qualified domain
name, an IP address, or any other character literal that is used
by the Authorization Server to decide whether or not access is
granted to the requesting entity.
E: Encrypted Ticket Face. A binary string containing an encrypted
ticket Face.
K: Key. A string that identifies the shared key between RS and AS
that can be used to decrypt the contents of E. If the attribute E
is present and no attribute K has been specified, the default is
to use the current session key for the secured channel between RS
and AS.
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TS: Time Stamp. An optional time stamp that indicates the instant
when the access ticket request was formed. This attribute can be
used by the resource server in an AS Information message to convey
a time stamp in its local time scale (e.g. when it does not have a
real time clock with synchronized global time). When the
attribute's value is encoded as a string, it MUST contain a valid
UTC timestamp without time zone information. When encoded as
integer, TS contains a system timestamp relative to the local time
scale of its generator, usually RS.
L: Lifetime. A lifetime of the ticket. When encoded as a string, L
MUST denote the ticket's expiry time as a valid UTC timestamp
without time zone information. When encoded as an integer, L MUST
denote the ticket's validity period in seconds relative to TS.
G: DTLS PSK Generation Method. A string that identifies the method
that RS MUST use to derive the DTLS PSK from the ticket Face.
This attribute MUST NOT be used when attribute V is present within
the contents of F.
F: Ticket Face. An object containing the fields AI, D, TS, and
optionally G, L and V.
V: Ticket Verifier. A binary string containing the shared secret
between C and RS.
5.1. Examples
The following example specifies an Authorization Server that will be
accessed using HTTP over TLS. The request URI is set to "/
a?ep=%5B2001:DB8::dcaf:1234%5D" (hence denoting the endpoint address
to authorize). TS denotes a local timestamp in UTC.
POST /a?ep=%5B2001:DB8::dcaf:1234%5D HTTP/1.1
Host: as-rs.example.com
Content-Type: application/dcaf+cbor
{"AS": "https://as-rs.example.com/a?ep=%5B2001:DB8::dcaf:1234%5D",
"D": "2001:DB8::dcaf:1234",
"AI": ["coaps://temp451.example.com/s/tempC", 1],
"TS": 0("2013-07-14T11:58:22.923")}
The following example shows a ticket for the distributed key
generation method (cf. Section 6.2), comprised of a Face (F) and a
Verifier (V). The Face data structure contains authorization
information AI, a client descriptor, a timestamp using the local time
scale of RS, and a lifetime relative to RS's time scale.
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The DTLS PSK Generation Method is set to "hmac_sha256" denoting that
the distributed key derivation is used as defined in Section 6.2 with
SHA-256 as HMAC function.
The Verifier V contains a shared secret to be used as DTLS PSK
between C and RS.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/dcaf+cbor
{
"F": {
"AI": [ "/s/tempC", 1 ],
"D": "2001:db8:ab9:1234:7920:3133:ae5f:87",
"TS": 2938749,
"L": 3600,
"G": "hmac_sha256"
},
"V": h'93b9448d4380304d5a574fc50b944958
55bbd5ba1422cc09fde61665aa519cf9'
}
The Face may be encrypted as illustrated in the following example.
Here, the field E carries an encrypted Face data structure that
contains the same information as the previous example, and an
additional Verifier. Encryption was done with a secret shared by AS
and RS. (This example uses AES128_CCM with the secret { 0x00, 0x01,
0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c,
0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f } and RS's timestamp { 0x00, 0x2C, 0xD7, 0x7D } as
nonce.) Line breaks have been inserted to improve readability.
The attribute K describes the identity of the key to be used by RS to
decrypt the contents of attribute E. Here, The value "key0" in this
example is used to indicate that the shared session key between RS
and AS was used for encrypting E.
{
"E": h'2e1c0c0ae1915711f1073f34e44bfc81
db12167f5bdbd8801d07686615b0b434
cdca7a5453d0d582565e2f236948235d
d353cef1114d64d138949f7ab01b92f0
b6f2caccce3a43cb0a32f270a82cde0a
98250e6ac2b79a26fb47c09ef4cb366f
1aa38017cd8b891a6d796fa684294a60
64f3665527c5890b65a33af73a5c66ef
66cbb9e28ea30c89'
',
"K": "key0",
"V": h'93b9448d4380304d5a574fc50b944958
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55bbd5ba1422cc09fde61665aa519cf9'
}
The decrypted contents of E are depicted below (whitespace has been
added to improve readability). The presence of the attribute V
indicates that the DTLS PSK Transfer is used to convey the session
key (cf. Section 6.1).
{
"F": {
"AI": [ "/s/tempC", 1 ],
"D": "2001:db8:ab9:1234:7920:3133:ae5f:87",
"TS": 2938749,
"L": 3600,
"G": "hmac_sha256"
},
"V": h'93b9448d4380304d5a574fc50b944958
55bbd5ba1422cc09fde61665aa519cf9'
}
6. DTLS PSK Generation Methods
One goal of the DCAF protocol is to provide for a DTLS PSK shared
between C and RS. AS and RS MUST negotiate the method for the DTLS
PSK generation.
6.1. DTLS PSK Transfer
The DTLS PSK is generated by AS and transmitted to C and RS using a
secure channel.
The DTLS PSK transfer method is defined as follows:
o AS generates the DTLS PSK using an algorithm of its choice
o AS MUST include a representation of the DTLS PSK in Face and
encrypt it together with all other information in Face with a key
K(AS,RS) it shares with RS. How AS and RS exchange K(AS,RS) is
not in the scope of this document. AS and RS MAY use their
preshared key as K(AS,RS).
o AS MUST include a representation of the DTLS PSK in the Verifier.
o As AS and C do not have a shared secret, the Verifier MUST be
transmitted to C using encrypted channels.
o RS MUST decrypt Face using K(AS,RS)
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6.2. Distributed Key Derivation
AS generates a DTLS PSK for C which is transmitted using a secure
channel. RS generates its own version of the DTLS PSK using the
information contained in Face (see also Section 4.1).
The distributed key derivation method is defined as follows:
o AS and RS both generate the DTLS PSK using the information.
included in Face. They use an HMAC algorithm on Face with a
shared key. The result serves as the DTLS PSK. How AS and RS
negotiate the used HMAC algorithm is not in the scope of this
document. They MAY however use the HMAC algorithm they use for
their DTLS connection.
o AS MUST include a representation of the DTLS PSK in the Verifier.
o As AS and C do not have a shared secret, the Verifier MUST be
transmitted to C using encrypted channels.
o AS MUST NOT include a representation of the DTLS PSK in Face.
o AS MUST NOT encrypt Face.
7. Authorization Configuration
For the protocol defined in this document, proper configuration of AS
is crucial. The principal who owns the resources hosted by RS (i.e.
the Resource Owner) needs to define permissions for the resources.
The data representation of these permissions are not in the scope of
this document.
8. Trust Relationships
C trusts AM, and RS trusts AS. Obviously, AM trusts C with the
specific permissions it hands over to it. How this trust is
established, is not in the scope of this document. It may be
achieved by using a bootstrapping mechanism similar to [bergmann12].
Additionally, AS and AM need to have a trust relationship
established. Its establishment is also not in the scope of this
document. It fulfills the following conditions:
1. AS has means to authenticate AM (e.g. it has a certificate of AM
or a PKI in which AM is included) and vice versa
2. As far as AS needs to rely on the different clients of AM to
receive different permissions, it can be sure that AM correctly
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identifies these clients towards AS and does not leak tickets
that have been generated for a specific client C to another
client.
AS trusts C indirectly because it trusts AM and AM vouches for C. The
DCAF Protocol does not provide any means for AS to validate that a
resource requests stems from C.
C indirectly trusts AS with some potentially confidential
information, and that AS correctly represents RS, because AM trusts
AS.
AM trusts RS indirectly because it trusts AS and AS vouches for RS.
C implicitly trusts RS with some potentially confidential information
because it trusts AM and because RS can prove that it shares a key
with AS.
AM <--------------------> AS
/|\ /|\
| |
\|/ \|/
C ..................... RS
9. Listing Authorization Server Information in a Resource Directory
CoAP utilizes the Web Linking format [RFC5988] to facilitate
discovery of services in an M2M environment. [RFC6690] defines
specific link parameters that can be used to describe resources to be
listed in a resource directory [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].
9.1. The "auth-request" Link Relation
This section defines a resource type "auth-request" that can be used
by clients to retrieve the request URI for a server's authorization
service. When used with the parameter rt in a web link, "auth-
request" indicates that the corresponding target URI can be used in a
POST message to request authorization for the resource and action
that are described in the request payload.
The Content-Format "application/dcaf+cbor with numeric identifier
TBD1 defined in this specification MAY be used to express access
requests and their responses.
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The following example shows the web link used by AM in this document
to relay incoming Authorization Request messages to AS. (Whitespace
is included only for readability.)
<client-authorize>;rt="auth-request";ct=TBD1
;title="Contact Remote Authorization Server"
The resource directory that hosts the resource descriptions of RS
could list the following description. In this example, the URI "ep/
node138/a/switch2941" is relative to the resource context "coaps
://as-rs.example.com/", i.e. the authorization server AS.
<ep/node138/a/switch2941>;rt="auth-request";ct=TBD1;ep="node138"
;title="Request Client Authorization"
;anchor="coaps://as-rs.example.com/"
10. Examples
This section gives a number of short examples with message flows for
the initial Unauthorized Resource Request and the subsequent
retrieval of a ticket from AS. The notation here follows the role
conventions defined in Section 1.2.1. The payload format is encoded
as proposed in Section 5. The IP address of AS is 2001:DB8::1, the
IP address of RS is 2001:DB8::dcaf:1234, and C's IP address is
2001:DB8::c.
10.1. Access Granted
This example shows an Unauthorized PUT request from C to RS that is
answered with an AS Information message. C then sends a POST request
to AM with a description of its intended request. AM forwards this
request to AS using CoAP over a DTLS-secured channel. The response
from AS contains an access ticket that is relayed back to AM.
C --> RS
PUT a/switch2941 [Mid=1234]
Content-Format: application/senml+json
{e: [{"bv": "1"}]}
C <-- RS
4.01 Unauthorized [Mid=1234]
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{"AS": "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941"}
C --> AM
POST client-authorize [Mid=1235,Token="tok"]
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{
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"AS": "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
"AI": ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 4]
}
AM --> AS [Mid=23146]
POST ep/node138/a/switch2941
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{
"AS": "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
"D": "2001:DB8::c",
"AI": ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 4]
}
AM <-- AS
2.05 Content [Mid=23146]
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{ "F": {
"AI": ["a/switch2941", 5],
"D": "2001:DB8::c",
"TS": 0("2013-07-04T20:17:38.002"),
"G": "hmac_sha256"
},
"V": h'50f18bf1d6f084eb0fd9d2ee6ec882d8
a87ef66a332c86a45bff8f67fe19bc47'
}
C <-- AM
2.05 Content [Mid=1235,Token="tok"]
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{ "F": {
"AI": ["a/switch2941", 5],
"D": "2001:DB8::c",
"TS": 0("2013-07-04T20:17:38.002"),
"G": "hmac_sha256"
},
"V": h'50f18bf1d6f084eb0fd9d2ee6ec882d8
a87ef66a332c86a45bff8f67fe19bc47'
}
C --> RS
ClientHello (TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8)
C <-- RS
ServerHello (TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8)
ServerHelloDone
C --> RS
ClientKeyExchange
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psk_identity=0x6146a4624149826c612f737769746368
0x323934310561446b323030313a444238
0x3a3a63625453c077323031332d30372d
0x30345432303a31373a33382e30303261
0x476b686d61635f736861323536
(C decodes the contents of V and uses the result as PSK)
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
(RS calculates PSK from AI, D, TS and its session key
HMAC_sha256(0x6146a4624149826c612f737769746368
0x323934310561446b323030313a444238
0x3a3a63625453c077323031332d30372d
0x30345432303a31373a33382e30303261
0x476b686d61635f736861323536,
0x66736563726574)
= 0x0e70158e...
)
C <-- RS
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
10.2. Access Denied
This example shows a denied Authorization request for the DELETE
operation.
C --> RS
DELETE a/switch2941
C <-- RS
4.01 Unauthorized
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{"AS": "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941"}
C --> AM
POST client-authorize
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{
"AS": "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
"AI": ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 8]
}
AM --> AS
POST ep/node138/a/switch2941
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Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{
"AS": "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
"D": "2001:DB8::c",
"AI": ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 8]
}
AM <-- AS
2.05 Content
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
C <-- AM
2.05 Content
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
10.3. Access Restricted
This example shows a denied Authorization request for the operations
GET, PUT, and DELETE. AS grants access for PUT only.
AM --> AS
POST ep/node138/a/switch2941
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{
"AS": "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
"D": "2001:DB8::c",
"AI": ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 13]
}
AM <-- AS
2.05 Content
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{ "F": {
"AI": ["a/switch2941", 5],
"D": "2001:DB8::c",
"TS": 0("2013-07-04T21:33:11.930"),
"G": "hmac_sha256"
},
"V": h'f5628265ec99349d2b1f3a1020223793
7098512d555f085a775f1ae6a9c66950'
}
10.4. Implicit Authorization
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This example shows an Authorization request using implicit
authorization. AM initially requests the actions GET and POST on the
resource "coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941". AS returns a
ticket that has no AI field in its ticket Face, hence implicitly
authorizing C.
AM --> AS
POST ep/node138/a/switch2941
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{
"AS": "coaps://[2001:DB8::1]/ep/node138/a/switch2941",
"D": "2001:DB8::c",
"AI": ["coaps://[2001:DB8::dcaf:1234]/a/switch2941", 3]
}
AM <-- AS
2.05 Content
Content-Format: application/dcaf+cbor
{ "F": {
"D": "2001:DB8::c",
"TS": 0("2013-07-16T10:15:43.663"),
"G": "hmac_sha256"
},
"V": h'6d30f6162b54cd50c8b7421674d46150
1baba2a34c0a86a7aacc0cfe3c2f2643'
}
11. Security Considerations
As this protocol builds on transitive trust between authorization
servers as mentioned in Section 8, AS has no direct means to validate
that a resource request originates from C. It has to trust AM that it
correctly vouches for C and that it does not give authorization
tickets meant for C to another client nor disclose the contained
session key.
The Authorization Server also could constitute a single point of
failure. If the Authorization Server fails, the resources on all
Resource Servers it is responsible for cannot be accessed any more.
Thus, it is crucial for large networks to use Authorization Servers
in a redundant setup.
12. IANA Considerations
The following registrations are done following the procedure
specified in [RFC6838].
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Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]"
with the RFC number of this specification.
12.1. dcaf+cbor Media Type Registration
Type name: application
Subtype name: dcaf+cbor
Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: none
Encoding considerations: Must be encoded as using a subset of the
encoding allowed in [RFC7049]. Specifically, only the primitive data
types String and Number are allowed. The type Number is restricted
to unsigned integers (i.e., no negative numbers, fractions or
exponents are allowed). Encoding MUST be UTF-8. These restrictions
simplify implementations on devices that have very limited memory
capacity.
Security considerations: TBD
Interoperability considerations: TBD
Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]
Applications that use this media type: TBD
Additional information:
Magic number(s): none
File extension(s): dcaf
Macintosh file type code(s): none
Person & email address to contact for further information: TBD
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Author: TBD
Change controller: IESG
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12.2. CoAP Content Format Registration
This document specifies a new media type application/dcaf+cbor (cf.
Section 12.1). For use with CoAP, a numeric Content-Format
identifier is to be registered in the "CoAP Content-Formats" sub-
registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry.
Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "RFC-XXXX" with
the RFC number of this specification.
+-----------------------+----------+------+------------+
| Media type | Encoding | Id. | Reference |
+-----------------------+----------+------+------------+
| application/dcaf+cbor | - | TBD1 | [RFC-XXXX] |
+-----------------------+----------+------+------------+
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-core-coap]
Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", draft-ietf-core-coap-18
(work in progress), June 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
3986, January 2005.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December
2005.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC
6838, January 2013.
Gerdes, et al. Expires August 18, 2014 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft DCAF February 2014
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, October 2013.
13.2. Informative References
[I-D.bormann-core-ace-aif]
Bormann, C., "An Authorization Information Format (AIF)
for ACE", draft-bormann-core-ace-aif-00 (work in
progress), January 2014.
[I-D.ietf-core-block]
Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, "Blockwise transfers in CoAP",
draft-ietf-core-block-14 (work in progress), October 2013.
[I-D.ietf-core-observe]
Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in CoAP", draft-ietf-
core-observe-12 (work in progress), February 2014.
[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]
Shelby, Z., Bormann, C., and S. Krco, "CoRE Resource
Directory", draft-ietf-core-resource-directory-01 (work in
progress), December 2013.
[I-D.schmertmann-dice-codtls]
Schmertmann, L., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "CoDTLS: DTLS
handshakes over CoAP", draft-schmertmann-dice-codtls-00
(work in progress), February 2014.
[RFC5988] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988, October 2010.
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, July 2012.
[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, August 2012.
[bergmann12]
Bergmann, O., Gerdes, S., Schaefer, S., Junge, F., and C.
Bormann, "Secure Bootstrapping of Nodes in a CoAP
Network", IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking
Conference Workshops (WCNCW), April 2012.
Authors' Addresses
Gerdes, et al. Expires August 18, 2014 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft DCAF February 2014
Stefanie Gerdes
Universitaet Bremen TZI
Postfach 330440
Bremen D-28359
Germany
Phone: +49-421-218-63906
Email: gerdes@tzi.org
Olaf Bergmann
Universitaet Bremen TZI
Postfach 330440
Bremen D-28359
Germany
Phone: +49-421-218-63904
Email: bergmann@tzi.org
Carsten Bormann
Universitaet Bremen TZI
Postfach 330440
Bremen D-28359
Germany
Phone: +49-421-218-63921
Email: cabo@tzi.org
Gerdes, et al. Expires August 18, 2014 [Page 32]