Network Working Group R. Gieben
Internet-Draft M. Groeneweg
Intended status: Standards Track R. Ribbers
Expires: August 29, 2013 A.L.J. Verschuren
SIDN Labs
February 25, 2013
Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-01
Abstract
This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
extension mapping for the purpose of relaying DNSSEC key material
from one registrar to another. The mapping introduces "<keyrelay>"
as a new command in EPP.
This command will help facilitating a transfer of a domain while
keeping DNSSEC's chain of trust intact.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2013.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents
1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Relaying Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Rational For a New Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Key Relay Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Example Key Relay Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Server Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Message Queue Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. Message Queue Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1. -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.2. -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
[RFC2119].
In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and
"S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. "////" is used
to note element values that have been shortened to better fit page
boundaries. Indentation and white space in examples is provided only
to illustrate element relationships and is not a mandatory feature of
this protocol.
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
character case presented in order to develop a conforming
implementation.
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The term "key material" denotes one more DNSKEY resource records
[RFC4034].
2. Introduction
Certain transactions for DNSSEC signed zones require an authenticated
exchange of DNSSEC key material between DNS operators. Often there
is no direct secure channel between the two or it is non-scalable.
One of such transactions is changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC
signed zones ([I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change]. In this
document we define a protocol extension for use in EPP that helps to
implement and automate this transaction. This protocol extension
introduces a new command called "<keyrelay>".
3. Relaying Key Material
The "<keyrelay>" command uses the existing authenticated EPP channel
with the registry. Both registrars can securely talk to the registry
and as such the registry can serve as a drop box for relaying key
material between them (see Figure 1).
+-------------------+ DNSKEY +--------------------+
|losing DNS operator| <~~~~~~~ |gaining DNS operator|
+-------------------+ +--------------------+
^ |
| v
+-----------------+ +---------+
|current registrar| |registrar|
+-----------------+ +---------+
^ |
EPP poll | | EPP keyrelay
| V
+----------------+
| registry |
+----------------+
The gaining and losing dns-operators should talk directly to each
other (the ~ arrow) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often there is no
trusted path between the two. As both can securely interact with the
registry through the registrar it can act as a relay for the key
material exchange.
Figure 1
The "<keyrelay>" command uploads new key(s) to the registry for a
given domain. This key material is then relayed to the current
registrar's message queue. There is no need for the registry to
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store the relayed key in the registry system, although the registry
MAY save the key for administrative purposes.
The registrar may upload multiple keys in one "<keyrelay>" message.
If keys are identical (Flags Field, Protocol Field, Algorithm Field
and Public Key Field are equal), the duplicate key MUST be dropped.
There is no restriction on the type (for instance Key Signing Keys or
Zone Signing Keys) of keys that can be put in the message. It is up
to the losing DNS operator to validate the correctness of the key
material.
If for some reason the registry can not process the "<keyrelay>"
command an EPP error response MUST be returned. If the registry does
process the "<keyrelay>" command it MUST put all (discarding any
duplicates) uploaded keys on to the current registrar's message
queue.
4. Rational For a New Command
The "<keyrelay>" command is different than the existing EPP commands,
because it allows someone to manipulate data without actually being
to owner of that data. The EPP transfer command comes close with
respect to this functionality. However we did not want to overload
the transfer command for this purpose, because a "<keyrelay>" has
nothing to do with that operation.
5. Key Relay Interface
The Key Relay Interface uses a "<keyrelay>" element for relaying the
key material. It needs a minimum of three elements: a domain name,
the key(s) to upload, a token which indicates a future transfer is
imminent and an OPTIONAL expire element.
Thus a "<keyrelay>" element MUST contain the following child
elements:
o A "<name>" element that contains the domain name for which we
upload the key.
o A "<keyData>" element that contains the key material as described
in [RFC5910], Section 4.2.
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o An "<authInfo>" that contains an authorization token ([RFC5931],
Section 3.2.4), this should be used as an indication that the
registrar had prior contact with the registrant, and a possible
future transfer is authorized. The registry MAY check if the
"<authInfo>" data is correct and if it does, it MUST return an EPP
error response if the authorization token is not correct.
And MAY contain:
o An "<expiry>" element that describes the lifetime of the relayed
key(s). The losing DNS operator can use this to decide when to
remove the key material from the zone again. The <expiry> element
MUST contain one of the following child elements:
* "<absolute/>": The policy is valid from the current date and
time until it expires on the specified date and time.
* "<relative/>": The policy is valid from the current date and
time until the end of the specified duration.
The current date and time are taken from the "<keyrelay>" service
message's "<qDate>" element, see Section 7.1.
5.1. Example Key Relay Interface
The following is an example of the "<keyrelay>" command, where we
upload two keys and use an relative expire date of one month and 13
days.
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
C: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
C: xmlns:ext="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0">
C: <extension>
C: <ext:command>
C: <ext:keyrelay>
C: <ext:name>example.org</ext:name>
C: <ext:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>8</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</secDNS:pubKey>
C: </ext:keyData>
C: <ext:keyData>
C: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
C: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
C: <secDNS:alg>8</secDNS:alg>
C: <secDNS:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</secDNS:pubKey>
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C: </ext:keyData>
C: <ext:authInfo>
C: <domain:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</domain:pw>
C: </ext:authInfo>
C: <ext:expiry>
C: <ext:relative>P1M13D</ext:relative>
C: </ext:expiry>
C: </ext:keyrelay>
C: </ext:command>
C: </extension>
C:</epp>
6. Server Reply
Example "<keyrelay>" response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed succesfully</msg>
S: </result>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
As stated an EPP error response MUST be returned if a "<keyrelay>"
command can not be processed for any reason.
7. Message Queue Interface
The message queue interface uses the interface as defined in
[RFC5730], Section 2.6. All elements that are present in the
"<keyrelay>" EPP message are put on the message queue of the current
registrar for the domain in the "<name>" element.
7.1. Message Queue Format
Example "<keyrelay>" service message:
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
S: xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
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S: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0">
S: <response>
S: <result code="1301">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully; ack to dequeue</msg>
S: </result>
S: <msgQ count="5" id="12345">
S: <qDate>1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z</qDate>
S: <msg>Key Relay action completed successfully.</msg>
S: </msgQ>
S: <resData>
S: <keyrelay:response>
S: <keyrelay:panData>
S: <keyrelay:name paResult="true">example.org
S: </keyrelay:name>
S: <keyrelay:paTRID>
S: <clTRID>BCD-23456</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>65432-WXY</svTRID>
S: </keyrelay:paTRID>
S: <keyrelay:paDate>1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z
S: </keyrelay:paDate>
S: <keyrelay:keyData>
S: <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
S: <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
S: <secDNS:alg>8</secDNS:alg>
S: <secDNS:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</secDNS:pubKey>
S: </keyrelay:keyData>
S: <keyrelay:authInfo>
S: <domain:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</domain:pw>
S: </keyrelay:authInfo>
S: <keyrelay:expiry>
S: <keyrelay:relative>P24D</keyrelay:relative>
S: </keyrelay:expiry>
S: </keyrelay:panData>
S: </keyrelay:response>
S: </resData>
S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>BCD-23456</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>65432-WXY</svTRID>
S: </trID>
S: </response>
S:</epp>
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8. Formal Syntax
An EPP object mapping is specified in XML Schema notation. The
formal syntax presented here is a complete schema representation of
the object mapping suitable for automated validation of EPP XML
instances.
"<keyrelay>" command schema:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
xmlns:epp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
xmlns:eppcom="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<annotation>
<documentation>
Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 domain name
extension schema for relaying key material.
</documentation>
</annotation>
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
schemaLocation="epp-1.0.xsd" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
schemaLocation="eppcom-1.0.xsd" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
schemaLocation="secdns-1.1.xsd" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
schemaLocation="domain-1.0.xsd" />
<element name="command" type="keyrelay:commandType" />
<element name="response" type="keyrelay:responseType" />
<complexType name="responseType">
<sequence>
<element name="panData"
type="keyrelay:panKeyRelayDataType"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="commandType">
<sequence>
<element name="keyrelay"
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type="keyrelay:keyRelayType" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="keyRelayExpiryType">
<choice>
<element name="absolute" type="dateTime" />
<element name="relative" type="duration" />
</choice>
</complexType>
<complexType name="keyRelayType">
<sequence>
<element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
<element name="authInfo"
type="domain:authInfoType" />
<element name="expiry"
type="keyrelay:keyRelayExpiryType"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<complexType name="panKeyRelayDataType">
<sequence>
<element name="name" type="domain:paNameType" />
<element name="paTRID" type="epp:trIDType" />
<element name="paDate" type="dateTime" />
<element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
<element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" />
<element name="expiry"
type="keyrelay:keyRelayExpiryType"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</schema>
9. IANA Considerations
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
conforming to a registry mechanism described in RFC 3688 [RFC3688].
Two URI assignments must be completed by the IANA.
Registration request for the extension namespace:
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URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
Registration request for the extension XML schema:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyrelay-1.0
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
10. Security Considerations
The "<keyrelay>" EPP extension does not allow for any object
transformations.
Any registrar can use this mechanism to put key material on the
message queue of another registrar, thus mounting a denial of service
attack. However this can, and should be detected by the registry. A
correct "<ext:authInfo>" element can be used as an indication that
putting the key material on the losing registrar's message queue is
allowed.
Communication between a registrar and registry is mostly done over
EPP, but communication between dns-operators, registrants or
registrars often is not. If EPP is not used between these entities,
relaying the key between a dns-operator and registrar should be
adequately authenticated for the complete relay channel to remain
secure. It's out of scope for this document to describe how to
authenticate with other methods than EPP.
11. Acknowledgements
Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids and Ed Lewis.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009.
[RFC5910] Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS)
Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 5910, May 2010.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change]
Koch, P. and M. Sanz, "Changing DNS Operators for DNSSEC
signed Zones", draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change-04
(work in progress), March 2012.
[RFC5931] Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only a Password", RFC
5931, August 2010.
[This section should be removed by the RFC editor before publishing]
1. Initial document.
1. Style and grammar changes;
2. Added an expire element;
3. Make the authInfo element mandatory and make the registry check
it.
Authors' Addresses
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R. (Miek) Gieben
SIDN Labs
Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD
NL
Email: miek@miek.nl
URI: http://miek.nl/
M. Groeneweg
SIDN Labs
Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD
NL
Email: marc.groeneweg@sidn.nl
URI: https://www.sidn.nl/
Rik Ribbers
SIDN Labs
Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD
NL
Email: rik.ribbers@sidn.nl
URI: https://www.sidn.nl/
Antoin Verschuren
SIDN Labs
Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD
NL
Email: antoin.verschuren@sidn.nl
URI: https://www.sidn.nl/
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