Network Working Group                                           E. Kline
Internet-Draft                                              Google Japan
Intended status: Informational                                 K. Duleba
Expires: January 30, 2014                                    Z. Szamonek
                                                 Google Switzerland GmbH
                                                           July 29, 2013


                   Self-published IP Geolocation Data
                draft-google-self-published-geofeeds-02

Abstract

   This document records a format whereby a network operator can publish
   a mapping of IP address ranges to simplified geolocation information,
   colloquially termed a geolocation "feed".  Interested parties can
   poll and parse these feeds to update or merge with other geolocation
   data sources and procedures.

   Some technical organizations operating networks that move from one
   conference location to the next have already experimentally published
   small geolocation feeds.  At least one consumer (Google) has
   incorporated these ad hoc feeds into a geolocation data pipeline.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.  This document may not be modified,
   and derivative works of it may not be created, except to format it
   for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 30, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.



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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Requirements notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.3.  Implications of publication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Self-published IP geolocation feeds  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.1.  Geolocation feed individual entry fields . . . . . . .  5
       2.1.2.  Prefixes with no geolocation information . . . . . . .  6
       2.1.3.  Additional parsing requirements  . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.1.4.  Looking up an IP address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.2.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.3.  Proposed extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.3.1.  Delegation size  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       2.3.2.  Alternate format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   3.  Finding self-published IP geolocation feeds  . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  Ad hoc 'well known' URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.2.  Using public databases of network authority  . . . . . . .  9
     3.3.  Using 'reverse' DNS with NAPTR records . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  Consuming self-published IP geolocation feeds  . . . . . . . . 11
     4.1.  Feed integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.2.  Verification of authority  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.3.  Verification of accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.4.  Refreshing feed information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   6.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  Relation to other work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Appendix A.  Sample Python validation code . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22






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1.  Introduction

1.1.  Motivation

   Providers of services over the Internet have grown to depend on best-
   effort geolocation information to improve the user experience.
   Locality information can aid in directing traffic to the nearest
   serving location, inferring likely native language, and providing
   additional context for services involving search queries.

   When an ISP, for example, changes the location where an IP prefix is
   deployed, services which make use of geolocation information may
   begin to suffer degraded performance.  This can lead to customer
   complaints, possibly to the ISP directly.  Dissemination of correct
   geolocation data is complicated by the lack of any centralized means
   to coordinate and communicate geolocation information to all
   interested consumers of the data.

   This document records a format whereby a network operator (an ISP, an
   enterprise, or any organization which deems the geolocation of its IP
   prefixes to be of concern) can publish a mapping of IP address ranges
   to simplified geolocation information, colloquially termed a
   "geolocation feed".  Interested parties can poll and parse these
   feeds to update or merge with other geolocation data sources and
   procedures.

   Some technical organizations operating networks that move from one
   conference location to the next have already experimentally published
   small geolocation feeds.  At least one consumer (Google) has
   incorporated these ad hoc feeds into a geolocation data pipeline.

1.2.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.3.  Implications of publication

   This document describes both a format and a mechanism for publishing
   data, with the implication that the owner of the data wishes it to be
   public.  Any privacy risk is bounded by the format, and data
   publishers MAY omit certain fields to further protect privacy (see
   Section 2.1 for details about which fields exactly may be omitted).
   Feed publishers assume the responsibility of determining which data
   should be made public.

   This proposal does not incorporate a mechanism to communicate



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   acceptable use policies for self-published data.  Publication itself
   is inferred as a desire by the publisher for the data to be usefully
   consumed, similar to the publication of information like host names,
   cryptographic keys, and SPF records [RFC4408] in the DNS.


2.  Self-published IP geolocation feeds

   The format described here was developed to address the need of
   network operators to rapidly and usefully share geolocation
   information changes.  Originally, there arose a specific case where
   regional operators found it desirable to publish location changes
   rather than wait for geolocation algorithms to "learn" about them.
   Later, technical conferences which frequently use the same network
   prefixes advertised from different conference locations experimented
   by publishing geolocation feeds, updated in advance of network
   location changes, in order to better serve conference attendees.

   At its simplest, the mechanism consists of a network operator
   publishing a file (the "geolocation feed"), which contains several
   text entries, one per line.  Each entry is keyed by a unique (within
   the feed) IP prefix (or single IP address) followed by a sequence of
   network locality attributes to be ascribed to the given prefix.

2.1.  Specification

   For operational simplicity, every feed should contain data about all
   IP addresses the provider wants to publish.  Alternatives, like
   publishing only entries for IP addresses whose geolocation data has
   changed or differ from current observed geolocation behavior "at
   large", are likely to be too operationally complex.

   Feeds MUST use UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding.  Text after a '#'
   character is treated as a comment only and ignored.  Blank lines are
   similarly ignored.

   Feeds MUST be in comma separated values format as described in
   [RFC4180].  Each feed entry is a text line of the form:

       ip_range,country,region,city,postal_code

   The IP range field is REQUIRED, all others are OPTIONAL (can be
   empty), though the requisite minimum number of commas SHOULD be
   present.







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2.1.1.  Geolocation feed individual entry fields

2.1.1.1.  IP Range

   REQUIRED.  Each IP range field MUST be either a single IP address or
   an IP prefix in CIDR notation in conformance with section 3.1 of
   [RFC4632] for IPv4 or section 2.3 of [RFC4291] for IPv6.

   Examples include "192.0.2.1" and "192.0.2.0/24" for IPv4 and "2001:
   db8::1" and "2001:db8::/32" for IPv6.

2.1.1.2.  Country

   OPTIONAL.  The country field, if non-empty, MUST be a 2 letter ISO
   country code conforming to ISO 3166-1 alpha 2 [ISO.3166.1alpha2].
   Parsers SHOULD treat this field case-insensitively.

   Examples include "US" for the United States, "JP" for Japan, and "PL"
   for Poland.

2.1.1.3.  Region

   OPTIONAL.  The region field, if non-empty, MUST be a ISO region code
   conforming to ISO 3166-2 [ISO.3166.2].  Parsers SHOULD treat this
   field case-insensitively.

   Examples include "ID-RI" for the Riau province of Indonesia and
   "NG-RI" for the Rivers province in Nigeria.

2.1.1.4.  City

   OPTIONAL.  The city field, if non-empty, SHOULD be free UTF-8 text,
   excluding the comma (',') character.

   Examples include "Dublin", "New York", and "Sao Paulo" (specifically
   "S" followed by 0xc3, 0xa3, and "o Paulo").

2.1.1.5.  Postal code

   OPTIONAL.  The postal code field, if non-empty, SHOULD be free UTF-8
   text, excluding the comma (',') character.  See Section 6 for some
   discussion of when this field must not be populated.

   Examples include "106-6126" (in Minato ward, Tokyo, Japan).







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2.1.2.  Prefixes with no geolocation information

   Feed publishers may indicate that some IP prefixes should not have
   any associated geolocation information.  It may be that some prefixes
   under their administrative control are reserved, not yet allocated or
   deployed, or are in the process of being redeployed elsewhere and
   existing geolocation information can, from the perspective of the
   publisher, safely be discarded.

   This special case can be indicated by explicitly leaving blank all
   fields which specify any degree of geolocation information.  For
   example:

       127.0.0.0/8,,,,
       224.0.0.0/4,,,,
       240.0.0.0/4,,,,

   Historically, the user-assigned country identifier of "ZZ" had be
   used for this same purpose.  This is not necessarily preferred, and
   no specific interpretation of any of the other user-assigned country
   codes is currently defined.

2.1.3.  Additional parsing requirements

   Feed entries missing required fields, or having a required field
   which fails to parse correctly MUST be discarded.  It is RECOMMENDED
   that such entries also be logged for further administrative review.

   While publishers SHOULD follow [RFC5952] style for IPv6 prefix
   fields, consumers MUST nevertheless accept all valid string
   representations.

   Duplicate IP address or prefix entries MUST be considered an error,
   and consumer implementations SHOULD log the repeated entries for
   further administrative review.  Publishers SHOULD take measures to
   ensure there is one and only one entry per IP address and prefix.

   Feed entries with non-empty optional fields which fail to parse,
   either in part or in full, SHOULD be discarded.  It is RECOMMENDED
   that they also be logged for further administrative review.

   For compatibility with future additional fields a parser MUST ignore
   any fields beyond those it expects.  The data from fields which are
   expected and which parse successfully MUST still be considered valid.







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2.1.4.  Looking up an IP address

   Multiple entries which constitute nested prefixes are permitted.
   Consumers SHOULD consider the entry with the longest matching prefix
   (i.e. the "most specific") to be the best matching entry for a given
   IP address.

2.2.  Examples

   Example entries using different IP address formats and describing
   locations at country, region, city and postal code granularity level,
   respectively:

       192.0.2.0/25,US,US-AL,,
       192.0.2.5,US,US-AL,Alabaster,
       192.0.2.128/25,PL,PL-MZ,,02-784
       2001:db8::/32,PL,,,
       2001:db8:cafe::/48,PL,PL-MZ,,02-784

   Experimentally, RIPE has published geolocation information for their
   conference network prefixes, which change location in accordance with
   each new event.  [GEO_RIPE_NCC] at the time of writing contains:

       193.0.24.0/21,IE,IE-D,Dublin,
       2001:67c:64::/48,IE,IE-D,Dublin,

   Similarly, ICANN has published geolocation information for their
   portable conference network prefixes.  [GEO_ICANN] at the time of
   writing contains:

       199.91.192.0/21,US,US-CA,Los Angeles,
       2620:f:8000::/48,US,US-CA,Los Angeles,

   Furthermore, it is worth noting that the geolocation data of SixXS
   users, already available at whois.sixxs.net, is now also accessible
   in the format described here (see [GEO_SIXXS]).  This can be
   particularly useful where tunnel broker networks [RFC3053] are
   concerned as:

   o  the geolocation attributes of users with neighboring prefixes can
      be quite different and therefore not easily aggregated, and

   o  attempting to learn this data by statistical analysis can be
      complicated by the likely low number of samples for any given
      user, making satisfactory statistical confidence difficult to
      achieve.





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2.3.  Proposed extensions

   Already some discussions have resulted in proposed extensions.  While
   the purpose of this document is principally to record existing
   implementation details, it may be that there is a larger desire to
   publish other "network attributes" in a similar manner.  One such
   network attribute, "delegation size", is not currently implemented
   but the state of the proposed extension is recorded here to
   demonstrate the flexibility required of parser implementations.

   The following have been only informally discussed and are not in use
   at the time of writing.

2.3.1.  Delegation size

   OPTIONAL.  A publisher may optionally communicate the average
   delegated prefix size for subnetworks within the IP prefix of this
   entry.  For a network operator this can be used to help consumers
   distinguish IP prefixes among various use types such as residential
   prefixes, allocations to businesses, or data center customer
   allocations.

   Non-empty strings MUST be of the form required for CIDR notation
   suffixes, i.e. "/" followed by the integer prefix length of the
   expected allocation to the subnetworks from within the entry's
   prefix.  In the absence of data to the contrary, it is common to
   assume that leaf networks may be delegated a prefix ranging from /24
   to /32 in IPv4 and /48 to /64 in IPv6.  Default assumptions about
   delegation size are left to the consumer's implementation.

   Examples for IPv6 include "/48", "/56", "/60", and "/64".

2.3.2.  Alternate format

   In order to more flexibly support future extensions, use of a more
   expressive feed format has been suggested.  Use of JavaScript Object
   Notation (JSON, [RFC4627]), specifically, has been discussed.
   However, at the time of writing no such specification nor
   implementation exists.


3.  Finding self-published IP geolocation feeds

   The issue of finding, and later verifying, geolocation feeds is not
   formally specified in this document.  At this time, only ad hoc feed
   discovery and verification has a modicum of established practice (see
   below).  Regardless, both the ad hoc mechanics and a few proposed but
   not yet implemented alternatives are discussed.



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3.1.  Ad hoc 'well known' URIs

   To date, geolocation feeds have been shared informally in the form of
   HTTPS URIs exchanged in email threads.  The two example URIs
   documented above describe networks that change locations
   periodically, the operators and operational practices of which are
   well known within their respective technical communities.

   The contents of the feeds are verified by a similarly ad hoc process
   including:

   o  personal knowledge of the parties involved in the exchange, and

   o  comparison of feed-advertised prefixes with the BGP-advertised
      prefixes of Autonomous System Numbers known to be operated by the
      publishers.

   Ad hoc mechanisms, while useful for early experimentation by
   producers and consumers, are unlikely to be adequate for long-term,
   widespread use by multiple parties.  Future versions of any such
   self-published geolocation feed mechanism SHOULD address scalability
   concerns by defining a means for automated discovery and verification
   of operational authority of advertised prefixes.

3.2.  Using public databases of network authority

   One possibility for enabling automation would be publication of feed
   URIs as a well-known attribute in public databases of network
   authority, e.g. the WHOIS service ([RFC3912]) operated by RIRs.
   Verification may be performed if the same or similarly authoritative
   service provides the identical feed URI for queries for each CIDR
   prefix in the geolocation feed.

   The burden of serving this data to all interested consumers,
   especially the load imposed by any verification process, is not yet
   known.  The anticipation of additional operational burden on the
   public resource of record (the database of network authority) is
   however a noted concern.

3.3.  Using 'reverse' DNS with NAPTR records

   Another possibility for automating the location and verification of a
   geolocation feed is to incorporate feed URIs into the DNS,
   specifically the in-addr.arpa and ip6.arpa portions of the DNS
   hierarchy.  A suitably formatted query for a NAPTR ([RFC3403])
   record, or more specifically a U-NAPTR ([RFC4848]) record, could
   yield a transformation to a geolocation feed URI.




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   For example, assuming a purely theoretical service name of
   "x-geofeed", a 'reverse' DNS zone might contain a record of the form:

       ;;       order pref flags
       IN NAPTR 200   10   "u"    "x-geofeed"        ( ; service
                                                       ; regexp
                                  "!.*!https://example.com/ipgeo.csv!"
                                  ""                   ; replacement
                                  )

   Attempts to locate the geolocation feed for a given IP address would
   begin by querying directly for a NAPTR record associated with the
   address's PTR-style name.  For example, 192.0.2.4 and 2001:db8::6
   would cause a NAPTR record request to be issued for "4.2.0.192.in-
   addr.arpa" and "6.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d
   .0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa", respectively.

   If no such record exists one further NAPTR query for the fully
   qualified domain name of the SOA record in the authority section of
   the response to the previous query would be performed ("2.0.192.in-
   addr.arpa" and "d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa" in the examples above).

   If one or more NAPTR records exist for the full PTR-style name but
   none of them are for the required service name (e.g. "x-geofeed"),
   then likely no SOA will be returned as a hint for subsequent queries.
   In this case implementations would need to first explicitly query for
   an SOA record for the full PTR-style name, and then query for a NAPTR
   record of the SOA in the response (assuming it differs from the
   previously queried name).

   Any successfully located feed URIs could then be processed as
   outlined by this document.

   Verification of the contents of a feed would proceed in essentially
   the same way.  CIDR prefixes may be verified by constructing a query
   for any single address (at random) within the prefix and proceeding
   as above.  While not strictly provably correct (in cases where a
   publisher has delegated some portion of the advertised prefix but not
   excluded it from its feed), it may nevertheless suffice for
   operational purposes, especially if a low-impact on-going
   verification of observed client IP addresses is implemented, to
   (eventually) catch any oversights.

   This mode is untested and may prove impractical.  However, the
   operational burden is more closely located with those wishing and
   willing to bear it, i.e. the publishers who would likely handle
   serving in-addr.arpa and ip6.arpa for the IP prefixes under their
   authority.



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4.  Consuming self-published IP geolocation feeds

   Consumers MAY treat published feed data as a hint only and MAY choose
   to prefer other sources of geolocation information for any given IP
   range.  Regardless of a consumer's stance with respect to a given
   published feed, there are some points of note for sensibly and
   effectively consuming published feeds.

4.1.  Feed integrity

   The integrity of published information SHOULD be protected by
   securing the means of publication, for example by using HTTP over TLS
   [RFC2818].  Whenever possible, consumers SHOULD prefer retrieving
   geolocation feeds in a manner that guarantees integrity of the feed.

4.2.  Verification of authority

   Consumers of self-published IP geolocation feeds SHOULD perform some
   form of verification that the publisher is in fact authoritative for
   the addresses in the feed.  The actual means of verification is
   likely dependent upon the way in which the feed is discovered.  Ad
   hoc shared URIs, for example, will likely require an ad hoc
   verification process.  Future automated means of feed discovery
   SHOULD have an accompanying automated means of verification.

   A consumer MUST only trust geolocation information for IP addresses
   or ranges for which the publisher has been verified as
   administratively authoritative.  All other geolocation feed entries
   MUST be ignored and SHOULD be logged for further administrative
   review.

4.3.  Verification of accuracy

   Errors and inaccuracies may occur at many levels, and publication and
   consumption of geolocation data are no exceptions.  To the extent
   practical consumers SHOULD take steps to verify the accuracy of
   published locality.  Verification methodology, resolution of
   discrepancies, and preference for alternative sources of data are
   left to the discretion of the feed consumer.

   Consumers SHOULD decide on discrepancy thresholds and SHOULD flag for
   administrative review feed entries which exceed set thresholds.

4.4.  Refreshing feed information

   As a publisher can change geolocation data at any time and without
   notification consumers SHOULD implement mechanisms to periodically
   refresh local copies of feed data.  In the absence of any other



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   refresh timing information it is recommended that consumers SHOULD
   refresh feeds no less often than weekly.

   For feeds available via HTTPS (or HTTP), the publisher MAY
   communicate refresh timing information by means of the standard HTTP
   expiration model (section 13.2 of [RFC2616]).  Specifically,
   publishers can include either an Expires header or a Cache-Control
   header specifying the max-age.  Where practical, consumers SHOULD
   refresh feed information before the expiry time is reached.


5.  Security Considerations

   As there is no true security in the obscurity of the location of any
   given IP address, self-publication of this data fundamentally opens
   no new attack vectors.  For publishers, self-published data merely
   increases the ease with which such location data might be exploited.

   For consumers, feed retrieval processes may receive input from
   potentially hostile sources (e.g. in the event of hijacked traffic).
   As such, proper input validation and defense measures MUST be taken.

   Similarly, consumers who do not perform sufficient verification of
   published data bear the same risks as from other forms of geolocation
   configuration errors.


6.  Privacy Considerations

   Publishers of geolocation feeds are advised to have fully considered
   any and all privacy implications of the disclosure of such
   information for the users of the described networks prior to
   publication.  A thorough comprehension of the security considerations
   of a chosen geolocation policy is highly recommended, including an
   understanding of some of the limitations of information obscurity
   (see also [RFC6772]).

   As noted in Section 2.1, each location field in an entry is optional,
   in order to support expressing only the level of specificity which
   the publisher has deemed acceptable.  There is no requirement that
   the level of specificity be consistent across all entries within a
   feed.  In particular, the Postal Code field (Section 2.1.1.5) can
   provide very specific geolocation, sometimes within a building.  Such
   specific Postal Code values MUST NOT be published in geo feeds
   without the consent of the parties being located.






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7.  Relation to other work

   While not originally done in conjunction with the [GEOPRIV] working
   group, Richard Barnes observed that this work is nevertheless
   consistent with that which the group has defined, both for address
   format and for privacy.  The data elements in geolocation feeds are
   equivalent to the following XML structure (vis.  [RFC5139]):

       <civicAddress>
         <country>country</country>
         <A1>region</A1>
         <A2>city</A2>
         <PC>postal_code</PC>
       </civicAddress>

   Providing geolocation information to this granularity is equivalent
   to the following privacy policy (vis. the definition of the
   'building' level of disclosure):

       <ruleset>
         <rule>
           <conditions/>
           <actions/>
           <transformations>
             <provide-location profile="civic-transformation">
               <provide-civic>building</provide-civic>
             </provide-location>
           </transformations>
         </rule>
       </ruleset>


8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to express their gratitude to reviewers and
   early implementers, including but not limited to Mikael Abrahamsson,
   Ray Bellis, John Bond, Alissa Cooper, Andras Erdei, Marco Hogewoning,
   Mike Joseph, Warren Kumari, Menno Schepers, Justyna Sidorska, Pim van
   Pelt, and Bjoern A. Zeeb.  Richard L. Barnes in particular
   contributed substantial review, text, and advice.


9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [ISO.3166.1alpha2]
              International Organization for Standardization, "ISO



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              3166-1 decoding table", <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/
              standards/country_codes/iso-3166-1_decoding_table.htm>.

   [ISO.3166.2]
              International Organization for Standardization, "ISO 3166-
              2:2007", <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/
              country_codes.htm#2012_iso3166-2>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [RFC4180]  Shafranovich, Y., "Common Format and MIME Type for Comma-
              Separated Values (CSV) Files", RFC 4180, October 2005.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.

   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.

9.2.  Informative References

   [GEOPRIV]  Internet Engineering Task Force, "IETF geopriv Working
              Group", <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/geopriv/>.

   [GEO_ICANN]
              Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers,
              "ICANN Meeting Geolocation Data",
              <https://registration.icann.org/geo/google.csv>.

   [GEO_RIPE_NCC]
              Schepers, M., "RIPE NCC Meeting Geolocation Data",
              <https://meetings.ripe.net/geo/google.csv>.

   [GEO_SIXXS]
              van Pelt, P., "SixXS Geolocation Data",
              <https://www.sixxs.net/export/google/>.

   [IPADDR_PY]
              Shields, M. and P. Moody, "Python IP address manipulation



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              library", <http://code.google.com/p/ipaddr-py/>.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC3053]  Durand, A., Fasano, P., Guardini, I., and D. Lento, "IPv6
              Tunnel Broker", RFC 3053, January 2001.

   [RFC3403]  Mealling, M., "Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS)
              Part Three: The Domain Name System (DNS) Database",
              RFC 3403, October 2002.

   [RFC3912]  Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
              September 2004.

   [RFC4408]  Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
              for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1",
              RFC 4408, April 2006.

   [RFC4627]  Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
              JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.

   [RFC4848]  Daigle, L., "Domain-Based Application Service Location
              Using URIs and the Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service
              (DDDS)", RFC 4848, April 2007.

   [RFC5139]  Thomson, M. and J. Winterbottom, "Revised Civic Location
              Format for Presence Information Data Format Location
              Object (PIDF-LO)", RFC 5139, February 2008.

   [RFC5952]  Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
              Address Text Representation", RFC 5952, August 2010.

   [RFC6772]  Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Cuellar, J., Polk, J.,
              Morris, J., and M. Thomson, "Geolocation Policy: A
              Document Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences for
              Location Information", RFC 6772, January 2013.


Appendix A.  Sample Python validation code

   Included here is a simple format validator in Python for self-
   published ipgeo feeds.  This tool reads CSV data in the self-
   published ipgeo feed format from the standard input and performs
   basic validation.  It is intended for use by feed publishers before
   launching a feed.  Note that this validator does not verify the
   uniqueness of every IP prefix entry within the feed as a whole, but
   only verifies the syntax of each single line from within the feed.  A
   complete validator MUST also ensure IP prefix uniqueness.



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   The main source file "ipgeo_feed_validator.py" follows.  It requires
   use of the open source ipaddr Python library for IP address and CIDR
   parsing and validation [IPADDR_PY].


#!/usr/bin/python
#
# Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of
# the code.  All rights reserved.  Redistribution and use in source and
# binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to,
# and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
# License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
# Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).


"""Simple format validator for self-published ipgeo feeds.

This tool reads CSV data in the self-published ipgeo feed format from
the standard input and performs basic validation.  It is intended for
use by feed publishers before launching a feed.
"""

import csv
import ipaddr
import re
import sys


class IPGeoFeedValidator(object):
  def __init__(self):
    self.ranges = {}
    self.line_number = 0
    self.output_log = {}
    self.SetOutputStream(sys.stderr)

  def Validate(self, feed):
    """Check validity of an IPGeo feed.

    Args:
      feed: iterable with feed lines
    """

    for line in feed:
      self._ValidateLine(line)

  def SetOutputStream(self, logfile):
    """Controls where the output messages go do (STDERR by default).




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    Use None to disable logging.

    Args:
      logfile: a file object (e.g., sys.stdout or sys.stderr) or None.
    """
    self.output_stream = logfile

  def CountErrors(self, severity):
    """How many ERRORs or WARNINGs were generated."""
    return len(self.output_log.get(severity, []))

  ############################################################
  def _ValidateLine(self, line):
    line = line.rstrip('\r\n')
    self.line_number += 1
    self.line = line
    self.is_correct_line = True

    if self._ShouldIgnoreLine(line):
      return

    fields = [field for field in csv.reader([line])][0]

    self._ValidateFields(fields)
    self._FlushOutputStream()

  def _ShouldIgnoreLine(self, line):
    line = line.strip()
    return len(line) == 0 or line.startswith('#')

  ############################################################
  def _ValidateFields(self, fields):
    assert(len(fields) > 0)

    is_correct = self._IsIPAddressOrRangeCorrect(fields[0])

    if len(fields) > 1:
      if not self._IsCountryCode2Correct(fields[1]):
        is_correct = False

    if len(fields) > 2 and not self._IsRegionCodeCorrect(fields[2]):
      is_correct = False

    if len(fields) != 5:
      self._ReportWarning('5 fields were expected (got %d).'
                          % len(fields))

  ############################################################



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  def _IsIPAddressOrRangeCorrect(self, field):
    if '/' in field:
      return self._IsCIDRCorrect(field)
    return self._IsIPAddressCorrect(field)

  def _IsCIDRCorrect(self, cidr):
    try:
      iprange = ipaddr.IPNetwork(cidr)
      if iprange.network._ip != iprange._ip:
        self._ReportError('Incorrect IP Network.')
        return False
      if iprange.is_private:
        self._ReportError('IP Address must not be private.')
        return False
    except:
      self._ReportError('Incorrect IP Network.')
      return False
    return True

  def _IsIPAddressCorrect(self, ipaddress):
    try:
      ip = ipaddr.IPAddress(ipaddress)
    except:
      self._ReportError('Incorrect IP Address.')
      return False
    if ip.is_private:
      self._ReportError('IP Address must not be private.')
      return False
    return True

  ############################################################
  def _IsCountryCode2Correct(self, country_code_2):
    if len(country_code_2) == 0:
      return True
    if len(country_code_2) != 2 or not country_code_2.isalpha():
      self._ReportError(
          'Country code must be in the ISO 3166-1 alpha 2 format.')
      return False
    return True

  def _IsRegionCodeCorrect(self, region_code):
    if len(region_code) == 0:
      return True
    if '-' not in region_code:
      self._ReportError('Region code must be in the ISO 3166-2 format.')
      return False

    parts = region_code.split('-')



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    if not self._IsCountryCode2Correct(parts[0]):
      return False
    return True

  ############################################################
  def _ReportError(self, message):
    self._ReportWithSeverity('ERROR', message)

  def _ReportWarning(self, message):
    self._ReportWithSeverity('WARNING', message)

  def _ReportWithSeverity(self, severity, message):
    self.is_correct_line = False
    output_line = '%s: %s\n' % (severity, message)

    if severity not in self.output_log:
      self.output_log[severity] = []
    self.output_log[severity].append(output_line)

    if self.output_stream is not None:
      self.output_stream.write(output_line)

  def _FlushOutputStream(self):
    if self.is_correct_line: return
    if self.output_stream is None: return

    self.output_stream.write('line %d: %s\n\n'
                             % (self.line_number, self.line))


############################################################
def main():
   feed_validator = IPGeoFeedValidator()
   feed_validator.Validate(sys.stdin)

   if feed_validator.CountErrors('ERROR'):
     sys.exit(1)

if __name__ == '__main__':
  main()

   A unit test file, "ipgeo_feed_validator_test.py" is provided as well.
   It provides basic test coverage of the code above, though does not
   test correct handling of non-ASCII UTF-8 strings.


#!/usr/bin/python
#



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# Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of
# the code.  All rights reserved.  Redistribution and use in source and
# binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to,
# and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
# License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
# Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

import sys
from ipgeo_feed_validator import IPGeoFeedValidator

class IPGeoFeedValidatorTest(object):
  def __init__(self):
    self.validator = IPGeoFeedValidator()
    self.validator.SetOutputStream(None)
    self.successes = 0
    self.failures = 0

  def Run(self):
    self.TestFeedLine('# asdf', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('   ', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('', 0, 0)

    self.TestFeedLine('asdf', 1, 1)
    self.TestFeedLine('asdf,US,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('aaaa::,US,,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('zzzz::,US', 1, 1)
    self.TestFeedLine(',US,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77', 1, 1)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.888', 1, 1)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.asdf', 1, 1)

    self.TestFeedLine('2001:db8:cafe::/48,PL,PL-MZ,,02-784', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('2001:db8:cafe::/48', 0, 1)

    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,PL', 0, 1)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,PL,,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,,,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,ZZ,,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,US,,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,USA,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,99,,,', 1, 0)

    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,US,US-CA,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,US,USA-CA,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,USA,USA-CA,,', 2, 0)

    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,US,US-CA,Mountain View,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,US,US-CA,Mountain View,94043', 0, 0)



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    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88,US,US-CA,Mountain View,94043,'
                      '1600 Ampthitheatre Parkway', 0, 1)

    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.0/24,US,,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88/24,US,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.88/32,US,,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77/24,US,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('55.66.77.0/35,US,,,', 1, 0)

    self.TestFeedLine('172.15.30.1,US,,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('172.28.30.1,US,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('192.167.100.1,US,,,', 0, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('192.168.100.1,US,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('10.0.5.9,US,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('10.0.5.0/24,US,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('fc00::/48,PL,,,', 1, 0)
    self.TestFeedLine('fe00::/48,PL,,,', 0, 0)

    print '%d tests passed, %d failed' % (self.successes, self.failures)

  def IsOutputLogCorrectAtSeverity(self, severity, expected_msg_count):
    msg_count = self.validator.CountErrors(severity)

    if msg_count != expected_msg_count:
      print 'TEST FAILED: %s\nexpected %d %s[s], observed %d\n%s\n' % (
          self.validator.line, expected_sg_count, severity, msg_count,
          str(self.validator.output_log[severity]))
      return False
    return True

  def IsOutputLogCorrect(self, new_errors, new_warnings):
    retval = True

    if not self.IsOutputLogCorrectAtSeverity('ERROR', new_errors):
      retval = False
    if not self.IsOutputLogCorrectAtSeverity('WARNING', new_warnings):
      retval = False

    return retval

  def TestFeedLine(self, line, warning_count, error_count):
    self.validator.output_log['WARNING'] = []
    self.validator.output_log['ERROR'] = []
    self.validator._ValidateLine(line)

    if not self.IsOutputLogCorrect(warning_count, error_count):
      self.failures += 1
      return False



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    self.successes += 1
    return True


if __name__ == '__main__':
  IPGeoFeedValidatorTest().Run()


Authors' Addresses

   Erik Kline
   Google Japan
   Roppongi 6-10-1, 26th Floor
   Minato, Tokyo  106-6126
   Japan

   Phone: +81 03 6384 9000
   Email: ek@google.com


   Krzysztof Duleba
   Google Switzerland GmbH
   Brandschenkestrasse 110
   Zuerich  8002
   Switzerland

   Email: kduleba@google.com


   Zoltan Szamonek
   Google Switzerland GmbH
   Brandschenkestrasse 110
   Zuerich  8002
   Switzerland

   Email: zszami@google.com















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