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Versions: 00 01 02 03                                                   
Internet Engineering Task Force                            Wassim Haddad
Mobility and Multi-homing Privacy                               Ericsson
Internet Draft                                             Erik Nordmark
Expires March 2005                                      Sun Microsystems
                                                          Francis Dupont
                                                       GET/ENST Bretagne
                                                         Marcelo Bagnulo
                                                     Soohong Daniel Park
                                                     Samsung Electronics
                                                         Basavaraj Patil
                                                            October 2004

                Privacy for Mobile and Multi-homed Nodes:
                       MoMiPriv Problem Statement


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
   patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been
   disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware
   will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.

   This document is an Internet Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
   areas, and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also
   distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-
   Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as
   "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet Drafts can be accessed at

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited


   This memo describes the privacy in mobility and multi-homing
   problem statement.

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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction................................................2
   2. Glossary....................................................3
   3. Problem Statement...........................................6
      3.1. The MAC Layer Problem..................................6
      3.2. The IP Layer Problem...................................8
      3.3. The Interdependency Problem............................9
   4. Security Considerations....................................10
   5. References.................................................10
   6. Authors' Addresses.........................................11
   Intellectual Property Statement...............................13
   Disclaimer of Validity........................................13
   Copyright Statement...........................................13

1. Introduction

   In the near future, the mobility and multi-homing features will
   coexist in the majority of small devices, e.g., terminals, PDAs,
   etc. In order to enable these features, Mobile IPv6 [MIPv6]
   protocol has already been designed to solve the mobility issues,
   while addressing the multi-homing issues is still an ongoing

   However, MIPv6 protocol does not provide any mean/support to
   protect the mobile node's privacy when moving across the
   internet, while in the multi-homing area, the privacy may well
   be supported in any potential solution but may probably lack
   some features. This is mainly due to the fact that the privacy
   issues are not limited to the IP layer only.

   This memo describes the privacy in mobility and multi-homing
   (momipriv) problem statement based on IPv6 only.

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2. Glossary


       Anonymity is a property of network security. An entity "A"
       in a system has anonymity if no other entity can identify
       "A", nor is there any link back to "A" that can be used, nor
       any way to verify that any two anonymous acts are performed
       by "A".

       Anonymity ensures that a user may use a resource or service
       without disclosing the user's identity.

       Anonymity in wireless networks means that neither the mobile
       node nor its system software shall by default expose any
       information, that allows any conclusions on the owner or
       current use of the node.

       Consequently, in scenarios where a device and/or network
       identifiers are used (e.g., MAC address, IP address),
       neither the communication partner nor any outside attacker
       should be able to disclose any possible link between the
       respective identifier and the user's identity.


       Pseudonymity is a weaker property related to anonymity. It
       means that one cannot identify an entity, but it may be
       possible to prove that two pseudonymous acts were performed
       by the same entity.

       Pseudonymity ensures that a user may use a resource or
       service without disclosing its user identity, but can still
       be accountable for that use.

       Consequently, a pseudonym is an identifier for a party to a
       transaction, which is not in the normal course of events,
       sufficient to associate the transaction with a particular

       Hence a transaction is pseudonymous in relation to a
       particular party if the transaction data contains no direct
       identifier for that party, and can only be related to them
       in the event that a very specific piece of additional data
       is associated with it.

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       Two events are unlinkable if they are no more and no less
       related than they are related concerning the a-priori

       Unlinkability ensures that a user may make use of resources
       or services without others being able to link these two
       uses together.

       Note that unlinkability is a sufficient condition of
       anonymity, but it is not a necessary condition.


       Privacy is a more general term than anonymity. Privacy is
       the claim of individuals, groups and institutions to
       determine for themesleves, when, how and to what extent
       information about them is communicated to others.

       In wireless telecommunications, privacy addresses especially
       the protection of the content as well as the context (e.g.,
       time, location, type of service, ...) of a communication

       Consequently, neither the mobile node nor its system
       software shall support the creation of user-related usage
       profiles. Such profiles basically comprise of a correlation
       of time and location of the node's use, as well as the type
       and details of the transaction performed.

       Privacy can even be achieved by disconnectivity, i.e., not
       being connected to a network.

   Location Privacy

       Location Privacy means the capability of a mobile node to
       conceal the relation between its location and the personal
       identifiable information from third parties.

   MAC Address

       A MAC Address is a 48 bits unique value associated with a
       network adapter. The MAC address uniqueness is by default
       global. A MAC Address is also known as the device/hardware

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       A communication facility or medium over which nodes can
       communicate at the link layer, such as an Ethernet (simple
       or bridged). A link is the layer immediately below IP.

   IPv6 Address

       An IP address is a unique 128-bit IP layer identifier for an
       interface or a set of interfaces attached to an IP network.
       An IPv6 address can be unicast, i.e., identifier for a
       single interface, or anycast, i.e., an identifier for a set
       of interfaces, and a packet sent to an anycast address is
       delivered to only one interface, or multicast, i.e., an
       identifier for a set of interfaces and a packet sent to a
       multicast address is delivered to all these interfaces.

   Interface Identifier

       A number used to identify a node's interface on a link. The
       interface identifier is the remaining low-order bits in the
       node's IP address after the subnet prefix.

   Basic Service Set (BSS)

       A set of stations controlled by a single coordination

   Extended Service Set (ESS)

       A set of one or more interconnected basic service set (BSSs)
       and integrated local area networks (LANs) that appears as a
       single BSS to the logical link control layer at any station
       associated with one of those BSSs.

   Distribution System (DS)

       A system used to interconnect a set of basic service sets
       (BSSs) and integrated local area networks (LANs) to create
       an extended service set (ESS).

   For more literature about the Glossary content, please refer to
   [ANON], [ISO99], [Priv-NG], [Freedom] and [ANON-PRIV].

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3. Problem Statement

   There are two main reasons for writing this document. First,
   the growing ability to trace a mobile node by an untrusted
   third party, especially in public access networks, is a direct
   and serious violation of the mobile user's privacy and can
   cause serious damage to its personal, social and professional
   life. The second reason is the fact that the privacy problem
   is not limited to one layer only and should not be solved
   independantly on one layer.

   As it appeared in the above, privacy is a more general term
   than anonymity/pseudonymity. Privacy becomes a real concern
   especially when the mobile node (MN) uses permanent device
   and/or network identifiers.

   However, in many scenarios, protecting the user's privacy can
   be achieved by providing one or many of the privacy aspects
   defined above with regards to the mobile node's requirements
   and/or location.
   For this purpose, we try in the rest of this document to use
   the terms defined above, in order to highlight the issues in a
   more precise way.

   It should be noted that this document focus on the privacy
   problem for a mobile and multi-homed node only and does not
   make any assumption regarding the privacy of static node,
   e.g., static correspondent node (CN). In addition, this
   document assumes that the real IPv6 address is not hidden by
   default, i.e., any node is always reachable via its real IPv6

   The problem statement can be divided into three problems. The
   first two problems are related to the identifiers associated
   with a mobile device, i.e., the MAC address and the IP address,
   and the third problem highlights their interdependency.

3.1 The MAC Layer Problem

   The first problem focus on the MAC layer and is raising growing
   concerns related to the user's privacy, especially with the
   massive ongoing indoor/outdoor deployment of WLAN technologies.

   A mobile device attached to a particular link is uniquely
   identified on that link by its MAC address, i.e., the device
   identifier. In addition, the device identifier is disclosed in
   any packet sent by/to the MN when it reaches that particular
   link, thus making it a very efficient tool to trace a mobile

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   user in a shared wireless medium access. Similar problems have
   caused bad press for cellular operators.

   For example, an eavesdropper located in one distributed system
   (DS) can trace a mobile node via its device identifier while
   moving in the entire ESS, and learn enough information about
   the user's activities and whereabouts. Having these information
   available in the wrong hands, especially with the exact time
   when they occur, may have bad consequences on the user.

   Another concern on the MAC layer, which can also be exploited
   by an eavesdropper to trace its victim is the sequence number
   carried by the frame header. The sequence number is incremented
   by 1 for each data frame and allows the bad guy to trace its
   targeted node, in addition to the MAC address.
   In addition, the sequence number allows also the malicious node
   to keep tracing the MN, if/when the real MAC address is replaced
   by one or many pseudo-identifier(s) during an ongoing session

   However, it should be noted that even if the real MN's device
   identifier remains undisclosed during all the session(s), it may
   probably not be enough to provide the unlinkability protection
   on the MAC layer, between ongoing session(s).
   Actually, if the MN's MAC address is replaced with a static
   pseudo-identifier, i.e., to provide pseudonymity, or with
   temporary ones, i.e., to provide anonymity, the unlinkability
   protection on the MAC layer can be easily broken if the MN's
   IPv6 address remains unchanged.

   Note that in such scenario, even a periodical change of the
   sequence number won't prevent the eavesdropper from correlating
   ongoing session(s), pseudo-identifiers and the mobile node.

   However, it should be mentioned that replacing the real device
   identifier with static/dynamic pseudo-identifiers, in order to
   provide anonymity/pseudonymity, during an ongoing session(s),
   raises another critical issue on the MAC layer level, which
   concerns the uniqueness of these new pseudo-identifier(s).

   Note that any temporary identifiers MUST be unique within the
   Extended Service Set (ESS) and the distributed system (DS).

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3.2 The IP Layer Problem

   The second problem focus on the IP layer and analyzes the
   privacy problems related to IPv6 only.

   A MN can configure its IPv6 address either from a DHCP server
   or by itself. The latter scenario is called the stateless
   address autoconfiguration [STAT], and discloses the MN MAC
   address in the IPv6 address, thus enabling an eavesdropper to
   easily learn both addresses in this case.

   In order to mitigate the privacy concerns raised, from using
   the stateless address auto-configuration [PRIV-STAT], [PRIVACY]
   introduced a method allowing to periodically change the MN's
   interface identifier.
   However, being limited to the interface identifier only, such
   change discloses the real network identifier, which in turn can
   reveal enough information about the user or can even be the
   exact piece of information needed by the eavesdropper.
   Another limitation to its efficiency lays in the fact that such
   change cannot occur during an ongoing session.

   Note that while using only a different IPv6 address for each
   new session may prevent/mitigate the ability to trace a MN on
   the IP layer level, it remains always possible to trace it
   through its device identifier(s) on the MAC layer level and
   consequently, to learn all IPv6 addresses used by the MN by
   correlating different sessions, thus breaking any unlinkability
   protection provided at the IP layer.

   MIPv6 allows an MN to move across the internet while ensuring
   optimal routing (i.e., by using route optimization (RO)) mode
   and keeping ongoing session(s) alive. Although these two
   features make the RO mode protocol looks efficient, they
   disclose the MN's home IPv6 address and its current location,
   i.e., care-of address (CoA) in each data packet exchanged
   between the MN and the correspondent node (CN).
   Furthermore, each time a MN switches to a new network, it has
   to send in clear a binding update (BU) message to the CN to
   notify it about its new location.

   Consequently, a malicious node located between the MN and the
   CN is able to identify any packet sent/received by the MN and
   trace its movements at any time and any place once it moves
   outside its home network(s) [Priv-NG].

   MIPv6 defines another mode called the bidirectional tunneling
   (BT), which allows the MN to hide its movements and locations
   from the CN by sending all data packets through its HA (i.e.,

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   encapsulated). In such mode, the CN uses only the MN's home
   IPv6 address to communicate with the MN.

   Note that if the CN initiates a session with a MN then it has
   to use the MN's home IPv6 address. In such scenario, if the MN
   wants to keep its movements hidden from the CN, then it has to
   switch to the bidirectional tunneling mode.

   Consequently, all data packets sent/received by the MN are
   exchanged through the MN's HA and the MN needs to update only
   its HA with its location.

   Although, the BT mode allows hiding the MN's location to the
   CN, it can disclose its real identity and current location to
   an eavesdropper located between the HA and the MN (e.g., by
   looking to the data packets inner header).

   In addition to mobility, the multi-homing feature allows a
   mobile node to belong to different home networks and to switch
   between these home networks without interrupting ongoing
   session(s) [MULTI].

   Although multi-homing can be considered as another aspect of
   mobility, switching between different home networks, in addition
   to moving between foreign networks, can disclose to a malicious
   node well located between the multi-homed MN and the CN, part or
   all of the MN's home IPv6 addresses, its device identifiers
   (e.g., when stateless address autoconfiguring is used) and its
   location(s). Such variety of identifiers can make the malicious
   eavesdropper's task easier.

   For example, a malicious node located between the MN and the CN
   can start tracing its victim based on prior knowledge of one of
   its home address or MAC address, and by tracking the BU messages
   (e.g., the MN is using the RO mode).
   After that, the malicious eavesdropper can correlate between
   different signaling messages and possibly data packets to expand
   his knowledge to other victim's home/MAC addresses.
   Learning new identifiers offer the eavesdropper additional tools
   to detect and track future movements.

3.3 The Interdependency Problem

   The MAC and IP layers problems described above highlight another
   concern that needs to be addressed in order to protect the MN's
   identifiers and/or hiding its locations: any change/update of
   the IP address and the pseudo-identifier must be performed in a
   synchronized way.

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   Otherwise, a change/update at the IP layer only, may allow the
   eavesdropper to keep tracing the MN via the device identifier
   and consequently to learn how/when the MN's identifiers are
   modified on the MAC layer, thus making such change(s)

4. Security Considerations

   Any potential solution for the momipriv problem, which allows
   using temporary device identifiers, dynamic pseudo-IP addresses
   and other parameters during an ongoing session should not allow
   a malicious eavesdropper to learn how nor when these identifiers
   are updated.

   Any potential solution must protect against replaying messages
   using old identifiers and/or hijacking an ongoing session during
   an update of the identifiers.

   Any potential solution should not allow exploiting any aspect of
   privacy, in order to gain access to networks.

5. References

   [ANON]       A. Pfitzmann et al. "Anonymity, Unobservability,
                Pseudonymity, and Identity Management - A Proposal
                for Terminology", Draft v0.21, September, 2004.

   [ANON-PRIV]  M. Schmidt, "Subscriptionless Mobile Networking:
                Anonymity and Privacy Aspects within Personal Area
                Networks", IEEE WCNC 2002.

   [Freedom]    A.F. Westin, "Privacy and Freedom", Atheneum Press,
                New York, USA, 1967.

   [ISO99]      ISO IS 15408, 1999, http://www.commoncriteria.org/.

   [MIPv6]      D. Johnson, C. Perkins, J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
                in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

   [MULTI]      N. Montavont, R. Wakikawa, T. Ernst, T. Noel, C. Ng,
                "Analysis of Multihoming in Mobile IPv6",
                July, 2004.

   [PRIV-NG]    A. Escudero-Pascual, "Privacy in the Next Generation

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                Internet", December 2002.

   [PRIV-STAT]  S. Deering, B. Hinden, "Statement on IPv6 Address
                Privacy", http://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng/html/
                specs/ipv6-address-privacy.html November, 1999.

   [Privacy]    T. Narten, R. Draves, S. Krishnan, "Privacy
                Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
                in IPv6", draft-ietf-ipv6-privacy-addrs-v2,
                September, 2004.

   [STAT]       S. Thomson, T. Narten, T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
                Address Autoconfiguration",
                draft-ietf-ipv6-rfc2462bis-05, August 2004.

   [WLAN-IID]   M. Gruteser, D. Grunwald, "Enhancing Location
                Privacy in Wireless LAN Through Disposable Interface
                Identifiers: A Quantitative Analysis, September
                2003", First ACM International Workshop on Wireless
                Mobile Applications and Services on WLAN Hotspots,
                September 2003.

6. Authors'Addresses

   Wassim Haddad
   Ericsson Research
   8400, Decarie Blvd
   Town of Mount Royal
   Quebec H4P 2N2

   Phone: +1 514 345 7900
   E-Mail: Wassim.Haddad@ericsson.com

   Erik Nordmark
   Sun Microsystems, Inc.
   17 Network Circle
   Mountain View, CA

   Phone: +1 650 786 2921
   Fax:   +1 650 786 5896
   E-Mail: Erik.Nordmark@sun.com

   Francis Dupont
   GET/ENST Bretagne

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   Campus de Rennes
   2, rue de la Chataigneraie
   CS 17607
   35576 Cesson-Sevigne Cedex

   E-Mail: Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr

   Marcelo Bagnulo
   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
   Av. Universidad 30
   Leganes, Madrid  28911

   Phone: 34 91 6249500
   E-Mail: Marcelo@it.uc3m.es
   URI:   http://www.it.uc3m.es/marcelo

   Soohong Daniel Park
   Samsung Electronics
   Mobile Platform Laboratory, Samsung Electronics
   416. Maetan-Dong, Yeongtong-Gu, Suwon

   Phone: +81 31 200 4508
   E-Mail: soohong.park@samsung.com

   Basavaraj Patil
   6000 Connection Drive
   Irving, TX 75039

   Phone:  +1 972 894-6709
   E-Mail: Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com

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Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of
   any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be
   claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the
   technology described in this document or the extent to which any
   license under such rights might or might not be available; nor
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   with respect to rights in IETF Documents can be found in BCP 78
   and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the
   use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR
   repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
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   required to implement this standard. Please address the
   information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
   The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights
   claimed in regard to some or all of the specification contained
   in this document. For more information consult the online list
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Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided

Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is
   subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in
   BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all
   their rights.

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