Network Working Group W. Haddad
Internet-Draft Ericsson Research
Expires: April 26, 2006 E. Nordmark
Sun Microsystems
F. Dupont
Point6
M. Bagnulo
UC3M
B. Patil
Nokia
October 23, 2005
Privacy for Mobile and Multi-homed Nodes: MoMiPriv Problem Statement
draft-haddad-momipriv-problem-statement-02
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
This memo describes the privacy in mobility and multi-homing problem
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statement.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Location Privacy vs. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. The MAC Layer Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. The IP Layer Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. The Security Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4.1. The IPsec Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4.2. The Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Problem . . . . . 12
4.5. The Interdependency Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
In the near future, mobility and multi-homing functionalities will
coexist in the majority of end hosts, such as terminals, PDAs, etc.
For this purpose, Mobile IPv6 [MIPv6] protocol has been designed to
provide a solution for the mobility at the network layer while Multi-
homing is still an ongoing work.
MIPv6 does not provide any mechanism to protect the mobile node's
privacy when moving across the Internet, while in the multi-homing
area, the privacy may well be supported in any potential solution but
may probably lack some features. This is mainly due to the fact that
the privacy issues are not limited to the IP layer only.
This memo describes the privacy in mobility and multi-homing
(momipriv) problem statement based on IPv6 only.
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2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [TERM].
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3. Glossary
For privacy related terminology, please refer to [PRITERM].
MAC Address
A MAC Address is a 48 bits unique value associated with a network
adapter. The MAC address uniqueness is by default global. A MAC
Address is also known as the device/hardware identifier.
Link
A communication facility or medium over which nodes can communicate
at the link layer, such as an Ethernet (simple or bridged). A link
is the layer immediately below IP.
IPv6 Address
An IP address is a unique 128-bit IP layer identifier for an
interface or a set of interfaces attached to an IP network.
An IPv6 address can be unicast, i.e., identifier for a single
interface, or anycast, i.e., an identifier for a set of interfaces,
and a packet sent to an anycast address is delivered to only one
interface, or multicast, i.e., an identifier for a set of interfaces
and a packet sent to a multicast address is delivered to all these
interfaces.
Interface Identifier
A number used to identify a node's interface on a link. The
interface identifier is the remaining low-order bits in the node's IP
address after the subnet prefix.
Basic Service Set (BSS)
A set of stations controlled by a single coordination function.
Extended Service Set (ESS)
A set of one or more interconnected basic service set (BSSs) and
integrated local area networks (LANs) that appears as a single BSS to
the logical link control layer at any station associated with one of
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those BSSs.
Distribution System (DS)
A system used to interconnect a set of basic service sets (BSSs) and
integrated local area networks (LANs) to create an extended service
set (ESS).
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4. Problem Statement
The growing ability to trace a mobile node by an untrusted third
party, especially in public access networks, is a direct and serious
violation of the mobile user's privacy and can cause serious damage
to its personal, social and professional life. Privacy becomes a
real concern especially when the mobile node (MN) uses permanent
device and/or network identifiers. Unfortunately, the privacy
problem is not limited to a single layer and should not be solved
independantly on one layer.
Protecting the user's privacy can be achieved, in many scenarios, by
providing one or many of the privacy aspects defined above with
regards to the mobile node's requirements and/or location. For this
purpose, we try in the rest of this document to use the terms defined
above, in order to highlight the issues in a more precise way.
It should be noted that this document focuses only on the privacy
problem for a mobile and multi-homed node only and does not make any
assumption regarding the privacy of a static node, e.g., static
correspondent node (CN). In addition, this document assumes that the
real IPv6 address is not hidden by default, i.e., any node is always
reachable via its real IPv6 address.
The problem statement is divided into four problems. The first two
problems focus on the MAC and IP layers identifiers associated with a
mobile device, i.e., MAC and IP addresses, and describe privacy
issues resulting from using these identifiers in the context of a
mobile and multi-homed environment. The third problem addresses
privacy issues resulting from applying security mechanisms, e.g., IP
Security (IPsec) and Securing Neighbor Discovery (SEND) while the
fourth problem highlights the interdependency between the three
problems, as being the main requirement to be considered when
designing any potential solution.
But before delving into these problems, a quick overview on
differences between location privacy and privacy is provided.
4.1. Location Privacy vs. Privacy
Before describing privacy problems related to the IP and the link
layer, it seems useful to highlight the differences between the
location privacy and privacy, in order to avoid a possible confusion
later.
Location privacy is the ability to prevent other parties from
learning one's current or past location [LOPRIPEC]. In order to get
such ability, the mobile node must conceal any relation between its
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location and the personal identifiable information. Note that in the
momipriv context, the mobile node location refers normally to the
topological location and not the geographic one. The latter is
provided by other means (e.g., GPS) than an IPv6 address. But it
should be noted that it may possible sometimes to deduce the
geographical location from the topological one.
However, concealing any relation between the location and the user's
identifier(s) does not guarantee that the identifier(s) itself will
not be disclosed, since it may be possible to hide the real location
alone. But, having at least one user's identifier disclosed may be
enough (e.g., if coupled with prior knowledge about few possible
whereabouts) for other party to discover the user's current and/or
previous location(s).
For example, in a context limited to IP and MAC layers, the only
available identifiers and/or locators are the IP and MAC addresses,
and only the IP address carries information, which can directly
disclose the MN's location (note that mobile IPv6 discloses both the
mobile node's home and current locations).
The MAC address alone does not provide any hint regarding the mobile
node current/previous location. But if the other party has already
established the link between the target and its MAC address and
gained knowledge about some of the user's possible current/future
whereabouts, then it will be possible to locate and even track the
target.
On the other side, it should be noted that the two main privacy
aspects, i.e., anonymity and pseudonymity, provide implicitly the
location privacy feature by concealing the real user's identifiers
regardless of his/her location(s).
Actually, in both privacy aspects, real identifiers are replaced by
static or dynamic ones, thus making the other party no more able to
identify its target even at the correct location, i.e., any past/
current location information becomes practically useless for locating
and tracking purposes.
4.2. The MAC Layer Problem
The first problem focus on the MAC layer and is raising growing
concerns related to the user's privacy, especially with the massive
ongoing indoor/outdoor deployment of WLAN technologies.
A mobile device attached to a particular link is uniquely identified
on that link by its MAC address, i.e., the device identifier. In
addition, the device identifier is disclosed in any packet sent by/to
the MN when it reaches that particular link, thus making it a very
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efficient tool to trace a mobile user in a shared wireless medium
access. Similar problems have caused bad press for cellular
operators.
For example, a malicious node located in one distributed system (DS)
can trace a mobile node via its device identifier while moving in the
entire ESS, and learn enough information about the user's activities
and whereabouts. Having these information available in the wrong
hands, especially with the exact time when they occur, may have bad
consequences on the user.
Another concern on the MAC layer, which can also be exploited by an
eavesdropper to trace its victim, is the sequence number (SQN)
carried by the frame header. The sequence number is incremented by 1
for each data frame and allows the bad guy to trace its targeted
node, in addition to the MAC address.
In addition, the sequence number allows also the malicious node to
keep tracing the MN, if/when the real MAC address is replaced by one
or many pseudo-identifier(s) during an ongoing session [WLAN-IID].
In addition, it should be noted that even if the real MN's device
identifier remains undisclosed during all ongoing session(s), it may
probably not be enough to provide the unlinkability protection on the
MAC layer, between ongoing session(s).
Actually, in a scenario, where the malicious node is located on the
link or within the distributed system, replacing the real MAC address
with a static pseudo-identifier, i.e., to provide pseudonymity, or
with temporary ones, i.e., to provide anonymity, it will always be
possible to break the unlinkability protection provided by the MAC
layer if the MN's IPv6 address remains unchanged.
Note that in such scenario, even a periodical change of the sequence
number won't prevent the eavesdropper from correlating ongoing
session(s), pseudo-identifiers and the mobile node.
However, it should be mentioned that replacing the real device
identifier with static/dynamic pseudo-identifiers, in order to
provide anonymity/pseudonymity, during an ongoing session(s), raises
another critical issue on the MAC layer level, which concerns the
uniqueness of these new pseudo-identifier(s).
In fact, any temporary/static identifiers MUST be unique within the
Extended Service Set (ESS) and the distributed system (DS).
4.3. The IP Layer Problem
The second problem focus on the IP layer and analyzes the privacy
problems related to IPv6 only.
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A MN can configure its IPv6 address either from a DHCP server or by
itself. The latter scenario is called the stateless address
autoconfiguration [STAT], and discloses the MN MAC address in the
IPv6 address, thus enabling an eavesdropper to easily learn both
addresses in this case.
In order to mitigate the privacy concerns raised from using the
stateless address auto-configuration, [Privacy] introduced a method
allowing to periodically change the MN's interface identifier.
However, being limited to the interface identifier only, such change
discloses the real network identifier, which in turn can reveal
enough information about the topological location, the user or can
even be the exact piece of information needed by the eavesdropper.
Another limitation to its efficiency lays in the fact that such
change cannot occur during an ongoing session.
While using only a different IPv6 address for each new session may
prevent/mitigate the ability to trace a MN on the IP layer level, it
remains always possible to trace it through its device identifier(s)
on the MAC layer level, i.e., when a malicious node (or another one)
is also attached to the same link/DS than its target.
Consequently, it will be possible to learn all IPv6 addresses used by
the MN by correlating different sessions, thus breaking any
unlinkability protection provided at the IP layer.
MIPv6 allows an MN to move across the Internet while ensuring optimal
routing (i.e., by using route optimization (RO)) mode and keeping
ongoing session(s) alive. Although these two features make the RO
mode protocol looks efficient, they disclose the MN's home IPv6
address and its current location, i.e., care-of address (CoA), in
each data packet exchanged between the MN and the correspondent node
(CN).
Furthermore, each time a MN switches to a new network, it has to send
in clear a binding update (BU) message to the CN to notify it about
its new location.
Consequently, MIPv6 RO mode discloses to a malicious node located
between the MN and the CN, all data required to identify, locate and
trace in real time its mobile target, once it moves outside its home
network(s) [Priv-NG].
MIPv6 defines another mode called the bidirectional tunneling (BT),
which allows the MN to hide its movements and locations from the CN
by sending all data packets through its HA (i.e., encapsulated). In
such mode, the CN uses only the MN's home IPv6 address to communicate
with the MN.
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But if the CN initiates a session with a MN then it has to use the
MN's home IPv6 address. In such scenario, if the MN wants to keep
its movements hidden from the CN, then it has to switch to the
bidirectional tunneling mode.
Consequently, all data packets sent/received by the MN are exchanged
through the MN's HA and the MN needs to update only its HA with its
location.
Although, the bi-directional tunneling mode allows hiding the MN's
care-of address to the CN, it can disclose its real identity, i.e.,
IPv6 home address, and current location to a malicious node located
between the HA and the MN (e.g., by looking to the data packets inner
header), unless the HA-MN tunnel is protected by using the IP
Encapsulation Security Payload [ESP].
In addition to mobility, the multi-homing feature allows a mobile
node to belong to different home networks and to switch between these
home networks without interrupting ongoing session(s) [MULTI].
Although multi-homing can be considered as another aspect of
mobility, switching between different home networks, in addition to
moving between foreign networks, can disclose to a malicious node
well located between the multi-homed MN and the CN, part or all of
the MN's home IPv6 addresses, its device identifiers (e.g., when
stateless address autoconfiguring is used) and its location(s). Such
variety of identifiers can make the malicious eavesdropper's task
easier.
For example, a malicious node located between the MN and the CN can
start tracing its victim based on prior knowledge of one of its home
address or MAC address, and by tracking the BU messages (e.g., the MN
is using the RO mode).
After that, the malicious eavesdropper can correlate between
different signaling messages and possibly data packets to expand his
knowledge to other victim's home/MAC addresses. Learning new
identifiers offer the eavesdropper additional tools to detect and
track future movements.
4.4. The Security Problem
4.4.1. The IPsec Problem
[IPsec] provides a set of security services at the IP layer. These
security services are provided through the use of two traffic
security protocols, i.e., namely the Authentication Header [AH] and
the ESP protocols, and through the use of cryptographic key
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management procedures and protocols, e.g., Internet Key Exchange
[IKE] protocol.
ESP and AH protocols make use of Security Associations (SAs) and a
major function of IKE protocol is to establish and maintain these
SAs. An SA is always identified by a static 32-bit parameter, i.e.,
Security Paramater Index (SPI), and possibly IP addresses.
Based on above, an IPsec SPI can be used to trace a particular mobile
node from one place to another, even if its IP address may change,
(e.g., if [MobIKE] or [SCTP_IPsec] is used). Tracing remains
possible even if care is taken to change the MAC address at the same
time than the IP address.
Consequently, the IPsec SPI can be an efficient tool to break the
unlinkability protection provided by a change(s) of the IP and MAC
addresses (even if both addresses change at the same time), and also
to learn and link the MN's new pseudo-IDs.
This is particularly problematic for the Internet Key Exchange
protocol (described in [IKE]) SPIs, as there is no possibility for
efficiently re-negotiating IKE shared secret(s), i.e., SPIs, without
revealing the previous SPIs in the process. Note that re-negotiating
an IPsec SPI may be done within the protection of the IKE SA, hence
hiding the change from eavesdroppers [EPSPR].
4.4.2. The Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Problem
In order to protect against threats related to the IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery protocol [NDP] and described in [NDPT], the IETF has
standardized the [SEND] protocol, which specifies security mechanisms
for IPv6 NDP.
SEND protocol enables a secure neighbor cache discovery and
construction by relying on the cryptographically generated addresses
[CGA] technology to provide a proof of address ownership.
CGA technology consists on generating an RSA key pair and configuring
an IPv6 address(es) from hashing the derived public key and other
parameters. When using SEND protocol, the MN has to sign NDP
messages with its CGA private key.
However, it is important to mention that generating an RSA key pair
on small devices is a computationally expensive and lenghty
procedure, i.e., power consumption is relatively high. Consequently,
it is likely that such limitation may force the MN to use only one
RSA key pair for a relatively long period of time, e.g., during an
ongoing session. A more optimistic scenario would consist on
precomputing few key pairs and using them in a random way.
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As a result, hiding both the MN's IP and MAC addresses and
periodically refreshing the SPI(s) (when they are used) and SQN(s)
may not be enough to prevent the malicious eavesdropper from tracing
the MN's movements by detecting its CGA public key(s) sent during the
Neighbor Discovery messages exchange, e.g., during a DAD procedure
following an IP handoff. Note also that tracing the public key(s)
can help the malicious node to link between different pseudo-
identifiers at the MAC and IP levels.
4.5. The Interdependency Problem
The MAC and IP layers problems described above highlight another
concern that needs to be addressed in order to protect the MN's
identifiers and/or hiding its locations: any change/update of the IP
address and the MAC pseudo-identifier, as well as all other static
parameter must be performed in a synchronized way.
Otherwise, a change/update for example at the IP layer only, may
allow the eavesdropper to keep tracing the MN via the device
identifier and/or other static parameters, and consequently to learn
how/when the MN's identifiers are modified on the MAC layer, thus
making such change(s) meaningless.
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5. Security Considerations
This document is a problem statement, which describes privacy issues
related to a mobile and multi-homed node, and does not introduce
security considerations by itself.
However it should be noted that any potential solution for the
momipriv problem, which allows using temporary device identifiers,
dynamic pseudo-IP addresses and other parameters during an ongoing
session should not allow a malicious eavesdropper to learn how nor
when these identifiers are updated.
Any potential solution must protect against replaying messages using
old identifiers and/or hijacking an ongoing session during an update
of the identifiers.
Any potential solution should not allow exploiting any aspect of
privacy, in order to gain access to networks.
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6. Acknowledgements
Soohong Daniel Park and Hannes Tschofenig have also contributed to
this document. Many thanks to them.
7. References
[AH] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", Internet
Draft, draft-ietf-ipsec-rfc2402bis-11.txt, March 2005.
[CGA] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3792, March 2005.
[EPSPR] Arkko, J., Nikander, P., and M. Naslund, "Enhancing
Privacy with Shared Pseudo Random Sequences", Security
Proposals, 13rd International Workshop, Cambridge,
April 2005.
[ESP] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
Internet Draft, draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v3-10.txt,
March 2005.
[IKE] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
Internet Draft, draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17.txt,
September 2004.
[IPsec] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", Internet
Draft, draft-ietf-ipsec-rfc2401bis-06.txt, March 2005.
[LOPRIPEC]
Beresfold, A. and F. Stajano, "Location Privacy in
Pervasive Computing", IEEE Pervasive Computing, 2003.
[MIPv6] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[MULTI] Montavont, N., Wakikawa, R., Ernst, T., Noel, T., Ng, C.,
and K. Kuladinithi, "Analysis of Multihoming in Mobile
IPv6", Internet Draft, draft-montavont-mobileip-
multihoming-problem-statement-04.txt, June 2005.
[MobIKE] Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
(MOBIKE)", Internet
Draft, draft-ietf-mobike-protocol-04.txt, October 2005.
[NDP] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IPv6", Internet
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Draft, draft-ietf-ipv6-2461bis-05.txt, October 2005.
[NDPT] Nikander, P., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756,
May 2004.
[PRITERM] Haddad, W. and E. Nordmark, "Privacy Terminology",
Internet
Draft, draft-haddad-alien-privacy-terminology-00.txt,
October 2005.
[Priv-NG] Escudero-Pascual, A., "Privacy in the Next Generation
Internet: Data Protection in the context of the European
Union Policy", PhD Dissertation, December 2002.
[Privacy] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6",
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ipv6-privacy-address-v2-04.txt,
May 2005.
[SCTP_IPsec]
Bellovin, S., Ioannidis, J., and A. Keromytis, "On the Use
of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with
IPsec", RFC 3554, July 2003.
[SEND] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "Secure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[STAT] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", Internet
Draft, draft-ietf-ipv6-rfc2462bis-08.txt, May 2005.
[TERM] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP , March 1997.
[WLAN-IID]
Gruteser, M. and D. Grunwald, "Enhancing Location Privacy
in Wireless LAN Through Disposable Interface Identifiers:
A Quantitative Analysis", First ACM International
Workshop Wireless Mobile Applications and Services on WLAN
Hotspots, September 2003.
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Authors' Addresses
Wassim Haddad
Ericsson Research
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada
Phone: +1 514 345 7900 #2334
Email: Wassim.Haddad@ericsson.com
Erik Nordmark
Sun Microsystems
17 Network Circle
Menlo Park, CA 94025
USA
Phone: +1 650 786 2921
Email: Erik.Nordmark@sun.com
Francis Dupont
Point6
c/o GET/ENST Bretagne
2 rue de la Chataigneraie
CS 17607, 35576 Cesson-Sevigne Cedex
France
Fax: +33 2 99 12 70 30
Email: Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr
Marcelo Bagnulo
UC3M
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Av. Universidad 30
Leganes, Madrid 28911
Spain
Phone: +31 91 6249500
Email: Marcelo@it.uc3m.es
URI: http://www.it.uc3m.es
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Basavaraj Patil
Nokia
6000 Connection Drive
Irving, TX 75039
USA
Phone: +1 972 8946709
Email: Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com
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