Uniform Data Fingerprint (UDF)
draft-hallambaker-udf-08

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08                                    
Network Working Group                                    P. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft                                         Comodo Group Inc.
Intended status: Informational                        September 18, 2017
Expires: March 22, 2018


                     Uniform Data Fingerprint (UDF)
                        draft-hallambaker-udf-07

Abstract

   This document describes means of generating Uniform Data Fingerprint
   (UDF) values and their presentation as text sequences and as URIs.

   Cryptographic digests provide a means of uniquely identifying static
   data without the need for a registration authority.  A fingerprint is
   a form of presenting a cryptographic digest that makes it suitable
   for use in applications where human readability is required.  The UDF
   fingerprint format improves over existing formats through the
   introduction of a compact algorithm identifier affording an
   intentionally limited choice of digest algorithm and the inclusion of
   an IANA registered MIME Content-Type identifier within the scope of
   the digest input to allow the use of a single fingerprint format in
   multiple application domains.

   Alternative means of rendering fingerprint values are considered
   including machine-readable codes, word and image lists.

   This document is also available online at
   http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-udf.html [1] .

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 22, 2018.




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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Algorithm Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Content Type Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.4.  Truncation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Related Specifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Binary Fingerprint Value  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.1.  Version ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Truncation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Base32 Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.4.1.  Using SHA-2-512 Digest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  Fingerprint Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.6.  Compressed Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.7.  Identifiers formed using UDFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.7.1.  URI Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.7.2.  DNS Name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Content Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  PKIX Certificates and Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  OpenPGP Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  DNSSEC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Additional UDF Renderings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Machine Readable Rendering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Word Lists  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.3.  Image List  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13



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     6.1.  Work Factor and Precision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  Semantic Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  URI Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.2.  Content Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.3.  Version Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     8.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   The use of cryptographic digest functions to produce identifiers is
   well established as a means of generating a unique identifier for
   fixed data without the need for a registration authority.

   While the use of fingerprints of public keys was popularized by PGP,
   they are employed in many other applications including OpenPGP, SSH,
   BitCoin and PKIX.

   A cryptographic digest is a particular form of hash function that has
   the properties:

   o  It is easy to compute the digest value for any given message

   o  It is infeasible to generate a message from its digest value

   o  It is infeasible to modify a message without changing the digest
      value

   o  It is infeasible to find two different messages with the same
      digest value.

   If these properties are met, the only way that two data objects that
   map to the same digest value is by random chance.  If the number of
   possible digest values is sufficiently large (i.e. is a sufficiently
   large number of bits in length), this chance is reduced to an
   arbitrarily infinitesimal probability.  Such values are described as
   being probabilistically unique.

   A fingerprint is a representation of a cryptographic digest value
   optimized for purposes of verification and in some cases data entry.







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1.1.  Algorithm Identifier

   Although a secure cryptographic digest algorithm has properties that
   make it ideal for certain types of identifier use, several
   cryptographic digest algorithms have found widespread use, some of
   which have been demonstrated to be insecure.

   For example the MD5 message digest algorithm [RFC1321] , was widely
   used in IETF protocols until it was demonstrated to be vulnerable to
   collision attacks [Dobertin95] .

   The secure use of a fingerprint scheme therefore requires the digest
   algorithm to either be fixed or otherwise determined by the
   fingerprint value itself.  Otherwise an attacker may be able to use a
   weak, broken digest algorithm to generate a data object matching a
   fingerprint value generated using a strong digest algorithm.

   The two digest algorithms currently used in the UDF scheme are both
   believed to be strong.  These are SHA-2-512 [SHA-2] and SHA-3-512
   [SHA-3] . The most secure, 512 bit version of the algorithm is used
   in both cases although the output is almost invariably truncated to a
   shorter length.  Use of the strongest version of the algorithm in
   every circumstance eliminates the need to negotiate the algorithm
   strength.

1.2.  Content Type Identifier

   A secure cryptographic digest algorithm provides a unique digest
   value that is probabilistically unique for a particular byte sequence
   but does not fix the context in which a byte sequence is interpreted.
   While such ambiguity may be tolerated in a fingerprint format
   designed for a single specific field of use, it is not acceptable in
   a general purpose format.

   For example, the SSH and OpenPGP applications both make use of
   fingerprints as identifiers for the public keys used but using
   different digest algorithms and data formats for representing the
   public key data.  While no such vulnerability has been demonstrated
   to date, it is certainly conceivable that a crafty attacker might
   construct an SSH key in such a fashion that OpenPGP interprets the
   data in an insecure fashion.  If the number of applications making
   use of fingerprint format that permits such substitutions is
   sufficiently large, the probability of a semantic substitution
   vulnerability being possible becomes unacceptably large.

   A simple control that defeats such attacks is to incorporate a
   content type identifier within the scope of the data input to the
   hash function.



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1.3.  Representation

   The representation of a fingerprint is the format in which it is
   presented to either an application or the user.

   Base32 encoding is used to produce the preferred text representation
   of a UDF fingerprint.  This encoding uses only the letters of the
   Latin alphabet with numbers chosen to minimize the risk of ambiguity
   between numbers and letters (2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).

   To enhance readability and improve data entry, characters are grouped
   into groups of five.

1.4.  Truncation

   Different applications of fingerprints demand different tradeoffs
   between compactness of the representation and the number of
   significant bits.  A larger the number of significant bits reduces
   the risk of collision but at a cost to convenience.

   Modern cryptographic digest functions such as SHA-2 produce output
   values of at least 256 bits in length.  This is considerably larger
   than most uses of fingerprints require and certainly greater than can
   be represented in human readable form on a business card.

   Since a strong cryptographic digest function produces an output value
   in which every bit in the input value affects every bit in the output
   value with equal probability, it follows that truncating the digest
   value to produce a finger print is at least as strong as any other
   mechanism if digest algorithm used is strong.

   Using truncation to reduce the precision of the digest function has
   the advantage that a lower precision fingerprint of some data content
   is always a prefix of a higher prefix of the same content.  This
   allows higher precision fingerprints to be converted to a lower
   precision without the need for special tools.

2.  Definitions

   This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
   terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
   terms used as requirements language.

2.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].



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2.2.  Defined Terms

   Cryptographic Digest Function

   A hash function that has the properties required for use as a
   cryptographic hash function.  These include collision resistance,
   first pre-image resistance and second pre-image resistance.

   Content Type  An identifier indicating how a Data Value is to be
      interpreted as specified in the IANA registry Media Types.

   Data Value  The binary octet stream that is the input to the digest
      function used to calculate a digest value.

   Data Object  A Data Value and its associated Content Type

   Digest Algorithm  A synonym for Cryptographic Digest Function

   Digest Value  The output of a Cryptographic Digest Function

   Data Digest Value  The output of a Cryptographic Digest Function for
      a given Data Value input.

   Fingerprint  A presentation of the digest value of a data value or
      data object.

   Fingerprint Presentation  The representation of at least some part of
      a fingerprint value in human or machine readable form.

   Fingerprint Improvement  The practice of recording a higher precision
      presentation of a fingerprint on successful validation.

   Fingerprint Work Hardening  The practice of generating a sequence of
      fingerprints until one is found that matches criteria that permit
      a compressed presentation form to be used.  The compressed
      fingerprint thus being shorter than but presenting the same work
      factor as an uncompressed one.

   Hash  A function which takes an input and returns a fixed-size
      output.  Ideally, the output of a hash function is unbiased and
      not correlated to the outputs returned to similar inputs in any
      predictable fashion.

   Precision  The number of significant bits provided by a Fingerprint
      Presentation.

   Work Factor  A measure of the computational effort required to
      perform an attack against some security property.



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2.3.  Related Specifications

   This specification makes use of Base32 [RFC4648] encoding, SHA-2
   [SHA-2] and SHA-3 [SHA-3] digest functions.

   UDFs are used in the definition of Strong Internet Names
   [hallambaker-sin] .

2.4.  Implementation Status

   The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
   the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] .

3.  Encoding

   A UDF fingerprint for a given data object is generated by calculating
   the Binary Fingerprint Value for the given data object and type
   identifier, truncating it to obtain the desired degree of precision
   and then converting the truncated value to a representation.

3.1.  Binary Fingerprint Value

   The binary encoding of a fingerprint is calculated using the formula:

   Fingerprint = &<Version-ID> + H (&<Content-ID> + ?:? + H(&<Data>))

                                 Figure 1

   Where

   H(x) is the cryptographic digest function
   &<Version-ID> is the fingerprint version and algorithm identifier.
   &<Content-ID> is the MIME Content-Type of the data.
   &<Data> is the binary data.

                                 Figure 2

   The use of the nested hash function permits a fingerprint to be taken
   of data for which a digest value is already known without the need to
   calculate a new digest over the data.

   The inclusion of a MIME content type prevents message substitution
   attacks in which one content type is substituted for another.








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3.1.1.  Version ID

   A Version Identifier consists of a single byte.  The following digest
   algorithm identifiers are specified in this document:

      +-----------------+------------------------+-----------------+
      | Version ID      | Algorithm              | Reference       |
      +-----------------+------------------------+-----------------+
      | 96              | SHA-2-512              | <norm="SHA-2"/> |
      | 97, 98, 99, 100 | SHA-2-512 (compressed) | <norm="SHA-2"/> |
      | 144             | SHA-3-512              | <norm="SHA-3"/> |
      +-----------------+------------------------+-----------------+

                                  Table 1

   These algorithm identifiers have been chosen so that the first
   character in a SHA-2-512 fingerprint will always be ?M? and the first
   character in a SHA-3-512 fingerprint will always be ?S?. These
   provide mnemonics for ?Merkle-Damgard? and ?Sponge? respectively.

3.2.  Truncation

   The Binary Fingerprint Value is truncated to an integer multiple of
   25 bits regardless of the intended output presentation.

   The output of the hash function is truncated to a sequence of n bits
   by first selecting the first n/8 bytes of the output function.  If n
   is an integer multiple of 8, no additional bits are required and this
   is the result.  Otherwise the remaining bits are taken from the most
   significant bits of the next byte and any unused bits set to 0.

   For example, to truncate the byte sequence [a0, b1, c2, d3, e4] to 25
   bits. 25/8 = 3 bytes with 1 bit remaining, the first three bytes of
   the truncated sequence is [a0, b1, c2] and the final byte is e4 AND
   80 = 80 which we add to the previous result to obtain the final
   truncated sequence of [a0, b1, c2, 80]

3.3.  Base32 Representation

   A modified version of Base32 [RFC4648] encoding is used to present
   the fingerprint in text form grouping the output text into groups of
   five characters separated by a dash ?-?. This representation improves
   the accuracy of both data entry and verification.








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3.4.  Examples

   In the following examples, <Content-ID> is the UTF8 encoding of the
   string "text/plain" and <Data> is the UTF8 encoding of the string
   "UDF Data Value"

   Data = 55 44 46 20 44 61 74 61 20 56 61 6c 75 65

3.4.1.  Using SHA-2-512 Digest

   H( <Data> ) =
       48 da 47 cc  ab fe a4 5c  76 61 d3 21  ba 34 3e 58
       10 87 2a 03  b4 02 9d ab  84 7c ce d2  22 b6 9c ab
       02 38 d4 e9  1e 2f 6b 36  a0 9e ed 11  09 8a ea ac
       99 d9 e0 bd  ea 47 93 15  bd 7a e9 e1  2e ad c4 15
   H(H( <Data> ) + Content-ID>) =
       45 e0 59 e0  39 34 ea b7  f6 5d 83 b2  d8 f9 b1 6d
       2a 6b 08 63  d9 3c c1 02  86 7b 83 49  f2 d9 f0 8f
       fe 07 87 30  c7 c9 05 74  ac a1 38 2b  b3 14 4d c6
       39 f9 8c 12  c0 4a 3e b5  05 0b 3e 67  df 52 4b 57

                                 Figure 3

   Text Presentation (100 bit)  MB2GK-6DUF5-YGYYL-JNY5E

   Text Presentation (125 bit)  MB2GK-6DUF5-YGYYL-JNY5E-RWSHZ

   Text Presentation (150bit)  MB2GK-6DUF5-YGYYL-JNY5E-RWSHZ-SV75J

   Text Presentation (250bit)  MB2GK-6DUF5-YGYYL-JNY5E-RWSHZ-SV75J-
      C4OZQ-5GIN2-GQ7FQ-EEHFI

3.5.  Fingerprint Improvement

   Since an application must always calculate the full fingerprint value
   as part of the verification process, an application MAY record a

   Applications are encouraged to make use of the practice of
   fingerprint improvement wherever possible.

3.6.  Compressed Presentation

   Fingerprint compression permits the use of shorter fingerprint
   presentation without a reduction in the attacker work factor by
   requiring the fingerprint value to match a particular pattern.






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   UDF fingerprints MUST use compression if possible.  A compressed
   fingerprint uses a version identifier that specifies the form of
   compression used as follows:

                 +------------+-------------------------+
                 | Version ID | Compression             |
                 +------------+-------------------------+
                 | 96         | None                    |
                 | 97         | First 25 bits are zeros |
                 | 98         | First 40 bits are zeros |
                 | 99         | First 50 bits are zeros |
                 | 100        | First 55 bits are zeros |
                 +------------+-------------------------+

                                  Table 2

   Thus, the fingerprint that would be represented in uncompressed form
   as MAAAA-AAWIY-LTMFTG-CZTRO is instead represented as MIWIY-LTMFTG-
   CZTRO.

3.7.  Identifiers formed using UDFs

   UDF fingerprints MAY be used to form a part of another protocol
   identifier.  Such practice carries the implicit semantic that the
   interpretation of the identifier formed is bound to the document
   identified by the fingerprint.

3.7.1.  URI Representation

   Any UDF fingerprint MAY be encoded as a URI by prefixing the Base32
   text representation of the fingerprint with the string ?udf:?

3.7.2.  DNS Name

   A UDF fingerprint MAY be encoded as a DNS label by prefixing the
   Base32 text representation with the string ?mm--?.

   A DNS name that includes a UDF fingerprint as a DNS label carries the
   implicit assertion that the interpretation of the address MUST be
   authorized by a security policy that is validated under a key that
   matches the corresponding fingerprint.

   Placing such a DNS label as the top level (rightmost) label in a DNS
   address creates an address that is not legal and thus cannot be
   resolved by the Internet DNS infrastructure.  Thus ensuring that the
   address is rejected by applications that are not capable of
   performing the associated validation steps.




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   For example, Alice has the email security key with fingerprint MB2GK-
   6DUF5-YGYYL-JNY5E.  She uses the following email addresses:

   alice@example.com  Alice publishes this email address when she does
      not want the other party to use the secure email system.

   alice@mm--mb2gk-6duf5-ygyyl-jny5e.example.com  Alice publishes this
      email address when she wants to give the other party the option of
      using secure email if their system supports it.

      The DNS server for example.com has been configured to redirect
      requests to resolve zz--mb2gk-6duf5-ygyyl-jny5e.example.com to the
      mail server example.com.

   alice@example.com.mm--mb2gk-6duf5-ygyyl-jny5e  Alice uses this email
      address when she wants the other party to be able to send her
      email if and only if their client supports use of the secure
      messaging system.

   While there should never be a DNS label of the form mm--* in the
   authoritative DNS root, such labels MAY be introduced by a trusted
   local resolver.  This would allow attempts at making an untrusted
   communication request to be transparently redirected through a
   locally trusted security enhancing proxy.

4.  Content Types

   While a UDF fingerprint MAY be used to identify any form of static
   data, the use of a UDF fingerprint to identify a public key signature
   key provides a level of indirection and thus the ability to identify
   dynamic data.  The content types used to identify public keys are
   thus of particular interest.

   As described in the security considerations section, the use of
   fingerprints to identify a bare public key and the use of
   fingerprints to identify a public key and associated security policy
   information are very different.

4.1.  PKIX Certificates and Keys

   UDF fingerprints MAY be used to identify PKIX certificates, CRLs and
   public keys in the ASN.1 encoding used in PKIX certificates.

   Since PKIX certificates and CLRs contain security policy information,
   UDF fingerprints used to identify certificates or CRLs SHOULD be
   presented with a minimum of 200 bits of precision.  PKIX applications
   MUST not accept UDF fingerprints specified with less than 200 bits of
   precision for purposes of identifying trust anchors.



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   PKIX certificates, keys and related content data are identified by
   the following content types:

   application/pkix-cert  A PKIX Certificate

   application/pkix-crl  A PKIX CRL

   application/pkix-keyinfo  The KeyInfo structure defined in the PKIX
      certificate specification

4.2.  OpenPGP Key

   OpenPGPv5 keys and key set content data are identified by the
   following content types:

   application/pgp-key-v5  An OpenPGP key

   application/pgp-keys  An OpenPGP key set.

4.3.  DNSSEC

   DNSSEC record data consists of DNS records which are identified by
   the following content type:

   application/dns  A DNS resource record in binary format

5.  Additional UDF Renderings

   By default, a UDF fingerprint is rendered in the Base32 encoding
   described in this document.  Additional renderings MAY be employed to
   facilitate entry and/or verification of fingerprint values.

5.1.  Machine Readable Rendering

   The use of a machine-readable rendering such as a QR Code allows a
   UDF value to be input directly using a smartphone or other device
   equipped with a camera.

   A QR code fixed to a network capable device might contain the
   fingerprint of a machine readable description of the device.

5.2.  Word Lists

   The use of a Word List to encode fingerprint values was introduced by
   Patrick Juola and Philip Zimmerman for the PGPfone application.  The
   PGP Word List is designed to facilitate exchange and verification of
   fingerprint values in a voice application.  To minimize the risk of
   misinterpretation, two word lists of 256 values each are used to



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   encode alternative fingerprint bytes.  The compact size of the lists
   used allowed the compilers to curate them so as to maximize the
   phonetic distance of the words selected.

   The PGP Word List is designed to achieve a balance between ease of
   entry and verification.  Applications where only verification is
   required may be better served by a much larger word list, permitting
   shorter fingerprint encodings.

   For example, a word list with 16384 entries permits 14 bits of the
   fingerprint to be encoded at once, 65536 entries permits 16.  These
   encodings allow a 125 bit fingerprint to be encoded in 9 and 8 words
   respectively.

5.3.  Image List

   An image list is used in the same manner as a word list affording
   rapid visual verification of a fingerprint value.  For obvious
   reasons, this approach is not generally suited to data entry.

6.  Security Considerations

6.1.  Work Factor and Precision

   A given UDF data object has a single fingerprint value that may be
   presented at different precisions.  The shortest legitimate precision
   with which a UDF fingerprint may be presented has 96 significant bits

   A UDF fingerprint presents the same work factor as any other
   cryptographic digest function.  The difficulty of finding a second
   data item that matches a given fingerprint is 2^n and the difficulty
   or finding two data items that have the same fingerprint is 2^(n/2).
   Where n is the precision of the fingerprint.

   For the algorithms specified in this document, n = 512 and thus the
   work factor for finding collisions is 2^256, a value that is
   generally considered to be computationally infeasible.

   Since the use of 512 bit fingerprints is impractical in the type of
   applications where fingerprints are generally used, truncation is a
   practical necessity.  The longer a fingerprint is, the less likely it
   is that a user will check every character.  It is therefore important
   to consider carefully whether the security of an application depends
   on second pre-image resistance or collision resistance.

   In most fingerprint applications, such as the use of fingerprints to
   identify public keys, the fact that a malicious party might generate
   two keys that have the same fingerprint value is a minor concern.



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   Combined with a flawed protocol architecture, such a vulnerability
   may permit an attacker to construct a document such that the
   signature will be accepted as valid by some parties but not by
   others.

   For example, Alice generates keypairs until two are generated that
   have the same 100 bit UDF presentation (typically 2^48 attempts).
   She registers one keypair with a merchant and the other with her
   bank.  This allows Alice to create a payment instrument that will be
   accepted as valid by one and rejected by the other.

   The ability to generate of two PKIX certificates with the same
   fingerprint and different certificate attributes raises very
   different and more serious security concerns.  For example, an
   attacker might generate two certificates with the same key and
   different use constraints.  This might allow an attacker to present a
   highly constrained certificate that does not present a security risk
   to an application for purposes of gaining approval and an
   unconstrained certificate to request a malicious action.

   In general, any use of fingerprints to identify data that has
   security policy semantics requires the risk of collision attacks to
   be considered.  For this reason the use of short, ?user friendly?
   fingerprint presentations (Less than 200 bits) SHOULD only be used
   for public key values.

6.2.  Semantic Substitution

   Many applications record the fact that a data item is trusted, rather
   fewer record the circumstances in which the data item is trusted.
   This results in a semantic substitution vulnerability which an
   attacker may exploit by presenting the trusted data item in the wrong
   context.

   The UDF format provides protection against high level semantic
   substitution attacks by incorporating the content type into the input
   to the outermost fingerprint digest function.  The work factor for
   generating a UDF fingerprint that is valid in both contexts is thus
   the same as the work factor for finding a second preimage in the
   digest function (2^512 for the specified digest algorithms).

   It is thus infeasible to generate a data item such that some
   applications will interpret it as a PKIX key and others will accept
   as an OpenPGP key.  While attempting to parse a PKIX key as an
   OpenPGP key is virtually certain to fail to return the correct key
   parameters it cannot be assumed that the attempt is guaranteed to
   fail with an error message.




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   The UDF format does not provide protection against semantic
   substitution attacks that do not affect the content type.

7.  IANA Considerations

   [This will be extended later]

7.1.  URI Registration

   [Here a URI registration for the udf: scheme]

7.2.  Content Type Registration

   [application/pkix-keyinfo]

   [application/pgp-key]

7.3.  Version Registry

   96 = SHA-2-512
   97 = SHA-2-512 with 25 leading zeros
   98 = SHA-2-512 with 40 leading zeros
   99 = SHA-2-512 with 50 leading zeros
   100 = SHA-2-512 with 55 leading zeros
   144 = SHA-3-512

                                 Figure 4

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006.

   [SHA-2]    NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", August 2015.

   [SHA-3]    Dworkin, M., "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and
              Extendable-Output Functions", August 2015.

8.2.  Informative References

   [Dobertin95]
              Eurocrypt 1996, "Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress".







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   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
              Implementation", draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer-04 (work
              in progress), September 2017.

   [hallambaker-sin]
              "[Reference Not Found!]".

   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992.

8.3.  URIs

   [1] http://prismproof.org/Documents/draft-hallambaker-udf.html

Author's Address

   Phillip Hallam-Baker
   Comodo Group Inc.

   Email: philliph@comodo.com






























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