Network Working Group T. Hardjono, Ed.
Internet-Draft MIT
Intended status: Standards Track E. Maler
Expires: October 6, 2015 ForgeRock
M. Machulak
Cloud Identity
D. Catalano
Oracle
April 4, 2015
OAuth 2.0 Resource Set Registration
draft-hardjono-oauth-resource-reg-06
Abstract
This specification defines a resource set registration mechanism
between an OAuth 2.0 authorization server and resource server. The
resource server registers information about the semantics and
discovery properties of its resources with the authorization server.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 6, 2015.
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Authorization Server Configuration Data . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Resource Set Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Scope Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Resource Set Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Resource Set Registration API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1. Create Resource Set Description . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.2. Read Resource Set Description . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.3. Update Resource Set Description . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.4. Delete Resource Set Description . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.5. List Resource Set Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Example of Registering Resource Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
There are various circumstances under which an OAuth 2.0 [OAuth2]
resource server may need to communicate information about its
protected resources to its authorization server:
o In some OAuth 2.0 deployments, the resource server and
authorization server are operated by the same organization and
deployed in the same domain, but many resource servers share a
single authorization server (a security token service (STS)
component). Thus, even though the trust between these two is
typically tightly bound, there is value in defining a singular
standardized resource protection communications interface between
the authorization server and each of the resource servers.
o In some deployments of OpenID Connect [OpenIDConnect], which has a
dependency on OAuth 2.0, the OpenID Provider (OP) component is a
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specialized version of an OAuth authorization server that brokers
availability of user attributes by dealing with an ecosystem of
attribute providers (APs). These APs effectively function as
third-party resource servers. Thus, there is value in defining a
mechanism by which all of the third-party APs can communicate with
a central OP, as well as ensuring that trust between the
authorization server and resource servers is able to be
established in a dynamic, loosely coupled fashion.
o In some deployments of User-Managed Access [UMA], which has a
dependency on OAuth 2.0, an end-user resource owner (the "user" in
UMA) may choose their own authorization server as an independent
cloud-based service, along with using any number of resource
servers that make up their "personal cloud". Thus, there is value
in defining a mechanism by which all of the third-party resource
servers can outsource resource protection (and potentially
discovery) to a central authorization server, as well as ensuring
that trust between the authorization server and resource servers
is able to be established by the resource owner in a dynamic,
loosely coupled fashion.
This specification defines an API through which the resource server
can register information about resource sets with the authorization
server.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all protocol properties and values are case
sensitive. JSON [JSON] data structures defined by this specification
MAY contain extension properties that are not defined in this
specification. Any entity receiving or retrieving a JSON data
structure SHOULD ignore extension properties it is unable to
understand. Extension names that are unprotected from collisions are
outside the scope of this specification.
1.2. Terminology
This specification introduces the following new terms and
enhancements of OAuth term definitions.
resource set One or more resources that the resource server manages
as a set, abstractly. A resource set may be a single API
endpoint, a set of API endpoints, a classic web resource such
as an HTML page, and so on. Defining this concept enables
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registering data about it, including, most importantly, scopes
but also other data.
scope A bounded extent of access that is possible to perform on a
resource set. In authorization policy terminology, a scope is
one of the potentially many "verbs" that can logically apply to
a resource set ("object"). This specification enhances the
OAuth concept of a "scope" by defining scopes as applying to
particular registered resource sets, rather than leaving the
relevant resources (such as API endpoints or URIs) implicit. A
resource set can have any number of scopes, which together
describe the universe of actions that _can be_ taken on this
protected resource set. For example, a resource set
representing a status update API might have scopes that include
adding an update or reading updates. A resource set
representing a photo album might have scopes that include
viewing a slideshow or printing the album. The resource server
registers resource sets and their scopes when there is not yet
any particular client in the picture.
resource set registration endpoint The endpoint defined by this
specification at which the resource server registers resource
sets it wants the authorization server to know about. The
operations available at this endpoint constitute a resource set
registration API (see Section 2.3).
1.3. Authorization Server Configuration Data
If the authorization server declares its endpoints and any other
configuration data in a machine-readable form, it SHOULD convey its
resource set registration endpoint in this fashion as well.
2. Resource Set Registration
This specification defines a resource set registration API. The
endpoint for this API SHOULD also require some form of authentication
to access this endpoint, such as Client Authentication as described
in [OAuth2] or a separate OAuth access token. The methods of
managing and validating these authentication credentials are out of
scope of this specification.
For any of the resource owner's sets of resources this authorization
server needs to be aware of, the resource server MUST register these
resource sets at the authorization server's registration endpoint.
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2.1. Scope Descriptions
A scope description is a JSON document with the following properties:
name REQUIRED. A human-readable string describing some scope
(extent) of access. This name MAY be used by the authorization
server in any user interface it presents to the resource owner.
icon_uri OPTIONAL. A URI for a graphic icon representing the scope.
The referenced icon MAY be used by the authorization server in any
user interface it presents to the resource owner.
For example, this scope description characterizes a scope that
involves reading or viewing resources (vs. creating them or editing
them in some fashion):
{
"name" : "View",
"icon_uri" : "http://www.example.com/icons/reading-glasses"
}
See Section 7 for a long-form example of scope descriptions used in
resource set registration.
2.2. Resource Set Descriptions
The resource server defines a resource set that the authorization
server needs to be aware of by registering a resource set description
at the authorization server. This registration process results in a
unique identifier for the resource set that the resource server can
later use for managing its description.
The resource server is free to use its own methods of describing
resource sets. A resource set description is a JSON document with
the following properties:
name REQUIRED. A human-readable string describing a set of one or
more resources. This name MAY be used by the authorization server
in its resource owner user interface for the resource owner.
uri OPTIONAL. A URI that provides the network location for the
resource set being registered. For example, if the resource set
corresponds to a digital photo, the value of this property could
be an HTTP-based URI identifying the location of the photo on the
web. The authorization server can use this information in various
ways to inform clients about a resource set's location.
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type OPTIONAL. A string uniquely identifying the semantics of the
resource set. For example, if the resource set consists of a
single resource that is an identity claim that leverages
standardized claim semantics for "verified email address", the
value of this property could be an identifying URI for this claim.
scopes REQUIRED. An array of strings, any of which MAY be a URI,
indicating the available scopes for this resource set. URIs MUST
resolve to scope descriptions as defined in Section 2.1.
Published scope descriptions MAY reside anywhere on the web; a
resource server is not required to self-host scope descriptions
and may wish to point to standardized scope descriptions residing
elsewhere. It is the resource server's responsibility to ensure
that scope description documents are accessible to authorization
servers through GET calls to support any user interface
requirements. The resource server and authorization server are
presumed to have separately negotiated any required interpretation
of scope handling not conveyed through scope descriptions.
icon_uri OPTIONAL. A URI for a graphic icon representing the
resource set. The referenced icon MAY be used by the
authorization server in its resource owner user interface for the
resource owner.
For example, this description characterizes a resource set (a photo
album) that can potentially be only viewed, or alternatively to which
full access can be granted; the URIs point to scope descriptions as
defined in Section 2.1:
{
"name" : "Photo Album",
"icon_uri" : "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
"scopes" : [
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"
],
"type" : "http://www.example.com/rsets/photoalbum"
}
2.3. Resource Set Registration API
The resource server uses the RESTful API at the authorization
server's resource set registration endpoint to create, read, update,
and delete resource set descriptions, along with retrieving lists of
such descriptions.
(Note carefully the similar but distinct senses in which the word
"resource" is used in this section. The resource set descriptions
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are themselves managed as web resources at the authorization server
through this API.)
The authorization server MUST present an API for registering resource
set descriptions at a set of URIs with the following structure:
{rsreguri}/resource_set
The {rsreguri} component is the authorization server's resource set
registration endpoint as advertised in its configuration data (see
Section 1.3). Following is a summary of the five registration
operations the authorization server is REQUIRED to support, where the
ellipsis represents whatever path segments might appear before the
required path structure. Each is defined in its own section below.
All other methods are unsupported.
o Create resource set description: POST .../resource_set
o Read resource set description: GET .../resource_set/{rsid}
o Update resource set description: PUT .../resource_set/{rsid}
o Delete resource set description: DELETE .../resource_set/{rsid}
o List resource set descriptions: GET .../resource_set
The {rsid} is the authorization server-assigned identifier for the
web resource corresponding to the resource set as returned in the
Location header.
Within the JSON body of a successful response, the authorization
server includes common properties, possibly in addition to method-
specific properties, as follows:
_id REQUIRED (except for the List method). A string value repeating
the {rsid} as appearing in the Location header. Its appearance in
both locations allows specialized header and body client software
to avoid extra parsing.
user_access_policy_uri OPTIONAL. A URI that allows the resource
server to redirect an end-user resource owner to a specific user
interface within the authorization server where the resource owner
can immediately set or modify access policies subsequent to the
resource set registration action just completed. The
authorization server is free to choose the targeted user
interface, for example, in the case of a deletion action, enabling
the resource server to direct the end-user to a policy-setting
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interface for an overall "folder" of resource sets where the
deleted resource set once resided.
If the request to the resource set registration endpoint is
incorrect, then the authorization server instead responds with an
error message by including one of the following error codes with the
response (see Section 3):
unsupported_method_type The resource server request used an
unsupported HTTP method. The authorization server MUST respond
with the HTTP 405 (Method Not Allowed) status code and MUST fail
to act on the request.
not_found The resource set requested from the authorization server
cannot be found. The authorization server MUST respond with HTTP
404 (Not Found) status code.
2.3.1. Create Resource Set Description
Adds a new resource set description using the POST method. If the
request is successful, the authorization server MUST respond with a
status message that includes an _id property.
Form of a create request, with an access token in the header:
POST /rs/resource_set HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69
...
(body contains JSON resource set description to be created)
Form of a successful response:
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
Location: /rs/resource_set/12345
...
{
"_id" : 12345,
"user_access_policy_uri" : "http://as.example.com/rs/222/resource/333/policy"
}
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2.3.2. Read Resource Set Description
Reads a previously registered resource set description using the GET
method. If the request is successful, the authorization server MUST
respond with a status message that includes a body containing the
referenced resource set description, along with an "_id" property.
Form of a read request, with an access token in the header:
GET /rs/resource_set/12345 HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69
...
Form of a successful response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
...
(body contains _id and resource set description)
If the referenced resource does not exist, the authorization server
MUST produce an error response with an error property value of
"not_found", as defined in Section 2.3.
2.3.3. Update Resource Set Description
Updates a previously registered resource set description using the
PUT method. If the request is successful, the authorization server
MUST respond with a status message that includes an "_id" property.
Form of an update request, with an access token in the header:
PUT /rs/resource_set/12345 HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69
...
(body contains JSON resource set description to be updated)
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Form of a successful response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
{
_"id": "12345"
}
2.3.4. Delete Resource Set Description
Deletes a previously registered resource set description using the
DELETE method, thereby removing it from the authorization server's
protection regime.
Form of a delete request, with an access token in the header:
DELETE /rs/resource_set/12345
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69
...
Form of a successful response:
HTTP/1.1 204 No content
...
As defined in Section 2.3, if the referenced resource does not exist
the authorization server MUST produce an error response with an error
property value of "not_found".
2.3.5. List Resource Set Descriptions
Lists all previously registered resource set identifiers for this
user using the GET method. The authorization server MUST return the
list in the form of a JSON array of {rsid} string values.
The resource server uses this method as a first step in checking
whether its understanding of protected resources is in full
synchronization with the authorization server's understanding.
Form of a list request, with an access token in the header:
GET /rs/resource_set HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer 204c69636b6c69
...
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Form of a successful response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
(body contains JSON array of {rsid} values)
3. Error Messages
When a resource server attempts to access the resource set
registration endpoint at the authorization server, if the request is
successfully authenticated by OAuth means, but is invalid for another
reason, the authorization server produces an error response by adding
the following properties to the entity body of the HTTP response:
error REQUIRED. A single error code, as noted in the API
definition. Value for this property is defined in the specific
authorization server endpoint description.
error_description OPTIONAL. A human-readable text providing
additional information, used to assist in the understanding and
resolution of the error occurred.
error_uri OPTIONAL. A URI identifying a human-readable web page
with information about the error, used to provide the end-user
with additional information about the error.
4. Security Considerations
This specification largely relies on OAuth for API security and
shares its security and vulnerability considerations.
The resource server itself is presumed to have a trust relationship
with the authorization server in question, and it registers resource
sets in the context of a particular resource owner. A malicious
resource server could register a bad icon URI at an authorization
server, "infecting" the authorization server either when the icon is
retrieved or by confusing a human resource owner about the nature of
the resource set being protected. To accomplish this, the resource
server would likely have to deceive a resource owner into authorizing
it to, first, dynamically registering for client credentials at the
authorization server, and second, outsourcing protection to the
authorization server.
An authorization server could mitigate this threat by not displaying
scope or resource set icons of a dynamically registered resource
server until such time as it establishes sufficient trust. A less-
trusted resource server could increase the likelihood of an
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authorization server displaying its icons by choosing icons that are
well-known and standardized by third parties.
5. Privacy Considerations
The communication between the authorization server and resource
server may expose personally identifiable information of a resource
owner. The context in which this API is used SHOULD account for its
own unique privacy considerations.
6. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
7. Example of Registering Resource Sets
The following example illustrates the intent and usage of resource
set descriptions and scope descriptions as part of resource set
registration in the context of [UMA].
This example contains some steps that are exclusively in the realm of
user experience rather than web protocol, to achieve realistic
illustration. These steps are labeled "user experience only". Some
other steps are exclusively internal to the operation of the entity
being discussed. These are labeled "internal only".
A resource owner, Alice Adams, has just uploaded a photo of her new
puppy to a resource server, Photoz.example.com, and wants to ensure
that this specific photo is not publicly accessible.
Alice has already introduced this resource server to her
authorization server, CopMonkey.example.com. However, Alice has not
previously instructed Photoz to use CopMonkey to protect any photos
of hers.
Alice has previously visited CopMonkey to map a default "do not share
with anyone" policy to any resource sets registered by Photoz, until
such time as she maps some other more permissive policies to those
resources. (User experience only. This may have been done at the
time Alice introduced the resource server to the authorization
server, and/or it could have been a global or resource server-
specific preference setting. A different constraint or no constraint
at all might be associated with newly protected resources.) Other
kinds of policies she may eventually map to particular photos or
albums might be "Share only with husband@email.example.net" or "Share
only with people in my 'family' group".
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Photoz itself has a publicly documented application-specific API that
offers two dozen different methods that apply to single photos, such
as "addTags" and "getSizes", but rolls them up into two photo-related
scopes of access: "view" (consisting of various read-only operations)
and "all" (consisting of various reading, editing, and printing
operations). It defines two scope descriptions that represent these
scopes, which it is able to reuse for all of its users (not just
Alice), and ensures that these scope description documents are
available through HTTP GET requests that may be made by authorization
servers.
The "name" property values are intended to be seen by Alice when she
maps authorization constraints to specific resource sets and actions
while visiting CopMonkey, such that Alice would see the strings "View
Photo and Related Info" and "All Actions", likely accompanied by the
referenced icons, in the CopMonkey interface. (Other users of Photoz
might similarly see the same labels at CopMonkey or whatever other
authorization server they use. Photoz could distinguish natural-
language labels per user if it wishes, by pointing to scopes with
differently translated names.)
Example of the viewing-related scope description document available
at http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view:
{
"name" : "View Photo and Related Info",
"icon_uri" : "http://www.example.com/icons/reading-glasses.png"
}
Example of the broader scope description document available at
http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all:
{
"name" : "All Actions",
"icon_uri" : "http://www.example.com/icons/galaxy.png"
}
While visiting Photoz, Alice selects a link or button that instructs
the site to "Protect" or "Share" this single photo (user experience
only; Photoz could have made this a default or preference setting).
As a result, Photoz defines for itself a resource set that represents
this photo (internal only; Photoz is the only application that knows
how to map a particular photo to a particular resource set). Photoz
also prepares the following resource set description, which is
specific to Alice and her photo. The "name" property value is
intended to be seen by Alice in mapping authorization policies to
specific resource sets and actions when she visits CopMonkey. Alice
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would see the string "Steve the puppy!", likely accompanied by the
referenced icon, in the CopMonkey interface. The possible scopes of
access on this resource set are indicated with URI references to the
scope descriptions, as shown just above.
{
"name" : "Steve the puppy!",
"icon_uri" : "http://www.example.com/icons/flower",
"scopes" : [
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"
]
}
Photoz uses the Create method of CopMonkey's standard OAuth resource
set registration API, presenting its Alice-specific access token to
use the API to register and assign an identifier to the resource set
description.
PUT /rs/resource_set HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"name" : "Steve the puppy!",
"icon_uri" : "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
"scopes" : [
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"
]
}
If the registration attempt succeeds, CopMonkey responds in the
following fashion.
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"_id" : "112210f47de98100"
}
At the time Alice indicates she would like this photo protected,
Photoz can choose to redirect Alice to CopMonkey for further policy
setting, access auditing, and other authorization server-related
tasks (user experience only).
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Once it has successfully registered this description, Photoz is
responsible for outsourcing protection to CopMonkey for access
attempts made to this photo.
Over time, as Alice uploads other photos and creates and organizes
photo albums, Photoz can use additional methods of the resource set
registration API to ensure that CopMonkey's understanding of Alice's
protected resources matches its own.
For example, if Photoz suspects that somehow its understanding of the
resource set has gotten out of sync with CopMonkey's, it can ask to
read the resource set description as follows.
GET /rs/resource_set/112210f47de98100 HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
...
CopMonkey responds with the full content of the resource set
description, including its _id, as follows:
Example of an HTTP response to a "read resource set description"
request, containing a resource set description from the authorization
server:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"_id" : "112210f47de98100",
"name" : "Photo album",
"icon_uri" : "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
"scopes" : [
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"
]
}
If for some reason Photoz and CopMonkey have gotten dramatically out
of sync, Photoz can ask for the list of resource set identifiers
CopMonkey currently knows about:
GET /rs/resource_set HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
...
CopMonkey's response might look as follows:
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
[ "112210f47de98100", "34234df47eL95300" ]
If Alice later changes the photo's title (user experience only) on
Photoz from "Steve the puppy!" to "Steve on October 14, 2011", Photoz
would use the Update method to ensure that Alice's experience of
policy-setting at CopMonkey remains consistent with what she sees at
Photoz. Following is an example of this request.
PUT /rs/resource_set/112210f47de98100 HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Host: as.example.com
...
{
"name" : "Steve on October 14, 2011",
"icon_uri" : "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
"scopes" : [
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"
]
}
CopMonkey would respond as follows.
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"_id" : "112210f47de98100"
}
There are other reasons Photoz might want to update resource set
descriptions, having nothing to do with Alice's actions or wishes.
For example, it might extend its API to include new features, and
want to add new scopes to all of Alice's and other users' resource
set descriptions.
if Alice later decides to entirely remove sharing protection (user
experience only) on this photo while visiting Photoz, ensuring that
the public can get access without any protection, Photoz is
responsible for deleting the relevant resource set registration, as
follows:
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DELETE /rs/resource_set/112210f47de98100 HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
...
8. Acknowledgments
The following people made significant text contributions to the
specification:
o Paul C. Bryan, ForgeRock US, Inc. (former editor)
o Mark Dobrinic, Cozmanova
o George Fletcher, AOL
o Lukasz Moren, Cloud Identity Ltd
o Christian Scholz, COMlounge GmbH (former editor)
o Mike Schwartz, Gluu
o Jacek Szpot, Newcastle University
Additional contributors to this specification include the Kantara UMA
Work Group participants, a list of whom can be found at
[UMAnitarians].
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[JSON] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", March 2014,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7159>.
[OAuth2] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
October 2012, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
9.2. Informative References
[OpenIDConnect]
Sakimura, N., "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 1", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
Hardjono, et al. Expires October 6, 2015 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft OAuth RSR April 2015
[UMA] Hardjono, T., "User-Managed Access (UMA) Profile of OAuth
2.0", December 2014,
<http://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/
draft-uma-core.html>.
[UMAnitarians]
Maler, E., "UMA Participant Roster", December 2014,
<http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/
Participant+Roster>.
Authors' Addresses
Thomas Hardjono (editor)
MIT
Email: hardjono@mit.edu
Eve Maler
ForgeRock
Email: eve.maler@forgerock.com
Maciej Machulak
Cloud Identity
Email: maciej.machulak@cloudidentity.co.uk
Domenico Catalano
Oracle
Email: domenico.catalano@oracle.com
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