Network Working Group T. Hardjono, Ed.
Internet-Draft MIT
Intended status: Standards Track C. Scholz
Expires: January 3, 2012 COM.lounge GmbH
P. Bryan
pbryan.net
M. Machulak
Newcastle University
E. Maler
XMLgrrl.com
L. Moren
Newcastle University
July 2, 2011
User-Managed Access (UMA) Core Protocol
draft-hardjono-oauth-umacore-00
Abstract
This specification defines the User-Managed Access (UMA) core
protocol. This protocol provides a method for users to control
access to their protected resources, residing on any number of host
sites, through an authorization manager that governs access decisions
based on user policy.
This document is an approved Report of the User-Managed Access Work
Group of the Kantara Initiative. The User-Managed Access Work Group
operates under Kantara IPR Policy - Option Patent and Copyright:
Reciprocal Royalty Free with Opt-Out to Reasonable And Non
discriminatory (RAND) and the publication of this document is
governed by the policies outlined in this option.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. Endpoint Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Protecting a Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1. Host Looks Up AM Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.1. AM Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2. Example AM Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2. Host Registers with AM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3. Host Obtains Host Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4. Host Registers Sets of Resources to Be Protected . . . . . 14
2.4.1. Example of Registering Resource Sets . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.2. Scope Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.3. Resource Set Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.4. Resource Set Registration API . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3. Getting Authorization and Accessing a Resource . . . . . . . . 27
3.1. Requester-Host: Attempt Access at Protected Resource . . . 29
3.1.1. Requester's Request Is Ambiguous . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.2. Requester Presents No Access Token . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.3. Requester Presents an Invalid Access Token . . . . . . 30
3.1.4. Requester's Token Has Insufficient Permission . . . . 31
3.1.5. Requester's Token Has Sufficient Permission . . . . . 31
3.2. Requester-AM: Requester Obtains Access Token . . . . . . . 32
3.3. Host-AM: Ask for Requester's Presented Access Token
Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3.1. AM Returns a Token Status Description . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.2. AM Returns a Token Invalid Response . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4. Host-AM: Register a Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4.1. AM Returns a Permission Registration Success
Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4.2. AM Returns a Permission Registration Error Response . 36
3.5. Requester-AM: Request Authorization to Add Permission . . 37
3.5.1. Trusted Claims with OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . 39
4. Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1. OAuth Error Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2. UMA Error Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7. Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
10. Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
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1. Introduction
The User-Managed Access (UMA) core protocol provides a method based
on [OAuth2] (currently draft 16) for users to control access to their
protected resources, residing on any number of host sites, through a
single authorization manager (AM) that governs access decisions based
on user policy.
There are numerous use cases for UMA, where a resource owner
nominates a third party to control access to these resources
potentially without the real-time presence of the resource owner. A
typical example is the following. A web user (authorizing user) can
authorize a web app (requester) to gain one-time or ongoing access to
a resource containing his home address stored at a "personal data
store" service (host), by telling the host to act on access decisions
made by his authorization decision-making service (authorization
manager or AM). The requesting party might be an e-commerce company
whose site is acting on behalf of the user himself to assist him/her
in arranging for shipping a purchased item, or it might be his friend
who is using an online address book service to collect addresses, or
it might be a survey company that uses an online service to compile
population demographics. Other scenarios and use cases for UMA usage
can be found in [UMA-usecases] and [UMA-userstories].
In enterprise settings, application access management often involves
letting back-office applications serve only as policy enforcement
points (PEPs), depending entirely on access decisions coming from a
central policy decision point (PDP) to govern the access they give to
requesters. This separation eases auditing and allows policy
administration to scale in several dimensions. UMA makes use of a
separation similar to this, letting the authorizing user serve as a
policy administrator crafting authorization strategies on his or her
own behalf.
The UMA protocol profiles and extends [OAuth2]. An AM serves as an
enhanced OAuth authorization server; a host serves as an enhanced
resource server; and a requester serves as an enhanced client,
acquiring an access token and the requisite authorization to access a
protected resource at the host.
UMA defines an interoperable protection API between the AM and host,
allowing them to reside in separate domains and allowing the host to
establish mutual trust with an AM on behalf of a particular user.
This API is itself OAuth-protected. Thus, the overall UMA flow has a
second embedded OAuth-based interaction within it governing the
host-AM relationship.
The UMA protocol has three broad phases (see Figure 1).
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The Three Phases of the UMA Protocol
+-----+----------------+
| UA | authorizing |
+-------Manage (A)--| | user |
| +-----+----------------+
| Phase 1: | UA |
| protect a +----------------+
| resource |
| Control (B)
| |
v v
+-----------+ +-----+----------------+
| host |<-Protect-(C)-|prot | authorization |
| | | API | manager (AM) |
+-----------+ +-----+----------------+
| protected | | authorization |
| resource | | API |
+-----------+ +----------------+
^ |
| Phases 2 and 3: Authorize (D)
| get authz and |
| access a resource v
| +----------------+
+-------Access (E)--------| requester |
+----------------+
(requesting party)
Figure 1
The phases work as follows:
1. Protect a resource: This phase involves the authorizing user,
host, and AM. The authorizing user has chosen to use a host for
managing online resources ("A"), and introduces this host to an
AM using an OAuth-mediated interaction that results in the AM
giving the host an access token. The host uses AM's protection
API to tell the AM what sets of resources to protect ("C"). Out
of band of the UMA protocol, the authorizing user instructs the
AM what policies to attach to the registered resource sets ("B").
This phase is described in Section 2.
2. Get authorization: This phase involves the requester, host, and
AM. It may also involve synchronous involvement by the
authorizing user if this person is synonymous with the requesting
party. This phase is dominated by a loop of activity in which
the requester approaches the host seeking access to a protected
resource ("E"), is sent to obtain an access token from the AM if
it does not have one, and then must demonstrate to the AM that it
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satisfies the user's authorization policy governing the sought-
for resource and scope of access if the host discovers that it
does not have the requisite authorization ("D"). This phase is
described in Section 3.
3. Access a resource: This phase involves the requester successfully
presenting an access token that has sufficient permission
associated with it to the host in order to gain access to the
desired resource ("E"). This phase is described along with Phase
2 in Section 3.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.
1.2. Terminology
authorizing user
An UMA-defined variant of an OAuth resource owner; a web user
who configures an authorization manager with policies that
control how it governs access decisions when a requester
attempts to access a protected resource at a host.
authorization manager (AM)
An UMA-defined variant of an OAuth authorization server that
carries out an authorizing user's policies governing access to
a protected resource.
protected resource
An access-restricted resource at a host, which is being policy-
protected by the AM.
host
An UMA-defined variant of an OAuth resource server that
enforces access to the protected resources it hosts, as
governed by an authorization manager.
host access token
An access token representing the authorizing user's consent for
a host to trust a particular authorization manager for control
over authorizations to access protected resources hosted there.
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claim
A statement of the value or values of one or more identity
attributes of a requesting party. Claims are conveyed by a
requester on behalf of a requesting party to an authorization
manager in an attempt to satisfy an authorizing user's policy.
requester
An UMA-defined variant of an OAuth client that seeks access to
a protected resource.
requester access token
An access token that can be associated with permissions to
access particular resources at a host on behalf of a particular
requesting party.
requesting party
A web user, or a corporation or other legal person, that uses a
requester to seek access to a protected resource. If the
requesting party is a natural person, it may or may not be the
same person as the authorizing user.
resource set description
A JSON-formatted document that represents a set of one or more
resources to be AM-protected and maps available scopes to them.
The host registers a resource set by giving this document to
the AM.
scope description A JSON-formatted document that represents a scope
of access on a particular resource set. The host refers to
this type of document from within resource set descriptions and
permissions that it registers.
token status description A JSON-formatted document that represents
the currently valid permissions for authorized access
associated with a requester access token.
permission A scope of access over a particular resource set at a
particular host that is being asked for by a requester or that
has been granted by an AM.
1.3. Endpoint Names
host access token endpoint Part of the protection API at the AM used
by the host (and part of standard OAuth). The endpoint at the
AM at which the host asks for a host access token on the
authorizing user's behalf.
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host user authorization endpoint Part of the protection API at the
AM used by the host (and part of standard OAuth). The endpoint
at the AM to which the host redirects the authorizing user to
authorize the host to use this AM for protecting resources, if
the authorization code grant type is being used.
resource set registration endpoint Part of the protection API at the
AM used by the host. The endpoint at the AM at which the host
registers resource sets which it wants the AM to protect.
permission registration endpoint Part of the protection API at the
AM used by the host. The endpoint at the AM at which the host
registers permissions that a requester will be asking for.
token status endpoint Part of the protection API at the AM used by
the host. The endpoint at the AM at which the host submits
requester access tokens to learn what currently valid
permissions are associated with them.
protected resource endpoint An endpoint at the host at which a
requester attempts to access resources. This can be a singular
API endpoint, one of a set of API endpoints, a URI
corresponding to an HTML document, or any other Web-accessible
URI.
requester access token endpoint Part of the authorization API at the
AM used by the requester (and part of standard OAuth). The
endpoint at the AM at which the requester asks for a requester
access token.
permission endpoint Part of the authorization API at the AM used by
the requester. The endpoint at the AM at which the requester
asks for authorization to have a new permission associated with
its requester access token.
2. Protecting a Resource
Phase 1 of UMA is protecting a resource. For a host to be able to
delegate authorization of protected-resource access to an AM, the
authorizing user must first introduce the host to the AM. This phase
is concluded successfuly when:
o The host has received metadata about the AM, such as endpoints it
needs to use in interacting with the AM.
o The host has received an OAuth host access token that represents
the authorizing user's approval for the host to work with the AM
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in protecting resources. This host access token is later used
when the host makes other requests at the AM's protection API.
o The AM has acquired information about resource sets on the host it
is supposed to protect on behalf of the authorizing user.
The user, host, and AM perform the following steps in order to
successfully complete Phase 1:
1. The host looks up the AM's metadata and learns about its
protection API endpoints and supported formats.
2. If the host has not yet obtained a unique OAuth client identifier
and optional secret from the AM, it registers with the AM as
required. It MAY do this using the OAuth dynamic registration
protocol (see [Dyn-Reg]) proposed by UMA WG participants, if the
AM supports it.
3. The host obtains a host access token from the AM with the
authorizing user's consent, using either the authorization code
grant type or the SAML bearer assertion grant type.
4. The host registers any resource sets with the AM that are
intended to be protected.
2.1. Host Looks Up AM Metadata
The host needs to learn the OAuth- and UMA-related endpoints of the
AM before they can begin interacting. The authorizing user might
provide the AM's location to get the host started in this process,
for example by typing a URL into a web form field or clicking a
button. Alternatively, the host might already be configured to work
with a single AM without requiring any user input. The exact process
is beyond the scope of this specification, and it is up to the host
to choose a method to learn the AM's location.
From the data provided, discovered, or configured, the host MUST
retrieve the hostmeta document as described in Section 2 of hostmeta
[hostmeta]. For example, if the user supplied "am.example.com" as
the Authorization Manager's domain, the host creates the URL
"https://am.example.com/.well-known/host-meta" and performs a GET
request on it.
2.1.1. AM Endpoints
The AM MUST provide an XRD 1.0-formatted document at the hostmeta
location, documenting the following:
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o A set of protection API endpoints for the host to use
o A set of authorization API endpoints for the requester to use
o At least one access token format the AM produces
o Any claim formats the AM supports
Property type values for access token and claim format information:
http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/token_formats
REQUIRED (one or more). Access token format produced by this
AM. Currently the only option is "artifact".
http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/claim_formats
OPTIONAL (zero or more). Claim format supported by this AM.
Currently the options are "openid-connect" and "claims2". If
the AM is capable of requesting and accepting any claim formats
at all, it MUST declare them.
Link relationship rel values for the protection API endpoints for the
host to use:
http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_token_uri
REQUIRED. The host access token endpoint. Available HTTP
methods are as defined by [OAuth2] for a token endpoint.
Supplies the endpoint the host uses to ask for a host access
token.
http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_user_uri
REQUIRED. The host user authorization endpoint. Available
HTTP methods are as defined by OAuth for an authorization
endpoint. Supplies the endpoint the host uses to gather the
consent of the authorizing user for a host-AM relationship if
it is using the authorization code grant type. The AM MUST
support the authorization code grant type method of obtaining
the authorizing user's consent.
http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_resource_reg_uri
REQUIRED. The resource set registration endpoint. Requests to
this endpoint require a host access token to be present.
Supplies the endpoint the host uses for registering resource
sets with the AM to be protected (see Section 2.4.4). This
endpoint SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer security
mechanism such as TLS.
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http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_token_status_uri
REQUIRED. The token status endpoint. Requests to this
endpoint require a host access token to be present. Supplies
the endpoint the host uses to request the status of access
tokens presented to them by requesters with respect to
currently valid permissions. This endpoint SHOULD require the
use of a transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS.
http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_perm_reg_uri
REQUIRED. The permission registration endpoint. Requests to
this endpoint require a host access token to be present.
Supplies the endpoint the host uses for registering permissions
with the AM for which a requester will be seeking authorization
(see Section 3.4). This endpoint SHOULD require the use of a
transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS.
Link relationship rel values for the authorization API endpoints for
the requester to use:
http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/req_token_uri
REQUIRED. The requester access token endpoint. Available HTTP
methods are as defined by [OAuth2] for a token issuance
endpoint. Supplies the endpoint the requester uses to ask for
an access token. This endpoint SHOULD require the use of a
transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS.
http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/req_perm_uri
REQUIRED. The permission endpoint. Supplies the endpoint the
requester uses to ask for authorization to have a new
permission associated with its existing requester access token,
which MUST accompany the request. This endpoint SHOULD require
the use of a transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS.
2.1.2. Example AM Metadata
For example:
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<!-- Applies to both hosts and requesters -->
<Property
type="http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/token_formats">artifact
</Property>
<Property
type="http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/claim_formats">claims2
</Property>
<!-- Host protection API -->
<!-- AM as authorization server to host-as-client -->
<Link
rel="http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_token_uri"
href="https://am.example.com/host/token_uri">
</Link>
<Link
rel="http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_user_uri"
href="https://am.example.com/host/user_uri">
</Link>
<!-- AM as resource server to host-as-client -->
<Link
rel="http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_resource_reg_uri"
href="https://am.example.com/host/resource_details_uri">
</Link>
<Link
rel="http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_token_status_uri"
href="https://am.example.com/host/token_validation_uri">
</Link>
<Link
rel="http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/host_perm_reg_uri"
href="https://am.example.com/host/scope_reg_uri">
</Link>
<!-- Requester authorization API -->
<!-- AM as authorization server to requester-as-client -->
<Link
rel="http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/req_token_uri"
href="https://am.example.com/requester/token_uri">
</Link>
<!-- AM as resource server to requester-as-client -->
<Link
rel="http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/req_perm_uri"
href="https://am.example.com/requester/perm_uri">
</Link>
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2.2. Host Registers with AM
If the host has not already obtained a unique client identifier and
optional secret from this AM, in this step it MUST do so in order to
engage in OAuth-based interactions with the AM. It MAY do this using
the OAuth dynamic registration protocol (see [Dyn-Reg]) proposed by
UMA WG participants, if the AM supports it. The AM MUST issue a
unique client identifier to every host. This is to ensure that
individual hosts can be unambiguously identified in resource set
registration, where the client identifier is used as a URI component.
2.3. Host Obtains Host Access Token
In this step, the host acquires a host access token from the AM that
represents the approval of the authorizing user for the host to trust
the AM for protecting resources belonging to the user.
The host MUST use the OAuth2 [OAuth2] authorization code grant type
or the SAML bearer token grant type [OAuth-SAML], utilizing the end-
user authorization and token endpoints as appropriate. Here the host
acts in the role of an OAuth client; the authorizing user acts in the
role of an OAuth end-user resource owner; and the AM acts in the role
of an OAuth authorization server. (Once the host has obtained an
access token, it presents it to the AM at various protection API
endpoints, at which point the AM acts in the role of a resource
server.)
The host has completed this step successfully when it possesses a
host access token it can use at the AM's protection API.
2.4. Host Registers Sets of Resources to Be Protected
Once the host has received a host access token, for any of the user's
sets of resources that are to be protected by this AM, it MUST
register these resource sets at the AM's registration endpoint.
Note that the host is free to offer the option to protect any subset
of the user's resources using different AMs or other means entirely,
or to protect some resources and not others. Additionally, the
choice of protection regimes can be made explicitly by the user or
implicitly by the host. Any such partitioning by the host or user is
outside the scope of this specification.
2.4.1. Example of Registering Resource Sets
The following example illustrates the intent and usage of resource
set registration.
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This example contains some steps that are exclusively in the realm of
user experience rather than web protocol, to achieve realistic
illustration; these steps are labeled "User experience only". Some
other steps are exclusively internal to the operation of the entity
being discussed; these are labeled "Internal only".
An authorizing user, Alice Adams, has just uploaded a photo of her
new puppy to a host, Photoz.example.com, and wants to ensure that
this specific photo is not publicly accessible.
Alice has already introduced this host to her AM,
CopMonkey.example.com, and thus Photoz has already obtained a host
access token from CopMonkey. However, Alice has not previously
instructed Photoz to use CopMonkey to protect any other photos of
hers.
Alice has previously visited CopMonkey to map a default "do not share
with anyone" policy to any resource sets registered by Photoz, until
such time as she maps some other less-draconian policies to those
resources. (User experience only. This may have been done at the
time Alice introduced the host to the AM, and/or it could have been a
global or host-specific preference setting. A different constraint
or no constraint at all might be associated with newly protected
resources.) Other kinds of policies she may eventually map to
particular photos or albums might be "Share only with
husband@email.example.net" or "Share only with people in my 'family'
group".
Photoz itself has a publicly documented API that offers two dozen
different methods that apply to single photos, such as "addTags" and
"getSizes", but rolls them up into two photo-related scopes of
access: "viewing" (consisting of various read-only operations) and
"all" (consisting of various reading, editing, and printing
operations). It defines two Web-accessible JSON-encoded documents
called scope descriptions that represent these scopes, which it is
able to reuse for all of its users (not just Alice).
The "name" parameter values are intended to be seen by Alice when she
maps authorization constraints to specific resource sets and actions
while visiting CopMonkey, such that Alice would see the strings "View
Photo and Related Info" and "All Actions", likely accompanied by the
referenced icons, in the CopMonkey interface. (Other users of Photoz
might similarly see the same labels at CopMonkey or whatever other AM
they use. Photoz could distinguish natural-language labels per user
if it wishes, by pointing to scopes with differently translated
names.)
Example of the "view" scope ,which description is a Web-accessible
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resource at http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view:
{
"scope":
{
"_id": "view"
"name": "View Photo and Related Info",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/reading-glasses.png"
}
}
Example of the "all" scope, which description is a Web-accessible
resource at http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all:
{
"scope":
{
"_id": "all"
"name": "All Actions",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/galaxy.png"
}
}
While visiting Photoz, Alice selects a link or button that instructs
the site to "Protect" or "Share" this single photo (user experience
only; Photoz could have made this a default or preference setting).
As a result, Photoz defines for itself a resource set that represents
this photo (internal only; Photoz is the only application that knows
how to map a particular photo to a particular resource set). Photoz
also prepares the following resource set description, which is
specific to Alice and her photo. The "name" parameter value is
intended to be seen by Alice in mapping authorization constraints to
specific resource sets and actions when she visits CopMonkey, such
that Alice would see the string "Steve the puppy!", likely
accompanied by the referenced icon, in the CopMonkey interface. The
possible scopes of access on this resource set are indicated with URI
references to the scope descriptions, as defined just above.
{
"resource_set":
{
"_id": "112210f47de98100"
"name": "Steve the puppy!",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/flower",
"scopes":
["http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"]
}
}
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Photoz uses the "create resource set description" method of
CopMonkey's standard UMA resource set registration API, presenting
its Alice-specific host access token there, to register and assign an
identifier to the resource set description. The resource set
identifier path component of the URL matches the "_id" parameter
value in the description.
PUT /host/photoz.example.com/resource_set/112210f47de98100 HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"resource_set":
{
"_id": "112210f47de98100"
"name": "Steve the puppy!",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
"scopes":
["http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"]
}
}
Once this description has been successfully registered, Photoz is
responsible for responding correctly to requesters' attempts to
access this photo, achieving protection of the resource by
"outsourcing" this task to CopMonkey.
At the time Alice indicates she would like this photo protected,
Photoz can choose to redirect Alice to CopMonkey for further policy
setting, access auditing, and other AM-related tasks (user experience
only).
Over time, as Alice uploads other photos and creates and organizes
photo albums, and as Photoz makes new action functionality available,
Photoz can use additional methods of the resource set registration
API to ensure that CopMonkey's understanding of Alice's protected
resources matches its own.
2.4.2. Scope Descriptions
The host defines a scope of access that is available for use with
resources it manages in a publicly Web-accessible document containing
a scope description. The scopes available for use at any one host
MUST have unique URI references so that the host's scope descriptions
are distinguishable by URI reference; the URI reference MAY include a
fragment identifier. Scope descriptions MAY reside anywhere; the
host is not required to self-host scope descriptions and may wish to
point to standardized scope descriptions residing elsewhere.
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A scope description is a JSON [RFC4627] object with the name "scope"
and with the following parameters:
_id REQUIRED. A string that uniquely identifies the scope across
all scopes available at this host.
name REQUIRED. A human-readable string describing the scope of
access. The AM SHOULD use the name in its user interface to
assist the user in setting policies for protected resource sets
that have this available scope.
icon_uri OPTIONAL. A URI for a graphic icon representing the scope.
If this is provided, the AM SHOULD use the referenced icon in its
user interface to assist the user in setting policies for
protected resource sets that have this available scope.
For example, this description characterizes a scope that involves
reading or viewing resources (vs. creating them or editing them in
some fashion):
{
"scope":
{
"_id": "view"
"name": "Read-only",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/reading-glasses"
}
}
Scope descriptions MAY contain extension parameters that are not
defined in this specification. The names of extension parameters
MUST begin with "x-" or "X-".
2.4.3. Resource Set Descriptions
The host defines a resource set that needs protection by registering
a resource set description at the AM. The host registers the
description and manages its lifecycle at the AM's host resource set
registration endpoint by using the resource set registration API (see
Section 2.4.4). The resource set description is a JSON [RFC4627]
object with the name "resource_set" and with the following
parameters:
_id REQUIRED. A string that uniquely identifies the resource set.
The resource set identifier has meaning only to the host, except
insofar as the AM is able to map this resource set description to
a particular user by virtue of the particular host access token
used to access the resource set registration API. The host MAY
use any identifier scheme to represent resource sets, for example,
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making its identifiers unique across all users of this host or
allowing for the sharing of resource set identifiers among users.
However, for privacy reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the host
assign an identifier that is obscured with respect to any human-
readable resource set label used at this host. Further, this
identifier MUST match the resource set identifier path component
of the URI used to manage this description in the resource set
registration API; see Section 2.4.4 for more information.
(Typically this matching is achieved through automatically
populating the parameter value on initial registration of the
description.)
name REQUIRED. A human-readable string describing a set of one or
more resources. The AM SHOULD use the name in its user interface
to assist the user in setting policing for protecting this
resource set.
icon_uri OPTIONAL. A URI for a graphic icon representing the
resource set. If provided, the AM SHOULD use the referenced icon
in its user interface to assist the user in setting policies for
protecting this resource set.
scopes REQUIRED. An array referencing one or more URI references of
scope descriptions that are available for this resource set.
For example, this description characterizes a resource set (a photo
album) that can potentially be only viewed, or alternatively to which
full access can be granted; the URIs point to scopes descriptions as
defined in Section 2.4.2:
{
"resource_set":
{
"_id": "112210f47de98100",
"name": "Photo album",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
"scopes":
["http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"]
}
}
Resource set descriptions MAY contain extension parameters that are
not defined in this specification. The names of extension parameters
MUST begin with "x-" or "X-".
When a host creates or updates a resource set description (see
Section 2.4.4), the AM MUST attempt to retrieve the referenced scope
descriptions. It MAY cache such descriptions as long as indicated in
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the HTTP header for the scope description resource unless the
resource set description is subsequently updated within the validity
period. At the beginning of an authorizing user's login session at
the AM, the AM MUST attempt to re-retrieve scope descriptions
applying to that user whose cached versions have expired.
2.4.4. Resource Set Registration API
The host uses a RESTful API at the AM's resource set registration
endpoint to create, read, update, and delete resource set
descriptions, along with listing groups of such descriptions. The
host MUST use its valid host access token obtained previously to gain
access to this endpoint.
(Note carefully the similar but distinct senses in which the word
"resource" is used in this section. UMA resource set descriptions
are themselves managed as web resources at the AM through this API.)
Individual resource set descriptions are managed at URIs with this
structure: "{rsreguri}/host/{hostid}/resource_set/{rsid}"
The components of these URIs are defined as follows:
{rsreguri} The AM's resource set registration endpoint as advertised
in its metadata (see Section 2.1.1).
{hostid} A registration area at the AM that is specific to this
host. The host MUST use the unique OAuth client identifier it was
assigned by this AM as its host identifier. If the host
identifier does not match the host access token used at the host
registration endpoint, the AM MUST report an HTTP 403 Forbidden
error and fail to act on the request.
{rsid} An identifier for a resource set description. The identifier
MUST match the "_id" parameter value in the description itself.
Without a specific resource set identifier path component, the URI
applies to the set of resource set descriptions already registered.
Following is a summary of the five registration operations the AM is
REQUIRED to support. Each is defined in its own section below. All
other methods are unsupported.
o Create resource set description: PUT /host/{hostid}/resource_set/
{rsid}
o Read resource set description: GET /host/{hostid}/resource_set/
{rsid}
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o Update resource set description: PUT /host/{hostid}/resource_set/
{rsid}
o Delete resource set description: DELETE /host/{hostid}/
resource_set/{rsid}
o List resource set descriptions: GET /host/{hostid}/resource_set/
If the request to the resource set registration endpoint is
incorrect, then the AM responds with an error message (see
Section 4.2) by including one of the following error codes with the
response:
unsupported_method_type The host request used an unsupported HTTP
method. The AM MUST respond with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status
code and MUST fail to act on the request.
hostid_access_token_mismatch The hostid does not match the presented
host access token. The AM MUST respond with the HTTP 403
(Forbidden) status code.
ambiguous_resource_set_id The resourcesetid provided in the resource
set description does not match the one provided in the URI. The
AM MUST respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code and
MUST fail to act on the request.
resource_set_not_found The resource set requested from the AM cannot
be found. The AM MUST respond with HTTP 404 (Not Found) status
code.
resource_set_mismatch The resource set that was requested to be
deleted or updated at the AM did not match the ETag value present
in the request. The AM MUST respond with HTTP 412 (Precondition
Failed) status code and MUST fail to act on the request.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"unsupported_method_type"
}
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2.4.4.1. Create Resource Set Description
Adds a new resource set description using the PUT method, thereby
putting it under the AM's protection. The host is free to use its
own methods of identifying and describing resource sets; the AM MUST
treat them as opaque for the purpose of authorizing access, other
than associating them with the authorizing user represented by the
host access token used to access the API. On successfully
registering a resource set, the host MUST use UMA mechanisms to limit
access to any resources corresponding to this resource set, relying
on the AM to supply currently valid permissions for authorized
access.
HTTP request:
PUT /host/{hostid}/resource_set/{rsid} HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
...
(Body contains JSON representation of resource set description to be created)
Example of an HTTP request that creates a resource set description at
the AM:
PUT /host/photoz.example.com/resource_set/112210f47de98100 HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Host: am.example.com
{
"resource_set":
{
"_id": "112210f47de98100",
"name": "Photo album",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
"scopes":
["http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"]
}
}
HTTP response (success):
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
Location: (URL of created resource, same as in the PUT request)
ETag: (entity tag of resource artifact)
...
(Body contains JSON representation of created resource set description)
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Example of an HTTP response confirming the created resource set
description:
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
Location: https://am.example.com/rsreg_uri/host/photoz.example.com/resource_set/112210f47de98100
ETag: "1234sdbdDX"
...
{
"resource_set":
{
"_id": "112210f47de98100",
"name": "Photo album",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
"scopes":
["http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"]
}
}
2.4.4.2. Read Resource Set Description
Reads a previously registered resource set description using the GET
method.
HTTP request:
GET /host/{hostid}/resource_set/{rsid} HTTP/1.1
...
Example of an HTTP request that reads a resource set description from
the AM:
GET /host/photoz.example.com/resource_set/112210f47de98100 HTTP/1.1
Host: am.example.com
...
HTTP response (success):
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
ETag: (entity tag of resource artifact)
...
(Body contains JSON representation of resource set description)
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Example of an HTTP response message containing a resource set
description from the AM:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
ETag: "1234sdbdDX"
...
{
"resource_set":
{
"_id": "112210f47de98100",
"name": "Photo album",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/flower.png",
"scopes":
["http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"]
}
HTTP response (not found):
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"error":"resource_set_not_found"
}
2.4.4.3. Update Resource Set Description
Updates a previously registered resource set description using the
PUT method, thereby changing the resource set's protection
characteristics.
This operation is different from the operation to create a new
resource set description (Section 2.4.4.1) because it assumes that
prior registration of the resource set in question has occurred.
HTTP request:
PUT /host/{hostid}/resource_set/{rsid} HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
If-Match: (entity tag of resource if operation is to be idempotent)
...
(Body contains JSON representation of resource set description to be updated)
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Example of an HTTP request that updates a resource set description at
AM:
PUT /host/photoz.example.com/resource_set/112210f47de98100 HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Host: am.example.com
If-Match: "1234sdbdDX"
{
"resource_set":
{
"_id": "112210f47de98100",
"name": "Updated Photo album",
"icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/sun.png",
"scopes":
["http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/scopes/all"]
}
}
HTTP response (success):
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
ETag: "54223dfda"
...
HTTP response (entity tag does not match):
HTTP/1.1 412 Precondition failed
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"error":"resource_set_mismatch"
}
2.4.4.4. Delete Resource Set Description
Deletes a previously registered resource set description using the
DELETE method, thereby removing it from the AM's protection regime.
HTTP request:
DELETE /host/{hostid}/resource_set/{rsid}
If-Match: (entity tag of resource if operation is to be idempotent)
...
Example of an HTTP request that deletes a resource set description
from the AM:
DELETE /host/photoz.example.com/resource_set/112210f47de98100 HTTP/1.1
Host: am.example.com
If-Match: "1234sdbdDX"
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HTTP response (success):
HTTP/1.1 204 No content
...
HTTP response (not found):
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"error":"resource_set_not_found"
}
HTTP response (entity tag does not match):
HTTP/1.1 412 Precondition failed
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"error":"resource_set_mismatch"
}
2.4.4.5. List Resource Set Descriptions
Lists all previously registered resource set identifiers for this
user using the GET method. The list is in the form of a JSON array
of {rsid} values.
HTTP request:
GET /host/{hostid}/resource_set HTTP/1.1
...
Example of an HTTP request that lists registered resource set
descriptions at the AM:
GET /host/photoz.example.com/resource_set HTTP/1.1
Host: am.example.com
...
HTTP response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
...
(Body contains JSON array of {rsid} values)
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Example of an HTTP response with the list of registered resource set
identifiers:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
...
{
"resource_set_id_list": [ "112210f47de98100", "34234df47eL95300" ]
}
3. Getting Authorization and Accessing a Resource
Phase 2 of UMA is getting authorization, and Phase 3 is accessing a
resource. In these phases, an AM orchestrates and controls
requesting parties' access to a user's protected resources at a host,
under conditions dictated by that user.
Phase 3 is merely the successful completion of a requester's access
attempt (see Section 3.1.5) that initially involved several embedded
interactions among the requester, AM, and host in Phase 2. Phase 2
always begins with the requester attempting access at a protected
resource endpoint at the host. How the requester came to learn about
this endpoint is out of scope for UMA; the authorizing user might,
for example, have advertised its availability publicly on a blog or
other website, listed it in a discovery service, or emailed a link to
a particular intended requesting party.
The host responds to the requester's access request in one of several
ways depending on the circumstances of the request, either
immediately or having first performed one or more embedded
interactions with the AM. Depending on the nature of the host's
response to an failed access attempt, the requester itself engages in
embedded interactions with the AM before re-attempting access.
The interactions are as follows. The interaction summarized in each
top-level list item MAY be the last interaction engaged in, if the
requester chooses not to continue pursuing access to the resource.
o The requester attempts access at a particular protected resource
at a host (see Section 3.1).
* If the user corresponding to the protected resource URI is
ambiguous: host responds immediately with an error (see
Section 3.1.1).
* If the user is unambiguous but the access attempt is
unaccompanied by a requester access token: host responds
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immediately with instructions on where to go to obtain one (see
Section 3.1.2).
o If the access attempt was accompanied by a requester access token,
the host checks the token's status at the AM (see Section 3.3).
* If the AM reports that the requester access token is invalid
(see Section 3.3.2), the host responds to the requester with
instructions on where to go to obtain a token (see
Section 3.1.2).
o If the AM supplies a token status description for a valid
requester access token (see Section 3.3.1) but none of the
permissions associated with the token match the scope of attempted
access, the host registers a suitable permission on the
requester's behalf at the AM (see Section 3.4) and then responds
to the requester with instructions on where to go to request
authorization to associate that permission with its token (see
Section 3.1.4).
o If the requester received instructions on where to get a token, it
requests a token from the appropriate AM (see Section 3.2).
o If the requester received instructions on where to get
authorization for access permission, it requests permission from
the appropriate AM (see Section 3.5).
o If the AM gave status back on a valid requester access token, and
at least one of the permissions associated with the token match
the scope of attempted access, the host responds to the
requester's access attempt with success (see Section 3.1.5).
This process extends OAuth in several notable ways:
o The requester access token signifies only a binding of this
requester, the requesting party on whose behalf it is acting, this
host, this authorizing user, and this AM, to be reused for all
permissions to access any of the user's protected resources at
this host that are protected by this AM.
o Any real-time authorizing user (resource owner) consent required
by policy is gathered at the time of claim requests, rather than
at the time of token issuance; the flow does not distinguish
between policies for "person-to-person" sharing and policies for
"person-to-self" sharing.
o The process of seeking authorization does not just rely on the
requester's ability to authenticate as the (or a) resource owner,
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but admits a wide-ranging set of policy options based on
attributes of the requesting party. This model could be called
claims-based authorization.
o The host is (for now) required to check with the AM in real time
about the status of all tokens unseen before or whose cached
status has expired. Eventually, this specification will define an
interoperable way to use of structured tokens to allow AMs the
opportunity to give out requester access tokens whose status hosts
can check "locally".
The interactions are described in detail in the following sections.
3.1. Requester-Host: Attempt Access at Protected Resource
This interaction assumes that the host has previously registered with
an AM one or more resource sets that correspond to the resource to
which access is being attempted, such that the host considers this
resource to be protected by a particular AM.
The requester typically attempts to access the desired resource at
the host directly (for example, when a human operator of the
requester software clicks on a thumbnail representation of the
resource). The requester is expected to discover, or be provisioned
with, knowledge of the protected resource and its location out of
band. Further, the requester is expected to acquire its own
knowledge about the methods made available by the host for operating
on this resource (such as viewing it with a GET method, or
transforming it with some complex API call) and the possible scopes
of access.
The host responds in one of five ways.
3.1.1. Requester's Request Is Ambiguous
By the nature of the requester's request for access (for example,
through a URI parameter specifying a username or other identifier),
the host needs to be able to detect uniquely which one of its users
has the operative control over access to this resource. Without
this, the host will be unable to interact with the correct AM using
the correct host access token in protecting the resource.
If the requester's request is ambiguous with respect to the specific
user at the host, the host immediately responds with an "ambiguous-
user" error message (see Section 4.2).
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For example:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"ambiguous-user"
}
3.1.2. Requester Presents No Access Token
If the host is able to detect uniquely which one of its users has the
operative control over access to the resource (see Section 3.1.1),
but the requester does not present any access token with the request,
the host MUST return an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code indicating
it is an "invalid_request" (see Section 2.4.1 of [OAuth-bearer]),
along with providing the AM's URI. This error indicates to the
requester that the request is missing a required parameter, includes
an unsupported parameter or parameter value, repeats the same
parameter, uses more than one method for including an access token,
or is otherwise malformed.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
WWW-Authenticate: UMA realm="example"
host_id="photoz.example.com",
am_uri="http://am.example.com"
3.1.3. Requester Presents an Invalid Access Token
If the requester presents an access token with its request, the host
asks the AM to give it the requester access token's status (see
Section 3.3). If the AM reports that the token is invalid, the Host
SHOULD return an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code indicating it is
an "invalid_token" (see Section 2.4.1 of [OAuth-bearer]), along with
providing the AM's URI. This error indicates to the requester that
the access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, or invalid
for other reasons.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: UMA realm="example"
host_id="photoz.example.com",
am_uri="http://am.example.com"
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3.1.4. Requester's Token Has Insufficient Permission
If the requester presents an access token with its request, the host
asks the AM to give it the requester access token's status (see
Section 3.3). If the AM supplies a token status description for a
valid requester access token, the host examines the token status
description. If the token status is not, in the host's judgment,
associated with any currently valid permission that applies to the
scope of access attempted by the requester, the Host SHOULD register
the desired permission with the AM (see Section 3.4) and then respond
to the requester with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code indicating
that the token has "insufficient_scope" (see Section 2.4.1 of
[OAuth-bearer]), along with providing the AM's URI and the permission
ticket it just received from the AM.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
WWW-Authenticate: UMA realm="example"
host_id="photoz.example.com"
am_uri="http://am.example.com",
ticket="5454345rdsaa4543"
3.1.5. Requester's Token Has Sufficient Permission
If the requester presents an access token with its request, the host
asks the AM to give it the requester access token's status (see
Section 3.3) If the AM supplies a token status description for a
valid requester access token, the host examines the token status
description. If the token status, in the host's judgment, is
associated with at least one currently valid permission that applies
to the scope of access attempted by the requester, the host gives
access to the desired resource.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: image/jpeg
...
/9j/4AAQSkZJRgABAgAAZABkAAD/7AARRHVja
3kAAQAEAAAAPAAA/+4ADkFkb2JlAGTAAAAAAf
/bAIQABgQEBAUEBgUFBgkGBQYJCwgGBggLDAo
KCwoKDBAMDAwMDAwQDA4PEA8ODBMTFBQTExwb
This response constitutes the conclusion of Phase 3 of UMA.
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3.2. Requester-AM: Requester Obtains Access Token
When a requester does not possess a valid access token to access
resources of a particular user at a particular host, it requests one
from the AM's requester token endpoint.
The requester learns about this endpoint by retrieving the AM's
hostmeta document (see Section 2.1.1) based on the "am_uri"
information that was provided by the host in its previous response,
as described in Section 2 of hostmeta [hostmeta]. For example, if
the "am_uri" is "am.example.com", the requester creates the URI
"https://am.example.com/.well-known/host-meta" and performs a GET
request on it.
Each such token is unique per requester; requesting party on whose
behalf the requester software is operating; authorizing user; AM; and
host. It is not unique per protected resource or resource set; the
token represents the set of permissions for that requesting party to
access potentially a large set of different resource sets with a
variety of scopes.
The requester SHOULD use the OAuth 2.0 client credentials
authorization grant type (see Section 4.4 of [OAuth2]).
In UMA, unlike in plain OAuth, obtaining an access token does not
automatically convey permission for access to any protected resource.
The token must first be associated with at least one suitable
permission for scoped access in order for the requester to succeed in
accessing the resource.
If the requester does not yet have a client identifier and the AM
demands requesters to have unique client identifiers, the requester
MAY use the dynamic OAuth registration protocol (see [Dyn-Reg])
proposed by the UMA participants, if the AM supports it.
3.3. Host-AM: Ask for Requester's Presented Access Token Status
On receiving a requester access token in an access attempt, the host
asks the AM for the token's status. If it has a cached token status
description available that has not expired yet, it MAY use it
instead.
The host makes the request to the AM with a POST to the AM's token
status endpoint. The body of the HTTP request message contains a
JSON [RFC4627] document providing the requester access token and the
IP address of the requester's request. The host MAY, at its
discretion, instead supply the originating IP address indicated in
the requester's X-Forwarded-For: header value. The IP address or
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originating IP address is advisory only; the AM MAY ignore it for
purposes of its own token validation process.
The host gains access to the token status endpoint by presenting its
own host access token in the request. The host access token also
allows the host and AM to uniquely identify the user they have in
common, and therefore allows the AM to look up the correct
authorizing user's policies and settings.
Example of a request to the token validation endpoint that provides
the host access token in the header:
POST /token_status HTTP/1.1
Host: am.example.com
Authorization: Bearer vF9dft4qmT
Content-Type: application/json
{
"token":"sbjsbhs(/SSJHBSUSSJHVhjsgvhsgvshgsv"
"resource_set_id":"112210f47de98100"
"host_id":"photoz.example.com"
"ipaddr":"192.168.1.1"
}
3.3.1. AM Returns a Token Status Description
If the the AM finds the requester's access token to be valid, it
returns the token's status in an HTTP response using the 200 OK
status code, containing a JSON [RFC4627] document supplying the token
status description. The token status description contains all of the
permissions that are currently valid for this requester access token
(and thus for the requesting party on whose behalf it is acting).
The AM MAY set a cache period for the returned token status
description that allows the host to reuse it over some period of time
when it later sees the same requester access token.
The token status description is a JSON object with the name
"token_status" containing an array of zero or more permission
objects, each with the following parameters:
resource_set_id REQUIRED. A string that uniquely identifies the
resource set, access to which has been granted to this requester
on behalf of this requesting party. The identifier MUST
correspond to a resource set that was previously registered as
protected.
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scopes REQUIRED. An array referencing one or more URIs of scopes to
which access was granted for this resource set. Each scope MUST
correspond to a scope that was registered by this host for the
referenced resource set.
exp REQUIRED. An integer representing the expiration time on or
after which the permission MUST NOT be accepted for authorized
access. The processing of the exp parameter requires that the
current date/time MUST be before the expiration date/time listed
in the exp claim. Host implementers MAY provide for some small
leeway, usually no more than a few minutes, to account for clock
skew.
Example:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"token_status":
[
{
"resource_set_id": "112210f47de98100",
"scopes":
["http://photoz.example.com/dev/actions/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/actions/all"],
"exp": 1300819380
}
]
}
3.3.2. AM Returns a Token Invalid Response
If the the AM finds the requester's access token to be invalid, it
returns an UMA error message.
The AM includes one of the following error codes in the error
response: (see Section 4.2) and responds with the HTTP 400 status
code:
invalid_requester_token AM determined that the requester access
token was not valid.
expired_requester_token AM determined that the requester access
token has expired.
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For example:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"invalid_requester_token"
}
3.4. Host-AM: Register a Permission
If, in the host's judgment, the permissions returned by the AM from a
token status request are insufficient to allow this requester's
access attempt, the host registers a permission with the AM that it
believes would be sufficient for the type of access sought. The AM
returns a permission ticket for the host to give to the requester in
its response (see Section 3.1.4).
The host registers the permission using the POST method at the AM's
permission registration endpoint, providing its host access token to
get authorized access to this endpoint. The body of the HTTP request
message contains a JSON [RFC4627] document providing the requester's
access token and the requested permission.
The requested scope is an object with the name "requested_permission"
and the following parameters:
resource_set_id REQUIRED. A string that uniquely identifies a
resource set, access to which this requester is seeking access.
The identifier MUST correspond to a resource set that was
previously registered as protected.
scopes REQUIRED. An array referencing one or more identifiers of
scopes to which access is needed for this resource set. Each
scope identifier MUST correspond to a scope that was registered by
this host for the referenced resource set.
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Example of an HTTP request that registers a permission at the AM's
permission registration endpoint:
POST /host/scope_reg_uri/photoz.example.com HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Host: am.example.com
{
"requested_permission":
{
"resource_set_id": "112210f47de98100",
"scopes": ["http://photoz.example.com/dev/actions/view",
"http://photoz.example.com/dev/actions/all"]
}
}
On receiving the scope registration request from the Host, the AM
issues a response message that has one of the possible following
outputs:
o A permission ticket and its expiration time (typically very
short).
o Error message indicating a malformed scope registration request.
3.4.1. AM Returns a Permission Registration Success Response
The AM responds with an HTTP 201 (Created) status code and includes
the Location header in its response as well as the "ticket" parameter
in the JSON-formatted body:
For example:
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
Location: https://am.example.com/permreg/host/photoz.example.com/5454345rdsaa4543
{
"ticket":"5454345rdsaa4543"
}
3.4.2. AM Returns a Permission Registration Error Response
The AM responds with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code and
includes one of the following error codes with the error response
(see Section 4.2):
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invalid_resource_set_id The provided resource set identifier was not
found at the AM.
invalid_scope At least one of the scopes included in the request was
not registered previously by this host.
invalid_requester_token The requester access token was not
recognized by the AM.
expired_requester_token The requester access token has expired.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
...
{
"error":"invalid_resource_set_id"
}
3.5. Requester-AM: Request Authorization to Add Permission
In this interaction, the requester asks the AM to grant authorization
to associate a new permission to its access token for use at a
particular host. It does this at the AM's permission endpoint by
supplying the permission ticket it got from the host, along with its
requester access token. The AM uses this information to look up the
previously registered permission, confirm that the correct requester
is asking for it, map the requested permission to operative user
policies, and demand in turn that the requester convey any claims
needed to support its request.
The requester learns about this endpoint by retrieving the AM's
hostmeta document (see Section 2.1.1) based on the "am_uri"
information that was provided by the host in its previous response,
as described in Section 2 of hostmeta [hostmeta]. For example, if
the "am_uri" is "am.example.com", the requester creates the URI
"https://am.example.com/.well-known/host-meta" and performs a GET
request on it.
The requester performs a GET on the permission endpoint, using the
standard HTTP "Accept" header to express the acceptable media type(s)
of any claims-requested response.
The AM responds in one of three ways:
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o If the AM requires no claims (or no further claims) from the
requester in order to grant authorization for the asked-for
permission based on user policy, it gives a success response,
indicating that the requested scope has been associated with the
requester's token.
o If the requester is definitively not authorized for this
permission according to user policy, the AM responds with a
failure response and the authorization request phase ends.
o If user policy demands more information from the requester, the AM
responds with a claims-requested response. The list SHOULD use
the claim format media type that was indicated by the requester as
acceptable.
The claims-requested list MAY contain internal logic that gives a
choice or other variability around the sets of claims that will
satisfy the request. This potentially allows the requester to select
a subset of claims to supply in order to obtain the needed
permission.
If claims are requested and the requester wishes to provide them, it
POSTs another permission request, providing one or more claims or
references to one or more locations where the AM can go to retrieve
claims.
The AM responds with a successful or unsuccessful access token
response, or with another claims-requested response. This loop can
be run through as many times as necessary for the AM to request
further claims and the requester to supply them, re-asking for
authorization to get the needed permission at every juncture.
If the content-type of the request is not recognized by the AM, the
AM MUST reject the document.
This specification does not define the formats of claims-requested
lists and appropriate responses. It may ultimately put minimum
conformance requirements on requesters and AMs to handle particular
claim formats defined in other specifications, as well as specifying
requirements that claim formats seeking consideration for use in UMA
must meet. Two candidate solutions, corresponding to claim formats
the AM can declare in its metadata (Section 2.1.1), are:
o [OpenID-Connect-Fmwk] (see Section 3.5.1 below for further
context).
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o [Claims2.0] and [SAAC].
3.5.1. Trusted Claims with OpenID Connect
It is hoped that UMA can profile the emerging OpenID Connect protocol
as a mechanism to support access control to enable specific use cases
in which the decision to grant access is made based on trusted (often
third-party-asserted) claims about the requesting party, such as
name, age, email address, role, and location.
OpenID Connect provides authentication, authorization, and attribute
transmission capability. The integration approach would treat the
claims-seeking UMA AM as an OpenID relying party and OpenID Connect
claims client, leveraging OpenID Connect mechanisms to transmit
claims from distributed sources.
In this scenario, the relying party interface is responsible for
authenticating the subject (the UMA requesting party) and
initializing the OpenID Connect protocol. The claims client
interface is responsible for requesting claims based on OpenID
Connect protocol, in order to satisfy the UMA authorizing user's
policy. The client interacts with the OpenID Connect authorization
server to obtain a specific access token to access to the subject's
(UMA requesting party's) UserInfo endpoint (trusted claims provider).
4. Error Messages
Ultimately the host is responsible for either granting the access the
requester attempted, or returning an error response to the requester
with a reason for the failure. [OAuth2] defines several error
responses for a resource server to return. UMA makes use of these
error responses, but requires the host to "outsource" the
determination of some error conditions to the AM. UMA defines its
own additional error responses that the AM may give to the host and
requester as they interact with it, and that the host may give to the
requester.
4.1. OAuth Error Responses
When a client (host or requester) attempts to access one of the AM
endpoints Section 2.1.1 or a client (requester) attempts to access a
protected resource at the host, it has to make an authenticated
request by including an OAuth access token in the HTTP request as
described in [OAuth2] Section 7.
If the client's request failed authentication, the AM or the host
responds with an OAuth error message as described throughout
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Section 2 and Section 3.
4.2. UMA Error Responses
When a client (host or requester) attempts to access one of the AM
endpoints Section 2.1.1 or a client (requester) attempts to access a
protected resource at the host, if the client request is successfully
authenticated by OAuth means, but is invalid for another reason, the
AM or host responds with an UMA error response by adding the
following parameters to the entity body of the HTTP response using
the "application/json" media type:
error REQUIRED. A single error code. Value for this parameter is
defined in the specific AM endpoint description.
error_description OPTIONAL. A human-readable text providing
additional information, used to assist in the understanding and
resolution of the error occurred.
error_uri OPTIONAL. A URI identifying a human-readable web page
with information about the error, used to provide the end-user
with additional information about the error.
Common error codes:
invalid_request The request is missing a required parameter or is
otherwise malformed. The AM MUST respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad
Request) status code.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
...
{
"error":"invalid_request",
"error_description":"There is already a resource with this identifier.",
"error_uri":"http://am.example.com/errors/resource_exists"
}
5. Security Considerations
This specification relies mainly on OAuth security mechanisms for
protecting the host registration endpoint at the AM so that only a
properly authorized host can access it on behalf of the intended
user. For example, the host needs to use a valid host access token
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issued through a user authorization process at the endpoint, and the
interaction SHOULD take place over TLS. It is expected that the host
will protect its client secret (if it was issued one) and its host
access token, particularly if used in "bearer token" fashion.
In addition, this specification dictates a binding between the host
access token and the host-specific registration area on the AM to
prevent a host from interacting with a registration area not its own.
For information about the technical, operational, and legal elements
of trust establishment between UMA entities and parties, which
affects security considerations, see [UMA-trustmodel].
6. Privacy Considerations
The AM comes to be in possession of resource set information (such as
names and icons) that may reveal information about the user, which
the AM's trust relationship with the host is assumed to accommodate.
However, the requester is a less-trusted party (in fact, entirely
untrustworthy until it acquires a requester access token in UMA
protocol step 2). This specification recommends obscuring resource
set identifiers in order to avoid leaking personally identifiable
information to requesters through the "scope" mechanism.
For information about the technical, operational, and legal elements
of trust establishment between UMA entities and parties, which
affects privacy considerations, see [UMA-trustmodel].
7. Conformance
This section outlines conformance requirements for various entities
implementing UMA endpoints.
This specification has dependencies on other specifications, as
follows:
o OAuth 2.0: AMs, hosts, and requesters MUST support OAuth 2.0
features named in this specification for conformance. For
example, AMs MUST support the authorization code grant type for
being introduced to hosts by authorizing users.
o hostmeta: AMs, hosts, and requesters MUST support the hostmeta
features named in this specification for conformance.
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8. IANA Considerations
TBD
9. Acknowledgments
The contributors to this specification include the Kantara UMA Work
Group participants, a list of whom can be found at [UMAnitarians].
10. Issues
Catalog of currently known issues.
o ISSUE#14: Need to unify the request for authorization with the
providing of claims, so that this can be a single request-response
pattern that can loop as required.
o ISSUE#15: If the content-type (of the claims response document) is
not recognized by the AM, what happens then? Should be an error
from the AM. We need to create an error for this.
o ISSUE#16: Need to profile for specific claims-requested lists and
claim responses.
o ISSUE#17: Need to say what claims formats are supported.
o ISSUE#18: Provide commentary on any requirements layered on the
forthcoming OAuth security considerations section; discuss UMA-
layer implications for more meaningful authentication of
requesters/requesting parties; discuss implications of user-
mediated AM/host trust model; discuss short-lived token technique
for lightweight requester correlation...
o ISSUE#19: More privacy considerations.
o ISSUE#24: From Lukasz email 6/6/2011: Rev8 Section 4.1: Empty
response body? In SAM we return 'resource_id' and 'policy_uri' so
that the host can redirect the user to the policy definition page
(sharing setting screen) on AM.
o ISSUE#25: From Lukasz email 6/6/2011: Section 4.1 - what happens
when a resource (being registered) already exists?
o ISSUE#27: Can Update Resource Set Description API mistakenly
overwrite/destroy an existing resource description?
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o ISSUE #32: RESOLVED in Rev 13: Need to add back detail on how the
host tells the requester which AM to go to so that it can discover
the token endpoint and authorization endpoint. Lukasz and Maciej
will flesh this out with their own message examples. I think we
still need to explain explicitly how the requester has to
construct the hostmeta URI.
o ISSUE #33: Should it be possible to have an "implicit resource
set" somehow that (in syntactic-sugar fashion) allows permissions
to be passed around much as scopes already are passed around in
plain OAuth?
o ISSUE #35: Consider allowing the host to provide a filter in the
token validation request to indicate the particular resource sets/
scopes it would find acceptable, so that the AM can provide only
permissions that potentially match any of them. This approaches a
PDP/PEP model.
o ISSUE #36: Okay to use the made-up URI
"http://kantarainitiative.org/ns/uma/1.0/..." for labeling the AM
endpoints and other identifying URIs? Should these actually
resolve to anything?
o ISSUE #37: Okay to cache token status as now explained? Do we
need to add examples if so?
o ISSUE #38: Does the returned permission ticket need an expiration
field?
o ISSUE #39: Examine all MAYs/SHOULDs throughout the spec to see
what conformance instructions/levels may be necessary. E.g., in
Section 3.1.3, why is the host's 401 Unauthorized response to a
requester with an invalid token a SHOULD instead of a MUST? When
would it ever do something different? Similarly, Section 3.1.4,
why are the host's actions in the case of insufficient permission
a SHOULD instead of a MUST? Is it a case of the host deciding to
just not respond at all? In Section 3.2, why do we say the
requester SHOULD use the client credentials authorization grant
type instead of MUST?
o ISSUE #40: MUST the host give access if the requester has suitable
permission?
o ISSUE #41: MUST the host register a permission? If it doesn't
want to, or doesn't succeed in doing so, MUST it respond to the
requester, and if so, should the ticket (and even the am_uri)
field be optional?
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11. References
11.1. Normative References
[Dyn-Reg] Scholz, C., "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
2010, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-hardjono-oauth-dynreg-00.html>.
[OAuth-SAML]
Campbell, B., "SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Grant Type
Profile for OAuth 2.0", February 2011, <http://
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-saml2-bearer-03>.
[OAuth-bearer]
Jones, M., "The OAuth 2.0 Protocol: Bearer Tokens",
June 2011,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-06>.
[OAuth2] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 2.0 Protocol", 2010,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-16>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[hostmeta]
Hammer-Lahav, E., "Web Host Metadata", May 2011,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-hostmeta-16>.
11.2. Informative References
[Claims2.0]
Maler, E., "Claims 2.0", 2010, <http://
kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Claims+2.0>.
[OpenID-Connect-Fmwk]
Sakimura, N., "OpenID Connect Framework 1.0", June 2011, <
http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-framework-1_0.html>.
[SAAC] Maler, E., "Simple Access Authorization Claims",
April 2010, <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/
display/uma/Simple+Access+Authorization+Claims>.
[UMA-trustmodel]
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Maler, E., "UMA Trust Model", February 2011, <http://
kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/
UMA+Trust+Model>.
[UMA-usecases]
Maler, E., "UMA Scenarios and Use Cases", October 2010, <h
ttp://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/
UMA+Scenarios+and+Use+Cases>.
[UMA-userstories]
Maler, E., "UMA User Stories", November 2010, <http://
kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/
User+Stories>.
[UMAnitarians]
Maler, E., "UMA Participant Roster", 2011, <http://
kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/
Participant+Roster>.
Appendix A. Document History
NOTE: To be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC
Authors' Addresses
Thomas Hardjono (editor)
MIT
Email: hardjono@mit.edu
Christian Scholz
COM.lounge GmbH
Email: cs@comlounge.net
URI: http://comlounge.net
Paul Bryan
pbryan.net
Email: email@pbryan.net
URI: http://pbryan.net
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Maciej Machulak
Newcastle University
Email: m.p.machulak@ncl.ac.uk
URI: http://ncl.ac.uk/
Eve Maler
XMLgrrl.com
Email: eve@xmlgrrl.com
URI: http://www.xmlgrrl.com/
Lukasz Moren
Newcastle University
Email: lukasz.moren@ncl.ac.uk
URI: http://ncl.ac.uk/
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