Point-to-Point Extensions Working Group H. Haverinen (editor)
Internet Draft Nokia
June 2002
EAP SIM Authentication
draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-04.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
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Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using the
GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). The mechanism specifies
enhancements to GSM authentication and key agreement whereby
multiple authentication triplets can be combined to create
authentication responses and encryption keys of greater strength
than the individual GSM triplets. The mechanism also includes
network authentication.
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Table of Contents
Status of this Memo.........................................1
Abstract....................................................1
Table of Contents...........................................2
1. Introduction.............................................2
2. Terms....................................................3
3. Overview.................................................4
4. Identity Privacy Support.................................5
5. Message Format...........................................7
6. Message Integrity and Privacy Protection.................8
6.1. AT_MAC Attribute.......................................8
6.2. AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA Attributes......................9
7. EAP-Response/Identity...................................10
8. EAP-Request/SIM/Start...................................11
9. EAP-Response/SIM/Start..................................12
10. EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge..............................13
11. EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge.............................16
12. Unsuccessful Cases.....................................18
13. EAP/SIM Notifications..................................18
14. Calculation of Cryptographic Values....................20
15. IANA Considerations....................................22
16. Security Considerations................................23
17. Intellectual Property Right Notice.....................24
18. Acknowledgements and Contributions.....................24
References.................................................24
Editor's Address...........................................26
1. Introduction
This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
[1] mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using
the GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM).
GSM authentication is based on a challenge-response mechanism. The
authentication algorithm that runs on the SIM can be given a 128-bit
random number (RAND) as a challenge. The SIM runs an operator-
specific confidential algorithm which takes the RAND and a secret
key Ki stored on the SIM as input, and produces a 32-bit response
(SRES) and a 64-bit long key Kc as output. The Kc key is originally
intended to be used as an encryption key over the air interface.
Please find more information about GSM authentication in [2].
In EAP/SIM, several RAND challenges are used for generating several
64-bit Kc keys, which are combined to constitute a longer session
key. EAP/SIM also enhances the basic GSM authentication mechanism by
accompanying the RAND challenges with a message authentication code
in order to provide mutual authentication.
EAP/SIM specifies optional support for protecting the privacy of
subscriber identity.
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2. Terms
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3].
This document frequently uses the following terms and abbreviations:
AAA protocol
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting protocol
AAA server
In this document, AAA server refers to the network element that
resides on the border of Internet AAA network and GSM network.
Cf. EAP server
AuC
Authentication Centre. The GSM network element that can authorize
the subscriber.
EAP
Extensible Authentication Protocol.
EAP Server
The network element that terminates the EAP protocol. Typically,
the EAP server functionality is implemented in a AAA server.
GSM
Global System for Mobile communications.
IMSI
International Mobile Subscriber Identifier, used in GSM to
identify subscribers.
NAI
Network Access Identifier
SIM
Subscriber Identity Module. SIM cards are smart cards distributed
by GSM operators.
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3. Overview
Figure 1 shows an overview of the EAP/SIM authentication procedure.
This version of EAP/SIM exchange uses three roundtrips to
authenticate the user and generate session keys. In this document,
the term EAP Server refers to the network element that terminates
the EAP protocol. The Authenticator typically communicates with the
user's EAP server using an AAA protocol. The AAA communications is
not shown in the figure.
The first EAP Request issued by the Authenticator is EAP-
Request/Identity. The clients response includes the user's
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) (Section 7).
Following the client's EAP-Response/Identity packet, the client
receives EAP Requests of type 18 (SIM) from the Authenticator and
sends the corresponding EAP Responses. The EAP packets that are of
the Type SIM also have a Subtype field. The first EAP-Request/SIM
packet is of the Subtype 10 (Start). Usually this packet contains no
attributes. (However, see Section 4 for an exception.) The client
responds with the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet, which includes the
AT_NONCE_MT attribute that contains a random number NONCE_MT, chosen
by the client. The client MUST NOT reuse the NONCE_MT value from
previous sessions but the client MUST choose it freshly for each
EAP/SIM authentication exchange. The client SHOULD use a good source
of randomness to generate NONCE_MT.
In this document, we assume that the EAP server has an interface to
the GSM network and it operates as a gateway between the Internet
AAA network and the GSM authentication infrastructure. After
receiving the EAP Response/SIM/Start, the EAP server obtains n GSM
triplets from the user's home operator's Authentication Centre (AuC)
on the GSM network, where n = 2 or n = 3. From the triplets, the EAP
server derives the keying material. Section 14 specifies how these
cryptographic values are calculated.
The next EAP Request the Authenticator issues is of the type SIM and
subtype Challenge (11). It contains the RAND challenges and a
message authentication code attribute AT_MAC to cover the
challenges. On receipt of this message, the client runs the GSM
authentication algorithm on the SIM card and calculates a copy of
the message authentication code. The client then verifies that the
calculated MAC equals the received MAC. If the MAC's do not match,
then the client silently ignores the EAP packet and does not send
any authentication values calculated on the SIM to the network.
Eventually, if another EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge packet with a valid
AT_MAC is not received, the connection establishment will time out.
Since the RAND's given to a client are accompanied with the message
authentication code AT_MAC, the client is able to verify that the
RAND's are fresh and they have been generated by the GSM network.
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If all checks out, the client responds with the EAP-
Response/SIM/Challenge, containing the client's response MAC_SRES
(Section 14). The EAP server verifies that the MAC_SRES is correct
and sends the EAP-Success packet, indicating that the authentication
was successful. The EAP server may also include derived keying
material in the message it sends to the Authenticator.
Client Authenticator
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<---------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes user's IMSI) |
|--------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| EAP-Request/SIM/Start |
|<---------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/SIM/Start |
| (AT_NONCE_MT) |
|--------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge |
| (AT_RAND, AT_MAC) |
|<---------------------------------------------------------|
| |
+-------------------------------------+ |
| Client runs GSM algorithms on SIM, | |
| verifies AT_MAC, derives AT_MAC_SRES| |
| and session key | |
+-------------------------------------+ |
| |
| EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge |
| (AT_MAC_SRES) |
|--------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| |
| EAP-Success |
|<---------------------------------------------------------|
| |
Figure 1 EAP/GSM SIM authentication procedure
4. Identity Privacy Support
In the very first connection to an EAP server, the client always
transmits the cleartext identity (IMSI) in the EAP-Response/Identity
packet. In subsequent connections, the optional identity privacy
support can be used to hide the IMSI and to make the connections
unlinkable to a passive eavesdropper.
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The EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message MAY include an encrypted
pseudonym in the value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute. The
AT_IV and AT_MAC attributes are also used to transport the pseudonym
to the client, as described in Section 10. Because the identity
privacy support is optional to implement, the client MAY ignore the
AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, and AT_MAC attributes and always transmit the
IMSI in the EAP-Response/Identity packet.
On receipt of the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge, the client verifies the
AT_MAC attribute before looking at the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute. If
the AT_MAC is invalid, then the client MUST silently discard the EAP
packet. If the AT_MAC attribute is valid, then the client MAY
decrypt the encrypted data in AT_ENCR_DATA and use the obtained
pseudonym used in the next authentication.
The EAP server produces pseudonyms in an implementation-dependent
manner. Please see [4] for examples on how to produce pseudonyms.
Only the EAP server needs to be able to map the pseudonym to the
cleartext identity. Regardless of construction method, the pseudonym
MUST conform to the grammar specified for the username portion of an
NAI.
On the next connection to the EAP server, the client MAY transmit
the received pseudonym in the first EAP-Response/Identity packet.
The client concatenates the received pseudonym with the "@"
character and the NAI realm portion. The client MUST use the same
realm portion that it used in the connection when it received the
pseudonym.
If the EAP server successfully decodes the pseudonym to a known
client identity (IMSI), the authentication proceeds with the EAP-
Request/SIM/Start message as usual.
If the EAP server fails to decode the pseudonym to a known identity,
then the EAP server requests the regular IMSI (non-pseudonym
identity) by including the AT_IDENTITY_REQ attribute (Section 8) in
the EAP-Request/SIM/Start message. The value field of the
AT_IDENTITY_REQ does not contain any data but the attribute is
included to request the client to include the AT_IDENTITY attribute
(Section 9) in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message. The AT_IDENTITY
attribute contains the client's identity in the clear.
Please note that the EAP/SIM client and the EAP/SIM server only
process the AT_IDENTITY_REQ and AT_IDENTITY attributes and entities
that only pass through EAP packets do not process these attributes.
Hence, if the EAP server is not co-located in the authenticator,
then the authenticator and other intermediate AAA elements (such as
possible AAA proxy servers) will continue to refer to the client
with the original pseudonym identity from the EAP-Response/Identity
packet regardless if the decoding fails in the EAP server.
This case is illustrated in the figure below.
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Client Authenticator
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes a pseudonym) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server fails to decode the |
| | Pseudonym. |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/SIM/Start |
| (Includes AT_IDENTITY_REQ) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/SIM/Start |
| (Includes AT_IDENTITY and AT_NONCE_MT) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
After the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message, the authentication
sequence proceeds as usual with the EAP Server issuing the EAP-
Request/SIM/Challenge message.
5. Message Format
The Type-Data of the EAP/SIM packets begins with a 1-octet Subtype
field, which is followed by a 2-octet reserved field. The rest of
the Type-Data consists of attributes that are encoded in Type,
Length, Value format. The figure below shows the generic format of
an attribute.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Attribute Type
Indicates the particular type of attribute. The attribute type
values are listed in Section 15.
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Length
Indicates the length of this attribute in multiples of four
bytes. The maximum length of an attribute is 1024 bytes. The
length includes the Attribute Type and Length bytes.
Value
The particular data associated with this attribute. This field is
always included and it may be two or more bytes in length. The
type and length fields determine the format and length of the
value field.
When an attribute numbered within the range 0 through 127 is
encountered but not recognized, the EAP/SIM message containing that
attribute MUST be silently discarded. These attributes are called
non-skippable attributes.
When an attribute numbered in the range 128 through 255 is
encountered but not recognized that particular attribute is ignored,
but the rest of the attributes and message data MUST still be
processed. The Length field of the attribute is used to skip the
attribute value in searching for the next attribute. These
attributes are called skippable attributes.
Unless otherwise specified, the order of the attributes in an
EAP/SIM message is insignificant, and an EAP/SIM implementation
should not assume a certain order to be used.
Attributes can be encapsulated within other attributes. In other
words, the value field of an attribute type can be specified to
contain other attributes.
6. Message Integrity and Privacy Protection
This section specifies EAP/SIM attributes for attribute encryption
and EAP/SIM message integrity protection.
Because the K_encr and K_int keys derived from the RAND challenges
(as specified in Section 14)are required to process the integrity
protection and encryption attributes, these attributes can only be
used in the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message and any EAP/SIM
messages sent after EAP-Requets/SIM/Challenge. For example, these
attributes cannot be used in EAP-Request/SIM/Start.
6.1. AT_MAC Attribute
The AT_MAC attribute can be used for EAP/SIM message integrity
protection. Whenever AT_ENCR_DATA (Section 6.2) is included in an
EAP message, it MUST be followed (not necessarily immediately) by an
AT_MAC attribute. Messages that do not meet this condition MUST be
silently discarded.
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The value field of the AT_MAC attribute contains two reserved bytes
followed by a message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is
calculated over the whole EAP packet with the exception that the
value field of the MAC attribute is set to zero when calculating the
MAC. The reserved bytes are set to zero when sending and ignored on
reception. The format of the AT_MAC attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_MAC | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| MAC |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The MAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA1-128 [11] keyed hash value, so the
length of the MAC is 16 bytes. The derivation of the integrity
protection key (K_int) used in the calculation of the MAC is
specified in Section 14.
6.2. AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA Attributes
AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes can be optionally used to transmit
encrypted information between the EAP/SIM client and server.
The value field of AT_IV contains two reserved bytes followed by a
16-byte initialization vector required by the AT_ENCR_DATA
attribute. The reserved bytes are set to zero when sending and
ignored on reception. The AT_IV attribute MUST be included if and
only if the AT_ENCR_DATA is included. Messages that do not meet this
condition MUST be silently discarded. The format of AT_IV is shown
below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_IV | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Initialization Vector |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute consists of two
reserved bytes followed by bytes encrypted using the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [5] in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
mode of operation, using the initialization vector from the AT_IV
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attribute. The reserved bytes are set to zero when sending and
ignored on reception. Please see [6] for a description of the CBC
mode. The format of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_ENCR_DATA | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Encrypted Data .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The derivation of the encryption key (K_encr) is specified in
Section 14.
The plaintext consists of nested EAP/SIM attributes.
7. EAP-Response/Identity
In the beginning of EAP authentication, the Authenticator issues the
EAP-Request/Identity packet to the client. The client responds with
EAP-Response/Identity, which contains the user's identity. The
formats of these packets are specified in [1].
GSM subscribers are identified with the International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [7]. The IMSI is composed of a three
digit Mobile Country Code (MCC), a two or three digit Mobile Network
Code (MNC) and a not more than 10 digit Mobile Subscriber
Identification Number (MSIN). In other words, the IMSI is a string
of not more than 15 digits. MCC and MNC uniquely identify the GSM
operator.
Internet AAA protocols identify users with the Network Access
Identifier (NAI) [8]. When used in a roaming environment, the NAI is
composed of a username and a realm, separated with "@". The username
portion identifies the subscriber within the realm. The AAA nodes
use the realm portion of the NAI to route AAA requests to the
correct AAA server. The realm name used in this protocol MAY be
decided by the operator. Operators SHOULD reserve the realm portion
of NAI for EAP/SIM users exclusively, so that exactly the same realm
is not used with other authentication methods. This convention makes
it easy to recognize that the NAI identifies a GSM subscriber of
this operator, which may be useful when configuring the routing
rules in the visited AAA networks.
When the optional IMSI privacy support is not used, the client
transmits the user's IMSI as a NAI in the EAP Response/Identity
packet. The NAI is of the format "0imsi@realm". In other words, the
first character is the digit zero (ASCII value 0x30), followed by
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the IMSI, followed by the @ character and the realm. The IMSI is an
ASCII string that consists of not more than 15 decimal digits (ASCII
values between 0x30 and 0x39) as specified in [7].
When the optional identity privacy support is used, the client MAY
use the pseudonym received as part of the previous authentication
sequence as the user name portion of the NAI, as specified in
Section 4.
The AAA network routes the AAA request to the correct AAA server
using the realm part of the NAI. The realm part MAY be chosen by the
operator and it MAY a configurable parameter in the EAP/SIM client
implementation. In this case, the client is typically configured
with the NAI realm of the home operator.
If no configured realm name is available, the client MAY derive the
realm name from the MCC and MNC portions of the IMSI. In this case,
the realm name is obtained by concatenating "mnc", the MNC digits of
IMSI, ".mcc", the MCC digits of IMSI and ".owlan.org". For example,
if the IMSI is 123456789098765, and the MNC is three digits long,
then the derived realm name is "mnc456.mcc123.owlan.org".
If the client is not able to determine whether the MNC is two or
three digits long, the client MAY use a 3-digit MNC. If the correct
length of the MNC is two, then the MNC used in the realm name will
include the first digit of MSIN. Hence, when configuring AAA
networks for operators that have 2-digit MNC's, the network SHOULD
also be prepared for realm names with incorrect 3-digit MNC's.
8. EAP-Request/SIM/Start
The first SIM specific EAP Request is of subtype Start. The format
of the EAP Request/SIM/Start packet is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_IDENTITY_REQ| Length = 1 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
1 for Request
Identifier
See [1].
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Length
The length of the EAP packet.
Type
18
Subtype
10
Reserved
Set to zero on sending, ignored on reception
AT_IDENTITY_REQ
The AT_IDENTITY_REQ attribute is optional and it is included in
the cases defined in Section 4. The value field only contains two
reserved bytes, which are set to zero on sending and ignored on
reception.
9. EAP-Response/SIM/Start
The format of the EAP Response/SIM/Start packet is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_NONCE_MT | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| NONCE_MT |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_IDENTITY | Length | Actual Identity Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Cleartext Identity (optional) .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
2 for Response
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Identifier
See [1].
Length
The length of the EAP packet.
Type
18
Subtype
10
Reserved
Set to zero when sending, ignored on reception.
AT_NONCE_MT
The AT_NONCE_MT attribute MUST be included. The value field
contains two reserved bytes followed by a random number generated
by the client (16 bytes), which is used as a seed value for the
new key. The reserved bytes are set to zero upon sending and
ignored upon reception.
AT_IDENTITY
The AT_IDENTITY attribute is optional and it is included in cases
defined in Section 4. The value field of this attribute begins
with 2-byte actual identity length, which specifies the length of
the identity in bytes. This field is followed by the cleartext
Network Access Identitier username portion of the indicated
actual length. The username format is specified in Section 7. The
user name does not include any terminating null characters.
Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of 4
bytes, the sender pads the identity with zero bytes when
necessary.
10. EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge
The format of the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge packet is shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_RAND | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. n*RAND .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_IV | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Initialization Vector (optional) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_ENCR_DATA | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Encrypted Data (optional) .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_MAC | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| MAC |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
1 for Request
Identifier
See [1]
Length
The length of the EAP packet.
Type
18
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Subtype
11
Reserved
Set to zero when sending, ignored on reception.
AT_RAND
The AT_RAND attribute MUST be included. The value field of this
attribute contains two reserved bytes followed by n GSM RANDs
(each 16 bytes long). The reserved bytes are set to zero upon
sending and ignored upon reception.
The number of RAND challenges MUST be two or three. The client
MAY silently ignore the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message, if the
number of RAND challenges is two while the client's local policy
requires three challenges to be used.
AT_IV
The AT_IV attribute is optional. See section 6.2.
AT_ENCR_DATA
The AT_ENCR_DATA attribute is optional. See section 6.2. The
plaintext consists of nested attributes as described below.
AT_MAC
AT_MAC MUST be included in EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge for network
authentication. See Section 6.1.
The AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_MAC attributes are used for identity
privacy. The plaintext of the AT_ENCR_DATA value field consists of
nested attributes, which are shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_PSEUDONYM | Length | Actual Pseudonym Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Pseudonym .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_PADDING | Length | Padding... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
AT_PSEUDONYM
The AT_PSEUDONYM attribute is optional. The value field of this
attribute begins with 2-byte actual pseudonym length, which
specifies the length of the pseudonym in bytes. This field is
followed by a pseudonym user name, of the indicated actual
length, that the client can use in the next authentication, as
described in Section 4. The user name does not include any
terminating null characters. Because the length of the attribute
must be a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender pads the pseudonym with
zero bytes when necessary.
AT_PADDING
The encryption algorithm requires the length of the plaintext to
be a multiple of 16 bytes. The sender may need to include the
AT_PADDING attribute as the last attribute within AT_ENCR_DATA.
The AT_PADDING attribute is not included if the total length of
other nested attributes within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute is a
multiple of 16 bytes. As usual, the Length of the Padding
attribute includes the Attribute Type and Attribute Length
fields. The Length of the Padding attribute is 4, 8 or 12 bytes.
It is chosen so that the length of the value field of the
AT_ENCR_DATA attribute becomes a multiple of 16 bytes. The actual
pad bytes in the value field are set to zero (0x00) on sending.
The recipient of the message MUST verify that the pad bytes are
set to zero, and silently drop the message if this verification
fails.
11. EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge
The format of the EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge packet is shown below.
As specified in Section 6, EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge MAY include
the AT_MAC attribute to integrity protect the EAP packet. Later
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versions of this protocol MAY make use of the AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_IV
attributes in this message to include encrypted (skippable)
attributes. AT_MAC, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_IV attributes are not shown
in the figure below. If present, they are processed as in EAP-
Request/SIM/Challenge packet. The EAP server MUST process EAP-
Response/SIM/Challenge messages that include these attributes even
if the server did not implement these optional attributes.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_MAC_SRES | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| |
| MAC_SRES |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
2 for Response
Identifier
See [1].
Length
The length of the EAP packet.
Type
18
Subtype
11
Reserved
Set to zero when sending, ignored on reception.
AT_MAC_SRES
The AT_MAC_SRES attribute MUST be included. The value field of
this attribute contains two reserved bytes followed by the
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MAC_SRES response calculated by the client (Section 14), 16
bytes. The reserved bytes are set to zero upon sending and
ignored upon reception.
12. Unsuccessful Cases
As normally in EAP, the client is sent the EAP-Failure packet when
the authentication procedure fails on the EAP Server. In EAP/SIM,
this may occur for example if the EAP server is not able to obtain
the GSM triplets for the subscriber or the EAP server receives an
incorrect MAC_SRES.
In general, if an error occurs on the client while processing a
received EAP-Request packet, the client silently ignores the EAP
packet and does not send any EAP messages to the network. Examples
of such errors, specified in detail elsewhere in this document, are
an invalid AT_MAC value, insufficient number of RAND challenges
included in AT_RAND, and an unrecognized non-skippable attribute.
As specified in [1], the EAP client must respond with EAP-
Response/Nak when it receives an EAP Request of an undesired or
unrecognized authentication type.
13. EAP/SIM Notifications
The EAP-Request/Notification, specified in [1], can be used to
convey a displayable message from the authenticator to the client.
Because these messages are not localizable, EAP/SIM uses a separate
EAP/SIM message subtype to transmit localizable notification codes
instead of the EAP-Request/Notification packet.
The EAP server MAY issue an EAP-Request/SIM/Notification packet to
the client. The client MAY delay the processing of EAP-
Request/SIM/Notification and wait for other EAP/SIM requests. If a
valid EAP/SIM request of another subtype is received, the client MAY
silently ignore the EAP-Request/SIM notification and process the
other EAP/SIM request instead. If the client decides to process the
EAP-Request/SIM/Notification, then the client MAY show a
notification message to the user and the client MUST respond to the
EAP server with an EAP-Response/SIM/Notification packet.
The format of the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification packet is shown
below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_NOTIFICATION| Length = 1 | Notification Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
1 for Request
Identifier
See [1].
Length
The length of the EAP packet.
Type
18
Subtype
12
Reserved
Set to zero when sending, ignored on reception.
AT_NOTIFICATION
The AT_NOTIFICATION attribute MUST be included. The value field
of this attribute contains a two-byte notification code. The
following code values have been reserved:
1024 - Visited network does not have a roaming agreement with
user's home operator
1026 - User's calls are barred
1031 - User has not subscribed to the requested service
The format of the EAP-Response/SIM/Notification packet is shown
below. Because this packet is only an acknowledgement of EAP-
Request/SIM/Notification, it does not contain any mandatory
attributes.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
2 for Response
Identifier
See [1].
Length
The length of the EAP packet.
Type
18
Subtype
12
Reserved
Set to zero when sending, ignored on reception.
14. Calculation of Cryptographic Values
This section specifies how keying material is generated and how the
message authentication code MAC_SRES is calculated.
EAP SIM requires three keys for its own purposes, the integrity
protection keys K_sres and K_int, and the encryption key K_encr, to
be used with the AT_MAC_SRES, AT_MAC and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes. In
addition, it is possible to derive additional key material, such as
a master key to be used with IEEE 802.11i.
Key derivation is based on the random number generation specified in
NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 186
[9]. The random number generator is specified in Appendix 3.1 of
[9]. The function G used in the algorithm is constructed via Secure
Hash Standard as specified in Appendix 3.3.
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160-bit XKEY and XVAL values are used, so b = 160. The initial
secret seed value XKEY is computed from the n GSM Kc keys and the
NONCE_MT with the following formula:
XKEY = SHA1(n*Kc| NONCE_MT)
The notation n*Kc| NONCE_MT denotes the n Kc keys and the NONCE_MT
value concatenated. The hash function SHA1 is specified in [10].
The optional user input values (XSEED_j) are set to zero.
The random number generator is originally designed for the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA). The DSA private keys, which are derived
with this algorithm, must be between zero and a 160-bit prime q, and
hence the step 3.c of the random number generator performs a modulo
q operation. In EAP SIM, the modulo q operation in Step 3.c is
omitted, because there is no requirement to have random numbers not
greater than a prime. The modulo operation is omitted so as to have
more uniformly distributed random numbers. Hence, the step 3.c of
the algorithm becomes
X_j = G(t, XVAL)
The resulting 160-bit random numbers x_0, x_1, ..., x_m-1 are
concatenated and partitioned into suitable-sized chunks and used
keys in the following order: K_sres (128 bits), K_encr (128 bits),
K_int (128 bits), EAP application specific keys. The number of
random number generator iterations (m) depends on the amount of
required keying material.
Even if K_encr or K_int were not used in the particular
authentication sequence, they are derived and the EAP application
specific material begins after K_int.
For example, the EAP application specific material can be used for
packet security between the client and the authenticator. Because
the required keying material depends on the EAP application and the
EAP key derivation standardization has not been finalized yet, exact
rules of key derivation cannot be given here. As a guideline, which
can be used applicable, the EAP application specific keys resulting
from the key expansion scheme is used in the following order:
any master session keys required,
any encryption keys required,
any integrity protection keys required,
any initialization vectors required
If separate keys or IV's are required for each direction, then the
downlink material (to protect traffic to user) is taken before the
uplink material (to protect traffic from user).
K_sres is used in the calculation of MAC_SRES as follows:
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MAC_SRES
HMAC-SHA1-128 (K_sres, n*SRES | Message Subtype)
The keyed message authentication code function HMAC-SHA1-128 is
specified in [14]. Message subtype above contains the contents of
the Subtype field of the EAP/SIM message (one octet), in which
MAC_SRES parameter is included.
When generating the initial seed value XKEY, the hash function is
used as a mixing function to combine several session keys (Kc's)
generated by the GSM authentication procedure and the random number
NONCE_MT into a single session key. There are several reasons for
this. The current GSM session keys are at most 64 bits, so two or
more of them are needed to generate a longer key. By using a one-way
function to combine the keys, we are assured that even if an
attacker manages to learn one of the EAP/SIM session keys, it
doesn't help him in learning the original GSM Kc's. In addition,
since we include the random number NONCE_MT in the calculation, the
client is able to verify that the SIM authentication values it
receives from the network are fresh and not a replay. (Please see
also Section 16.)
15. IANA Considerations
The realm name "owlan.org" has been reserved for NAI realm names
generated from the IMSI.
IANA has assigned the EAP type number 18 for this protocol.
EAP/SIM messages include a Subtype field. The following Subtypes are
specified:
Start..........................................10
Challenge......................................11
Notification...................................12
The Subtype-specific data is composed of attributes, which have
attribute type numbers. The following attribute types are specified:
AT_RAND.........................................1
AT_IDENTITY.....................................5
AT_PADDING......................................6
AT_NONCE_MT.....................................7
AT_MAC_SRES.....................................9
AT_IDENTITY_REQ................................10
AT_MAC.........................................11
AT_NOTIFICATION................................12
AT_IV.........................................129
AT_ENCR_DATA..................................130
AT_PSEUDONYM..................................132
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The AT_NOTIFICATION attribute contains a notification code value.
Values 1024, 1026 and 1031 have been specified in Section 13 of this
document.
16. Security Considerations
The protocol in this document is intended to provide the appropriate
level of security to operate Extensible Authentication Protocol
using the GSM SIM.
EAP/SIM includes optional IMSI privacy support that protects the
privacy of the subscriber identity against passive eavesdropping.
The mechanism cannot be used on the first connection with a given
server, when the IMSI will have to be sent in the clear. EAP/SIM
does not protect the privacy of the IMSI against active attacks. An
active attacker that impersonates the network can easily learn the
subscriber's IMSI. This is the same level of protection as in the
GSM and UMTS cellular networks.
In EAP/SIM, the client believes that the network is authentic
because the network can calculate a correct AT_MAC value in the EAP-
Request/SIM/Challenge packet. To calculate AT_MAC, it is sufficient
to know the complete GSM triplets (RAND, SRES, Kc) used in the
authentication. Because the network selects the RAND challenges and
hereby the triplets, an attacker that knows two or three GSM
triplets for the subscriber is able to impersonate a valid network
to the client. Given physical access to the SIM card, it is easy to
obtain any number of GSM triplets. Another way to obtain a RAND
challenge and the corresponding SRES response of a GSM triplet is to
eavesdrop on the GSM network. The corresponding Kc key could be
obtained for example by cryptanalysing encrypted GSM traffic. (Of
course, this can be used to attack EAP/SIM only if the same SIM card
is used both for GSM network access and for EAP/SIM.) For these
reasons, network authentication of EAP/SIM SHOULD NOT be used
exclusively if strong network authentication is a concern.
There is no known way to obtain complete GSM triplets by mounting an
attack against EAP/SIM. A passive eavesdropper can learn n*RAND,
AT_MAC and AT_MAC_SRES, and may be able to link this information to
the subscriber identity. An active attacker that impersonates a GSM
subscriber can easily obtain n*RAND and AT_MAC values from the EAP
server for any given subscriber identity. However, calculating the
Kc and SRES values from AT_MAC and MAC_SRES would require the
attacker to reverse the keyed message authentication code function
HMAC-SHA1-128.
EAP/SIM combines several GSM triplets in order to generate a
stronger session key and stronger AT_MAC and AT_MAC_SRES values. The
actual strength of the resulting key depends, among other things, on
the operator-specific authentication algorithms, the strength of the
Ki key, and the quality of the RAND challenges, which is also
operator specific. For example, some SIM cards generate Kc keys with
10 bits set to zero. Such restrictions may prevent the concatenation
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technique from yielding strong session keys. Because the strength of
the Ki key is 128 bits, the ultimate strength of any derived secret
key material is never more than 128 bits.
An EAP/SIM implementation SHOULD use a good source of randomness to
generate the random numbers required in the protocol. Please see
[15] for more information on generating random numbers for security
applications.
17. Intellectual Property Right Notice
On IPR related issues, Nokia refers to the Nokia Statement on Patent
licensing, see http://www.ietf.org/ietf/IPR/NOKIA.
18. Acknowledgements and Contributions
The editor thanks Juha Ala-Laurila, N. Asokan, Simon Blake-Wilson,
Jan-Erik Ekberg, Patrik Flykt, Jukka-Pekka Honkanen, Antti Kuikka,
Jukka Latva, Lassi Lehtinen, Valtteri Niemi, Kaisa Nyberg, Jyri
Rinnemaa, Timo Takamäki and Raimo Vuonnala for theirs contributions
and critiques.
Thanks to Greg Rose of Qualcomm for his most valuable comments [16].
The IMSI privacy support is based on the identity privacy support of
[4]. The attribute format is based on the extension format of Mobile
IPv4 [17].
This protocol has been partly developed in parallel with EAP AKA
[18], and hence this specification incorporates many ideas from Jari
Arkko.
References
[1] L. Blunk, J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998
[2] GSM Technical Specification GSM 03.20 (ETS 300 534): "Digital
cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2); Security related
network functions", European Telecommunications Standards
Institute, August 1997
[3] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to indicate Requirement
Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[4] J. Carlson, B. Aboba, H. Haverinen, "EAP SRP-SHA1
Authentication Protocol", draft-ietf-pppext-eap-srp-03.txt,
July 2001 (work-in-progress)
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[5] Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) draft standard,
"Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)",
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/dfips-AES.pdf,
September 2001
[6] US National Bureau of Standards, "DES Modes of Operation",
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 81,
December 1980.
[7] GSM Technical Specification GSM 03.03 (ETS 300 523): "Digital
cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2); Numbering,
addressing and identification", European Telecommunications
Standards Institute, April 1997
[8] Aboba, B. and M. Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier", RFC
2486, January 1999.
[9] Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication
186, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", National Institute of
Standards and Technology, May 19, 1994
Available on-line at:
http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip186.htm
[10] Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication
180-1, "Secure Hash Standard," National Institute of Standards
and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, April 17, 1995.
[11] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997
[12] Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication
180-1, "Secure Hash Standard," National Institute of Standards
and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, April 17, 1995.
[13] D. Harkins, D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", RFC
2409, November 1998
[14] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997
[15] D. Eastlake, 3rd, S. Crocker, J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750 (Informational),
December 1994
[16] Qualcomm, "Comments on draft EAP/SIM", 3rd Generation
Partnership Project document 3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security - S3#22,
S3-020125, February 2002
[17] C. Perkins (editor), "IP Mobility Support", RFC 2002, October
1996
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[18] J. Arkko, H. Haverinen, "EAP AKA Authentication", draft-arkko-
pppext-eap-aka-04.txt, June 2002 (work in progress)
Editor's Address
Henry Haverinen
Nokia Mobile Phones
P.O. Box 88
FIN-33721 Tampere
Finland
E-mail: henry.haverinen@nokia.com
Phone: +358 50 594 4899
Fax: +358 3 318 3690
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