DOTS                                                          Y. Hayashi
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Informational                              K. Nishizuka
Expires: January 21, 2020                             NTT Communications
                                                            M. Boucadair
                                                                  Orange
                                                           July 20, 2019


       DDoS Mitigation Offload: DOTS Applicability and Deployment
                             Considerations
                   draft-hayashi-dots-dms-offload-00

Abstract

   This document describes a deployment scenario to assess the
   applicability of DOTS protocols together with a discussion on DOTS
   deployment considerations of such scenario.  This scenario assumes
   that a DMS (DDoS Mitigation System) whose utilization rate is high
   sends its blocked traffic information to an orchestrator using DOTS
   protocols, then the orchestrator requests forwarding nodes such as
   routers to filter the traffic.  Doing so enables service providers to
   mitigate the DDoS attack traffic automatically while ensuring
   interoperability and distributed filter enforcement.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  DDoS Mitigation Offload Scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  DOTS Deployment Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  DOTS Signaling via Out-of-band Link . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.1.1.  Example of using Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  DOTS Signaling via In-band Link . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.2.1.  Example of using Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.2.2.  Example of using Signal Channel Call Home . . . . . .  12
       5.2.3.  Data Channel and Signal Channel Controlling Filtering  14
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   Volume-based distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks such as DNS
   amplification attacks are critical threats to be handled by service
   providers.  When such attacks occur, service providers have to
   mitigate them immediately to protect or recover their services.

   Therefore, for the service providers to immediately protect their
   network services from DDoS attacks, DDoS mitigation needs to be
   automated.  To automate DDoS attack mitigation, it is desirable that
   multi-vendor elements involved in DDoS attack detection and
   mitigation collaborate and support standard interfaces to
   communicate.

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a set of protocols for real-time
   signaling, threat-handling requests, and data filtering between the
   multi-vendor elements [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]



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   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home]
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].
   This document describes an automated DDoS Mitigation offload scenario
   inherited from the DDoS orchestration scenario
   [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases], which ambitions to enable cost-effective
   DDoS Mitigation.  Furthermore, this document describes deployment
   consideration for network operators who carry out this scenario using
   DOTS protocols in their network.

   This document aims to assess to what extent DOTS protocols can be
   used to provide the intended functionality and identify any gaps.

2.  Terminology

   The readers should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612]
   [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]

   In addition, this document makes use of the following terms:

   Mitigation offload:  Getting rid of a DMS's mitigation action and
      assigning the action to another entity when the utilization rate
      of the DMS reaches a given threshold.  How such threshold is set
      is deployment-specific.

   Utilization rate:  A scale to measure load of an entity such as link
      utilization rate or CPU utilization rate.

3.  The Problem

   In general, DDoS countermeasures are divided into detection and
   filtering.  Detection is technically challenging given the dynamic of
   attacks and sophisticated attack strategies.  DDoS Mitigation System
   (DMS) can detect attack traffic based on a specific technology
   (provided and supposed to be updated and maintained by vendors to
   detect complex attacks), so service providers can increase DDoS
   countermeasure level by deploying the DMS in their network.

   However, the number/capacity of DMS instances that can be deployed in
   a service providers network is limited due to equipment cost and
   dimensioning matters.  Thus, DMS's utilization rate can reach its
   maximum capacity faster when the volume of DDoS attacks is enormous.
   When the rate reaches maximum capacity, the mitigation strategy needs
   to offload mitigation actions from the DMS to cost-effective
   forwarding nodes such as routers.







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4.  DDoS Mitigation Offload Scenario

   This section describes offloading mitigation actions from DMS whose
   utilization rate is high to cost-effective forwarding node using DOTS
   protocols.  This section does not consider deployments where the
   network orchestrator and DMS are co-located.

   Figures 1 and 2 show a sample component diagram and a sequence
   diagram of the deployment scenario, respectively.

   +--------------+        +-----------+
   |              |        | DDoS      |+
   | Orchestrator |<-------| mitigation||
   |              |S DOTS C| systems   ||
   +--------------+        +-----------+|
          |                  +----------+
          | e.g., BGP, BGP Flowspec
          |
          |  +------------------+
          +->| Forwarding nodes |+
             +------------------+|
               +-----------------+
       * C is for DOTS Client function
       * S is for DOTS Server function

      Figure 1: Component Diagram of DDoS Mitigation Offload Scenario

   The component diagram shown in Figure 1 differs from that of DDoS
   Orchestration scenario in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] in some respects.
   First, the DMS embeds a DOTS client to send DOTS requests to the
   orchestrator.  Second, the orchestrator sends a request to underlying
   forwarding nodes to filter the attack traffic.



















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   +------------+          +----------+   +------------+
   |            |          |DDoS      |+  | Forwarding |+
   |Orchestrator|          |Mitigation||  | Nodes      ||
   |            |          |Systems   ||  |            ||
   +------------+          +----------+|  +------------+|
        |                   +----------+   +------------+
        |                         |              |
        | DOTS Request            |              |
        |S<----------------------C|              |
        |                         |              |
        | e.g., BGP, BGP Flowspec |              |
        | Filter Attack Traffic   |              |
        |-------------------------|------------->|
        |                         |              |
        * C is for DOTS Client function
        * S is for DOTS Server function

      Figure 2: Sequence Diagram of DDoS Mitigation Offload Scenario

   In this scenario, it is assumed that volume based attack already hits
   a network and attack traffic is detected and blocked by a DMS in the
   network.  When the volume-based attack becomes intense, DMS's
   utilization rate can reach a certain threshold (e.g., maximum
   capacity).  Then, the DMS sends a DOTS request as offload request to
   the orchestrator with the actions to enforce on the traffic.  After
   that, the orchestrator requests the forwarding nodes to filter attack
   traffic by dissemination of flow specification rules protocols such
   as BGP Flowspec [RFC5575] on the basis of the blocked traffic
   information.

   This schenario is divided into two cases based on type of link
   between the DMS and the orchestrator: "out-of-band case" and "in-band
   case".

   "Out-of-band case" is that the DMS sends a DOTS request to the
   orchestrator with blocked traffic information by the DMS via out-of-
   band link.  The link is not congested when it is under volume attack-
   time, so the link can convey a lot of information.

   On the other hand, "in-band case" is that the DMS sends a mitigation
   request to the orchestrator with blocked traffic information by the
   DMS via in-band channel.  The link can be congested when it is under
   volume attack-time, so the link can convey limited information.








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5.  DOTS Deployment Considerations

   This section describes deployment considerations: what type of DOTS
   protocol can be used and what type of information can be conveyed and
   effective by DOTS protocol in this scenario.  Figure 3 shows overview
   of the DOTS signaling method and conveyed information for the out-of-
   band case and in-band case.

   The volume of information should be considered carefully when DOTS
   protocol is used in the in-band case.  What type of information can
   be conveyed by DMS relays on attack type detected by the DMS:
   reflection attack or non-reflection attack.  When it is under non-
   reflection attack, src_ip and src_port information cannot be conveyed
   because attackers usually randomize the parameters so number of its
   become enormous.  On the other hand, when it is under reflection
   attack, dst_port information cannot be conveyed because attackers
   usually randomize src_port so the number of dst_port of attack
   packets reached to victim become enormous.  Furthermore, when it is
   under reflection attack, src_ip information cannot be conveyed when
   number of reflector is enormous.































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  +-------------+-----------------------------------+------------------+
  |             |        Reflection Attack          |  Non-Reflection  |
  |             |                                   |     Attack       |
  +-------------+-----------------------------------+------------------+
  | Out-of-band | Attack Time                                          |
  |     case    | Method : Data Channel                                |
  |             | Info : src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port, protocol  |
  +-------------+-----------------------------------+------------------+
  |   In-band   | Attack Time                       | Attack Time      |
  |    case     | (Number of reflector is small)    | Method : Signal  |
  |             | Method : Signal Channel with src  |          Channel |
  |             | Info : src_ip, src_port,          | Info : dst_ip,   |
  |             |        dst_ip, protocol           |        dst_port, |
  |             +-----------------------------------+        protocol  |
  |             | Attack Time                       |                  |
  |             | (Number of reflector is enormous) |                  |
  |             | Method : Signal Channel with src  |                  |
  |             | Info : src_port, dst_ip, protocol |                  |
  |             +-----------------------------------+------------------+
  |             | Peace Time                        | Peace Time       |
  |             | Method : Data Channel             | Method : Data    |
  |             | Info : src_port,                  |          Channel |
  |             |        dst_ip, protocol           | Info : dst_ip,   |
  |             |                                   |        dst_port, |
  |             |                                   |        protocol  |
  |             |                                   |                  |
  |             | Attack Time                       | Attack Time      |
  |             | Method : Signal Channel           | Method : Signal  |
  |             |          Control Filtering        |          Channel |
  |             | Info : ACL name                   | Control Filtering|
  |             |                                   | Info : ACL name  |
  |-------------+------------------------------------------------------+


            Figure 3: Signaling Method and Conveyed Information

   About offloading DMS against reflection attack, the current signal
   channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is insufficient in terms of
   conveying source information.  On the other hand, both signal channel
   extensions defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home] (called,
   source-* clauses hereafter) and the filtering control extensions
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] allow for sending source
   information.

   Using src-* attributes defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home]
   enables signal channel to convey src_ip information and src_port
   information in attack time.  On the other hand, filtering control
   extensions can activate filtering rule configured in peacetime.



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   Filtering rule for well-known port numbers abused for reflection
   attack can be configured to DOTS server in peacetime.  However,
   filtering rule for reflector's IP address in attack time can't be
   known in peace time.  So filtering control expansion can convey
   src_port information but can't send src_ip information against
   reflection attack.  About sending source information in the DMS
   offload s scenario, the capability of the call home extension
   encompasses the capabilities of the filtering control extension.

   The following sub-sections describes example of use DOTS protocols in
   each case.

5.1.  DOTS Signaling via Out-of-band Link

   In this case, the link is not congested when it is under volume
   attack-time, so DOTS data channel [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] is
   suitable because DOTS data channel has capability of conveying the
   drop-listed filtering rules including (src_ip, src_port, dst_ip,
   dst_port, protocol) information (and other actions such as 'rate-
   limit').

5.1.1.  Example of using Data Channel

   The procedure to use DOTS Data Channel in such case is as follows:

   o  The DMS generates a list of flow (src_ip, src_port, dst_ip,
      dst_port, protocol) information which the DMS is blocking/rate-
      limiting and wants to offload.

   o  The DMS creates data-channel ACL such as shown figure 4.

   o  The DMS sends the data-channel ACL to the orchestrator.

       {
         "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
           "acl": [
             {
               "name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_ACL",
               "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
               "activation-type": "immediate",
               "aces": {
                 "ace": [
                   {
                     "name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_ACE_00",
                     "matches": {
                       "ipv4": {
                         "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                         "source-ipv4-network": "203.0.113.2/32",



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                         "protocol":17
                       },
                       "udp": {
                         "source-port": {
                           "operator": "eq",
                           "port": 53
                         }
                       }
                     },
                     "actions": {
                       "forwarding": "drop"
                     }
                   },
                   {
                     "name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_ACE_01",
                     "matches": {
                       "ipv4": {
                         "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                         "source-ipv4-network": "203.0.113.3/32",
                         "protocol":17
                       },
                       "udp": {
                         "source-port": {
                           "operator": "eq",
                           "port": 53
                         }
                       }
                     },
                     "actions": {
                       "forwarding": "drop"
                     }
                   }
                 ]
               }
             }
           ]
         }
       }

    Figure 4: JSON Example of ACL including (src_ip, src_port, dst_ip,
       dst_port, protocol) information conveyed by DOTS data channel

5.2.  DOTS Signaling via In-band Link

   In this case, the link can be congested when it is under volume
   attack-time, so DOTS data channel can't be used to convey the drop-
   listed filtering rules as blocked traffic information [Interop].  On
   the other hand, DOTS signal channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel],



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   the source-* clauses defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home] and
   filtering control [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] can be used
   to communicate the policies to the orchestrator.

5.2.1.  Example of using Signal Channel

   DOTS signal channel has capability to send (dst_ip, dst_port,
   protocol) information.  The procedure to use DOTS Signal Channel in
   this case is as follows:

   o  The DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, dst_port, protocol)
      information which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.

   o  The DMS creates mitigation request such as shown figure 5.

   o  The DMS sends the mitigation requests to the orchestrator.


































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   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-port-range": [
             {
              "lower-port": 80
             },
             {
              "lower-port": 443
             }
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         },
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-port-range": [
             {
              "lower-port": 53
             },
             {
              "lower-port": 123
             }
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             17
           ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

       Figure 5: JSON Example of offload request including (dst_ip,
      dst_port, protocol) information conveyed by DOTS signal channel








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5.2.2.  Example of using Signal Channel Call Home

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home] extends the DOTS signal channel to
   convey (dst_ip, dst_port, src_ip, src_port, protocol) information in
   a mitigation request.  A mitigation request can convey src_ip
   information when the number of reflectors detected by a DMS is small.
   The procedure to use DOTS src-* clauses is as follows:

   o  The DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, src_ip, src_port, protocol)
      information which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.

   o  The DMS creates mitigation request such as shown figure 6.

   o  The DMS sends the mitigation requests to the orchestrator.

   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
            "ietf-dots-call-home:source-prefix": [
              "203.0.113.2/32"
            ],
            "ietf-dots-call-home:source-port-range" : [
            {
              "ietf-dots-call-home:lower-port": 53
            },
            {
             "ietf-dots-call-home:lower-port": 123
            }
            ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         },
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
            "ietf-dots-call-home:source-prefix": [
            "203.0.113.3/32"



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            ],
            "ietf-dots-call-home:source-port-range" : [
            {
             "ietf-dots-call-home:lower-port": 19
            },
            {
             "ietf-dots-call-home:lower-port": 11211
            }
            ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 6: JSON Example of offload request including (dst_ip, src_ip,
      src_port, protocol) information conveyed by DOTS signal channel

   On the other hand, a mitigation request cannot convey src_ip
   information when number of reflector detected by DMS exceeds a
   certain number (cannot fit within one single request).  The procedure
   to use the DOTS signal channel in the situation is as follows:

   o  The DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, src_port, protocol)
      information which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.

   o  The DMS creates mitigation request such as shown in Figure 7.

   o  The DMS sends the mitigation requests to the orchestrator.





















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   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
            "ietf-dots-call-home:source-port-range" : [
            {
             "ietf-dots-call-home:lower-port": 53
            },
            {
             "ietf-dots-call-home:lower-port": 123
            },
            {
             "ietf-dots-call-home:lower-port": 19
            },
            {
             "ietf-dots-call-home:lower-port": 11211
            }
            ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

       Figure 7: JSON Example of offload request including (dst_ip,
      src_port, protocol) information conveyed by DOTS signal channel

5.2.3.  Data Channel and Signal Channel Controlling Filtering

   DOTS signal channel controlling filtering
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] has capability to activate or
   deactivate ACL configured by Data Channel.  Against reflection
   attack, DOTS client configures ACL including (dst_ip, src_port,
   protocol) information in peace time by Data Channel, and DOTS client
   activate the ACL in attack time by Signal Channel controlling
   filtering.  Note that the src_port is well known port abused to carry
   out reflection attack by attacker.  The procedure to use DOTS data
   channel and signal channel controlling filtering is as follows:

   o  In peace time, the DMS sends the ACL including (dst_ip, src_port,
      protocol) information such as figure 8.




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   o  In attack time, the DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, src_port,
      protocol) which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.  After that, the DMS sends the mitigation requests to
      activate corresponding ACL configured to the orchestrator such as
      figure 9.

   {
     "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
       "acl": [
         {
           "name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_ACL",
           "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
           "activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_ACL_DNS_amp",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv4": {
                     "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                     "protocol":17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 53
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "drop"
                 }
               },
               {
                 "name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_ACL_NTP_amp",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv4": {
                     "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                     "protocol":17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 123
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {



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                   "forwarding": "drop"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 8: JSON Example of ACL including (dst_ip, src_port, protocol)
                 information conveyed by DOTS data channel

   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
              "192.0.2.2/32"
            ],
            "target-protocol": [
              17
            ],
            "acl-list": [
              {
                "acl-name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_ACL_DNS_amp",
                "activation-type": "immediate"
              }
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 9: JSON Example of including acl name conveyed by DOTS signal
                                  channel

   Against non-reflection attack, DOTS client configures ACL including
   (dst_ip, dst_port, protocol) information in peace time by Data
   Channel, and DOTS client activate the 'acl' in attack time by Signal
   Channel.  Note that the dst_port is well known port abused to carry
   out non-reclection attack by attacker.  The procedure to use DOTS
   data channel and signal channel controlling filtering is as follows:

   o  In peace time, the DMS sends the ACL including (dst_ip, dst_port,
      protocol) information such as figure 10.





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   o  In attack time, the DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, dst_port,
      protocol) which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.  After that, the DMS sends the mitigation requests to
      activate corresponding ACL configured to the orchestrator such as
      figure 11.

   {
     "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
       "acl": [
         {
           "name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_ACL",
           "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
           "activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_HTTP_GET_Flooding",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv4": {
                     "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                     "protocol":6
                   },
                   "tcp": {
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 80
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "drop"
                 }
               },
               {
                 "name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_SYN_Flooding_FTP",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv4": {
                     "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                     "protocol":6
                   },
                   "tcp": {
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 20
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {



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                   "forwarding": "drop"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 10: JSON Example of ACL including (dst_ip, dst_port, protocol)
                 information conveyed by DOTS data channel

   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
              "192.0.2.2/32"
            ],
            "target-protocol": [
              6
            ],
            "acl-list": [
              {
                "acl-name": "DMS_Offload_scenario_HTTP_GET_Flooding",
                "activation-type": "immediate"
              }
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 11: JSON Example of including ACL name conveyed by DOTS signal
                                  channel

6.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] and
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] are to be taken into account.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require any action from IANA.






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8.  Acknowledgement

   Thanks to Tirumaleswar Reddy, Shunsuke Homma, Pan Wei, and Xia Liang
   for the comments.

   Thanks to Koichi Sakurada for demonstrating proof of concepts of this
   proposal .

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]
              Boucadair, M. and R. K, "Distributed Denial-of-Service
              Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification",
              draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-30 (work in progress), July
              2019.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home]
              K, R., Boucadair, M., and J. Shallow, "Distributed Denial-
              of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel
              Call Home", draft-ietf-dots-signal-call-home-03 (work in
              progress), July 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
              K, R., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N.
              Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
              Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", draft-
              ietf-dots-signal-channel-35 (work in progress), July 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control]
              Nishizuka, K., Boucadair, M., K, R., and T. Nagata,
              "Controlling Filtering Rules Using Distributed Denial-of-
              Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel",
              draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control-01 (work in
              progress), May 2019.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
              Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Fouant, S., Moskowitz, R.,
              Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS
              Open Threat Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-18 (work
              in progress), July 2019.







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   [Interop]  Nishizuka, K., Shallow, J., and L. Xia , "DOTS Interop
              test report, IETF 103 Hackathon", November 2018,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/
              slides-103-dots-interop-report-from-ietf-103-hackathon-
              00>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC5575]  Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
              and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
              Rules", RFC 5575, DOI 10.17487/RFC5575, August 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5575>.

   [RFC8612]  Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
              Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8612>.

Authors' Addresses

   Yuhei Hayashi
   NTT
   3-9-11, Midori-cho
   Musashino-shi, Tokyo  180-8585
   Japan

   Email: yuuhei.hayashi@gmail.com


   Kaname Nishizuka
   NTT Communications
   GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
   Tokyo  108-8118
   Japan

   Email: kaname@nttv6.jp


   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com




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