Tsunemasa Hayashi, NTT
   Internet Draft                          Haixiang He, Nortel Networks
   Expires: August 13, 2005                          Hiroaki Satou, NTT
                                                      Hiroshi Ohta, NTT
                                         Susheela Vaidya, Cisco Systems


                                                       February 13 2005


    Issues Related to Receiver Access Control in the Current Multicast
                                 Protocols
                     <draft-hayashi-rac-issues-00.txt>


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of section 3 of RFC 3667.  By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
   author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
   which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
   which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
   RFC 3668.


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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 13, 2005


Copyright Notice


   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005)



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Abstract

   This I-D lists and describes issues related to receiver access
   control in current multicasting protocols which are especially
   important to commercial, large-scale multicasting.  A few common
   business models for content and network provision are presented to
   provide background and explain the motivation of this work.  Four
   existing possible multicasting architectures (with or without some
   form of access or content control) are presented. Then each
   architecture is analyzed with respect to how it can or cannot
   satisfactorily address each issue.  This I-D concludes that for many
   of these issues the possible architectures based on present standards
   as they now exist require non-standardized solutions to meet common
   use requirements. This I-D recommends for requirements to be defined
   that would set the groundwork for creating standardized ways to
   overcome these limitations.





   Copyright Notice...................................................1
   1. Introduction....................................................3
   2. Definitions and Abbreviations...................................4
   2.1 Definitions....................................................4
   2.2 Abbreviations..................................................5
   3. Common use models and network architecture implications.........5
   4. Issues in multicasting related to commercial and large-scale
   implementations....................................................6
   4.1 Access limits and resource issues..............................6
   4.1.1 Access limit for multicast groups............................6
   4.1.2 Maintain guaranteed quality-level of data delivery (Voice,
   Video).............................................................7
   4.1.3 Issue of network resource protection.........................7
   4.1.3.1 Control mechanism to support bandwidth of multicast stream
   from a physical port of edge router or switch......................7
   4.2 Capability to distinguish between receivers (end hosts)........7
   4.3 Capability to distinguish between users (as opposed to merely
   hosts).............................................................8
   4.4 Channel "leave latency"........................................8
   4.5 Surveillance of receiver by sender.............................9
   4.5.1 Precise access log...........................................9
   4.5.2 How to share user information................................9
   4.5.3 Trustworthy logs to monitor user activity....................9



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   4.6 Notification to users of the result of the join request.......10
   4.7 Triple Play...................................................10
   4.8 DRM Protection................................................10
   5. Description of existing architectures..........................10
   5.1 IGMP/MLD......................................................10
   5.2 IGMP/MLD with L2 Authentication with ACL......................11
   5.3 Unicast Control with IGMP/MLD.................................12
   5.4 IGMP/MLD with Multicast Encryption............................12
   6. Evaluation of architectures by issue...........................13
   6.1 Access limit capabilities, compared by architecture...........13
   6.2 Capability to distinguish between receivers, compared by
   architecture......................................................14
   6.3 Capability to distinguish between users, compared by architecture
   ..................................................................14
   6.4 Maintain guaranteed quality-level of data delivery (Voice, Video),
   compared by architecture..........................................15
   6.5 Fast leave for fast surfing capability, compared by architecture
   ..................................................................15
   6.6 Surveillance of receiver by sender, compared by architecture..16
   6.7.Notification to users of the result of the join request compared
   by architecture...................................................16
   6.8 Triple Play capability, compared by architecture..............17
   7. IANA considerations............................................17
   8. Security considerations........................................17
   9. Conclusion.....................................................17
   Normative References..............................................18
   Full Copyright Statement..........................................19
   Intellectual Property.............................................19
   Acknowledgement...................................................19


1. Introduction

   The intention of this I-D is to initiate a discussion on issues
   related to receiver access control in the current multicast protocols
   especially when deployed for commercial, large-scale multicasting.
   It is hoped that further drafts will define requirements to address
   the issues raised in this draft.

   Existing IP multicasting protocols (as presented in Section 5) were
   designed to meet certain sets of requirements that do not necessarily
   include architectural considerations intended to support commercial
   services. This I-D presents a number of issues network providers may
   face when they attempt to apply current multicasting standards to
   commercial services.   The extent to which existing multicast



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   protocols can or cannot satisfactorily deal with issue is explored.
   A few network models based on a range of different business models
   are presented as a basis for defining requirements in a future
   document.

   IP multicasting is becoming widely used as a method to save network
   resources such as bandwidth or CPU processing power of the sender's
   server for cases where a large volume of information needs to be
   distributed to a large number of receivers.  This trend can be
   observed both in enterprise use and in broadband services provided by
   network operator/service providers.

   Distance learning within a university and in-house (in-company)
   sharing of multimedia information are examples of enterprise use.  In
   these examples, sources generate high-bit rate (e.g., 6Mbit/s)
   streaming information.  When the number of receivers becomes large,
   such systems do not scale well without multicasting.

   On the other hand, content delivery service (CDS) is an example of a
   broadband service provided by network operators/service providers.
   Distribution of movies and other video programs to each user are
   typical services.  Each channel requires large bandwidth (e.g.,
   6Mbit/s) and operator/service providers need to provide many channels
   to make their service attractive.  In addition, the number of
   receivers is large (e.g., more than a few thousands).  The system to
   provide this service does not scale well without multicasting.

   As such, multicasting can be useful to make the network more scalable
   when a large volume of information needs to be distributed to a large
   number of receivers.  However, multicasting according to current
   standards (e.g., IGMPv3[1] and MLDv2[2]) has drawbacks compared to
   unicasting.  This I-D first presents a few common business models for
   content and network provision in order to provide background and
   explain the motivation of this work. Then, issues which are important
   for commercial, large-scale implementations of multicasting are
   listed.  Next, a few possible existing architectures used for
   multicasting with access control based on current standards are
   presented. Specifically 1) IGMP/ MLD, 2) IGMP/MLD with L2
   Authentication with ACL 3) Unicast Control with IGMP/MLD and 4)
   IGMP/MLD with Multicast Encryption will each be presented and
   described.  Each architecture is discussed with respect to the
   presented list of issues.


2. Definitions and Abbreviations

2.1 Definitions

   For the purposes of this I-D the following definitions apply:




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   Accounting: actions for grasping each user's behavior, when she/he
   starts/stops to receive a channel, which channel she/he receives, etc.

   Authentication: action for identifying a user as a genuine one.

   Authorization: action for giving permission to access the content or
   network to a user.

   Receiver: an end-host or end-client which receives content.  A
   receiver may be distinguishable by a network ID such as MAC address
   or IP address.  The receiver should be distinguished from the user
   (see below.)

   User: a human with a user account.  A user may possibly use multiple
   reception devices.  Multiple users may use the same reception device.


2.2 Abbreviations

   For the purposes of this draft the following abbreviations apply:

   ACL: Access Control List

   CDS: Content Delivery Services

   CSP: Content Service Provider

   DRM: Data Rights Management

   KEI: Key Exchange Identifier

   NSP: Network Service Provider

   QoS: Quality of Service


3. Common use models and network architecture implications

   Issues such as user identification, access-control, tracking and
   billing are common requirements for commercial content delivery
   services (CDS) systems (and are important in many non-commercial CDS
   systems as well.)  These same requirements should be met for CDS
   systems that employ multicasting.

   In some cases a single entity may design and be responsible for a
   system that covers the various common high-level requirements of a
   commercial multicasting system such as 1) content serving, 2) the
   infrastructure to multicast it, 3) network and content access control
   mechanisms.




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   However it should not be assumed that the entity responsible for the
   multicasting structure and the entity responsible for content serving
   are the same.  Indeed because the infrastructure for multicasting is
   expensive and many content holders are not likely to be competent at
   building and maintaining complicated infrastructures necessary for
   multicasting, many content holders would prefer to purchase the
   services from a network service provider and thus share the
   infrastructure costs with other content holders.

   Similarly commercial network service providers do not generally
   specialize in providing content and are unlikely to build and
   maintain such a resource-intensive system without a certain level of
   demand from content holders.

   The business model of a single NSP providing multicasting services to
   multiple CSP has certain implications:

        -Need for user tracking and billing capabilities
        -Need for network access control and/or content access control
   satisfactory to the requirements of the CSP
        -Methods for sharing information between the NSP and CSP to make
   the above two possible


   When the NSP and CSP are the same single entity the general
   requirements are as follows.

        -Need for user tracking and user-billing capabilities
        -Need for access control and/or content protection at level the
   entity deems appropriate

   In the next section issues in multicasting related to commercial and
   large-scale implementations are presented.  Some presented issues are
   not pertinent to cases where the NSP and CSP are the same entity.


4. Issues in multicasting related to commercial and large-scale
   implementations

   This section lists issues related to receiver access control in
   current multicasting protocols which are especially important to
   commercial, large-scale multicasting.


4.1 Access limits and resource issues

4.1.1 Access limit for multicast groups

   For commercial applications of multicasting network and content
   providers generally wish to be able to control the number of groups a



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   host can access at the same time.  If any user can access any group
   without limitation network providers may waste network resources, and
   this may have implications on the Quality of Service (QoS) they can
   provide to other users.  Access control is also important to prevent
   against unauthorized access of data as it is a priority of many
   content providers to control access to their content from reasons
   ranging to IPR issues to privacy issues.

4.1.2 Maintain guaranteed quality-level of data delivery (Voice, Video)

   For NSP to guarantee and charge for a certain quality of data
   delivery it is important that they can limit the number of receivers
   to a level that their bandwidth and servers can handle.

   With best-effort services (e.g. mail transfer, web surfing) strict
   network resource allocation is not necessary, but for services with a
   guaranteed QoS level (e.g. IP television, teleconferencing, VoIP) it
   is necessary to allocate sufficient bandwidth and server resources to
   each service.

4.1.3 Issue of network resource protection

   In order to guarantee certain QoS levels as described in the above
   section (4.1.2), it is important for network providers to be able to
   protect their network resources from being wasted, (either
   maliciously or accidentally).

4.1.3.1 Control mechanism to support bandwidth of multicast stream from
   a physical port of edge router or switch

   The network should be able to control the combined bandwidth for all
   groups both at the physical port of the edge router or switch and on
   each link between routers and/or NW switches so that these given
   physical entities are not overflown by the traffic.

4.1.3.2. Number of groups delivered from a physical port of edge router
and switch

   So that the NSP can guarantee a certain level of QoS to the CSP and
   the receivers it is important that it be able to control the number
   of groups that are served from any certain edge router or switch at
   any certain time.

   When the NSP and the CSP are the same entity the QoS obligations are
   simplified since guarantees would be made only to the users.

4.2 Capability to distinguish between receivers (end hosts)

   Currently the sender cannot distinguish which receivers (end hosts)
   are actually receiving its information with current protocols



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   (IGMP/MLD.)  The sender must rely on the information from the
   multicasting routers. This can be complicated if the sender and
   routers are maintained by different entities. There is currently no
   standard way to share such information.

4.3 Capability to distinguish between users (as opposed to merely
   hosts)

   Many content providers would like to have detailed information on
   what users are consuming their content and information on their usage
   behavior. This information might be used for ratings information,
   billing, auditing, and programming decisions.  Also content and
   network providers may wish to provide users with access to their
   usage history.  If a network provider and content provider are
   separate entities there are no protocols for sharing such information
   on a user basis.

   For example, if NSPs are going to provide access control and/or usage
   information to a CSP on a user level it is important that the two
   entities be able to distinguish users and communicate appropriate
   information.  For example, it is quite conceivable that a CSP might
   want to bill or track separate users who may use the same device
   (such as at Internet cafes, at hotels, with families, etc.) In such a
   case it is important that the NSP record information on who is
   actually downloading data on the user-level since the CSP would
   otherwise not be able to receive this information. Also for example,
   in many usage models it is important to provide portability, in other
   words to allow users to access the network from different devices
   and/or different access points.  If NSPs are going to provide access
   control and/or billing capability to a separate-entity CSP, this
   capability of distinguishing users is important.



   If the same entity is providing both content and network services,
   the entity has access to sufficient data to distinguish users.
   Nevertheless a standard way of relaying this information between
   servers on the network would be attractive from the standpoint of
   potential decreased development and operational costs.


4.4 Channel "leave latency"

   Commercial implementations of IP multicasting are likely to have
   strict requirements in terms of user experience.  Leave latency is
   the time between when a user sends a signal that he/she wishes to
   "leave" a group and when the network recognizes the "leave."

   Leave latency impacts :
         i. Acceptable end-user experience for fast channel surfing.



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              In an IP-TV application, users are not going to be
   receptive to slow response time when changing channels.

         ii. Resource consumption
               With a low "leave latency" network providers could
   minimize streaming content when there are no audiences.


4.5 Surveillance of receiver by sender

4.5.1 Precise access log

   In many commercial multicast situations, NSP and CSP would like to be
   able to precisely grasp the content consumption of end-users.  Such
   information might be used for "identifying highly viewed content" for
   advertising revenue, ratings calculations, programming decisions, etc.

   To assemble such an understanding of end-user behavior, it is
   necessary to precisely log information such as who (host/user) is
   accessing what content at what time (join action) until what time
   (leave action).  The result of the access-control decision (e.g.
   results of authorization) would also be valuable information.

4.5.2 How to share user information

   For commercial multicast applications where NSP and CSP are different
   entities, there are a number of issues regarding how to share user
   information between the NSP and CSP.  For example, which entities
   should be able to access which information relating to user-based
   tracking? What is the user identifier that can be used between the
   entities to distinguish among users, and which entities should be
   able to recognize this identifier?  Another important issue is how
   the edge router should be able to access and then maintain user
   information. The current situation of present architectures is that
   only the NSP can get information about user activity, because user
   activities are only observable from join/leave information logged on
   edge devices which are under control of the NSP.


4.5.3 Trustworthy logs to monitor user activity

   An important issue for commercial multicasting applications is how
   the NSP can get trustworthy data on user activity which may be needed
   for billing and statistics purposes.  A standard way of logging user
   activity and protecting the integrity of the logs does not exist.
   Often network providers do not want to keep logs on untrusted user
   terminal which can be tampered with.





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4.6 Notification to users of the result of the join request

   It is necessary to provide information to the user about the status
   of his/her join request(granted/denied/other).

4.7 Triple Play

   Ideally the NSP should be able to use the same infrastructure (such
   as access control) to support commercial multicast services for the
   so called "triple play" services: voice (VoIP), video, and broadband
   Internet access services.



4.8 DRM Protection

   Digital Rights Management (DRM) is important but out of scope of this
   I-D.


5. Description of existing architectures

   In this section, existing architectures used for multicasting based
   on current standards are defined.  In section 6 these architectures
   will be compared by the issues presented in section 4.


5.1 IGMP/MLD

   Internet Group Management Protocol(IGMP) or Multicast Listener
   Discovery (MLD) are protocols for layer 3 management of multicasting.
   In IP multicast a receiver sends a request to a first-hop multicast
   router to join a particular multicast group. The router is then
   responsible for forwarding the appropriate data from the sender to
   the receiver.

     +----------+    +----------+   +----------+         +----------+
     | Sender   |    | Router   |   | L2SW     |         | Receiver |
     |          |    |          |<---------------1,JOIN--|          |
     |          |    |          |   |          |         |          |
     |          |------------>x------------------2,Data->|          |
     |          |    |        | |   |          |         |          |
     |          |    |        | |   |          |         |          |
     +----------+    +--------|-+   +----------+         +----------+
                              |
                              V




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5.2 IGMP/MLD with L2 Authentication with ACL

   With a basic implementation of IGMP/MLD implementation, no
   authorization is performed on the receiver.  It is possible to
   combine an IGMP/MLD implementation with Layer 2 Authentication to
   provide a control mechanism for accessing the network using 802.X. In
   this scenario a receiver first requests to the L2 authentication
   server for access to network. The authentication controller then
   queries the policy server with the receiver's credentials (such as IP
   or MAC address), and if the receiver is determined to be an
   authorized user of the network ("success"), the router downloads the
   ACL from the policy sever.  For example, users which are not on the
   ACL are rejected.  Then the Layer 2 Switch is directed to open a port
   for the receiver to send a join request to the multicast router. The
   router is then responsible for forwarding the appropriate data from
   the sender to the receiver.

   Note: ACL is one of the methods to realize an access control policy.
   Other methods exist.

     +----------+
     | Policy   |
     | Server   |\
     |          | \
     +----------+  \ 4,ACL Download
        |    ^      \
        |    |       \
        V    |        V
     +----------+    +----------+   +----------+          +----------+
     | L2       |    | Router   |   | L2SW     |          | Receiver |
     |          |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     | Auth.    |<----------------------------  1,Request-|          |
     |          |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |--------2,Success------------>X(3,Auth)  |          |
     +----------+    |          |   |          |          |          |
                     |          |   |          |          |          |
     +----------+    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |    |          |<---------------5,Join---|          |
     | Sender   |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |------------>x------------------6,Data-->|          |
     |          |    |        | |   |          |          |          |
     +----------+    +--------|-+   +----------+          +----------+
                              |
                              V
Key:
 Auth: Authentication



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5.3 Unicast Control with IGMP/MLD

   The receiver first sends a unicast request to the sender, if
   authorization is successful the sender sends the multicast address
   information via unicast.  With this multicast address the receiver
   does a IGMP\MLD join as in described in 5.1.
     +----------+    +----------+   +----------+          +----------+
     | Sender   |    | Router   |   | L2SW   |          | Receiver |
     |          |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |<------------------------------1,Request-|          |
     |          |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |-------------------------------2,Success>|          |
     |          |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |    |          |<--------------3,Join----|          |
     |          |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |------------>x-----------------4,Data--->|          |
     |          |    |        | |   |          |          |          |
     |          |    |        | |   |          |          |          |
     +----------+    +--------|-+   +----------+          +----------+
                              |
                              V

5.4 IGMP/MLD with Multicast Encryption

   With a basic implementation of IGMP/MLD implementation, no data
   protection is performed on data sent to the receiver.  No credential
   check is performed on the receiver and any receiver can receive and
   use the data.  The IGMP/MLD with Multicast Encryption model assumes
   that the sender is sending encrypted data and that for this data to
   be useful to the receiver it must first request and receive a key
   from a group controller and key server that is synchronized with the
   content encryption occurring on the sender's data.




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     +----------+    +----------+   +----------+          +----------+
     | G.C. &   |    | Router   |   | L2SW     |          | Receiver |
     |          |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     | Key S.   |<------------------------------1,Request-|          |
     |          |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |-------------------------------2,Key---->|          |
     +----------+    |          |   |          |          |          |
                     |          |   |          |          |          |
     +----------+    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |    |          |<---------------3,Join---|          |
     | Sender   |    |          |   |          |          |          |
     |          |------------>x------------------4,Data-->|          |
     |          |    |        | |   |          |          |          |
     +----------+    +--------|-+   +----------+          +----------+
                              |
                              V
   Key:
   G.C. & Key S.= Group Controller and Key Server


6. Evaluation of architectures by issue

   In this section the various issues raised in section four are
   analyzed by each of the architectures introduced in section five.


6.1 Access limit capabilities, compared by architecture

   Comparison of currently available architectures with respect to
   limiting the access of multicast groups

   - IGMP/MLD:  It is not possible to limit data reception.

   - L2 authentication with ACL:
   With an ACL it is possible to limit access of multicast groups.
   However it should be discussed as to how scalable this approach is
   because configuring an ACL could be a labor-intensive task.

   - IGMP/MLD with Unicast control
   It is possible for malicious users to reconfigure the receiver's
   terminal to ignore the Unicast control. As such, this method may not
   be strong enough to exclude ineligible accesses.


   -Multicast Encryption:
   It is possible for receivers to receive IP packets, even if they do
   not possess the keys to decrypt them. A receiver may also be able to
   store such received data until they discover a way to decrypt it.
   Another disadvantage of this method is that network resources are



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   wasted if an ineligible receiver receives an encrypted content even
   if they do not have a valid key.


6.2 Capability to distinguish between receivers, compared by
   architecture

   Comparison of currently available protocols.

   -IGMP/MLD:
   The sender has no direct line of contact with the receiver and
   therefore cannot distinguish on a receiver-basis.    (If the
   interface is fixed to the receiver then the join-log can be used, but
   this would mean portability is sacrificed.  Moreover, this method is
   not applicable to a case where the CSP and NSP are different
   companies because CSP cannot access this join-log.)

   -L2 authentication with ACL:
   At the moment of L2 authentication it is possible to recognize
   receivers, but if there are multiple content service providers (CSP)
   a single L2 Authorization Server cannot distinguish among the CSPs.
   Therefore it would be necessary to gather the join logs.  (If the
   interface is fixed then the join-log can be used, but this would mean
   portability is sacrificed.  Moreover, this method is not applicable
   to a case where the CSP and NSP are different companies because the
   CSP cannot access this join-log.)

   -IGMP/MLD with Unicast control :
   It is possible to distinguish among receivers using Unicast control.

   -Multicast Encryption:
   If the Content Service Provider maintains the Key Server it is
   possible to distinguish on the receiver-level.  If the Network
   Service Provider maintains the key server it is necessary to devise a
   method for the NSP to notify the CSP.


6.3 Capability to distinguish between users, compared by architecture

   Comparison of currently available protocols:

   -IGMP/MLD:
   Since there is no user-based information, it is not possible to
   distinguish on the user-level.

   -L2 authentication with ACL:
   At the moment of L2 Authentication it is possible to distinguish on
   the user-level.




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   However it is difficult to combine user and group logs: it would be
   necessary to match user IDs from L2-Auth logs and group IDs from the
   Join logs to match users and groups.

   -IGMP/MLD with unicast control :
   Distinguishing by user is possible using unicast control.

   -Multicast Encryption:
   If the Content Provider manages the Key Server it is possible to
   distinguish the user.
   If the Network Service Provider manages the Key Server it is
   necessary to notify the Content Provider.


6.4 Maintain guaranteed quality-level of data delivery (Voice, Video),
   compared by architecture

   Comparison of currently available protocols:

   -IGMP/MLD:
    It is not possible to reject a user attempting to access even if
   there are not sufficient resources.

   -L2 authentication with ACL:
   The AAA server does not know whether there are sufficient resources
   or not.  While it is possible to control QoS levels on a link-by-link
   basis, it is not possible on a service-by-service basis.

   -IGMP/MLD with Unicast control :
   When the CSP and NSP are separate entities it is not possible for the
   CSP to make a proper authorization decision because only the NSP
   grasps the network resource availability.

   -Multicast Encryption:
   It is not possible to reject a user attempting to access even if
   there are not sufficient resources because the user can receive data
   even without a valid key.


6.5 Fast leave for fast surfing capability, compared by architecture

   Comparison of currently available protocols:

   -IGMP/MLD:
   It is possible to track on a per host level (based on host address)
   therefore fast leave for fast surfing capability can be achieved.


   -L2 authentication with ACL:



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   It is possible to track on a per host level (based on host address)
   therefore fast leave for fast surfing capability can be achieved.

   -IGMP/MLD with Unicast control :
   Even if a quick leave is possible, changing to a new channel using
   Unicast Control is slow (latency problem).

   -Multicast Encryption:
   Even if a quick leave is possible, delivery of the Key Exchange
   Identifier(KEI) is slow.


6.6 Surveillance of receiver by sender, compared by architecture

   Comparison of currently available protocols:

   -IGMP/MLD:
   With this protocol it is possible to log separately join and leave
   actions, but it is difficult to match these join and leave actions
   when analyzing the logs is heavy computation (scalability with
   millions of users).

   -L2 authentication with ACL:
   In this protocol the leave action is not recorded.

   -IGMP/MLD with Unicast control :
   In this solution the leave action is not recorded.

   -Multicast Encryption:
   If logs are recorded for each renewal of keys, then it is possible to
   track activity on a per-user basis. However if logs are only recorded
   per content data download then such tracking is not possible.


6.7.Notification to users of the result of the join request compared by
   architecture

   Comparison of currently available protocols:

   -IGMP/MLD:
   After the join it is not possible to notify the user of the result of
   the join request.

   -L2 authentication with ACL:
   After the join it is not possible to notify the user of the result of
   the join request.

   -IGMP/MLD with Unicast control :
   After the join it is not possible to notify the user of the result of
   the join request.



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   -Multicast Encryption:
   After the join it is not possible to notify the user of the result of
   the join request.


6.8 Triple Play capability, compared by architecture

   Comparison of currently available protocols:

   -IGMP/MLD:
   It is necessary for NSP to integrate all "triple play services" into
   a single access control system.  No standards currently exist.

   -L2 authentication with ACL:

   When services have a per-channel fee structure that require real-time
   changes to the access control list (such as prepayment for specific
   shows), it is not possible to integrate these services with other
   services. On the other hand for a fixed subscription based service
   where the access control list is not changed, it is possible to
   integrate the triple-play services on one infrastructure.


   -IGMP/MLD with Unicast control :
   It is necessary for NSP to integrate all "triple play services" into
   a single access control system.  No standards currently exist.

   -Multicast Encryption:
   It is necessary for NSP to integrate all "triple play services" into
   a single access control system.  No standards currently exist.

7. IANA considerations

   This I-D does not raise any IANA consideration issues.


8. Security considerations

   This I-D does not raise any new security issues which are not already
   existing in original protocols.  Enhancement of multicast access
   control capabilities may enhance security performance.

9. Conclusion

   Issues such as user identification, access-control, tracking and
   billing are common requirements for many content delivery services
   (CDS) systems.  When CDS systems employ multicasting with
   architectures based on currently existing multicasting standards, it
   is often necessary to deploy non-standardized solutions to meet these



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   common requirements. It is recommended that requirements be defined
   to serve as a basis for creating standardized ways to address the
   various issues discussed in this I-D which are limiting the
   application of multicasting especially to commercial, large-scale CDS
   services. Such requirements should take into consideration a range of
   possible architectures based on multiple business or usage models.


Normative References

   [1] B. Cain, et. al., "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3",
       RFC3376, October 2002.

   [2] R. Vida, et. al., "Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2)
       for IPv6", RFC3810, June 2004.


   Authors' Addresses

           Tsunemasa Hayashi
           NTT Network Innovation Laboratories
           1-1 Hikari-no-oka, Yokosuka-shi, Kanagawa, 239-0847 Japan
           Phone: +81 46 859 8790
           Email: hayashi.tsunemasa@lab.ntt.co.jp

           Haixiang He
           Nortel Networks
           600 Technology Park Drive
           Billerica, MA 01801, USA
           Phone: +1 978 288 7482
           Email: haixiang@nortelnetworks.com

           Hiroaki Satou
           NTT Network Service Systems Laboratories
           3-9-11 Midoricho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180-8585 Japan
           Phone : +81 422 59 4683
           Email : satou.hiroaki@lab.ntt.co.jp

           Hiroshi Ohta
           NTT Network Service Systems Laboratories
           3-9-11 Midoricho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180-8585 Japan
           Phone : +81 422 59 3617
           Email: ohta.hiroshi@lab.ntt.co.jp

           Susheela Vaidya
           Cisco Systems, Inc.
           170 W. Tasman Drive
           San Jose, CA  95134
           Phone: +1-408-525-1952
           Email: svaidya@cisco.com



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