INTERNET-DRAFT T. Herbert
Intended Status: Informational Facebook
Expires: January 7, 2017
July 6, 2016
Transport layer protocols over UDP
draft-herbert-transports-over-udp-01
Abstract
This specification defines a mechanism to encapsulate layer 4
transport protocols over UDP. Such encapsulation facilitates
deployment of alternate transport protocols or transport protocol
features on the Internet. DTLS can be employed to encrypt the
encapsulated transport header in a packet thus minimizing the
exposure of transport layer information to the network and so
promoting the end-to-end networking principle. Transport connection
identification can be disassociated from network location (IP
addresses) to provide connection persistence for mobility and across
state eviction in NAT.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
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Copyright and License Notice
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Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Basic encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Encapsulation format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Direct transport protocol encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Disassociated location encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1 Packet format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 Session identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3 TOU Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4 Connection tuple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.5 Session lookup tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.6 Session identifier negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.7 Transport connection lookup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.8 Established state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.9 Learning addresses and ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.10 Closing a sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.11 Session creation deferral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4 TCP over UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1 Mapping TCP state to TOU session state . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2 Resets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3 SYN cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1 Introduction
This specification defines Transport Layer Protocols over UDP (TOU)
as generic mechanism to encapsulate IP transport protocols over UDP
[RFC0768]. The purpose of TOU is to facilitate the use of alternate
protocols and protocol mechanisms over the Internet.
The realities of protocol ossification in the Internet, particularly
the infeasibility of deploying IP protocol extensions and alternative
transport protocols (protocols other than UDP and TCP), have been
well documented. A direction to resolve protocol ossification is
suggested in RFC7663 [RFC7663]:
"... putting a transport protocol atop a cryptographic protocol
atop UDP resets the transport versus middlebox tussle by making
inspection and modification above the encryption and demux layer
impossible."
Accordingly, this specification provides a method to encapsulate
transport layer protocols in UDP and allows encrypting most of the
UDP payload including the encapsulated transport headers and
payloads. This solution espouses a model that only the minimal
necessary information about the packet is made visible to the
network. This exposed information is sufficient to route the packet
through the network and to demultiplex and decrypt the packet at the
receiving end host. In particular, the encapsulated protocol and
related connection state may be rendered invisible to the network.
TOU allows "disassociated location" for connection identification at
the end points. That is the identification of a connection for a
received packet can be independent of the network layer addresses of
the packet. Disassociated location enables connection persistence for
different use cases in mobility and NAT state eviction.
1.1 Requirements
The requirements of TOU are:
- Allow encapsulation of any IP transport layer protocol (e.g.
TCP, SCTP, UDP, DCCP, etc.) over UDP.
- Work seamlessly with NAT including conditions where the ports
or addresses being used for an encapsulated connection change.
To provide for this we disassociate the layer 4 endpoint
identification from the IP addresses.
- Allow encryption/authentication of the encapsulated transport
packet including transport headers. The encryption algorithm
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should be flexible to allow different methods. Any layer 4
information that is exposed in cleartext (such as session
identifier defined below) should be authenticated.
- Information needed for TOU is sent with along with encapsulated
transport packets, there are no standalone TOU messages. Any
negotiation to set up state for TOU should not require
additional round trips apart from those needed by the
encapsulated transport protocol.
- The solution must not be biased towards any particular
implementation method. Specifically, TOU should allow for
transport protocol implementations in userspace, kernel,
hardware, etc.
- Minimize changes to transport protocols and implementation. TOU
should not require any changes to the transport protocol
proper, however TOU will extend the concept of transport
endpoints beyond the canonical 5-tuple.
- Minimize changes to applications. TOU should be enabled with
existing applications, APIs, and transport protocols without
needing major rework. The desire to use transport layer
protocols over UDP should not require applications to adopt
completely new transport protocols.
1.2 Related work
Several transport and encapsulation protocols have been defined to be
encapsulated within UDP [RFC0768]. In this model, the payload of a
UDP packet contains a protocol header and payload for an encapsulated
protocol.
TCP-over-UDP [I-D.chesire-tcp-over-udp] specifies a method to
encapsulate TCP in UDP. That solution essentially casts the UDP
header into a modified TCP header so that the port numbers
simultaneously refer to both the UDP and TCP flows. In TOU, the TCP
header (generally transport header) is encapsulated in UDP without
changing the header format.
SCTP-over-UDP [RFC6951] describes a straightforward encapsulation of
SCTP in UDP. This work should be leverage-able for use with SCTP in
TOU. One potential benefit of TOU is that disassociated location
encapsulation (described below) could be used to maintain SCTP
connections when UDP NAT flow mappings change.
QUIC [QUIC] implements a new transport protocol that is intended to
run over UDP. QUIC defines a connection identifier that is used to
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identify connections at the endpoints independent of IP addresses or
UDP ports. A similar concept is adopted for TOU in the session
abstraction.
SPUD [I-D.hildebrand-spud-prototype] defines an architecture for
group grouping UDP packets together in a "tube", also allowing
network devices on the path between endpoints to participate
explicitly in the tube outside the end-to-end context. TOU implements
a subset of the the SPUD architecture but expressly does not require
or include provisions to leak end-to-end information for consumption
in the network. The encapsulation protocol used in TOU (GUE) is
extensible to optionally allow information exposure if this proves to
be warranted.
1.3 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2 Basic encapsulation
Generic UDP Encapsulation (GUE) [I-D.ietf-nvo3-gue] is the
encapsulation protocol for encapsulating transport layer protocols
over UDP. TOU can encapsulate both stateless transport protocols
(e.g. UDP, DCCP, UDP-lite) and stateful protocols (e.g TCP, SCTP).
2.1 Encapsulation format
The general format of TOU encapsulation using GUE (UDP) is:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| Source port | Destination port | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ UDP
| Length | Checksum | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/
|0x0|C| Hlen | Proto/ctype | Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ GUE Fields (optional) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Transport layer packet ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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Proto/ctype contains the IP protocol number of the GUE payload, in
the case of TOU this contains the protocol number of a transport
protocol (e.g. for TCP over UDP the value is 6). The C bit (control)
is zero for TOU indicating that GUE is carrying a data packet.
Certain general GUE flags and fields, such as remote checksum offload
or fragmentation, may be useful for TOU but not required for its
operation. The example packet formats in the remainder of the this
document do not indicate use of any flags or fields other than those
required for TOU operation.
The Hlen contains the GUE header length in 32-bit words, including
optional fields but not the first four bytes of the header. Computed
as (header_len - 4) / 4. All GUE headers are a multiple of four bytes
in length. Maximum header length is 128 bytes.
2.2 Direct transport protocol encapsulation
Transport protocol packets can be encapsulated directly in GUE. The
simplest format of this is:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| Source port | Destination port | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ UDP
| Length | Checksum | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/
|0x0|0| 0 | Protocol | 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Transport layer packet ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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For example, TCP over UDP could be encapsulated as:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| Source port | Destination port | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ UDP
| Length | Checksum | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/
|0x0|0| 0 | 6 | 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| Source Port | Destination Port | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Sequence Number | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Acknowledgment Number | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Data | |U|A|P|R|S|F| | TCP
| Offset| Reserved |R|C|S|S|Y|I| Window | |
| | |G|K|H|T|N|N| | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Checksum | Urgent Pointer | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Options | Padding | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/
| data |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
For TOU the flow identification of the encapsulated transport packet
includes the encapsulating UDP source and destination port. For a
transport protocol that uses the canonical ports for flow
identification, flows are identified by the 7-tuple:
<Protocol, SrcIP, DstIP, SrcPort, DstPort, SrcUport, DstUport>
Where protocol refers to the encapsulated protocol (taken from the
Proto/ctype field in the GUE header), SrcIP and DstIP refer to the
source and destination IP addresses, SrcPort and DstPort refer to the
respective ports in the encapsulated transport header, SrcUport and
DstUport refer to the source and destination ports in the
encapsulating (outer) UDP header.
To reply to a transport layer packet encapsulated in TOU, a
corresponding TOU packet is sent where the source and destination
addresses, source and destination UDP ports, and source and
destination transport ports are swapped. The outer addresses and
ports may have undergone NAT so that the return path must also go
through NAT. To ensure reachabilty, a host must reply to a TOU
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encapsulated with a corresponding TOU packet.
Stateful protocol connections are identified by the 7-tuple as
defined above. Since the UDP ports are included in the connection
tuples, the typical transport layer 5-tuple (<Protocol, SrcIP, DstIP,
Sport, Dport>) of a TOU connection does not need to be unique with
those of non-TOU connections.
The inner and outer ports have no correlation. The lengths and
checksums must also be set correctly in each header layer. In the
case of UDP-over-UDP for IPv6 both the inner and outer checksum must
be set.
For encapsulated transport packets that define a checksum that
includes a pseudo header (e.g. TCP), the checksum pseudo header is
changed to only cover the transport layer ports and not the IP
addresses. Note that the addresses in a packet traversing NAT may be
changed so that the pseudo header checksum for TOU would no longer be
correct-- not including the addresses in the pseudo header checksum
avoids these bad checksums. In this case the IP addresses are already
covered in IPv4 header checksum or the outer UDP checksum for IPv6.
3 Disassociated location encapsulation
TOU allows transport protocol encapsulation where the location is
disassociated from flow identification. That is a connection can
remain functional even if the addresses or encapsulation ports
change. A common use case will be when NAT state mappings for UDP
flows changing. TOU includes a facility to negotiate a shared session
identifier for a transport connection which is sent as part of the
encapsulation of packets for the connection. The session identifier
is used in connection lookup instead of the IP addresses and
encapsulation ports.
This section describes the protocol formats and operational aspects
of TOU for disassociated location transport protocol encapsulation.
3.1 Packet format
Transport layer packets are encapsulated using Generic UDP
Encapsulation (GUE). Two GUE flags and two field are defined for TOU.
The format of this encapsulation is illustrated below:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| Source port | Destination port | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ UDP
| Length | Checksum | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/
|0x0|0| Hlen | Protocol | 0 |S|D| 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Source session identifier +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Destination session identifier +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Transport layer packet ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
S: Source session identifier bit: This indicates the presence of
the source session identifier field.
D: Destination session identifier bit. This indicates the presence
of the destination session identifier field.
Source session identifier: 64-bit field that holds the source
(sender's) session identifier.
Destination session identifier: 64-bit field that holds the
destination (receiver's) session identifier.
3.2 Session identifiers
A session represents a flow of packets that correspond to the same
transport layer connection. Sessions are identified by a pair of
session identifiers where both sides of a connection create session
identifier for the session. Session identifier negotiation
establishes the session pair between two hosts so that each host will
know both the locally created session identifier as well as the one
created by the remote peer. When a packet is sent on a session the
peer's session identifier is included in the packet, on reception the
received session identifier is matched to a session.
A session has identifier has two uses:
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1) A location independent representation of the identities in the
communication.
2) Security context for encryption or authentication of the
encapsulated packet.
Each node defines a namespace over its communications. Local session
identifiers must be unique in the name space of each node in the
communication. Each side of a transport communication creates a local
session identifier for a session.
3.3 TOU Identity
TOU disassociates the IP address of a peer from the abstraction of
transport protocol endpoint. A peer's identity is implicit in session
identifiers that are established between the two nodes of a
communications session. All packets sent in the session contain a
session identifier. Each local session identifier is unique among all
other communications for a node, so the node can use it to
distinguish between different communicating peers. A session
identifier is meaningful only to the nodes that share it in a
communication, externally to those nodes it has no defined meaning.
Since session identifiers are disassociated with IP addresses, no
relevant information can consistently be inferred in the network. Two
packets containing the same session identifier but use different
addresses may in fact refer to the same session. Two packets with the
same session identifier and same addresses (and UDP ports) that are
temporally observed probably, but not definitely, refer to the same
session. Note that sessions identifiers are not symmetric for both
directions of a flow.
Transport layer communications occurs between two nodes in a network.
Nodes in this context are not restricted to hosts, any application or
process can be considered a node. A node is unambiguously reachable
and distinguishable from other nodes, that is if a packet is received
it must be deterministic as to which node on the host the packet
belongs. For a server application that listens on one or more UDP
ports for TOU packets, each listener port instance can be considered
a node. For a client application, each peer destination (IP address,
TOU port) might be considered to belong to a different node, however
for simplicity the whole client application could considered as one
node.
3.4 Connection tuple
The local session identifier, instead of IP addresses, provides the
endpoint identity of a transport layer connection. As mentioned this
allows the IP addresses associated with the endpoint addresses to
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change without breaking the connection. The transport layer tuple
that identifies a specific connection thus changes accordingly to use
the session identifier instead of addresses.
For a transport protocol that uses canonical ports for flow
identification, a flow in TOU is identified at receive by the 4-
tuple:
<protocol, destination SID, source port, destination port>
Where the source and destination ports refer to the encapsulated
transport layer ports in a TOU packet.
A session is created for each transport layer connection. A single
session could be used to multiplex several connections over the same
session however that is not recommended. If such semantics are needed
the transport layer protocol can provide that (SCTP sub-streams for
instance). A transport layer connection may be sent using different
session identifiers during its lifetime. This may be useful for
instance to limit tracking of long lived transport connections.
3.5 Session lookup tables
TOU logically uses two different tables to perform session lookup.:
- Local session table
The tuple used to match in this table is:
<srcIP, dstIP, udp_sport, udp_dport, source_SID>
- Established sessions table
Lookups in the established sessions table are performed on the
session identifier of a received packet. The lookup tuple in
established sessions table is trivially:
<destination_SID>
The session negotiation table is consulted when a TOU packet is
received where the S bit is set and the D bit is not set-- most
commonly this occurs when session negotiation is being performed. The
established sessions table is consulted when the D bit is set in a
TOU packet.
3.6 Session identifier negotiation
The process of session identifier negotiation is:
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1) The initiating host creates its session state and local session
identifier. The process is:
a) Create a 64-bit random number
b) Check the local sessions table if a state with a local
session identifier of the same value exists
- If no session has that same local identifier it is
considered unique. Process to next step.
- Else, the proposed value is not unique. Repeat the process
(got back to step a.)
2) Send a TOU packet with the S bit set and the source session
identifier set to the value created in step 1.
3) Peer host receives the TOU packet. Since the S bit is set and
the D bit is not set this indicates session identifier
negotiation.
4) The target creates a proposed session identifier. This is based
on a secure hash over the 6-tuple:
<srcIP, dstIP, udp_sport, udp_dport, source_SID, gen>
srcIP, dstIP, udp_sport, udp_dport, and source_SID are the
respective values in the packet. gen is a generation number for
the algorithm. For the first invocation this value is zero. The
hash calculation should include a randomly seeded key.
5) The target performs a lookup on the proposed local session
identifier. There are three possibilities:
- If no session is found with the same identifier proceed with
the next step. This is a new negotiation.
- If a matching session is found and it is less than N seconds
old and the saved local IP address, remote IP adress, local
UDP port, remote UDP port, and peer SID match the dstIP,
srcIP, udp_dport, udp_sport, and source_SID in the packet--
then the session negotiation is considered a retransmission.
Goto step 7.
- Else, the proposed local session identifier is not unique.
Repeat the process with an incremented generation number
(goto step 4).
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6) Create a new session state. Save the IP address, UDP port
numbers, the source_SID as the remoteSID, and the created SID
value as the local SID.
7) Send a response packet (e.g. a TCP SYN-ACK) with both the S bit
and the D bit set. The source session identifier is the local
session identifier, the destination is the remote session
identifier that was learned from the initiator.
8) When the intitiator receives the packet it will match the local
session based on the destination session identifier. The source
session identifier is recorded in the session state.
The initiator responds (e.g. final ACK in TCP 3WHS) with both
the source and destination identifiers set (to allow use with
SYN cookies). The destination session identifier contains the
value learned from the target.
9) When the target receives a TOU packet with the D bit set and
matches a session, this indicates that session negotiation is
complete. Any subsequent packets sent by either the target or
initiator will only have the destination session identifer set.
3.7 Transport connection lookup
A connected transport protocol typically maintains one or more tables
of connections (i.e. multiple tables may be used for different
connection states). In lieu of using IP addresses, connection lookup
is performed in TOU using the session (specifically a reference to
the session).
For a transport protocol using the canonical definition of ports, the
tuple for matching connections in TOU becomes:
<Protocol, Session, Source-port, Destination-port>
This implies that connection lookup for a received packet involves
two lookups:
1) A lookup is performed to find the session.
2) A connection lookup is performed using the session found in #1
in the lookup tuple.
Note that TOU requires that a separate session is created for each
encapsulated transport layer connection. This allows consolidating
session and connection lookup by including a reference to the
transport connection in the session state.
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3.8 Established state
After session establishment, which normally corresponds to transport
protocol connection being established, running operations commences.
Each packet sent on the underlying connection will be encapsulated
using TOU. The 64-bit destination session identifier is set in
packets by both sides of the connection to the peer's session
identifier. When either side receives a packet a lookup is performed
on the destination session identifier in the established sessions
table.
3.9 Learning addresses and ports
After session negotiation is complete connection identification is
disassociated from the network layer, however a host still needs to
know the IP address and destination UDP port to send a TOU packets to
a destination. These are learned from received packets and are
recorded in the session state.
The destination address and port for a session can change over time
(for example a NAT may remap the UDP flow to use different addresses
and ports). The peer address and port are inferred from the source
address and port in packets received over the session. When a packet
on a session is received and has been fully validated (session state
matched and authenticity is verified by security mechanisms such as
DTLS), if the source address or source port does not match those
recorded in the session state then the new values are saved in the
session state; packets subsequently sent will use the new address and
port for the destination.
3.10 Closing a sessions
A session is closed when the underlying transport connection closes
(e.g. a TCP connection moves to closed state).
3.11 Session creation deferral
When a target receives an initial packet (e.g. a TCP SYN with with
only source session identifier set in the GUE header) creating a
session state may be deferred until the transport layer creates its
state. If the transport layer does not create a state (e.g. the SYN
generated a reset) no session state is created. The reply packet is
returned with TOU using the same session identifier received in the
request (in this case the source session identifier is no set).
4 TCP over UDP
TCP over UDP implicitly allows nodes using TCP to be multihomed and
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mobile.
4.1 Mapping TCP state to TOU session state
Session state can be created in conjunction with creating TCP state
(TCP PCB for instance). If a TCP packet is received for which no
state exists, a reply to the packet is sent without creating session
state. For instance this would happen is a TCP stack sends a TCP-RST
in response to a SYN.
For SYN packets the destination session identifier must be zero (D
bit is not set). The source session identifier is set to a value that
is unique among all connections in the client name space as described
in section 3.6.
Replies to SYN, ie. SYN-ACK packets, must have both the source and
destination identifiers set (D bit and S bit are set). The source
identifier on the responding host is created as described in section
3.6.
The final ACK to complete TWS and all packets sent in established
state and beyond only include the destination session (only the D bit
is set).
Note that simultaneous opens cannot happen. A simultaneous connection
attempt between two nodes with same TCP ports will result in two
different sessions with two different identifiers.
The session state is destroyed when the underlying TCP connection
moves to closed state. In the initiator this entails freeing session
identifier to be used with new connections. At the target, the full
session identifier is free to be reused.
4.2 Resets
TCP resets may be sent with either the destination session identifier
set or the source session identifier set. If the reset is being sent
based on an existing connection state with negotiated session
identifiers, then the peer session identifier is used as the
destination session identifier in the reset packet. If the reset is
generated without any associated session state, then the destination
session identifier in the packet that generated the reset is used as
the source session identifer in the reset packet.
4.3 SYN cookies
For SYN cookies, a target may send a SYN-ACK without creating a
session state. A session identifier should be created so that it is
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unique with other established sessions or any values used in other
SYN responses within last N minutes. When a client responds to the
SYN cookie ACK and the server verifies the SYN cookie is valid
(including the session identifier) the TCP connection state and
session state can then be created using the session identifier
provided in the received packet. As described in section 3.6 the
session identifier created in response to a SYN packet is based on a
secure hash and so is useful for validation of SYN cookies.
5 Security Considerations
Using strong end to end security is recommended with TOU. In
disassociated location encapsulation security is extremely important
to prevent spoofing and connection hijacking (assuming that an
attacker can deduce the session identifiers). In order to thwart this
end to end security should be established that authenticates the
nodes in a communication.
Security is provided using DTLS [RFC6347] and the GUE Payload
Transform Field [I-D.hy-gue-4-secure-transport]. The encapsulation
format of TOU with DTLS is:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| Source port | Destination port | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ UDP
| Length | Checksum | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/
|0x0|0| Hlen | 59 | 0 |T|S|D| 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Payload Transform Field |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Source session identifier +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Destination session identifier +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Encrypted transport layer packet ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The T flag bit in the GUE header indicates the presence of the
Payload Transform Field.
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The Payload Transform field is defined as:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Payload Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type: Payload transform codepoint. 0x1 indicates DTLS.
Payload type: IP protocol of the encrypted payload.
The Proto/type field in the GUE header is set to 59 "no next header"
to indicate that the GUE payload cannot be parsed as an IP protocol.
6 IANA Considerations
Two bits and one field in the GUE header are reserved for TOU use.
Port 6080 has been reserved for GUE, however we will request another
port specfically for TOU. GUE would be used on this TOU port, however
only TOU that encapsulates a transport protocol with TCP-friendly
congestion control is used. Thus traffic destined to the TOU port (as
well as traffic in the reverse direction of a flow) can be assumed to
be properly congestion controlled and not subject to reflection or
other attacks common to some uses of UDP.
7 References
7.1 Normative References
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
August 1980, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
7.2 Informative References
[RFC7663] B. Trammell, Ed., M. Kuehlewind, Ed. "Report from the IAB
Workshop on Stack Evolution in a Middlebox Internet
(SEMI)}, October 2015.
[I-D.chesire-tcp-over-udp] Chesire, S., Graessley, J., and McGuire,
R., "Encapsulation of TCP and other Transport Protocols
over UDP", June 2013
[QUIC] Roskind, J., "QUIC: Multiplexed Stream Transport Over UDP",
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/88/slides/slides-88-
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tsvarea-10.pdf
[RFC6951] Tuexen, M. and R. Stewart, "UDP Encapsulation of Stream
Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Packets for End-Host
to End-Host Communication", RFC 6951, May 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6951>.
[I-D.hildebrand-spud-prototype] Hildebrand, J. and Trammell, B.
"Substrate Protocol for User Datagrams (SPUD) Prototype",
draft-hildebrand-spud-prototype-03 (work in preogress),
March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-gue] Herbert, T., Yong, L., and Zia, O., "Generic UDP
Encapsulation", draft-ietf-nvo3-gue-01 (work in progress),
March 2016.
[I-D.hy-gue-4-secure-transport] Yong, L. and Herbert, T. Generic UDP
Encapsulation (GUE) for Secure Transport draft-hy-gue-4-
secure-transport-03 (work in progress), March 2016
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
Authors' Addresses
Tom Herbert
Facebook
1 Hacker Way
Menlo Park, CA
US
EMail: tom@herbertland.com
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